Private Authority

The paper addresses the role of multinational companies in changes of oil crisis governance structures along the public-private dimension in 1911 to 2009. Building on transaction cost economics, it argues that companies should seek a move to political governance, if asset specificity and uncertainty increase beyond a certain threshold. The paper presents results of a preliminary Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on important governance changes. It classifies these changes along two dimensions, namely level of hierarchy and involvement of public actors. It looks into the motives for companies to either support or obstruct these changes by conducting a QCA on changes in asset specificity and uncertainty. Using Stirling’s diversity concept, the paper operationalizes asset specificity roughly as low values in variety, balance and disparity of a supply portfolio. For data, it refers to the IEA’s World Oil Statistics and – for 1860 to 1971 – to the statistical compilation by Etemead and Luciani. Results of the long-term research project will increase our understanding of institutional dynamics in energy crisis governance and transnational public-private partnerships in general.

Twenty years ago, international cooperation against trafficking in persons was close to non-existent. This changed suddenly and irreversibly in 2000, with the signing of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (TIP), especially Women and Children. Since then, regional and bilateral cooperation initiatives on TIP have proliferated. In addition to these interstate agreements, recent years have witnessed the emergence and spread of novel forms of soft or voluntary rule making, developed by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and private actors. As a result, the governance of TIP has evolved from a state-centric regime to a transnational regime complex, in which public and private actors share responsibilities over various global governance tasks, including information sharing, standard setting and monitoring and evaluation. In seeking to map out and shed light on the different components of this transnational regime complex, the article proposes a typology of transnational governance initiatives and illustrates its usefulness with an original dataset of 58 private, and public-private schemes involved in various aspects of the governance of TIP. The article then considers the implications of this increasing institutional complexity for international efforts to stop human trafficking. I argue that despite these remarkable institutional transformations and the growing role of private actors, the implementation of TIP rules and norms remains uneven and driven by state interests. Notwithstanding the increasing participation of non-state actors and IGOs in the governance of TIP, states' security concerns and their reluctance to cooperate on migration issues continue to drive anti-trafficking policies worldwide.

This book provides a novel approach for understanding and analyzing transnational governance by private authorities. It brings together theoretical and empirical insights by introducing a new master concept: governance generating networks (GGN). These networks comprise three structural elements: (1) nodes of design, where global standards are developed; (2) forums of negotiation, where stakeholders discuss and negotiate the standards; and (3) sites of implementation, where global rules are transferred into concrete practices on the ground. This concept captures both transnational processes and local practices that take place in the sites of implementation, involving local actors and stakeholders as they react and adjust to the new global standards.The book focuses on forest governance through the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification scheme, investigating implementation of FSC standards in Russia. Using several case studies in which the GGN concept is used as an analytical tool, this study assesses how global governance through the FSC contributes to forest governance in Russia, and to what extent it fills an institutional void by giving voice to private actors and enabling them to foster sustainable forest management. Scholars of political science, sociology, and related disciplines as well as practitioners, such as NGO activists, company representatives, FSC experts, managers and auditors, will find valuable insights, both theoretical and empirical, in this empirically rich and theoretically innovative study.

ABSTRAK Meningkatnya transaksi cashless di seluruh dunia menunjukkan transisi sistem transaksi yang semakin terdigitalisasi. Transaksi biasa yang harus dilakukan dengan menggunakan pihak ketiga yang dipercaya seperti bank, agensi pemerintah dan semacamnya membutuhkan waktu yang lebih lama karena adanya proses administratif pada intermediaris tersebut. Munculnya bitcoin pada 2009 yang berlandaskan teknologi blockchain menghapus peran dari pihak ketiga yang dipercaya dalam bertransaksi sehingga memungkinkan semua orang untuk melakukan transaksi yang lebih cepat dengan pseudonym yang merahasiakan identitas pelaku transaksi. Popularitas penggunaan bitcoin dalam bertransaksi yang dimulai dari pasar gelap Silk Road kemudian muncul ke publik dan terus berkembang sehingga penggunaannya mulai diterapkan di transaksi-transaksi biasa pada perusahaan besar. Penggunaan yang semakin meluas ini kemudian menciptakan sebuah penerimaan umum akan bitcoin dan cryptocurrency lainnya sehingga pada akhirnya menciptakan komunitas pasar cryptocurrency yang independen dari kontrol negara. Pasar cryptocurrency ini secara langsung menyaingi otoritas negara dalam hal moneter dengan persetujuan yang diterima oleh aktor pasar untuk menggunakan cryptocurrency untuk terus melakukan kegiatan ekonomi. Kata-kata kunci: Pasar, cryptocurrency, bitcoin, otoritas The increase of cashless transaction all over the world shows a transition of transaction systmen which becoming more digitalized. Usual transactions are conducted by using trusted thirds parties such as banks, government agency, and others. These take more time for there are administrative steps to be taken on the intermediaries. The birth of bitcoin in 2009 based on blockchain technology eradicates the role of trusted third parties while doing transaction so that it may allow everyone to do faster transaction by using pseudonym which conceal the actors' identity of transaction. The popularity of bitcoin use in transaction which started in the Silk Road black market of deep web eventually bring emergence of bitcoin in public and its use kept increasing as well as the applications of it in private companies. The broadening of bitcoin use and other cryptocurrencies shaped some kind of general acceptance which then created a cryptocurrency market all over the world where state has no control over it. This cryptocurrency market directly challenges the state authority in monetary terms with the aggrements accepted by the market actors in using cryptocurrency while doing their economy activity.

Carbon markets are flourishing around the globe, created both by
governments and by nonstate actors. In this article, I investigate
when and why governments choose to interact with and use
private rules about carbon offsets in public regulatory arrangements.
The analysis demonstrates that there is “blurring” between
public and private authority, insofar that there are a multiple
interactions between the two spheres. However, a closer look
reveals that most of these are of a relatively weak nature, since
private standards are used for voluntary rather than compliance
purposes. To explain this trend, I use qualitative and quantitative
analysis and find that NGOs are the main catalysts for the interaction
between public and private rules. States are most likely to
interact with private regulations when they have large numbers of
NGOs active within their borders. In short, private authority is
largely a complement to public regulatory arrangements. While
previous work that suggests that private authority arises when
there are gaps in public rules, the analysis here

The number of eco-labeling schemes is rising dramatically, yet the rigor and credibility of such schemes remains uneven. Whereas some eco-labeling organizations (ELOs) comply with best practice guidelines designed to increase the credibility of their standards through attention to good operating principles, such as transparency and impartiality, others do not. Within this article, I attempt to explain this variation through multivariate regression analysis of an original cross-sectoral dataset of transnational ELO policies and practices. I find compelling evidence to suggest that ELOs with environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) partners, nonprofit structures, or broad transnational reach are most likely to comply with best practices. I also find that private ELOs are more likely to disregard best practices than public ones. Conversely, I find little evidence that levels of industry funding or sector-specific competition dynamics affect best practice compliance. This study contributes new data, a new method of comparison, and new findings to the growing literature on transnational governance.

Global law firms are one of the architects in the construction of international soft law norms. This paper looks for the characterization of these law firms on the global realm, with the purpose to identify the role as private authority in international law.

Las firmas globales de abogados se constituyen en uno de los arquitectos de la promulgación de normas de soft law en el derecho internacional. Este artículo pretende caracterizar los grandes bufetes de abogados a escala global y con ello identificar su papel de autoridad privada en derecho internacional.

Stakeholders who seek to reward or punish businesses for their environmental programs
often cannot observe these organizations’ internal policies and operations. To address these informational problems, and signal their beyond-compliance environmental commitments, some businesses are participating in voluntary environmental programs (VEPs). This article examines whether business managers associate the brand value of VEPs—due to their differing program sponsors—with the perceived preferences of their critical stakeholders. Drawing on a novel data set of nearly 300 organizations, we assess business’ participation in 19 government- and industry-sponsored VEPs. We find that managers who recognize the importance of stakeholder influences on their business’ environmental practices are more likely to participate in a VEP but that pressures from different stakeholders are associated with variations in organizations’ participation in either government- or industry-sponsored VEPs.

Abstract: Voluntary environmental programs (VEP) are institutions that encourage participating actors to produce environmental public goods beyond the requirements of government law. Drawing on the club approach to the study of VEPs, we identify four collective action challenges facing VEPs. First, sponsoring actors must be motivated to invest resources to create a VEP despite incentives to free ride on the efforts of others. Second, VEPs need to be designed to offer firms sufficient excludable incentive to join ...

This paper seeks to explain the success of two NGOs in creating standards for calculating and reporting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the level of an entire company. These emissions accounting standards, called the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, have been widely adopted by multinational firms, emissions reporting registries, and even an emissions trading scheme. The paper traces the widespread adoption of the standards, and then offers an explanation for this successful instance of private regulation. It presents a supply and demand model of private entrepreneurial authority—where private actors project authority without delegation by states. The two NGOs were successful rule-makers because they were able meet a demand for three benefits to potential users of the standard: reduced transaction costs, first-mover advantage, and an
opportunity to burnish their reputation as environmental leaders. The paper also explains the supply of private authority—that is, why we see entrepreneurial authority rather than delegation by states. The disagreement among developed countries on the appropriate role for emissions trading in the climate regime delayed action on developing firm-level accounting methodologies. Moreover, the relative weakness of the focal institution in the climate regime—the climate change Secretariat—meant that there was no obvious international organization to take up the task of creating new measurement tools.

Mining companies are increasingly seen as co-governors of sub-Saharan Africa’s gold mining industries, sharing sovereignty with states through private governance initiatives. Using interviews with company executives from the continent’s largest gold mining firms this paper highlights the private authority of these firms vis-à-vis the state. This paper firstly examines the globalization and governance literature, focusing on why states share sovereignty with non-state actors. Secondly, a “three faces of power” framework is employed to understand how authority is exercised. Thirdly, private governance regimes specific to the mining industry are outlined. Finally, individuals’ and firms’ attitudes towards these private governance regimes are examined through an analysis of elite interviews. The theoretical and empirical analysis demonstrates that firms are formulating rules in order to increase certainty and reduce investment risk. These firms are engaging in private governance initiatives to build reputations as industry experts thereby controlling the regulation of their sector, rather than sharing authority with states.

In recent years, International Political Economy literature on" politics beyond state" has emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in broader policy processes, both national and international. In addition to their impact on states, NGOs influence the policies of non-state actors such as firms via public and private politics. Dissatisfied with the progress firms have made in response to public regulation, NGOs have sponsored private authority regimes in several issue areas and pushed firms to participate ...