Hydropolitics

The South African state has been transformed since 1994, but not in the way that many people hoped or expected. In the 1990s and 2000s analyses—and protests-- focused on the incompetency, or ‘lack of capacity’, of the state, its skewed priorities toward elite interests and its failure to deliver services adequately or equitably. Events in the 2010s have shifted our purview to a more insidious reality: the transformation of the state through its capture. The devastating impact of state capture on its institutions is becoming increasingly visible. This article looks at how the first stage of state capture, or high level capture that corroded the ethos of governing, has cascaded through the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) through a second stage of capture. This stage undermines the operation of the DWS and its management and protection of water resources and provision of water services. Through an analysis of primary data including Parliamentary reports and informati...

This paper proposes a partial reconceptualization and a redesign of the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony, an analytical tool devised to study how power, hegemony, and power asymmetries can influence transboundary water politics. This is done by presenting the original Circle of Hydro-Hegemony (CHH), an analytical framework that places the neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony at the centre of its structure, to illustrate how various forms of power are connective in the function of hegemony. Following a theoretical discussion on how the concepts of power and hegemony can interact, the case of the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia will provide a practical application of the CHH to transboundary water politics.

The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) is arguably the largest regional development project ever witnessed in Turkey. Begun in the 1970s, GAP initially aimed primarily at the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and of extensive irrigation networks to produce hydroelectric energy and water 1.8 million hectares of land in southeastern Turkey. Later, the scope of GAP broadened significantly as it became a more ambitious and comprehensive scheme of modernization and transformation. Following this expansion, the multidimensionality of GAP and its multifaceted implications became clearer at both the national and international level. The project grew more visible and influential not only in political and public discourses, but also in the GAP region itself. Despite these developments, however, the question of how the project’s characteristics, vocabulary, rationales, and mechanisms have changed since its inception remains underdiscussed. This article asks what GAP was in the past and what it has more recently become. It examines the gradual transformation of GAP over forty years by specifically taking into account the continuities and ruptures in development discourse, theory, and practice since the 1950s. In this way, the article aims to provide a new perspective regarding the stages through which the project has passed to reach its current form.

Turkey’s rising importance in the South Caucasus regional politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been subject to numerous studies in the literature. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan intensified the debates about regional integration and political rivalries in the region. In the changing geopolitical setting in the South Caucasus, where Turkey’s political weight tends to increase, Turkey’s regional environmental policies contradict its cooperation and friendly relations with the regional states, especially with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Taking a recent hydropower development project in the Kura-Araks river basin initiated by the government of Turkey as a case study, this study intends to review Turkey’s environmental policies in the region in connection with its political ties with the regional countries. Scrutinizing Turkey’s environmental policies within the broader conceptual framework of hydrohegemony, this paper finds some signs of Turkey exerting its soft power distributively by exploiting the current and historical issue-linkages and benefit-sharing options. As this paper aims to show, the intention to act like a hydrohegemon in the South Caucasus will negatively impact Turkey’s leadership position in regional cooperation and strategic partnerships with the riparians in the Kura-Araks River Basin, especially Azerbaijan and Georgia.

World-Ecology, World-Culture, World-Economy: Crisis, Slump, Revolution?, University of Durham, July 2016.

'Making the desert bloom' was notoriously an ambition of the early Israeli state, strongly associated with Israel's first president and Zionist figurehead David Ben-Gurion. Reshaping Israel's environment through drastically altering the country's hydrological landscape served to symbolically inscribe Israeli ownership into the land, while increasing the country's economic potential (notably agriculture, but also supplying coastal cities). This practice demonstrated the new state's technological prowess on a global stage, aligning Israel with the Euro-American world through showing its shared adherence to dominant ideologies of mastering nature. American and European experts participated in 'modernising' Israel's hydroscape as part of a wider global circulation of American-led discourses of development in the mid-twentieth century (Linton 2010). Today it may seem as if water management expertise flows in the opposite direction, as Israeli politicians proclaim that the country's desalination technologies will end persistent droughts in California and South Africa. 'Bluetech' is an increasing Israeli export, with the country seeking to fashion itself as - in the oft-repeated phrase - 'the Silicon Valley of water technology'. Ben-Gurion's nation-building rhetoric is repurposed in Israeli government promotional material to serve Israel's neoliberalising economy, as the country bids for membership of the world system's core. Israel's key export until now has been military expertise and technology (Graham 2010). While water tech may seem a much less problematic export, apparently aiding global responses to looming scarcity, these domains are, as I discuss, not as far apart as they may at first appear. Drawing on disciplines including political ecology, science and technology studies and anthropology, this paper examines the ways in which contemporary local and global discourses about water and economics are registered in Israeli and Palestinian literatures, specifically what I call 'hydrofictions'. It explores the role of Israeli and Palestinian literature in reproducing or resisting unequal power relations brought about through Israeli control and militarisation of water supply. Crucially, it argues for the central role of Israel/Palestine in understanding the power dynamics, politics and cultural impact of global water crisis.

Water is an irreplaceable and transient resource, which crosses political boundaries in the form of rivers, lakes, and groundwater aquifers. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, led to the birth of fifteen countries including the five Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. When the USSR ceased to exist, so did the centralised Soviet resource distribution system that managed the exchange and allocation of water, energy, and food supplies. A whole new set of international relations emerged, and the newly formed Central Asian governments had to redefine the policies related to the exchange and sharing of their natural resources.

This book analyses the role of state power in transboundary water relations. It provides an in–depth study of the evolution of interstate relations in Central Asia in the field of water from 1991-2015. Taking as a case study the planned construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the author examines various forms of overt and covert power shaping interstate relations and the way hegemonic and counter-hegemonic measures are put in place in an international river basin. He argues that the intimate correlation between the concepts of power and hegemony can offer key insights to the analysis and understanding of transboundary water relations. While the analytical focus is placed on state power, the book demonstrates that hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics represent the ways in which power is wielded and observed.

Offering fresh theoretical interpretations to the subjects of power and counter-hegemony in the Aral Sea basin, this book puts forward the original circle of hydro-hegemony, an analytical framework in which the various forms of power are connective in the function of hegemony. It will be of interest to scholars in the field of water and environmental politics and Central Asian Studies.

Accepted version of article published in Textual Practice, 2020.

In recent years ecocriticism and the environmental humanities have undergone a 'hydrological turn', sometimes referred to as the emergence of the 'blue humanities'. This 'turn' has, however, typically focused on the maritime and oceanic rather than the fresh water essential for the reproduction of much life on earth. In this article I analyse contemporary Canadian poet Rita Wong's 2015 collection undercurrent for thematic and formal insights into how dominant ways of understanding water have enabled its exploitation within the capitalist world-system. I argue that Wong's poetry resists a concept that geographer Jamie Linton calls 'modern water' (2010: 14), or water as ultimately reducible to abstract molecules of 'H₂O' circulating within the hydrological cycle. Wong's poems illustrate how this concept has facilitated the exhaustion and contamination of the world's water in the pursuit of profit, amplifying these concerns in formal strategies that situate local Canadian water histories within what Jason W. Moore describes as capitalism's 'world-ecological regime'. I combine world-systems theory with Indigenous, ecofeminist and posthumanist thought to show how Wong's poetry models non-anthropocentric modes of relating to water and other water-dependent beings that move towards environmental justice.

The Nile Basin has been experiencing process of dramatic changes since the middle of the 1990s which opens a new chapter in the hydropolitics of the Nile. Two most important features the signing and ratification of the CFA andEthiopiàs ongoing construction of the GERD characterize the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin. These contemporary developments in the Basin are signals that the old game is waning and a new Nile basin that will benefit all its riparian states and their peoples equitably and reasonably is emerging. Firstly, this process of change is a result of years of water diplomacy which involves the negotiation of the riparian states to create a permanent Nile River basin organization based on a multilateral and basin wide binding Nile water treaty that could regulate the utilization and management of the Nile waters in the Basin. Secondly such a transition is also a result of the political decision which involves by a few upstream riparian states such as Ethiopia in undertaking mega hydraulic infrastructures on the Nile which was unthinkable a few years back. EspeciallyEthiopiàs mega dam GERD has an all-encompassing hydropolitical implication to the Nile Basin and is shaping the current and future hydropolitics of the Nile Basin despite not welcomed by Egypt. How is the different implications manifested on the Basin? These are the core questions that the article attempted to answer in order to understand contemporary issues pertaining to the GERD Project of Ethiopia on the Nile Basin and its implication to the future interactions between the riparian states and argued that the Dam is a benchmark in shaping the future of the Nile Basin in a way that benefits all the riparian states of the Nile.

"The first paper in this anthology is “The practice on inter-ethnic conflict transformation in Ethiopia: The case of Amhara-Afar conflict in Kewot and Semurobi- GelaAloworeda”. The paper focuses on the Amhara-Afar conflict in Kewot and Semurobi-gela’alo woreda as one of the various conflicts in Ethiopia which can be described along ethnic lines and describes and analyses the process of transforming the conflict in the area. The second paper “Inter-ethnic conflict transformation in the post 1991 Ethnic federalism: Experiences from Asossa woreda in Benishanguel-Gumuz Regional State of Ethiopia” investigates inter-ethnic conflict transformation in the post 1991 Ethiopian ethnic federalism in light of experiences in Asossa woreda, Benishanglu-Gumuz Regional State (BGRS) vis-àvis to elucidate the relevance of inter-ethnic conflict transformation theory for internal harmony among people with different ethnic, linguistic or religious divisions. The third paper on “The political economy of small arms and light weapons (SALW) among pastoralist communities: The case of Borena , Ethiopia” studies the proliferation of illicit arms among Borena society, describes and analyses them. Fourthly, “The role of gender equity in promoting peace and development: The case of Awra Amba community Fogera Woreda of Amhara National Regional State” investigated the manner through which gender equality contributes to the peace and development efforts in the Awra-Amba community in the light of the conceptual and theoretical framework within which the discussions concerning the linkages between and among ‘gender equality’ ‘peace’ and development have been casted and proceeded. The fifth paper “The status of gender equality and its implications for peace: The case of Berek Woreda of Oromia Regional state” aimed at analyzing the status of rural women in access to and control over household resources, and their decision making power in Berek Woreda of Oromia Regional State as compared to the legal instruments adopted to minimize gender disparities."

SUMMARY
When one loook at last situation of the Syrian map, it can be seen that the Islamic State is squeezed out of its strongholds in Mosul and Raqqa and witnesses a steady decline in the influx of foreign fighters. As of 2017 July IS has lost 60% of territory, 80% of revenue This brings any other important question: what is next for ISIS? Will it continue to retain control of several urban centers in the region—or will it disband and devote its complete attention to external operations and attacking Europe and the West? Balanche clearly pointied out very curucial issue in his article (2) while it has been out of mind during this chaotic civil war situation.After six year civil war,regardless of who controls the Euphrates Valley agricultural zone next, they will need to address the legacy of failed regime irrigation policies that are once again creating tension among local tribes A major offensive military movements in the eastern Syria has taken place to eradicate the Islamic State (IS) presence in the area. The Syrian army is advancing toward Deir al-Zour and Tabqa with the help of Russian aviation, while U.S.-supported Kurdish and Arab fighters under the flag of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are closing in from the North.(2). Ousting ISIS from its de facto capital of Raqqa may not be too far behind. Last month, Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, commander of Operation Inherent Resolve, said that he hoped the assault on Raqqa would be “underway by this summer” and would be surprised if it continued into next year. In many ways, while the battles against ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa may soon reach their conclusions Military expert explanations indicate that time has come to prepare for "the day after IS" in the Euphrates area.After IS, it is clear that various economic issues will play very key role to local political stabilization. Regardless of who controls the area next -- whether the Assad regime, the SDF, or other players -- they will face the problem of water scarcity, which has long driven the area's political and economic dynamics.
It seems that change is inevitable and the region must prepare for it. In this article, we explained current situation and threats to draw the attention to crucial water issues.

Keywords: Middle East, Syria, Divided Syria, New Syria ,Euphrates River

The main purpose of this study is to evaluate the sustainability of the use and re-use of traditional groundwater extraction systems called qanats. Qanats are subterranean tunnels that tap the groundwater and lead the water based on gravity to a human settlement and agricultural lands. Qanats played a tremendously important role in the spread of irrigated agriculture and the establishment of sophisticated settlements in dry areas. In modern times, social, technological and economical transformation processes have greatly influenced the traditional use of qanats. The study uses action development research and a livelihood approach to help in the evaluation of the sustainability of use and renovation these ancient irrigation systems in Syria.

This article examines the complex space between the commodification and decommodification of water, showing how civil society leaves these ‘fictitious’ boxes behind in water and sanitation struggles.  Drawing on Polanyi (1944), it looks at how the balance between what is commodified and what is not, can – and is – affected by the engagement between government and civil society in all its forms.  In response to the local municipality implementing policy or introducing innovations, civil society in all its forms responds, and acts as a catalyst for significant policy shifts.  Important changes in people’s lives can result from civil society engagement with the municipality through dialogue and negotiation alongside protest.  It examines this engagement in four critical areas of water and sanitation in Durban, South Africa, namely connections and disconnections; water pricing, affordability and free basic water; dry sanitation and urine diversion toilets; and participation and citizen voice.  Although constrained by structural realities, there is evidence that civil society agency can ‘make a difference’ in people’s every day lives, spurring us on to more extensive policy challenges to widen this space, while contributing to the development of counter hegemonic alternatives. 

Key words:
‘Free Basic Water’, Urinary Diversion, Water Dialogues, eThekwini Water, civil society, Polanyi, Citizens Voice, Durban water, commodification

Water is, and will remain, the most contentious natural resource issue of the 21st century. International watersheds account for about 60 percent of the world's freshwater supply and are home to approximately 40 percent of the world's population (Dehydrating Conflict). Some 261 of the world's rivers are shared by two or more countries. (Dehydrating Conflict). As early as the mid-1980s United States government intelligence services estimated that there were at least 10 places in the world where war could break out over shared water (Water Wars, Joyce R. Starr). Exacerbating scare resources is population growth; since 1950, the renewable supply per person has fallen 58 percent as world population has increased from 2.5 billion to 6 billion. By 2015, nearly 3 billion people—40 percent of the projected world population-- are expected to live in countries that find it difficult or impossible to mobilize enough water to satisfy the food, industrial, and domestic needs of their citizens. (Dehydrating Conflict) In order to ensure water security, cooperation among citizens, countries, regions and continents is vital. History shows substantial efforts of cooperation; from 805 to 1984, countries have signed more than 3,600 water-related treaties. (Dehydrating Conflict)
      Further, the overarching lesson gathered from the basins of the Jordan, the Nile, and the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and other regions of water dispute is not that worsening scarcity will lead inevitably to water wars. It is rather that unilateral actions to engage in a water development initiatives in the absence of a treaty or institutional mechanism that safeguards the interests of other countries in the basin is the most destabilizing, often spurring hostility before cooperation is pursued. (World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2001). The way the Nile is managed in coming decades will have worldwide implications (Terje Tvedt, The River Nile In The Post-Colonial Age, 2010).

A three-phase study was initiated as a way to promote Integrated Catchment Management approaches in
the Limpopo River basin. This paper presents the situational assessment, which should enable De Beers
to understand how their Venetia Mine operations are located within a broader and highly dynamic socioeconomic
and ecohydrological landscape as it pertains to water risks. The second phase, Risk assessment,
aims to develop conservation interventions in the identified areas; the third phase will develop mechanisms
for implementing water stewardship schemes to mitigate the shared water risks.
Analysis of the social-ecological system (hydrological, climatic, ecological, socio-economic and
governance systems) of the Limpopo River basin indicates that the institutional arrangement of the
Limpopo River basin is neither simple nor effective. The basin is rapidly approaching closure in the sense
that almost all of the available supplies of water have already been allocated to existing water users. If
the proposed ecological flow requirements were to be met for all of the tributaries, the basin would be
‘closed’. On-going and projected land use changes and water resources developments in the upper
reaches of the basin, coupled with projected rainfall reductions and temperature increases, and allocation
of the flows for the ecological reserve, are likely to further reduce downstream river flows. The
coupled increase in temperature and decrease in rainfall is of great concern for everyone in the basin,
especially the poorer communities, who rely on rain-fed agriculture for their livelihoods. Increased
temperatures also lead to increased evaporation from reservoirs and therefore result in a decrease in
water availability. This will lead to increased abstraction of groundwater, especially from alluvial aquifers,
and consequently an increase in river transmission losses and a decrease in river flows.

Water resource access as an integral part of everyday life serves multiplicity of purposes from agriculture to the hydroelectric power needs of most areas. However, in the Nile Basin region where major water sources for nations pass through international boundaries, limited access to water and lack of it can be a source of economic, political and ecological conflicts. Accordingly, in the last several years, the complexities and processes involved in transboundary water use under the ambit of hydropolitics in the Nile Basin region, continue to stoke anxieties and tensions among the nations in their strategic relationships. Given the high stakes, occasional responses to addressing hydrological stress can sometimes involve unilateral investment in the latest advances in technology to extract water, recourse to negotiated settlements and multilateral accords. Conversely, unilateral responses to water insecurity in such a region when not properly negotiated often create uncertainties and distrust that threaten regional stability. Even in the face of such volatilities, nations that were once at odds in the past over water insecurity are resorting to negotiations instead of the drumbeats of war in the Nile Basin of Africa. This is compounded by rapid growth in population, the threats of climate change through recurrent drought amidst high propensity to instability and poverty. Having said that, very little exists in the literature on current state of water politics of the study area using a mixscale model of GIS and descriptive statistics. At the same time, there has been limited coverage on the scale of water use, the different uses, and the distribution patterns in the study area. To bridge that void, the study will focus on transboundary water use within the purview of hydropolitics along the Nile Basin with emphasis on the issues, trends, factors, impacts and efforts. While the paper used mixscale techniques of GIS and descriptive statistics to analyze the trends. The results reveal notable disparity in hydrological parameters with evidence of water stress and abundance in various areas of the study area. For that, irrigation water use was more pronounced in the Northern nations of Egypt and Sudan coupled with cases of unmet water needs in the heavily populated places (Egypt and Ethiopia). Both nations experienced more cases of unmet water needs compared to the countries in the South. Notwithstanding, the higher volumes of rainfall and more per capita fresh water in the Sub Saharan Africa portion, than the North African zone, areas classified as water bodies and wetlands declined substantially throughout the Nile Basin. This could lead to depletion and growing anxiety. Considering the role of socioeconomic , political and physical elements in all these, the paper proffered solutions ranging from education, conservation, mediation and negotiated settlements as well as effective policies, and mutually binding agreements among nations in the region on water use.

In broad terms, this thesis examines India’s management of the Indus River system. It is a work in intellectual history which analyses the writings of Indian water experts within the context of Indus Basin hydropolitics during the decade long Baglihar dispute.
The Indus River and its five main tributaries flow through India before they reach Pakistan. The Indus river-waters constitute most of Pakistan’s fresh water supply, and are immensely important to Pakistan. It is therefore important for Pakistan to maintain a relationship with India that contributes to safeguarding their water supply. Between 1999 and 2008, India and Pakistan disputed an Indian hydroelectric project, Baglihar, which was under construction on the Chenab River in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Baglihar dispute is analyzed as an important excerpt from the modern history of the Indus River, and it is contextualized as a case that reflects the major issues of hydropolitics in the region, the struggle for sharing the Indus river-waters, utilizing the river-water for hydropower generation, and implementing sustainable water management.
In order to avoid conflict over water, India had to maintain cooperation with the contenders for water in the Indus Basin. India had to balance their relations with J&K, who wanted to exploit the waters in the western rivers further, and with Pakistan, who objected to, and feared Indian control over these rivers.

O objetivo desta tese é analisar a evolução e as ações da hidropolítica local na bacia transnacional do Prata por meio do estudo comparativo de duas bacias transfronteiriças: a bacia do rio Apa (Brasil-Paraguai) e a bacia do rio Quaraí (Brasil-Uruguai). No cenário global de crise hídrica, a hipótese inicial é que a hidropolítica das águas compartilhadas na bacia
hidrográfica do Prata tem evoluído para a governança dos recursos hídricos de forma descentralizada e localizada. Embora a escala de ação continue sendo a bacia hidrográfica já é possível observar uma maior sensibilidade às demandas dos atores sociais situados na zona
de fronteira. Nesse sentido, o objetivo é diferenciar as ações executadas na escala da bacia transnacional compartilhada por cinco países (Argentina, Bolívia, Brasil, Paraguai e Uruguai), das ações engendradas na escala das bacias transfronteiriças. A análise parte das discussões
globais sobre a água para chegar às repercussões da crise hídrica na zona de fronteira internacional por meio da análise das ações em diferentes níveis e a discussão da produção das escalas de ação.

O entendimento de uma crise global dos recursos hídricos com possíveis repercussões na segurança ambiental e nacional permitiu a formulação, nos campos acadêmicos e políticos, de modelos de ação e de governança que buscam a descentralização da tomada de decisões.
Na zona de fronteira isso significou a necessidade de uma maior articulação entre atores sociais situados em ambos os lados do limite internacional. No entanto, as questões derivadas da soberania territorial dos estados nacionais, consubstanciadas na assinatura de tratados e
acordos internacionais, ainda estão presentes nas iniciativas de gestão de bacias transfronteiriças, o que, em alguns casos, significa um engessamento das ações de governança compartilhada.

Nos estudos de caso propomos que as ações hidropolíticas são construídas baseadas nas condições territoriais da zona de fronteira. Por este motivo, a hidropolítica local/regional foi analisada por meio da evolução das condições de uso do solo, de uso da água e das
interações transfronteiriças, para entender como essas condições pesam na instituição de governança dos recursos hídricos transfronteiriços.

Mesmo que as condições de interação hidropolítica seja específica a cada segmento da zona de fronteira, consideramos que a comparação das ações em diferentes bacias hidrográficas e regiões de fronteira ajuda no entendimento da política instituída sobre os recursos hídricos e no aperfeiçoamento dos atuais modelos de governança ambiental.

This thesis aims to analyze the actions and the evolution of local hydropolitics within the transnational La Prata river basin, by carrying out a comparative study of two transboundary river basins cases: the Apa river basin (Brazil-Paraguay) and the Quaraí river basin (Brazil- Uruguay). The hypothesis is that the hydropolitics of shared waters in the La Prata river basin has evolved from its entanglement with the global water crisis scenario towards a more localized water resource governance. The scale of territorial intervention is still the river basin but the demands of social actors located at the border zone are increasingly
taken into account. In this sense, the actions carried out at the scale of the La Plata transnational river basin, shared by five countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) differ from actions at the scale of the smaller transboundary sub-basins. A summary
of global discussions on the global water crisis is followed by its repercussions on the border zone through a multi-level analysis and a discussion on the production of scales of action over water resources.

The understanding of the global water resources crisis, with possible repercussions on environmental and national security, allows the formulation of actions and the adoption of governance models seeking a devolved decision making process. At border zones this means that a greater articulation between social actors located on both sides of the international boundary is paramount to success but frequently thwarted by the signing of treaties and agreements between national states that lean heavily on discourses of territorial sovereignty and national state legitimacy. The intervention of central governments has in many cases
frustrated the thickening of shared governance actions at the local and regional levels.

Our assumption is that hydropolitical actions at the sub-basin level are dependent on the territorial conditions of the border zone. Therefore, local hydropolitics is analyzed through the evolution of land cover conditions, water uses and transboundary interactions, aiming to
understand how these conditions help the building up of transboundary water resources governance institutions.

Although the conditions for hydropolitical interactions are specific to each segment of the border zone, the comparison of actions in different river basins and border regions helps us to understand water resources issued policies and to improve the current environmental governance models.

The lack of transboundary water agreements/institutions between Afghanistan and its northern neighboring countries over the ADRB is significantly affecting the inter-state multilateral cooperation and the status of the water resources. No water resource sharing schemes were ever stipulated. If the Amu Darya River does not manage sustainably, in that case, it can turn over to be the prime cause of tension among the riparian countries connected through historical, cultural, environmental, and economic ties. The potential of interstate conflict and the opportunities of cooperation between the riparian’s on the water is mainly sourced in the state’s national interest.
This paper’s primary focus is to answer the reasons for Afghanistan’s exclusion from the ADRB and current hydropolitics over the ADRB. It also focuses on inter-state cooperation as a catalyst for settlement water conflicts among the riparian nations. This research suggests that
effective and multi-sectorial cooperation on Amu Darya River Basin is imperative rather than water-related conflicts. It put forward that water, energy, trade routes, and other sources of connectivity can bring Afghanistan and CARs together to initiate the potentials that they have. It
would also help Amu Darya River Basin equitable and reasonable water resources utilization and help the Aral Sea in sustainable development. Despite the hydro-connectivity, the geo-economics connectivity is also promising in the region.

During his twenty years of rule, Mussolini’s use of hydropolitics was primarily founded in large projects for land reclamation of marshy areas of Italy. This was due to different necessities: the need to improve the internal agricultural production, to achieve the Fascist idea of economic independence (“autarchia”); the will to ruralise the Italian society, perceived as the best solution to sociodemographic issues such as low natality rates and unemployment; the reintegration of socially dangerous war veterans; last, but possibly most importantly, the search for political legitimisation.
This essay focuses on the Fascist project for land reclamation in the Pontine Marshes; most expensive program in the history of Italian Fascism, it presents an interesting combination between hydro-engineering and several means to political consensus, such as architecture and propaganda newsreels.

This report examines the problems of populations made vulnerable by the abuse of water as a weapon or as a target in violent conflicts. In the past, some of the state agencies and combatant forces in the region have destroyed water infrastructure. Since 2014, ISIS, a new terrorist group has shown propensity to use water resources to achieve its illegitimate objectives. The international community cannot ignore a developing tragedy and this report also explores possible options for the UN and other international actors.

Il fiume Hirmand (conosciuto anche come Helmand) nasce in Afghanistan, 80 Km a Ovest di Kabul. Dopo un percorso di
circa 1'125km sfocia in un complesso sistema di zone umide chiamato "Tālāb-e Hāmun", protetto dall'Unesco e dalla convenzione di Ramsar, situato in parte in territorio afghano e in parte in territorio iraniano nella regione storica del Sistan. Entrambi questi Paesi soffrono di problemi legati alla carenza di risorse idriche, indispensabili per il proprio
sviluppo, in primis agricolo. Entrambi quindi sono interessati ad un maggiore sfruttamento delle acque del fiume
Hirmand, l’utilizzo delle quali è regolamentato da un accordo internazionale del 1973 considerato però insoddisfacente
dalle due parti. All’importanza economica di questo fiume si aggiunge l’importanza ambientale: il delicato ecosistema
delle zone umide degli Hāmun, situato in prossimità del delta interno del fiume, è infatti fondamentale per la
sopravvivenza delle attività umane della zona, oltre che per le rotte migratorie di molti volatili. Si configura pertanto un
conflitto sull’utilizzo dell’acqua fra tre contendenti, tre "stakeholder": Iran, Afghanistan e l'ecosistema degli Hāmun.
Diversi fattori di natura climatica, sociale e politica complicano la situazione. La tesi si propone di tratteggiare i contorni
legali, geografici, storici e politici di questo conflitto alla luce dei moderni principi del diritto internazionale ambientale
e degli sviluppi avvenuti negli ultimi 10 anni nella zona.

Water scarcity is the most pressing environmental issue in the Middle East and is increasingly becoming an additional source of conflict in an already unstable region. This paper offers two interrelated arguments, first, the water scarcity has become a volatile strategic issue in the Middle East where goes beyond a simply environmental risk. In this context, water resources as a strategic asset are playing major role in re-architecting the regional security arrangement by hydrohegemons. Second, the power asymmetry in transboundary waters has led to failure in addressing water challenges in the region multilaterally. Bringing Power and Hydropolitics theories with current transboundary water conflicts together, this paper suggests that water scarcity have significant negative spillover both within and outside the Middle East and could be a trigger for more migration, political instability, social unrest, state failure, and economic recession in the downstream riparian which consequently jeopardizes international security. Therefore, water is becoming one of the global threats facing humanity into the Alpha century. Many observers who approach this issue from a security standpoint have frequently warned that future wars will be over water resources and the Middle East will be the focal point of this grave international crisis. That is why water crises in the Middle East compels us to think globally.

Abundența apei este una dintre iluziile cele mai mari ale omenirii. Cu toate că pare o resursă banală, disponibilă oricui, realitatea tinde să contrazică această impresie. Astfel, apa potabilă devine, în anumite circumstanțe, elementul central al unor configurații politice și economice de nivel internațional.

Un prim obiectiv al acestui articol este acela de a demonstra faptul că războiul pentru apă poate fi o certitudine a viitorului numai atunci când acest tip de resursă va deveni un vector de proiectare a puterii. Un al doilea obiectiv vizează demonstrarea faptului că un conflict armat izbucnit din asemenea rațiuni nu este altfel decât inutil. Potențialele avantaje nu pot compensa costurile pe care le-ar implica o asemenea acțiune. Cel de-al treilea obiectiv constă în identificarea probabilității izbucnirii unui conflict de mediu în Asia Centrală și, de asemenea, în formularea unor propuneri care să conducă la evitarea acestui scenariu sumbru.

Articolul poate fi găsit la pagina 35.