French Law

Quelques précisions importantes sur le champ d'application et les modalités du déséquilibre significatif de l'article L. 442-6, I, 2º, du Code de commerce I-« SOUMISSION » ÉGALE « CONTRAT D'ADHÉSION » II-LES CLAUSES CONTRÔLABLES III-L'INTERDÉPENDANCE DES STIPULATIONS-Quelques précisions importantes sur le champ d'application et les modalités du déséquilibre significatif de l'article L. 442-6, I, 2º, du Code de commerce Revue Lamy Droit civil, Nº 148, 1er mai 2017 C'est un véritable arrêt de principe qu'a rendu la Chambre commerciale de la Cour de cassation le 25 janvier 2017 à propos du champ d'application et des modalités du déséquilibre significatif opéré sur le fondement de l'article L. 442-6, I, 2º, du Code de commerce. Il en ressort que les conventions susceptibles d'être contrôlées sont les contrats d'adhésion, que le juge peut contrôler l'adéquation du prix à la prestation promise et que l'appréciation du déséquilibre significatif doit tenir compte de l'indépendance des stipulations.

La réforme du droit des contrats du 10 février 2016 a introduit la notion de déséquilibre significatif pour les contrats d'adhésion. Cette nouveauté est l'occasion d'opérer une comparaison avec les dispositions du Code de commerce et du Code de la consommation qui sanctionnent déjà les clauses abusives

This article discusses the different choice of law rules used with foreign currency debt through a comparative study of three jurisdictions U.S. , France & Egypt. The article demonstrates the current body of law in the above jurisdictions. The article then analyze the body of law in light of current choice of law doctrine and IMF agreement. Then the article concludes with an approach that the author believes to be appropriate to deal with foreign currency debts.

Harm and loss in the French law of civil liability after the Projet de réforme of March 2017. Pure economic losses and pure non-economic losses (wrongful life and wrongful death). Punitive damages. Vindicatory damages.  Functions of civil liability.

The inventory is possessions that was erroneously separated from this related article, is now available here.  As my research expands, it is important for those interested in my area of study to have access to this manuscript. 

Abstract:
https://academic.oup.com/jhc/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jhc/fhx047/4628089

Published online with appendix on 14 November 201 7 with "Journal of the History of Collections".

De nos jours, on remarque que la notion d’Etat est utilisée dans tous les contextes ; que ce soit dans la vie quotidienne ou dans des sujets plus complexes, ce terme est omniprésent, surtout dans les médias. Au XVIIème siècle, Louis XIV définissait l’Etat de la manière suivante : « L’Etat c’est moi » ; de nos jours la conception n’est plus la même. En effet, l’Etat se définit aujourd’hui comme une personne morale titulaire de la souveraineté, et étant constitué d’un territoire, d’une population et d’une organisation juridique et politique. Il en existerait à peu près deux cent reconnus, dont trente-cinq ayant une population inférieure à cinq cent mille habitants.
A proprement parler, cette définition laisserait alors penser que l’Etat français est identique à l’Etat allemand, ou que l’Etat russe est assimilable aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique, puisque toutes ces entités correspondent à la définition de l’Etat. Cependant il est nécessaire de les différencier, car en observant de plus près ces Etats, il est constatable qu’ils sont tous plus ou moins différents. En réalité, il est nécessaire de distinguer plusieurs formes d’Etat, même deux grandes formes, l’Etat unitaire et l’Etat fédéral.
L’Etat unitaire se distingue par l’unicité de son organisation politique et juridique, il n’a qu’une seule constitution, applicable uniformément à l’ensemble de la population et sur la totalité du territoire.
L’Etat fédéral, lui, se distingue par le fait qu’il soit composé de multiples entités étatiques revendiquant une certaine autonomie ; ces entités sont les Etats fédérés. Ces « Etats dans l’Etat » ont une constitution propre, ce qui implique plusieurs organisations juridiques et politiques. L’Etat fédéral se décharge donc en quelque sorte d’une partie de ses pouvoirs pour l’octroyer aux différents Etats fédérés le composant.  Chaque Etat fédéré est donc titulaire d’un minimum de souveraineté et de liberté d’agir, tout en restant en accord, évidemment, avec l’Etat fédéral.

The reform passed in 2016 has deeply affected the structure of Book III of the Code Napoléon and re-founded the whole law of contract and obligations within the French legal system. The article seeks to give an account of the major changes occurred in basic concepts and terminology and to compare them to other civil law jurisdictions, particularly the Italian one

W książce przedstawiono zasadę proporcjonalności jako instrument umożliwiający kontrolę politycznie umocowanych działań władzy, które w nomenklaturze prawnej określa się mianem „władzy dyskrecjonalnej” lub „swobodnego uznania”. Oznaczało to konieczność zbadania doktrynalnych podstaw oraz instytucjonalnego rozwoju sądowej kontroli działań organów władzy, zwłaszcza tych, które pozostawały w sferze swobodnego uznania. Przedmiotem analizy były treści doktrynalne oraz prawo we Francji, Niemczech, Austrii i Anglii oraz w Polsce od XIX w., do czasów obecnych. Pozwoliło to, obok prezentacji samego zagadnienia kontroli kompetencji dyskrecjonalnych i zasady proporcjonalności w podstawowych europejskich kulturach prawnych, ukazać również rozwój nowoczesnej teorii politycznej i szeroko pojmowanego prawa publicznego ze wskazaniem na charakterystyczne dla tych procesów prawidłowości.
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The principle of proportionality is presented as a means which makes the judicial review of discretionary powers possible. For this reason, the book starts with an analysis of the very concept of discretionary powers in itself, its philosophical origins and legal consequences, as well as the development of the judicial review of action by the state on its different levels (first administrative, then legislative) in various European countries. The legal systems of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Austria are examined from the 19th century to the present day, and the Polish legal system since 1918. This is the context in which the emergence of the principle of proportionality in German law is described, as well as its development and subsequent reception throughout the whole of Europe. Particular attention is devoted to the principle of proportionality in EU law and within the system of the European Convention of Human Rights. An investigation is carried out of the crucial role of case law under the ECHR for the pan-European reception of proportionality. This is followed by an examination of the way in which the German and French legal methods for the judicial review of discretionary powers have shaped the identity of the proportionality principle within EU law.The adoption of the principle of proportionality at the turn of the 20th and 21st century is described in detail in relation to the legal systems of France, Austria, the United Kingdom and Poland. Particular attention is devoted to the fact that the principle was first adopted on the level of constitutional law and only later in administrative law, with a certain exception for the United Kingdom?, due to the absence of a regular constitutional review. It is also pointed out that the judicial means of reviewing discretionary powers (including the principle of proportionality) are very powerful instruments for the strengthening of one political centre against another. This aspect is analysed in the context of administrative – parliamentary relations in 19th-century Europe and in the relations between national legislatures and EU transnational administration in the late 20th and early 21st century.

The concepts of copyright law in the Common Law and Continental Law systems appear to display contrasting trends. Copyright protection under Continental Law places a particular emphasis on the author’s interests, while copyright under the Common Law system focuses rather on the protection of the economic investments. This difference also manifests itself with regards to moral rights since this notion is strongly protected under the Continental system but exists only in a limited form under the Common Law system. The explosive growth of the Internet and technological tools has brought to light new issues regarding the concept of moral rights. Indeed, the widespread use of digital technology, allowing users to easily access and manipulate creative works, makes difficult the enforcement of moral rights. Creative works can be largely disseminated on Internet without the permission of the author, compromising the right of disclosure. The possibilities of borderless exploitation of works, the endless ways of using digital works, and the changes in how works are created have challenged the concept of moral rights and its core foundation. Therefore, it is vital to rethink this notion. Several options can be highlighted. Some European legal systems are trying to adapt to this new dimension either through preventative measures or attempts at harmonization with European or international laws. Another approach lies in the United States’ economic approach which recognizes limited, if not nonexistent, moral rights. At the same time, copyleft movements are gaining in importance. Some of them, such as the Creative Commons, seem to recognize a certain form of moral rights more in synchronization with the new artistic and technological paradigm. The question is, henceforth, whether what seems to be the philosophical cornerstone of author’s rights under Continental law should disappear in favor of a limited and optional protection through these new licenses. It is through a comparison of these two systems, then, that we can better evaluate the different modern issues of moral rights, their possible evolution, and the necessary adaptations of these rights, essential to the protection of the art world and the preservation of authors’ creativity.

Spanish Abstract: El avance y la masificación en el uso de las Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación (TICs) ha modificado enormemente la forma en que las relaciones humanas se desarrollan, y continuará haciéndolo en el futuro. En lo que respecta al campo del derecho del trabajo, las nuevas tecnologías han afectado el equilibrio entre vida profesional y personal. La sobre conectividad a la que estamos expuestos gracias a la facilidad de comunicarse en todo momento y lugar desdibuja los límites entre tiempos de trabajo y tiempos de descanso. Para contrarrestar los efectos nocivos de la sobre conectividad, Francia ha reconocido en la Ley n° 2016-1088 del 8 de agosto de 2016 –conocida como Ley El Khomri– un derecho a la desconexión para los trabajadores, en respeto de su vida personal y familiar. El presente trabajo pretende exponer la serie de antecedentes fácticos que trazaron el camino para la obtención legal del derecho a la desconexión en Francia y los factores que justifican la oportunidad de su tratamiento como herramienta para devolver el equilibrio al binomio trabajo-vida personal. Luego se analizará el marco regulatorio actual, meritando sus aciertos y desaciertos con la intención de servir como punto de partida a futuras mejoras y regulaciones en otras jurisdicciones. Finalmente se indicarán ciertas modalidades de ejercicio prácticas de este derecho en base a la experiencia empírica.
Palabras clave: Derecho a la desconexión – Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación – Sobre-conexión - Deber de desconexión - Informe Mettling – Ley El Khomri – Acuerdos de forfait jours – Organización de tiempos de trabajo – Tiempos de descanso.

English Abstract: The advances and popularisation of the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have greatly modified the way in which human relationships develop, and will continue to do so in the future. With regard to the field of labor law, new technologies have thoroughly affected the balance between professional and personal life. The over-connectivity to which we are exposed thanks to the current ease of getting communicated at any time and place blurs the boundaries between working times and rest periods. To counteract its harmful effects, France has recognized in the Act No. 2016-1088 of August 8, 2016 –known as the El Khomri Law– a right to disconnect for workers, in order to respect their personal and family lives. This paper intends to present the factual background that paved the way for the legal obtaining of the right to disconnect in France and the aspects that justify the convenience of its treatment as a means to restore the balance of the binomial work-personal life. Then the current regulatory framework will be analyzed, considering its strengths and drawbacks with the purpose of serving as a starting point for future improvements and regulation in others jurisdictions. Finally, certain modalities of practical exercise of this right will be indicated based on empirical experience.
Keywords: Right to disconnect – Information and Communication Technologies – Over-connectivity – Duty to disconnect – Mettling Report – El Khomri Law – Forfait jours agreements – Working time – Rest periods.

Dans le contexte actuel de concurrence des droits nationaux, le droit est de plus en plus appréhendé par les institutions publiques et privées comme un produit auquel sont appliquées les méthodes du marketing. C’est ainsi que le droit fait l’objet d’études de marchés, de promotion ou encore de tentatives d’amélioration visant à répondre aux attentes des « consommateurs de droit » que sont les entreprises. Cette « marketisation » du droit, qui conduit à faire émerger une analyse gestionnaire du droit (Law and Marketing), n’est pas sans produire des effets ambigus.

This book shall address the problem of choice of law in cross-border bankruptcy. The reasons for that unfortunate state of affairs are numerous and shall be dealt with in this book. This book calls for adopting the center of main interests (COMI) as a uniform choice of law rule that could act as a functioning solution until harmonization in this field of law could be achieved. The main focus of this book is to test the validity of the proposed choice of law rule through a comparative law study of three different states which are the U.S., France and Egypt. The above states were chosen to reflect as much as possible the diverse standing on the issue of Cross-border bankruptcy in particular and in choice of law in general.In particular the focus will be on The lately enacted chapter (15) of the U.S. bankruptcy code and the European Insolvency Regulation as it is applied within France and the E.U.

The contracts are made to be kept – pacta sunt servanda. This maxim surely is the cornerstone of any effective contract law system, but it cannot, and never has, reigned supreme in each and every legal system. Unexpected events that dramatically change the landscape of a particular contract do occur, rendering its performance sometimes impossible but more often much more onerous for one party.

This article deals with the second situation. The aim is to analyze the standpoint of three major European legal systems – French, English and German – on the issue of what (if anything) happens to the contract and rights of the parties if contractual performance becomes more onerous than initially envisaged. This area offers fertile ground for comparative analysis as it will be shown that these three major legal systems adopt genuinely different solutions. These can be sorted on a scale, with the French law being by far the least responsive and German law on the other containing codified rules to flexibly deal with these situations.

Quarante ans après son abolition, la peine de mort garde une certaine popularité dans l’opinion publique. Un tel sentiment de regret s’explique par le long compagnonnage de la peine capitale avec les systèmes judiciaires, depuis la plus haute Antiquité. Malgré des prodromes repérables dans différentes civilisations au cours des siècles, l’abolitionnisme moderne naît au XVIIIe siècle, avec la révolution de la pensée pénale menée par Beccaria. L’argumentaire abolitionniste met cependant du temps à convaincre, particulièrement dans un pays comme la France. Ce n’est que dans la deuxième moitié du XXe siècle qu’une dynamique se développe à l’échelle européenne, mobilisant les militants des droits humains, ce qui aboutit à l’abolition française de 1981.

Can corporate language be regulated? Should it be? This question, at the crossroads of economic and linguistic policy, is here addressed by looking at France’s Loi Toubon, which obliges French businesses to use French in a number of contexts. Although the reasons for regulating language use in companies are many, be it from a macro-economic, social or linguistic point of view, the actual usefulness of the law, too ambitious and too vague at the same time, is open to doubt. Perhaps the company is bound to remain a ‘blind spot’ of language policy. Drawing on this, we suggest an alternative approach based on stakeholders’ implication and acknowledgement of what we propose to call the company’s ‘sociolinguistic responsibility’.

The present article provides an overview of the regime governing exemption and limitation clauses in France. Attention is paid to the closely related Belgian law as well.
Key words: exemption clauses, limitation clauses, party autonomy, freedom of contract, comparative law, French law, Belgian law.

В статье дается обзор достижений французского права в создании режима соглашений об ответственности за нарушение обязательства. Статья учитывает также и опыт бельгийского права, родственного французскому.

Ключевые слова: соглашения об ответственности, освобождение от ответственности, ограничение ответственности, частная автономия, свобода договора, сравнительное правоведение, французское право, бельгийское право.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione.-2. Contenuti del progetto di riforma.-2.1. Rapporti tra responsabilità contrattuale e responsabilità civile: la regola del non-cumulo.-2.2. Gli elementi costitutivi della responsabilità.-2.3. Cause di esonero e di esclu-sione della responsabilità.-2.4. Gli effetti della responsabilità e l'illecito doloso lu-crativo.-2.5. Le clausole contrattuali di limitazione della responsabilità.-2.6. I regimi speciali di responsabilità.-3. Conclusioni: la responsabilità civile come strumento di regolazione del mercato.

Food is fundamental to French identity. So too is the denial of structural racism and racial identity. Both tenets are central to the nation's self-definition, making them all the more important to think about together. This article purports to identify and critique a form of French food Whiteness (blanchité alimentaire), that is, the use of food and eating practices to reify and reinforce Whiteness as the dominant racial identity. To do so, it develops four case studies of how law elevates a fiction of homogeneous French/White food as superior and normative at the expense of alternative ways of eating and their eaters-the law of geographical indications, school lunches, citizenship, and cultural heritage.

In 1918, the states of continental Europe, beginning with the German speaking countries, started to incorporate into their new national Constitutions the Anglo-American maxim "[international law is] part of the law of the land". Formulated by William Blackstone in 1769, this principle concerns the field of customary international law. Going forward on this basis, the general rules of international law were then generally and permanently transformed into national law, notwithstanding any act enacted by state bodies (referred to as "transformation ipso jure"). International law's  transformation ipso jure into national law does not originally appear to result from a legal obligation imposed upon the state, rather this process is the product of a deliberate policy intended to show that any given state subjects itself to international law, including when it concerns domestic affairs. It merely provides a means for implementing positive international law, alongside other possible techniques available to the different national legal systems, from which this thesis articulates a typology. Therefore, the different national constitutional norms undergoing the transformation ipso jure are not superfluous. On the one hand, the transformation ipso jure consists of a general authorization for the benefit of state organs and eventually of private individuals to be able to apply international law. On the other hand, by attributing to international law a certain internal derogatory force (in German referred to as derogatische Kraft), this process opens up the possibility for international legal norms to prevail upon internal rules with which they enter into collision.

C'est à partir de 1918 que les États d'Europe continentale, à commencer par ceux de langue allemande, introduisent dans leurs nouvelles constitutions nationales la maxime d'origine anglo-américaine « [international law is] part of the law of the land », valable en matière de droit international coutumier (formulation William Blackstone, 1769). Sur un tel fondement, les règles générales du droit international se transforment désormais de manière générale et permanente en droit interne, nonobstant toute procédure effectuée par les organes étatiques (on parlera de « transformation ipso iure »). La transformation ipso iure du droit international en droit interne n'apparaît donc à l'origine aucunement comme une exigence juridique pesant sur l'État, mais résulte d'une volonté politique délibérée de montrer que l'État en question se soumet au droit international, et ce, jusque dans sa sphère domestique. Il ne s'agit donc que d'une manière, d'une technique, pour l'État de concrétiser le droit international, à côté d'autres qui restent possibles, et d'ailleurs présentes dans les différents droits positifs nationaux ; l'on en dessinera une typologie. Les différentes normes constitutionnelles nationales qui disposent de la transformation ipso iure ne s'en trouvent pas pour autant superflues : elles consistent, d'un côté, en une habilitation générale au bénéfice des organes internes, ainsi, qu'éventuellement, aux simples particuliers, d'appliquer le droit international ; de l'autre côté, elles ouvrent la possibilité pour le droit international de prévaloir sur les réglementations internes avec lesquelles il entre en collision, en lui attribuant une certaine force dérogatoire interne.

Seit 1918 haben die Staaten des europäischen Kontinents, allen voran die deutschsprachigen, in ihren nationalen Verfassungen die aus dem anglo-amerikanischen Raum stammende Maxime eingeführt, nach der Völkerrecht Teil der nationalen Rechtsordnungen ist (International law is part of the law of the land). Diese Norm, erstmals formuliert von William Blackstone (1769), gilt im Völkergewohnheitsrecht. Auf dieser Grundlage werden seither die allgemeinen Regeln des Völkerrechts generell und ständig in nationales Recht umgesetzt, und zwar unabhängig von den jeweils durch die staatlichen Organe praktizierten Verfahren. Die Übertragung ipso iure des Völkerrechts in innerstaatliches Recht ist somit ursprünglich keinesfalls eine juristische Forderung gegen den Staat, sondern sie resultiert aus dem bewussten politischen Willen deutlich zu machen, dass der betreffende Staat sich dem Völkerrecht unterwirft, und zwar bis in seine inneren Angelegenheiten hinein. Es handelt sich also nur um eine bestimmte Art und Weise, eine Technik unter anderen, die übrigens in den verschiedenen nationalen positiven Rechtsordnungen verankert sind, nach der der Staat Völkerrecht konkretisiert; diese Techniken werden wir typologisch darstellen. Die verschiedenen nationalen Verfassungsnormen, die die Umsetzung ipso iure regeln, sind trotzdem keineswegs überflüssig: Einerseits ermächtigen sie generell die innerstaatlichen Organe, manchmal jedoch auch Einzelpersonen, Völkerrecht anzuwenden. Anderseits eröffnen sie die Möglichkeit, dem Völkerrecht Vorrang gegenüber innerstaatlichen Vorschriften einzuräumen, mit denen es kollidiert, indem sie ihm eine gewisse derogatorische Kraft verleihen.

As regards (incorporeal) movable goods, possession does (not) have the value of a title: Going back to the sources of a dogma concerning article 2279 of the Code Napoléon
Classically, the possessors of incorporeal movable goods are excluded from the protection given by article 2279 of the Code Napoléon (French and Belgian Civil Code; the French Civil Code has changed the number to art. 2276 without changing its wording). However, this article says that "concerning movables, possession has the value of a title". It does not exclude incorporeal goods. One may therefore wonder if the traditional exclusion of incorporeal movable goods was the will of the Napoleonic legislator. This article will try to respond to that question by an analysis of the sources of the Code Napoléon and of the reasons advanced in the nineteenth century in favour of the exclusion of incorporeal goods. It will also appreciate whether these reasons are still relevant today. It does this with regard to French and Belgian law.