Innatism

Siguiendo una discusión de hace muchos años y que se manifiesta en muchas de las áreas que estudian al ser humano y sus capacidades, vamos a verla en el problema de la categorización, es decir el cómo se adquieren los conceptos. La clásica discusión se debe al enfrentamiento de las visiones innatas que dan peso a lo racionalista y a mecanismos que están programados en el ser humano. La segunda visión es la empirista, según la cual las capacidades cognitivas se desarrollan progresivamente por medio de la percepción, la asociación y el aprendizaje en general.

Desde un cierto punto de vista, una
gramática es una entidad mental, representada
en la mente/cerebro de un individuo y que
caracteriza su capacidad lingüística. La
gramática emerge con la exposición a un
entorno lingüístico que detona el desarrollo de
ésta a partir de un estado inicial estructurado,

común a la especie. Este estado inicial es la
Gramática Universal, la parte del genotipo que
es relevante para la emergencia de la gramática.
                                                          David Lightfoot

"La lengua-e es concebida (...) como el objeto real de la investigación, la gramática es una noción derivada; el lingüista es libre para seleccionar de una u otra forma la gramática, siempre que identifique correctamente la lengua-e. No se plantean cuestiones de verdad o falsedad al margen de esta consideración"
(Chomsky, 1986a: 35,).

This contribution focuses on the nature of language, language acquisition and its relation with the body and the res cogitans, i.e. mind, in Descartes. The aim is to show that, despite the parallelism between the Cartesian rationalism and the Chomskyan rationalism of MIT, there are deep differences regarding the conception of mind and of language. Chomsky, in fact, characterizes the mind as an agglomerate of mechanisms containing concepts and logical symbols (mentalese), while Descartes was a defensor of the unextended mind (i.e. its indivisible unity). The French philosopher claims for an intrinsic union with body and mind, for mechanic laws, arbitrariness of language and of its empirical acquisition through mechanical memorization. Furthermore Descartes separates the laws of bodies from the laws of mind and, as we will discuss in this paper, this is a central aspect for understanding his thought.

After the introduction (Section 1), I offer a brief summary of “idealist” and “realist” readings of Epicurean theology (Section 2) as well as a description of minimal requirements for a successful interpretation (Section 3). Then I turn to the overview of the four main arguments invoked in the debate (Section 4) and discuss the hypothesis of dispositional innatism (Section 5), concluding that none of these considerations proves decisive. Then I suggest that Epicurus’ position might have been deliberately non-committal, and relate this suggestion, first, to different kinds of the Epicurean self (Section 6) and, second, to the theory of multiple explanation (Section 7).

The thesis explains the link between Leibniz's philosophy of language, his theory of the imagination, and how both relate to his theory of harmony. The thesis is published on the open access repository of the University of Münster: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:6-05169689910

Abstract

Analytic philosophy triggered a methodological transformation in the study of the history of philosophy. This has led to a gradual adoption of philosophical approaches by the historians of medieval philosophy toward the history of medieval Latin philosophy, going beyond the previous historical approaches. However, a similar shift has not yet occurred in the historiography of medieval Islamic philosophy. The study of medieval Islamic philosophical works almost exclusively by historical approaches precludes these works from being better understood and some problems in this field from being fruitfully solved. One such problem is whether Avicenna’s epistemology is rationalist or empirical, which has created a longstanding debate among historians. I use the critical (rational) reconstruction approach to resolve this debate, and design my solution as a case study of applying this approach and showing its efficiency in solving the problems of the historiography of Islamic philosophy and gaining a deeper understanding of medieval Islamic philosophical works.

Bringing together an empirical perspective and analytic methodology, this approach enables us to notice the epistemological crisis in medieval Islamic thought. I argue that the debate on Avicenna’s epistemology is only one manifestation of this crisis. To resolve the debate, I first flesh out the basic theses and supplementary elements of rationalism and empiricism by using the resources of analytic philosophy, and I argue that empiricism provides better solutions to the problems of epistemology than rationalism does. I then investigate whether Avicenna is committed to any rationalist theses or elements. In the end, I find him to be a strong rationalist. Finally I propose two suggestions: (i) A research program should be created that does historiography of Islamic philosophy by using the philosophical approaches (the critical reconstruction approach in particular) to find out how much philosophical truth there is in medieval Islamic philosophical works. (ii) The epistemological crisis ongoing in contemporary Islamic thought can and should be solved by a move toward empiricism.

Keywords: Islamic philosophy, analytic philosophy, epistemological crisis, Avicenna’s epistemology, empiricism, rationalism

Özet

Analitik felsefenin felsefe tarihyazımı alanında tetiklediği metodolojik dönüşüm Ortaçağ Latin felsefe tarihinin tarihsel yaklaşımlardan ziyade gittikçe artan oranda felsefi yaklaşımlarla çalışılması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Ancak aynı dönüşüm İslam felsefe tarihyazımında henüz yaşanmamıştır. Ortaçağ Müslüman filozofların eserlerinin hala neredeyse tamamen tarihsel yaklaşımlarla incelenmesi onların daha iyi anlaşılmasını engellemekte ve bu alandaki bazı problemlerin çözülememesine neden olmaktadır. Tarihçiler arasında İbn Sina epistemolojisinin rasyonalist mi empirik mi olduğuna dair tartışma bu problemlerden biridir. Tartışmayı sonuca kavuşturmak için bu çalışmada eleştirel yeniden-inşa yaklaşımı kullanılmıştır. Böylece sözkonusu problemin çözümü bu yaklaşımın İslam felsefe tarihyazımının problemlerini çözme ve Ortaçağ Müslüman filozofların eserlerini daha iyi anlamada ne kadar başarılı olduğunu gösterecek bir vaka incelemesi olarak tasarlanmıştır.

Empirik perspektif ve analitik metodolojiyi birleştiren bu yaklaşım Ortaçağ İslam dünyasındaki epistemolojik krizi farketmemizi sağlar. Bu çalışmada sözkonusu tartışmanın bu krizin tek bir yansıması olduğu ileri sürülmüştür. Tartışmayı sonuca kavuşturmak için öncelikle analitik felsefenin kaynakları kullanılarak rasyonalizm ve empirizmin temel tezleri ve tamamlayıcı unsurları tespit edilmiş, empirizmin epistemolojinin temel problemlerine nispeten daha iyi çözümler sunduğu iddia edilmiştir. Sonra İbn Sina epistemolojisinde bu rasyonalist unsurların bulunup bulunmadığı araştırılmış ve nihayet İbn Sina’nın güçlü derecede rasyonalist olduğu saptanmıştır. En son bu bulgunun uzanımı olarak iki öneride bulunulmuştur: (i) Ortaçağlı Müslüman filozofların eserlerinde ne kadar felsefi doğru bulunduğunu tespit etmek için İslam felsefe tarihini felsefi yaklaşımlar (özellikle eleştirel yeniden-inşa yaklaşımı) ile inceleyen bir araştırma programı oluşturulmalıdır. (ii) Çağdaş İslam düşüncesinde devam etmekte olan epistemolojik kriz empirizm ile çözülebilir ve çözülmelidir.

Keywords: İslam felsefesi, analitik felsefe, epistemolojik kriz, İbn Sina epistemolojisi, empirizm, rasyonalizm

My article proposes a revision of the periodization and the canon of Romanticism by going back to the roots of key elements of this literary period, in linking together the imagination to the pivotal assumption of the Enlightenment, i.e. the debunking of innatism, as Locke had proposed it. Joseph Addison reworks his theory of the imagination accordingly, in particular, in his Journal «The Spectator», with a series of essays called 'The Pleasures of the Imagination' (1712). Here he affirms that the tabula rasa of the mind is modelled by the sensations we acquire via the senses, which write on the ‘blank slate’, producing our distinguished and unique understanding of the world. The faculty of the imagination is thus revolutionarily seen not as an innate gift of the gods to geniuses, but simply as a faculty each human being possesses. Each and every human being could, from then on, imagine a different world, fostering thus what I consider the major asset of all Romanticisms of the world: romantic individualism. Therefore, I propose to link these two, only seemingly different, cultural periods of time, the Enlightenment and Romanticism, together, to give their due both to the empiricists and to the romantics, who jointly permitted an evolution of humankind, in ‘authorising’ all human beings in the use of their imagination, just as artists, scientists, and so-thought geniuses had done in the past. In doing this they became ‘artists’ themselves, assuming upon them the accountability towards reality. ‘Enlightened Romanticism’ synthesizes this revolutionary synergy created by the dismissal of innatism and the rise of the imagination.

An important aspect of Evald Ilyenkov's theory of social mind is anti-innatism. Anti-innatism is not only the necessary logical outcome of Ilyenkov's overall philosophical system and in particular of his anti-reductionism, but also it is a socio-historically possible and necessary consequence of the capitalist mode of production, which amounts to the formation of a gap between socially formed human knowledge and growth of the productive powers, on the one hand, and value-producing labour, on the other.

In our contribution, we describe the point of view of Nicholas of Cusa on the topic of the origins of mental concepts of human knowledge. We find that Nicholas finds in the IV chapter of De mente, the philosophical tradition had developed two fundamentals currents of thought: the innatism, that was born with the theory of Plato, and the sensism, which refers to the philosophy of Aristotle. The first one supposes that the origins of the mental concepts are in the mind: Plato, that in the human mind there exists an innate concept of the real things. This theory focuses itself on the power of the mind, that the Platonic view opposes itself against the instability of sensation. The second one takes the reverse point of view: it is the Aristotelian belief that all human knowledge originates from a sensation and the mind can only elaborate the information from the senses. This theory focus itself instead on the requirement of the sensitive perception. Nicholas of Cusa analyzes these two traditions and he presents a third form of theory of knowledge, that we describe as “elegant innatism”.

This essay argues that Berkeley's doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke's conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley's views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley's doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found in Descartes' later writings and in Leibniz. Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying this―at least in the case of the concepts of self, causation, substance, and virtue―Berkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism.

An essay about the " cartesian linguistics " and N. Chomsky's innatism. The essay introduces the first italian translation of G. de Cordemoy "Discours physique de la parole" (1668) . The books contains a contribute by Chomsky itself.(see section "Translation).

En la época moderna de la filosofía existió un extenso debate que se enfocaba en desarrollar una teoría epistemológica que logrará explicar qué es el conocimiento y cómo accedemos a él. A raíz de esto se desarrollaron dos corrientes epistemológicas: el racionalismo y el empirismo, la primera se extendió hacia una explicación que desestimaba el conocimiento que provenía de las experiencias sensibles y argumentaba a favor de la razón como fuente del conocimiento y de ideas innatas  como prueba de ello, la segunda sostuvo una argumentación referente a que todo nuestro conocimiento estaba ligado a una experiencia con el mundo y, por tanto, era imposible la existencia de ideas que no tuvieran como fuente una experiencia sensible. Por consiguiente, el objetivo de este escrito será reconstruir el argumento de uno de los primeros filósofos racionalistas y principal proponente de la teoría innatista, Rene Descartes; para después, exponer a grandes rasgos el argumento epistémico contra el innatismo de John Locke con el fin de demostrar que es imposible la existencia de ideas innatas y que la razón por la cual conocemos se haya en el uso y desarrollo tanto de nuestras facultades perceptuales como cognitivas.

Is it true that all formative influence is unethical, and that we ought to avoid influencing children (and indeed anyone at all)? There are more or less defensible versions of this doctrine, and we shall follow some of the strands of argument that lead to this conclusion. It seems that in maintaining that all influence is immoral, one is committed to the notion that children have an innate teleology, that these may be frustrated, and that to frustrate the child's innate teleology would be to wrong them. First we consider a strong view of innate teleology exemplified in the writing of Plato. However, even those who favour such a view can approve of those formative influences which lead people to better realise their innate teleology. Next we consider a weaker version of the doctrine, one claiming that we ought to broaden the possibilities available to those that we influence, and never to narrow them. This seems too permissive a strategy, however. Finally Foss and Griffin's worry about a desire for control and domination being embedded in persuasion is explored together with their proposed alternative strategy of 'invitational rhetoric'. Ultimately, this paper argues that we often have good reason to encourage certain formative outcomes and discourage others

Language acquisition starts in childhood. Oral language is the initial language to learn. Within it, lies norms to make language functional. Children start to function the language through communication. Communication provides an identity that shapes them into different settings. As language acquisition is unique and individual, experts have been studying to interpret it. There are at least three theorists of language acquisition. They are a behaviorist, innatist, and interactionist. Experts are debating on which theory provides the most appropriate approaches for the students. The discussion will compare innatist and interactionist approaches to the students' first and second language acquisition. It describes how the educational program would be like when using innatist and interactionist learning approaches. There are also critiques on innatist and interactionist approaches. A suggestion is provided to strategically integrate both approaches to understand language acquisition process in both first and second language students.

Celestino Galiani (1681-1753) was born in San Giovanni Rotondo, a small town in the Gargano, and from there began a long wandering through Italy, between his first religious training in the province of
Foggia and subsequent trips to Rome, where he will be appreciated for his wit, and Naples where he will become Chaplain Major and Prefect of the Royal Studies, with the task of reforming the University of Naples.
Galiani, who did not give any of his writings to print, is best known for spreading Newton’s theories and empiricism in Italy. The study of the theses of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(1690) engaged the abbot for twenty years. His writings, which also include an outline of a work that remained unpublished entitled Ricerche sulla scienza morale (Researches on Moral Science), are the main
trace of the diffusion of Locke’s theories in the Italian panorama of the early 18th century and of how it was a fundamental component in preparing the season of the Southern Enlightenment of the mid-century.

Many scholars rely on a passage from Arrian’s Discourses (II 11.1–6) to interpret Epictetus’ gnoseology as divergent from Stoic tradition. They find in this passage an expression of innatism, starting from the statement that «we come» (to an unuttered whither) carrying certain preconceptions (προλήψεις) or innate conceptions (ἔμφυτοι ἔννοιαι): this would allude to man ‘coming into the world’ not completely ignorant. This reading, relying upon an unlikely translation, finds no parallel elsewhere in our evidences on Epictetus. Contrariwise, it can be undermined by a comparison with one of those, with two excerpts concerning Musonius Rufus and with other evidences on Stoic gnoseology. The new reading of the passage proposed here, justified from a linguistic perspective, enables to preserve Epictetus’ adherence to Stoic gnoseology: here he is not alluding to the genesis of knowledge in man, but to the cognitive condition of one about to embark on his philosophical training.

Polifacético, innovador, polemista mordaz y crítico acérrimo de la política exterior de su
país, Chomsky es quizás uno de los pensadores contemporáneos más influyentes. Se lo ha
definido como el padre de la lingüística moderna, como filósofo analítico, como científico
cognitivo, como analista político y como activista; y, a decir verdad, con sus más de ciento
veinte libros, otros tantos artículos científicos y periodísticos, y varias decenas de apariciones
públicas y entrevistas, ha contribuido con interesantes aportes en cada uno de esos campos.
329
Debido, pues, a la vastedad y variedad de su obra es imposible hacerle justicia en pocas
líneas, y me veo forzado a tomar una decisión fundamental: presentaré al Chomsky téorico,
dejando de lado su participación pública en causas sociales y en asuntos coyunturales de
política internacional. Me concentraré, de este modo, en las secciones subsiguientes, en la
presentación filosófica de dos grandes temas de su obra: el lenguaje y la naturaleza humana.

Abstract Is it true that all formative influence is unethical, and that we ought to avoid influencing children (and indeed anyone at all)? There are more or less defensible versions of this doctrine, and we shall follow some of the strands of argument that lead to this conclusion. It seems that in maintaining that all influence is immoral, one commits oneself to the idea that children have innate teleologies, that these may be frustrated, and that to frustrate a child’s innate teleology would be to wrong them. First we consider a strong view of innate teleology exemplified in the writing of Plato. However, even those who favour such a view can approve of those formative influences which lead people to better realise their innate teleology. Next we consider a weaker version of the doctrine, one claiming that we ought to broaden the possibilities available to those that we influence, and never to narrow them. This seems too permissive a strategy, however. Finally Foss and Griffin’s worry about a desire for control and domination being embedded in persuasion is explored together with their proposed alternative strategy of ‘invitational rhetoric’. Ultimately, this paper argues that we often have good reason to encourage certain formative outcomes and discourage others.

The aim of the present paper is to defend a partial reductionist explication of the concept of innateness in cognitive science. Firstly, I specify a set of minimal conditions for the analysis of the innateness concept. Secondly, I present the main proposals in dispute, namely, the reductionist, autonomist and skeptical accounts of innateness. After criticizing both skeptical and autonomist positions, I develop a partial account of innateness as genetic control, showing how that concept from developmental biology could be used to explicate innateness in cognitive science. Finally, I mention some philosophical advantages of my proposal.

James of Viterbo is one of the rare medieval authors to sustain a thoroughly innatist philosophy. He borrows from Simplicius the notion of idoneitas (aptitude, predisposition) so as to ground a cognition theory in which external things are not the efficient and formal causes of mental acts. A predisposition has the characteristic of being halfway between potentiality and actuality. Therefore, the subject that has predispositions does not need to be acted upon by another thing to actualize them. External things only “incline” the mind to make use of a stock of cognitive schemes. Consequently, in order to avoid an infinite regress James must adopt innatism. Following the lead of late Neoplatonism, he goes as far as including, not only conceptual schemes, but also perceptual schemes among the inbuilt stock.  As a result, James’s theory, while it echoes certain preoccupations and themes that are common in the thirteenth century, proves to be one of a kind.

La tesis bio-antropología del innatismo Falacias descubiertas desde la reflexión filosófica acerca de la experiencia moral Bio-anthropological thesis of innatism On the fallacies discovered through philosophical reflection on the moral experience ÓSCAR BARROSO FERNÁNDEZ Universidad de Granada RESUMEN En los últimos años se observa una tendencia a recuperar la tesis del innatismo moral desde el ámbito de las ciencias bio-antropológicas. Dicha tesis encuentra apoyo en el descubrimiento de ciertos universales morales y en la constatación de la capacidad humana de producir respuestas morales de forma inmediata. El autor de este trabajo, aun cuando considera plausible que en la conducta moral haya elementos innatos, mantiene que las pruebas aducidas incurren en la falacia del falso dilema: respecto a los universales morales, pueden ser alcanzados racional-mente; respecto a las respuestas morales inmediatas, pueden ser resultado de un proceso de habituación. Para demostrar el carácter falaz de estas demostraciones, el autor se apoyará en la antropología moral de Zubiri. PALABRAS CLAVE ANTROPOLOGÍA BIOLÓGICA, INNATISMO, UNIVERSALES MORALES, EXPE-RIENCIA MORAL, ZUBIRI ABSTRACT Recently, we have been witnessing a tendency to bring back to life the thesis of moral innatism, mainly due to the support of bio-anthropological sciences. This thesis is based on the discovery of some moral universals on the one hand, and on the affirmation of human capacity to produce