Logic and Legal Reasoning in Law

En 1951 von Wright construyó el primer sistema de lógica deóntica, iniciando el estudio riguroso y sistemático de una nueva rama de la lógica: la lógica deóntica. Dicho sistema, a pesar de sus múltiples virtudes, posee una estructura simple basada principalmente en la lógica proposicional y en la lógica modal alética, la cual, no es capaz de dar cuenta del carácter dinámico propio de las acciones que, justamente, constituyen el objeto de las normas. En razón de ello, von Wright refinó su aparato conceptual y desarrolló, en su obra Norm and Action (1963), un nuevo sistema de lógica deóntica más complejo y apto para representar el cambio y el carácter dinámico propio de las acciones. No obstante, tal sistema no está exento de problemas y dificultades conceptuales. El presente trabajo pretendeanalizar la estructura y los principales elementos teóricos del sistema de Norm and Action y mostrar algunos de sus más importantes problemas conceptuales.

It is proposed that legal "common sense reasoning" can be modelled by a many valued logic system, termed U4. In the jurisprudence of common law a binary verdict of guilty or not-guilty associated with the prosecution and defence suggests a two-valued logic. Observation of legal protocols, however, finds that in addition to truth and falsity associated with the verdict, the logic states of uncertainty, impossibility, relevancy and irrelevancy are also operating in court proceedings.

Legal discourse can be considered to be undertaken in a four-valued logic. Accordingly, the U4 logic system allows true, false, uncertain and impossible logic states, denoted respectively as {T, F, U, 0}. Relevancy of evidence and discourse is a strict requirement and any irrelevancy is excluded from court proceedings. Irrelevancy can be considered to be a logical state and in U4 irrelevancy is rendered impossible denoted, N = 0. Hence, all logic states in U4 are relevant.

A simple probability interpretation of the verdict in criminal common law "beyond reasonable doubt" derived from U4 has been posited. In civil common law, the application of the Dempster-Shafer evidential theory which can be derived from U4 shows that if relevant uncertainty is non-zero, the plaintiff must nevertheless obtain greater than 50% probability for a ruling in their favour. As illustration of this theory, an analysis of the "Gate Crasher Paradox" and a fair resolution of the paradox submitted in favour of defence.

U4 provides a reliable reference of logic that is an advance upon classical logic and an improvement upon common sense reasoning. The system can be further employed as a basis for legal artificial intelligence systems.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being applied to law and a myriad of legal tasks amid attempts to bolster AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) autonomous capabilities. A major question that has generally been unaddressed involves how we will know when AILR has achieved autonomous capacities. The field of AI has grappled with similar quandaries over how to assess the attainment of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), a persistently discussed issue among scholars since the inception of AI, with the Turing Test communally being considered as the bellwether for ascertaining such matters. This paper proposes a variant of the Turing Test that is customized for specific use in the AILR realm, including depicting how this famous gold standard of AI fulfillment can be robustly applied across the autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning.

This chapter is a light-weighted overview of significant contributions to legal logic insofar as they involve deontic reasoning and related methods. A special emphasis is given to defeasible reasoning, which has been the major topic for legal reasoning in the last decades. The chapter is divided into three parts and the layout is as follows. Part 1 provides an introductory outline. In particular, we briefly recall an issue that was discussed in the context of deontic logic and that has been as well a hot research theme in legal reasoning, i.e., the very possibility of the use of logic in the law. Part 2 reconstructs the contribution of the literature about some classic topics or methods in deontic logic as relevant for the law: normative positions, the concept of permission, contrary-to-duty reasoning, input/output logic, algebras for normative systems, norm change, defeasibility in law. Part 3 is the largest one and offers, from our previous work, a unifying formal framework, based on Defeasible Logic, re-addressing some of the topics that we have already discussed in Part 2: legal hierarchies and dynamics, institutional agency and normative positions, and deontic aspects of legal interpretation.

Este trabajo se enfoca en demostrar que la Filosofía de la interpretación del derecho de Luis Recaséns Siches, al ser un ensayo de caracterización y de fundamentación del derecho como saber práctico de lo justo y lo equitativo, acierta no sólo porque puede ser considerada una precursora hispana de la teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica, sino porque, en cierto sentido, la aventaja. En ella se encuentra el germen de una Ciencia acerca de la determinación prudencial del derecho que, partiendo de la experiencia vital de lo humano, entienda al derecho como una práctica institucional eminentemente moral-valorativa que encuentre en la realización histórica de la justicia —concretada a través de la dignidad y los derechos humanos— su valor determinante por excelencia, capaz de conjugar tanto lo permanente como lo histórico de la realidad jurídica en cada caso concreto.

In this essay I argue against rule-deductivism. Rule-deductivism is the view that the justification of law-applying decisions is adequately understood on the model of a deductive argument—a “legal syllogism”, as it is often called—with a statement of an applicable rule as the “major premise” and a statement of the relevant facts as the “minor” one. Rule-deductivism—not to be confused with formalism—has long been a popular view in legal argumentation theory. Endorsed by Kelsen, Hart, MacCormick, and Alexy, it continues to be accepted by authors such as Gardner, Leiter, and Marmor, among many others. This paper begins by offering a characterization of rule-deductivism; goes on to argue that rule-deductivism is not, even in its stronger version, a view that should be accepted; and concludes by sketching and motivating a new model of the justification of law-applying decisions that overcomes the flaws of the model of the legal syllogism.

Realizar un estudio de algunas de las ideas de Aristóteles no es tarea fácil, requiere esfuerzo y máxima concentración, en primera porque no se trata de cualquier persona que haya vivido, sino de alguien que debido a su inteligencia observó las cosas de forma distinta a muchos: detalles en el lenguaje, en los objetos y con bases cimentadas sobre ésas observaciones aportó muy buenas ideas que hoy por hoy siguen en nuestro conocimiento; en segunda dichas ideas, se plasmaron desde cero siendo uno de los logros más alucinantes del intelecto humano, aunque muchas veces resultan difíciles al leer, y como consecuencia de esto, no cualquiera tiene acceso a su conocimiento, a menos que lo haga por medio de otros autores que se refieran a él, pero es supeditarse a la idea de unos cuantos, quienes en muchas de las ocasiones tienen una imagen errónea o contraria a los postulados de éste gran lógico. Aristóteles (en griego antiguo 1 F 0 8 ριστοτέλης) fue un gran polímata, discípulo de Platón a quien conocemos por sus ideas expuestas en los famosos Diálogos de gran relevancia política, fundador del Liceo en Atenas, donde enseñara a Alejandro Magno famoso por sus estrategias militares que le valieron la conquista de muchas tierras. Se dice que sus estudios, novedosos para su tiempo, hoy forman parte del sentido común de muchas personas, sin embargo yo me pregunto ¿Realmente comprenderían sus libros Analíticos? ¿Podrían ellos plantear la multitud de ideas que el expone? No me sorprendería que a manera de respuesta la negación asome tímidamente, ya que éste tipo de conocimiento no siempre se comparte en un aula, o en algunos estados de la república mexicana. El presente texto intenta estudiar sus postulados conocidos como los Primeros Analíticos, que se encuentran contenidos en su famoso libro El organon1 (del Ensayo sobre la Lógica Aristotélica 1 1 1 Nombre dado por sus estudiantes de la escuela peripatética que tenía Aristóteles en el Liceo, fundada en Atenas en 336 a.C. Para más información, consultar:

Logic learns things like principles, rules and procedures for correct reasoning. Reasoning is the process of human thought that produces a new statement which is a sequential result of other statements that have been previously known. Logically the formal truth relies on the existence of paths, methods, techniques and laws that are followed, then analyzed and finally formulated in a logic. Thinking is an object of logic which is the processing of reason to obtain truth by way of considering, deciphering, comparing and connecting understanding with one another. The method of legal reasoning provides a rebuttal in the debated legal paradigm, especially concerning the issue of application and implementation of the law. The process of legal reasoning is needed to keep legal actions within the corridor of applicable legal provisions. Intersection of reasoning occurs because there is no logical relationship between the premise and conclusions and violations of logic rules. Legal reasoning looks for the basis of a legal act. Legal reasoning is useful in finding the basis for determining whether a legal event has fulfilled all legal provisions and legal rules

En el contexto contemporáneo donde vienen refinándose distintas teorías de la argumentación jurídica, Atienza ha acuñado un término que ha comenzado a gozar de fortuna sobre todo en la literatura especializada hispánica: "teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica". No obstante el éxito de dicha categoría, no ha dejado de haber cierta controversia sobre la misma, entre otras cosas, sobre dos cuestiones conectadas entre sí. Por un lado, sobre su utilidad, y por otro lado, sobre los modelos argumentativos que cabría ads-cribir a ella, en particular el del propio Atienza. El propósito en este trabajo es ensayar una respuesta a ambas cuestiones, para sostener que el enfoque del profesor de la Universidad de Alicante puede ser adscrito a la "teoría estándar", pero sólo si se asume un modo de entenderla "externo" al modelo de racionalidad kantiano, el que evidencia, al mismo tiempo, que dicha categoría puede resultar de utilidad para el perfeccionamiento de las contemporáneas teorías de la argumentación jurídica.

This Essay focuses on one specific jurisprudential idea that Leibniz developed during and advanced in the Specimen and in the Dissertation, namely the importance of logic for modeling, explaining, discerning, and understanding law and legal process. It comments on the way in which the young Leibniz advanced creative ideas about the relation of logic and law that remain both fertile and contentious today, especially in Anglo-American jurisprudence. It concludes with an examination, sometimes critical, of some specific “perplexing” paradoxes in and related to law that Leibniz discussed, in his lifelong effort to bring “the light of reason” to law through the use of logic (and other philosophical tools).

Основная цель настоящей работы — показать, что логика является эффективным средством анализа аргументации в нормативных контекстах, поскольку, во-первых, обладает арсеналом инструментов для изучения формальных аспектов нормативных рассуждений. Во-вторых, несмотря на то, что способность рассуждать рациональным образом присуща человечеству в целом, и это в некоторой степени объясняет возможность сочетания в повседневной жизни юридической практики и неосведомленности в вопросах формальной логики, информационные системы и педагогические задачи в области юриспруденции нуждаются в методиках моделирования аргументативных правовых дискурсов. Нужды исследований в области правового дискурса и информационных систем (искусственного интеллекта) определяются не столько задачами создания и поддержания юридических баз данных и экспертных систем в этой области, сколько необходимостью изучения рассуждений «здравого смысла», или практических рассуждений. Педагогическая практика в этой области, как и во всякой иной, направленная на обучение основным принципам и приемам обоснования и аргументации, преследует не только энциклопедические и общеобразовательные цели, но и в значительной мере теоретические. Логика представляется здесь наиболее приемлемым кандидатом, потому что одной из главных ее задач является изучение моделей правильных рассуждений, для чего в рамках логики был выработан специальный аппарат выявления структуры рассуждений (формализация) и сопоставления их с идеальными моделями (доказательство, разрешимость). Другая важная задача логики — распознание и анализ смысловых значений рассуждений и выявление взаимосвязи формальных и содержательных аспектов рассуждений (логическая семантика). Таким образом, выявление формальных структур и содержательных аспектов рассуждений, а также особенностей использования полученных моделей в аргументативных дискуссиях делает логику одним из эффективных средств анализа таких дискурсов.
Для достижения поставленной цели в работе представлен краткий обзор основных подходов к изучению аргументации в нормативных контекстах: логического, риторического, диалектического. Поскольку в фокусе исследования каждого из этих подходов оказывается преимущественно один из критериев приемлемости аргументации, соответственно, формальный, материальный или процедурный, в работе обсуждается специфика каждого из этих аспектов обоснования. На основании этого делается вывод, что потребности универсализации процедуры обоснования, сведения ее к рациональным принципам, формам и аспектам приемлемости как отдельных аргументов, так и аргументации в целом, апеллируют к формальным критериям, характерным для логической обоснованности: непротиворечивости, семантической определенности, полноты (релевантности). Правда, в отличие от строго формальных логических критериев выводимости, непосредственно предъявляемых к формальным системам, данные критерии приемлемости аргументации представляют собой результат инструментального применения логики для реконструкция аргументативного дискурса. Так, требования полноты в формальной системе означает, что всякая общезначимая формула в ней доказуема. Критерий «полноты» в правовой аргументации означает, что всякий приемлемый аргумент является обоснованным.
Важное место в работе отводится рассмотрению таких особенностей правовой аргументации как наличие нестандартных ситуаций в юридической практике, и как следствие, обоснование исключений из установленных норм, а также уточнение норм в процессе законотворчества. Введение уточняющих положений в норму закона приводит к тому, что на действие первоначальной нормы накладываются ограничения (вводятся расширения, отмены). В работе показано, что наиболее адекватным инструментом оказывается немонотонная логика, или логика умолчаний.
Другим испытанием для стандартных логических систем стала задача моделирования рассуждений в условиях противоречивой информации, или в условиях дискуссии, когда аргументы сторон внутренне непротиворечивы, но вместе составляют противоречие. Основной принцип построения модели разрешения таких ситуаций состоит в ранжировании информации по релевантности и создании иерархии посылок.

ABSTRACT
Attraverso un saggio diviso in varie parti, si intende teorizzare e praticare l’analisi argomentativa della motivazione del giudice comune, in particolare penale. In questa prima parte, dopo aver
stabilito i principi fondamentali dell’analisi argomentativa, essa verrà confrontata con l’analisi
giuridica. Il confronto verrà condotto analizzando da entrambi i punti di vista sia una immaginaria motivazione qualificatoria, sia una reale motivazione censoria di una motivazione relativa
alla forza probatoria della testimonianza, contenuta nella sentenza Cass., Sez. VI, n. 3041/2018.

The work, which will be divided in many parts, aims both to give a theory of the argumentative
analysis of the justification of the common judgment, particulary of the criminal one, as well as
some examples of such analysis. In this first part, after explaining the fundamental principles of
the argumentative analysis, it will be compared to the legal analysis. The comparison will be
made by analysing from both points of view, on the one hand, a fictional qualificatory justification, on the other hand, a real justification of the legitimacy check on the justification of the trial judge concerning the probative value of the common testimony. The latter justification has
been extracted from the judgment of the Corte di Cassazione, Sez. VI, n. 3041/2018.

El artículo apunta contra la concepción objetivista de
los estándares de prueba defendida en la obra conjunta
de Jordi Ferrer Beltrán. Se toma en consideración, como
blanco principal de la crítica, su último trabajo: Prueba
sin convicción. En primer lugar, se pone de manifiesto
por qué el autor está comprometido con una visión objetivizada
de los estándares de prueba y en qué sentido
ha de entenderse ese objetivismo. Luego, se desarrollan
varios argumentos para mostrar que esa visión está desencaminada.
Algunos de esos argumentos apuntan contra
réplicas que Ferrer Beltrán articula en Prueba sin convicción
frente a objeciones más antiguas. Por último, luego
de mostrar por qué la pretensión objetivista tiene que ser
abandonada, se propone una relectura de las fórmulas que
establecen supuestos estándares de prueba.

En nuestro día a día nos encontramos
constantemente con alguien que quiere que
actuemos de determinada manera; podemos
encontrarnos inducidos tanto por el Estado, como
por nuestros hijos, por nuestros socios de toda la
vida o por el nuevo cliente que acabamos de
conocer. Y lo mismo hacemos con los demás.
La actividad judicial no escapa a esta circunstancia:
intentamos lograr que el juez actúe de
determinada manera, es decir, haciendo lugar a
nuestra pretensión. Ahora bien, ¿hay diferencias en
el modo de lograrlo?, ¿qué tipo de argumentos
tienen prioridad, los lógicos o los falaces?, ¿qué
nos trae mejores resultados, apelar al raciocinio o
al sentimiento? En este trabajo se intenta explicar
que, en algunas circunstancias, cuando creemos
que apelamos a la racionalidad en realidad nos
movemos por sentimientos y que, a su vez, cuando
apelamos a los sentimientos lo hacemos
racionalmente.

Courts and lawyers often argue a fortiori. Sometimes they actually use the Latin phrase to indicate that their conclusions do not just follow, but " follow a fortiori " from certain premises. These are taken to be inferences of a distinct and important kind. But how exactly are they distinct, and why are they important? Despite their popularity, a fortiori arguments are not well understood and have not drawn much attention from legal theorists. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to bring out the form of a fortiori arguments, articulating those assumptions that, though typically left unstated, are necessary elements of arguments of this kind. The second goal is to say something about the point of such arguments, and to characterise the sort of context in which an arguer will have reason to deploy an a fortiori rather than an inference of a different type.

In the early 1880s, Oliver Wendell Holmes criticized Langdell's idea that a legal system is like a system of logical axioms. But neither was aware of the new modern logic just then beginning with the work of Frege and Peirce.  Haack argues that ,despite this, Holmes's critique of Langdell is still defensible.

Translated by Liu jingkun (recently appointed Deputy Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court of China).

Il presente lavoro analizza la tecnica normativa impiegata dal legislatore italiano nell’art. 533 c.p.p., al fine di verificarne la compatibilità con i suggerimenti emersi nel recente dibattito filosofico sul tema degli standard probatori. Assunta una prospettiva “baconiana” della bard rule, si sostiene una relazione quantitativa fra le soglie decisorie operanti nelle varie fasi del procedimento penale e nei rapporti fra quest’ultimo e il processo civile. Una relazione fondata sul diverso grado di conferma probatoria richiesto dal legislatore per la prova di determinati fatti e in vista della preferenza accordata a determinati interessi.

While procedural languages are commonly used to program smart contracts in blockchain systems, logic-based languages may be interesting alternatives. In this paper, we inspect what are the possible legal and technical (dis)advantages of logic-based smart contracts in light of common activities featuring ordinary contracts, then we provide insights on how to use such logic-based smart contracts in combination with blockchain systems. These insights lead us to emphasize a fundamental challenge-algorithms for logic approaches have to be efficient, but they also need to be literally cheap as measured within the environment where they are deployed and according to its economic rules. We illustrate this with different algorithms from defeasible logic-based frameworks.

En este trabajo nuestro objetivo será describir sintéticamente y ofrecer una renovada sistematización de la Filosofía de la interpretación del derecho de Recaséns, destacando sus rasgos más característicos con un especial énfasis en aquellos que hacen de ella una propuesta susceptible de ser considerada precursora de las contemporáneas teorías de la argumentación jurídica, sin pretender ocuparnos aquí del necesario paralelo o contraste de éstas últimas con la primera. Estamos frente una investigación descriptiva y de valoración crítica de la propuesta recaseniana realizada desde una perspectiva predominantemente iusfilosófica. Este libro corresponde básicamente al primer capítulo de la tesis doctoral en la que venimos trabajamos desde 2011 sobre el tema: “La dimensión axiológica de la Filosofía de la interpretación del derecho de Luis Recaséns Siches. Una revalorización a la luz de la teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica”. En orden a su publicación se han realizado al texto original algunas adiciones y supresiones con el objetivo de darle autonomía.

Karl Llewellyn's critique of the canons of statutory interpretation led to a decline in their use for several decades. His critique, however, faced sustained resistance from some corners of the academy and the judiciary. Although this resistance has had only a selective uptake, it animated a gradual revival of the canons and brought the state of scholarship to an impasse that is for the most part partisan. In this article, I examine the semantic canons from a deeper level and argue that a universal assumption about them is false. Said assumption is that, although not dispositive, the semantic canons at least offer some reasons in favour of or against a candidate interpretation. Inclinations to rely on the semantic canons are also based on this assumption, although it is an assumption that the critics of the canons also share. I argue that this assumption is false because the semantic canons are a class of rules that are by nature not reason-giving. This provides a new ground against giving the semantic canons deliberative weight in questions of statutory interpretation.

(Forthcoming in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Penultimate draft).

RESUMEN
En este trabajo presentamos brevemente la lógica inductiva bayesiana objetiva, OBIL, propuesta por Jon Williamson (2017), y lo aplicamos a la argumentación jurídica, en especial, a la subsunción, a la presunción, a la analogía y a la ponderación. De modo que retomando la propuesta de Miró-Quesada Cantuarias (2000), se logra una mayor reducción metodológica que la planteada por él.
Palabras clave: subsunción, presunción, analogía, ponderación, reducción metodológica, lógica inductiva.

ABSTRACT
In the paper we briefly expose the objective Bayesian inductive logic, OBIL, proposed by Jon Williamson (2017), then we apply it to legal argumentations, especially to subsumption, presumption, analogy and balancing. Thus, picking up the Miró-Quesada Cantuarias’ proposal we achieve a mayor methodological reduction than him’s.
Key words: subsumption, presumption, analogy, balancing, inductive logic.

What do different concepts like true lie, bad luck, honest thief, old news, spacetime, glocalization, symplexity, sustainable development, constant change, soft law, substantive due process, pure law, bureaucratic efficiency and global justice have in common? What connections do they share with innumerable paradoxes, like the ones of happiness, time, globalization, sex, and of free will and fate?

Law in the Time of Oxymora provides answers to these conundrums by critically comparing the apparent rise in recent years of the use of rhetorical figures called "essentially oxymoronic concepts" (i.e. oxymoron, enantiosis and paradoxes) in the areas of art, science and law. Albeit to varying degrees, these concepts share the quality of giving expression to apparent contradictions. Through this quality, they also challenge the scientific paradigm rooted in the dualistic thinking and binary logic that is traditionally used in the West, as opposed to the East, where a paradoxical mode of thinking and fuzzy logic is said to have been cultivated.

Following a review of oxymora and paradoxes in art and various scientific writings, hundreds of "hard cases" featuring oxymora and a comprehensive review of the legal literature are discussed, revealing evidence suggesting that the present scientific paradigm of dualism alone will no longer be able to tackle the challenges arising from increasing diversity and complexity coupled with an apparent acceleration of change. Law in the Time of Oxymora reaches the surprising conclusion that essentially oxymoronic concepts may inaugurate a new era of cognition, involving the ways the senses interact and how we reason, think and make decisions in law and in life.

Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) that are being applied to legal efforts have raised controversial questions about the existent restrictions imposed on the practice-of-law. Generally, the legal field has sought to define Authorized Practices of Law (APL) versus Unauthorized Practices of Law (UPL), though the boundaries are at times amorphous and some contend capricious and self-serving, rather than being devised holistically for the benefit of society all told. A missing ingredient in these arguments is the realization that impending legal profession disruptions due to AI can be more robustly discerned by examining the matter through the lens of a framework utilizing the autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR). This paper explores a newly derived instrumental grid depicting the key characteristics underlying APL and UPL as they apply to the AILR autonomous levels and offers key insights for the furtherance of these crucial practice-of-law deb...

El presente articulo intenta responder algunos de los mas importantes interrogantes sobre la logica deontica, puesto que ha habido profundos malentendidos con respecto a su naturaleza y a la forma en que se diferencia de otros tipos de logica. Algunos de los problemas que se han abordado en este trabajo son: ?que entendemos cuando hablamos de logica deontica? ?Cual es su objeto de estudio? ?Es lo mismo que la logica juridica? ?Es mas deseable definir tal disciplina simplemente como logica del deber ser? ?Existe alguna diferencia entre normas y proposiciones normativas? Las respuestas a estos interrogantes permitiran arribar una nocion mas nitida de logica deontica y esclareceran su peculiar jurisdiccion conceptual.

En este trabajo me propongo indagar y explicitar el sistema de lógica deóntica esbozado por Georg Henrik von Wright en 1951. Esto es: analizar cuáles son sus presupuestos básicos; examinar si se trata de una lógica derivada de otras lógicas o si, por el contrario, se trata de una lógica totalmente novedosa e inédita para la época; explicitar cuáles son sus operadores, sus variables y sus conectivas, es decir, su nomenclatura; y finalmente, se observará cuáles son sus principios y leyes fundamentales. Asimismo, se examinará el problema principal que, según creemos, motivó el desarrollo de este sistema y, por último, se expondrán los caracteres generales de dicho sistema y se lo ubicará en la clasificación de lógicas no clásicas propuesta por Susan Haack en su obra Lógica divergente.

What do different concepts like true lie, bad luck, honest thief, old news, spacetime, glocalization, symplexity, sustainable development, constant change, soft law, substantive due process, pure law, bureaucratic efficiency and global justice have in common? What connections do they share with innumerable paradoxes, like the ones of happiness, time, globalization, sex, and of free will and fate?

Law in the Time of Oxymora provides answers to these conundrums by critically comparing the apparent rise in recent years of the use of rhetorical figures called "essentially oxymoronic concepts" (i.e. oxymoron, enantiosis and paradoxes) in the areas of art, science and law. Albeit to varying degrees, these concepts share the quality of giving expression to apparent contradictions. Through this quality, they also challenge the scientific paradigm rooted in the dualistic thinking and binary logic that is traditionally used in the West, as opposed to the East, where a paradoxical mode of thinking and fuzzy logic is said to have been cultivated.

Following a review of oxymora and paradoxes in art and various scientific writings, hundreds of "hard cases" featuring oxymora and a comprehensive review of the legal literature are discussed, revealing evidence suggesting that the present scientific paradigm of dualism alone will no longer be able to tackle the challenges arising from increasing diversity and complexity coupled with an apparent acceleration of change. Law in the Time of Oxymora reaches the surprising conclusion that essentially oxymoronic concepts may inaugurate a new era of cognition, involving the ways the senses interact and how we reason, think and make decisions in law and in life.

The main goal of the course consists in providing the basis to acquiring a full ability in analysing and interpreting legal sources by means of mastery in interpretive techniques, reasoning and argumentation. Another goal consists in acquiring consciousness about cultural and value aspects connected to the legal questions and, in general, to the jurist's function. 1. The main acquired knowledge will refer to contemporary theories of interpretation and legal reasoning, in their connection with the theory of legal sources. 2. The basic acquired abilities (that are the capacity of applying the acquired knowledge) will refer to the methodological and deontological questions connected with legal interpreters'work in today's pluralistic societies. Prerequisites Knowledge of legal terminology, ability to use a sound vocabulary of specialised terms, ability to read legal texts with understanding. Getting through the exam of Filosofia del diritto, Diritto costituzionale, and Istituzioni di diritto privato is a necessary condition for standing up to the test. Course programme The course will deal with the analysis of legal reasoning and interpretation in the judicial context. It pays attention to the proceeding of legal implementation. It analyses the issues about the modalities of interpreting and applying legal texts with reference to cases and the way by which interpreters find the proper statement. It provides with an analysis of legal sources, use of legal methods, reasoning, the role of logical control in interpretation, legal logic, ethics, effective implementation of rules from a sociological and legal point of view. Furthermore, the course aims at exploring new frontiers of the law: new phenomena which deeply affect contemporary legality. The fast development of Information Technology (IT) raises important questions about the identification of notions, principles and rules legitimizing the new technological practices. This radical change that requires an ongoing adjustment of the relation between law and technology calls into question the basics of contemporary legal culture. Basic notions such as "rights", "person" and "power" are continuously twisted in their meaning if compared with their legal origin; the revolution of new technologies induces the creation of a new lexicon, which acquires a theoretical and general relevance in legal language and interpretation in the age of cyberspace. In particular, the course consists of frontal and practical lessons for a total of 40 hours. At least 1 hour per week will be dedicated to the study and discussion of the relevant case law. The program is divided in four parts: PART I – Legal Theories and Concepts (12 hours): 1. The law as interpretative discourse; 2. Kelsen's General Legal Theory;