Kenyan Politics

Is it possible to construct unity in a prefabricated state? What is the best way to bring together people of different cultures under one flag? In 2010, Kenya decided to take a 180-degree turn in its path to achieve unity. Until then, it had focused on a centralized state with all the powers, aiming to eliminate differences and forge unity from the capital, Nairobi. But the 2007 post-electoral violence showed the reality of a washed-up state incapable of bringing together its differences.

An Experiment in Devolution: National Unity and the Deconstruction of the Kenyan State is a review of the new path Kenya has taken for the last ten years. Back then, Kenya decided to adopt a new Constitution that involved, for the first time, decentralization of powers. In 2013, the 47 new county governments were effectively set in place after the first local elections. The book reviews Kenya’s progress on the nine objectives of devolution set in Article 174 of the Constitution.

It’s our turn to eat is much more than the story of John Githongo, a portly upper-class man in his mid-40s which dreamed of changing a country’s history of sleaze, state-capturing and ethnic identification. Githongo’s story is the personification of a change of mentality in a new generation of Kenyans which want to modernize its institutions and forget the times when your luck and wealth depended on if you shared ethnicity with the president.

The Fifth Estate: The Total Waste of Imagination In the recent past, I have had a sustained interest in the Fort Hall School of Government not because I think it is worth it, but just for the sake of it. I thought it was a home of critical and intellectual thinkers. People whose sense of imagination and thought was within acceptable intellectualism. Sadly, in the recent past, I have found it quite maligned. The whole program is a sad mockery of intellectualism that is obsessed with Raila Odinga. In fact, the last 15 or so episodes have painted either Odinga as an antichrist, an evil incarnate or simply the devil himself while making Uhuru Kenyatta look like the guardian angel straight from the heavens.

Livestock raiding among Northern Kenya’s pastoralists has profoundly changed in the last decades. It is commercialized, extremely violent and fought out with modern weaponry. This contribution shows that it also serves as a ploy in conflicts that aim at territorial expansion, boundary adjustments and other political considerations. These conflicts are part of Kenya’s troubled politics of decentralisation and as such they must be viewed in context with the politicized violence in Central Kenya. Yet the nexus between this political dimension and pastoralist conflicts remains obscure, and raiding is still largely portrayed as a cultural tendency. Based on data from fieldwork in East Pokot and surrounding areas in Kenya’s Central Rift Valley Province, this article explores the forces behind these dynamics.

Abstracts of International Conference “Elections in Africa”. First joint Conference of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Centre of African Studies of the Porto University in the “Internal Changes and Foreign Policy of African Countries” Conference Series. Moscow, Russia. November 1–2, 2018.

Professor Abdilatif Abdalla was imprisoned by the Kenyatta regime after he, in a political pamphlet Kenya: Twendapi? (Kenya: Where Are We Heading To?). While in prison, he wrote an anthology of poems that ironically won the 1974 edition of the Jomo Kenyatta Award for Literature, an award named after the very man who had imprisoned. The interview.

QUESTION:
Why and how did colonialism come to Kenya? What kinds of structures of power and authority did the colonial powers establish in Kenya during the colonial period? Who wielded and exercised power and authority in Kenya during the colonial period? What qualities did one need to exercise power and authority in Kenya during the period?


As a continent, Africa has had a tough past. The race for Europeans to colonize Africa began in the 1400’s. Many African ancestors were displaced from their own kingdoms by newly arrived Euro-centric imperialists. East Africa's Kenya was one such country to face this ordeal. Kenya as a country was dominated and overpowered quickly by the domineering Europeans, who were motivated by the urge for more territories, the demand for cheap labor and raw materials to support the industrial revolution in Europe and its strategic position in relation to India and the Far East. The Europeans, primarily British, that came to Kenya devastated its native resources and culture through colonization so severely it is still felt today.

On the Kenya coast, it was widely hoped that devolution would address strict political functions – historical injustices and communal narratives of marginalization. However, newly elected county governors are finding themselves constrained in addressing this role due to ongoing operational logics of local governance and the limitation of the role of county governors by the central government to ‘less political’ and ‘quieter’ functions of development. Based on field interviews, official reports, newspaper sources, and electoral data, this article advances a series of interrelated arguments. Firstly, to avoid political contestation from below, the central government frames devolution in technocratic (as opposed to political) terms of development. Secondly, county governments contest official de-politicization due to ongoing logics of patronage politics – where local county leaders have to show that they are able to protect local interests in terms of both immediate assistance and communal narratives of injustice. Thirdly – related to preceding arguments – county governors and executives find themselves vulnerable within incompatible
expectations, differing from common analyses of decentralization across Africa that emphasize on ‘elite capture’ or re-centralization.

This article marks the five years since the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya by advancing the argument that the discourse of law and constitutional knowledge is a myth of a particular historical time in a particular place in the geography of social struggle and differentiation. It adopts the form of a dialogue containing questions and replies, objections and rejoinders within the limits of a private deliberation, using post-election violence and ethnic demographic narratives to focus on legal-cultural progress in Kenya. Hence, the paper concludes that the metaphysical infrastructure of a constitution and its legal and political representational practices largely proceed with the contingent assertion of cultural interpretations.

The catastrophic period of violence and displacement during the 2007 general elections led to an African Union mediation which, in addition to establishing a power-sharing agreement between the two opposing political parties, sought a commitment from the new government to constitutional reform, eventually resulting in the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution.

In addition to a set of safeguards protecting all Kenyans against discrimination across a range of grounds, including age, sex, disability and marital status, the Constitution attempted to address the systemic under- representation of women in public office in innovative ways.
The most significant of these was the introduction of the ‘2/3 Gender Principle’ (The Gender Principle) under Arts 27, and 81(b) of the Bill of Rights which seeks to guarantee that not more than two thirds of members of elective public bodies in Kenya will be occupied by one gender. The Constitution also allocates a number of seats exclusively for women representatives at Senate and county levels.

This paper explores the reception and efficacy of the Gender Principle from its inception, through the two subsequent general elections, 2013 and 2017. I also briefly examine the formal reception of the Gender Principle by the courts, parliament, and Kenyan civil society, and through interviews and focus groups with grass roots women living in urban and rural areas of Kenya.

The tensions generated by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) indictment of four prominent Kenyans—including Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, who went on to become president and deputy president of the Kenyan Republic, respectively—in 2013 promised to reorder the relationship between Kenya and the international community. This chapter discusses the ICC’s intervention and its impact on both local Kenyan politics and Kenya’s relationship with its regional and international partners including its traditional Western partners, such as Europe, the UK, and the US. The chapter also discusses how tensions between Kenya and the West influenced Kenya’s relationship with the East including China, India, and Japan.

Using a gendered analysis, this article examines the post election violence (PEV) in Kibera, Kenya, between December 2007 and February 2008. Through in-depth interviews with Kibera residents, the article interrogates how gender influenced violent mobilizations in Kenya's most notorious slum. Most scholarly analyses have tended to understand the post-election violence as a result of politicized ethnic identities, class, and local socioeconomic dynamics. Implicitly or explicitly, these frameworks assume that women are victims of violence while men are its perpetrators, and ignore the ways in which gender, which cuts across these categories, produces and shapes conflict. Kibera's conflict is often ascribed to the mobilization of disaffected male youths by political " Big Men. " But the research findings show how men, who would ordinarily not go to war, are obliged to fight to " save face " in their communities and how women become integral to the production of violent exclusionary mobilizations. Significantly, notions of masculinity and femininity modified the character of Kibera's conflict. Acts of gender-based violence, gang rapes, and forced circumcisions became intensely entwined with ethno-political performances to annihilate opposing groups. The battle for political power was also a battle of masculinities.

For decades, Kenyan Muslims have felt economically marginalized and socially alienated. Recent excesses by security forces, including ethnic profiling, mass detention and extraordinary rendition, have compounded frustrations. These excesses, along with reports of extrajudicial executions, have also increased the allure of radical messages, and thus deepened divisions within the Muslim community. Kenya now faces the difficult task of developing a security program that both protects its citizens and diminishes the appeal of extremism. Most Kenyans recognize the perils of the current culture of impunity, and this may provide an opening for reform. The success of counterterrorism will likely be determined by Kenya’s willingness to honor human rights, end impunity and engage Muslim citizens as partners.

The study analyzes the political economy of the development of the Nairobi Expressway toll-road set to be launched for public-use in 2022, in a bid to understand not only the influence of domestic politics in shaping incentives for ruling elites to favour or commit to certain development policies but also how local political dynamics interact and blend with competing foreign aid relations. The study provides an alternative, ‘South’ perspective to the dominant narrative that centralizes the motives and interests of China and Chinese trans-national companies in African countries.

This paper takes a psychoanalytical/Freudian approach to discuss the passage of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) and psychoanalyses the assumption that Kenya is still far from realising the essence of the Constitution and the best way forward from a psycho-therapeutic perspective.

There is an increasing feeling among scholars of African democracy that Western election observers apply a double standard in their operations in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the explanation for this supposed posture on the part of international election monitors is yet to be exhaustively explored. Associated scholarship has largely confined itself to three broad factors: the “progress bias,” defined by Susan Dodsworth as “a tendency to tolerate flawed elections that improved on those held previously”; the risk of triggering electoral violence; and the protection of strategic partnerships. In an attempt to further scholarship on Western observers of African elections, this article employs the lens of globalization and monopoly capitalism to discuss Kenya’s 2017 polls within the context of China’s rise as a global power. It revolves around the following broad question: If, in fact, the John Kerry-led international observer team was complicit in facilitating election rigging during Kenya’s 2017 election cycle, how do we explain this from an economic perspective? It concludes, partly, that the quest to either attain or retain dominance among global powers, is not only contributing to the erosion of constitutional gains but also exposing the Kenyan masses to dictatorial and predatory leadership. Moreover, during Kenya’s 2017 election cycle, there appears to have been a significant shift in the inclination and preference of citizens, from substantive to procedural democracy.

On October 14, a terrorist bombing shook Somalia, one of the deadliest since its civil war in 1991. Hundreds were killed and wounded after a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck along a main road between Mogadishu’s K4 and K5 districts.  Two weeks later, a second major attack rocked the capital on October 28, targeting the popular Naso-Hablod Hotel and killing several senior government and military officials. The gunmen who carried out the attack used uniforms and identity cards from the country’s National Intelligence and Security Agency to infiltrate the building.

After the first attack, Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed called for three days of national mourning and thousands of Mogadishu residents rallied to condemn al Shabaab, an al Qaeda affiliate presumed to have carried out the bombing. (It has yet to admit or deny responsibility most likely because it does not want to be seen as having killed civilians.) The group did claim the second attack, however, and it continues to wage a bitter insurgency against the federal government, regional Somali state administrations, and the 22,000-strong African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Despite the new signs of public unity across Somalia’s divided society, the question remains: Is this violent episode a signal of a resurgent al Shabaab or will it finally trigger a fundamental and lasting change in the country’s ongoing insurgency and political situation?

Why then is Peter Kenneth not going for the Murang’a gubernatorial seat? It is easy to capture, no tribal maths, no hefty investments required, no brutal campaigns, just some nominations somewhere in May and he could now focus on his presidency in 2022?

Why is he not choosing this path? I consider it easier and somewhat assured! The answer is what I called the magma. Is this political magnet flattering to deceive?
Peter Kenneth, despite Nairobi requiring someone who is hotter to the issues that bedevil it, he is also very dangerous. You are not sure exactly why Peter Kenneth wants to be the Governor of Nairobi.

As far as I am concerned, Peter Kenneth is unlikely to have a Billion shillings to spare to bribe someone. So, is there another hand on the table? Most certainly yes! That hand could be the magma, quiet in demeanour and mannerism, but extremely hot to handle.

The idea that Kenya is made up of 42(+) tribes is widespread, but the origins, nature and consequences of any list are not well-known. This article compares ethnic classifications in all Kenyan censuses to demonstrate the origins of the '42' in (only) the 1969 census, and the multiple political purposes of classifying and counting. To make sense of why the 42(+) remains significant, I argue a cultivated vagueness provides a sense of consistency, linking a national past to present and future, while providing the basis for both numbers-based competitive politics and more inclusive politics. Moreover, it avoids engaging in politically risky work of making legible sense of shifts in ethnic identities, classifications and numbers, and avoids having to resolve their relation to the nation, which benefits both state and citizens. Extending literature on the political utility of uncertainty, I theorise this cultivated vagueness as magic, backed by opaque forces, potentially dangerous or beneficent, which deters interrogation or certainty on all sides. To further clarify this awkward relationship between vagueness and certainty, I argue ethnic classifications are intelligible via the social imaginary of the 42(+), but not especially legible, contesting the literature on census practices as tools of legibility and governability.

In the early 2000’s the government of Kenya set up many public policy reform initiatives aimed at boosting the country’s growth. In 2004, the country set out to implement public policy changes in agriculture under the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA). This public policy change was in line with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) that Kenya had committed to with several other African countries to ensure the growth of the agricultural industry.
However, almost a decade later, this initiative saw very little actualization in contrast to several other countries in the agreement: Rwanda, Burkina Faso, and Ethiopia. This was primarily due to the effects of a switch from reformation politics to clientelistic ones following the unraveling of the incumbent political coalition, NARC after the 2002 elections. Finally, this paper argues that the success/failure of policies lies in their ability to adapt and align themselves with the clientelistic democratic system that exists in Kenya.

Introduction Let it be impossible that anything should be done which is unknown to the nation--prove to it that you neither intend to deceive nor to surprise--you take away all the weapons of discontent. The public will repay with usury the confidence you repose in it (Bentham, 1839) There is an old saying in my ancestral locality of Mt. Elgon that "Judges put on their trousers one leg at a time, just like everybody else." If I understand this slightly sexist statement correctly, it refers to the ineradicable subjectivity brought to the legal system by the very fact of the judge's humanity. From it, we can adduce examples of commonsense justice and its negative counterpart, irresponsible judicial meddling. The post-election violence (PEV) of 2008 that mostly shaped the current 2010 Constitution was largely blamed on judicial meddling by the executive. As the country marks five years of its current Constitution, there is growing interest in the cultural interpretations ...

This paper provides an ethnographic perspective on the street-level deliberations of Kenya's opposition supporters between the 2013 and 2017 elections, arguing that rather than appeals to ethnicity what defines its discourse are broader, inclusive notions of political membership. A civic nationalism is enunciated by opposition supporters that congeals support between multiple ethnic groups through its emphasis on universal values – democracy, due process, equality, adherence to the constitution. However, when such civic ideas are used in political campaigning and mobilising rhetoric, describing a resurgent Kenyan ‘people’ that has been systematically disenfranchised, they take on an exclusionary character. As ‘good constitutionalists’, opposition supporters contrast themselves with ‘bad nationalists’ associated with the government, portrayed as mobilising particularistic ethnic loyalties at the expense of a majority of Kenyans. In practice, their civic ideas remain only potentially inclusive.

The Daily Nation’s titillating headline reminds me of another (but mercifully less consequential) underwear mystery from my time in Kenya. This found its way into my fieldnotes when I was studying the entrepreneurial achievements of Amkeni, a women’s group in Chilulu, Jibana Location (Walsh 1986), just down the road (or up the path) from the pseudonymised site of David Parkin’s Palms, Wine and Witnesses (1972). One Saturday afternoon (this was in October 1986) I was sitting with a housemate listening to records on a battery-operated player, when we were joined by a young Giriama man – let’s call him Charo – who had clearly had a drink or three of palm wine and was bursting to tell us his story.

The East Africa Protectorate, declared in 1895, was annexed to the British Dominions under the name Colony of Kenya in 1920. African resistance to British colonization began at contact, culminating in the sustained Mau Mau campaign in 1952 – 1960.

Mekatilili was one of the few recorded African women during this early period of colonial occupation to organize and lead a resistance effort within her tribe, waGiriama (the Giriama people). Variously described as a prophetess, diviner and a witch, Mekatilili’s role in the Giriama uprising 1913 – 1914 slowed the British expansion into the Kenya coastal region, and hampered colonial infrastructure development in the region. MeKatilili and her compatriot, the male elder Wanje, were tenacious activists for Giriama independence, and were arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment and exile in Nyanza province in 1913.

Managing to escape incarceration several times only to be recaptured, Mekatilili and Wanje became symbols of the British failure to literally and metaphorically contain African resistance to direct rule. As Shreya Bhattacharji argues, “the body-scape of the woman … remains [the] most strategic and problematic site [of the colonial frontier].” * This inability to control the physical body of Mekatilili, combined with her rumoured mystical powers of divination, offer unique insights into the ways in which the political and cultural power of African women is located by both community and coloniser within their sexed, physical bodies.

* Tamale, S. 2008 ‘The Right to culture and the culture of rights: A critical perspective on women’s sexual rights in Africa’, Feminist Legal Studies No. 16, pg 53 quoting Bhattacharji 2004, pg 1

At a time when states, armed insurgent movements, and ethnic and nationalist political parties make claims based on the defence of communal interests and political and religious ideologies — with often deadly consequences — it is important to understand the discourses and actions that are used to legitimize these claims. This book argues that competing moral economies — the beliefs and practices that normatively regulate and legitimize the distribution of wealth, power, and status in a society — play an important role in ethnic and nationalist conflict.

Bringing together international experts on the politics of ethnicity and nationalism, this final volume in the prestigious EDG series investigates how moral economies have been challenged in identity-based communities in ways that precipitate or exacerbate conflicts. The combination of theoretical chapters and case studies ranging from Africa and Asia to North America provides compelling evidence for the value of moral economy analysis in understanding problems associated with ethnic and nationalist mobilization and conflict.

Editors: Bruce J. Berman, André Laliberté, and Stephen J. Larin

Other Contributors: Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Leslie Doucet, Oded Haklai, Lotte Hughes, Emma Hunter, Manuel Litalien, and Gabrielle Lynch

Peer research has been recognized as an important strategy. As with other qualitative approaches, one issue that is often raised is how do we judge the quality of such methods? This paper argues that one of the ways we can do this is by comparing the data collected through participatory methods with that collected with other research strategies within the same research context. This was done through a qualitative study which investigated student's attitudes towards ethnicity and politics in two secondary schools in Kenya. A research design was developed using focus-group discussions where half of the focus groups were led by an adult researcher and the other half by a student researcher. The paper will compare the data collected from these two kinds of focus groups using the framework method in order to illustrate that peer research produces high-quality data comparable to that collected using other means. Moreover, the paper will use reflections from the process to show that one other way that we can judge the quality of peer research is through the benefits that accrue not only to the peer researchers such as skills development but also to the adult researchers, for example greater reflexivity.