UNCLOS

It is a well-established principle of international law that applicable law provisions do not expand the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals. Nevertheless, UNCLOS tribunals have not uniformly conformed to this principle. In particular, the tribunals in M/V Saiga (No. 2), Guyana v. Suriname, and M/V Virginia G effectively invoked Article 293(1) to expand their jurisdiction. And although the tribunals in MOX Plant, Chagos, Arctic Sunrise, and Duzgit Integrity have stood by the principle, they all failed to recognize the legal error committed by the other three tribunals. This Comment argues that an express refutation of the erroneous jurisprudence is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of UNCLOS proceedings.

The recently passed law 14/2014 on Maritime Navigation is the most important source of regulation on this subject in Spanish law. Despite the positive impulse that this law implies in terms of a badly needed simplification and rationalization in a so far disperse and incoherent body of regulation, the approach taken by the legislator will nonetheless let down those expecting an improvement also in the technical quality of the law. In this short analysis, the authors review some of the most relevant elements of the new law and point at the main hurdles that practitioners and academics might find in its application.

Programme attached.

My presentation was titled 'The Indian Ocean, UNCLOS and Competing Continental Shelf Claims'.

Abstract

The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf was established to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea vis-à-vis the outer limits of the continental shelf. Several Indian Ocean littoral states have made submissions to the Commission. Hence, the purpose of the paper is to revisit these submissions, their progress and the implications of their outcomes for IORA. Besides this, the paper will attempt to offer recommendations to IORA and members states to resolve outstanding claims.

Submarine cables are the backbone of global telecommunications and the Internet. The UN General Assembly resolution has rightly recognised submarine cables as 'critical communications infrastructure'. The web of submarine cables traverses the maritime zones of several countries connecting people and businesses across the globe. In this network, India is located in a strategically and geographically significant position, where every cable system that connects Europe and South East Asia inevitably needs to transit. However, this paper notes that India's critical role is not supported by an efficient and expedient permitting system for cable repairs in India. Repairing within Indian jurisdiction requires permits from about seven Indian governmental authorities. Therefore, repair and restoration of the undersea cable network in the event of cable faults is time-consuming. This article examines international law that regulates submarine cables, the UNCLOS and the overarching Indian legislation and the implementing regulations that govern submarine cable repairs in the maritime areas under Indian jurisdiction. It analyses the Indian permit practice in light of the national legal framework. Finally, the article suggests best practices consistent with Indian and international law, and practice on cable repairs that India should follow.

The Bogotá Declaration of 1976, in which a series of equatorial states attempted to resist the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 by claiming sovereignty over geostationary orbit above their territories, presents a unique case that contradicts some assumptions about the use of commons-like regimes to correct asymmetric governance regimes. This case suggests the value of historical scholarship on colonialism and development to ongoing disputes in space law and in other regimes governing extraterritorial domains.

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law - The Bulletin, Dec. 2017.

http://jtl.columbia.edu/the-bogota-declaration-a-case-study-on-sovereignty-empire-and-the-commons-in-outer-space/

Recent concern over criminality and perceived impunity at sea (including inter alia piracy, IUU fishing, environmental crime) has resulted in a popular image of the high seas as a lawless space. Whilst there is clearly a considerable body of law that actually applies to the high seas under UNCLOS 1982 and elsewhere, if we instead focus on the freedom of the seas (mare liberum) and its regulatory consequences as encoded and perpetuated through UNCLOS, especially through the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction (EFSJ), the imagery of lawlessness has a great deal more resonance. Nevertheless, in this chapter I show how the EFSJ principle is far more limited, both conceptually and practically, than is often presumed. Indeed, despite the evident disincentives to effective enforcement that it arguably creates, it still leaves a great deal of room for proactive legislative and policy measures from port, coastal and flag states alike.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been, since

1994, the only globally recognised codification of rights and responsibilities of nations in

the international waters, also known as the high seas. For the purpose of this essay we

shall only consider Part VII (High Seas) of UNCLOS, as the international cyberspace is in

many ways comparable to the international waters, and their security regulations, as we

will see throughout the essay, pose many similar challenges. Within Part VII of UNCLOS

the following two relevant themes arise (clustered by author): inclusive and safe usage and

navigation of the high seas (Art. 87-94, 97) and suppression of piracy and other criminal

acts in the high seas (Art. 100-109, 111)

purposes of relevant concepts (free navigation, illegal acts, aggression, etc.) as well as to

consider the rights and responsibilities of the nation states between those applicable in

international waters and in cyberspace.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is considered as the universal legal regulator towards maritime spaces and resources. However, many states are directly and indirectly violating its basic Articles and political practice of. This situation gives background for the main question of this book: has the UNCLOS become a genuine «Constitution» of the Seas; would the regime, generated by it, remain unchanged in the new international conditions?

Throughout the past decades, the legal framework governing Indonesia's maritime regime has experienced various changes. This is apparent during the enactment of the 1957 Djuanda Declaration and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) when the novel concept of archipelagic State was introduced. This paper reviewed the historical development of this concept up until the recent issue of designating archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) in Indonesia. Dubbing this issue as the epilogue of Indonesia's journey towards archipelagic statehood, this paper focuses on (1) the importance of designating ASL for archipelagic States, (2) the kind of considerations that pose challenge to its designation and (3) how these challenges have particularly affected Indonesia's reluctance to open ASL routes which are internationally sanctioned, particularly with regards to the East-West route. This paper found that such hardship stems from the lack of clarity in relevant UNCLOS clauses on archipelagic States as well as from the inherent rivalry between flag and coastal States. Security concerns have also been crucial in explaining Indonesia's reluctance to fully abide by international demand. The paper ended with some possible pathways and policy recommendations that Indonesia may take with regards to its ASL regime.

Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
Case : United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland v. Iceland,
Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland
สิทธิการขยายเขตอำนาจทางทะเลของรัฐชายฝั่งอย่างมีเงื่อนไข และ
การพัฒนาหลักการสู่การบัญญัติไว้ในอนุสัญญาสหประชาชาติว่าด้วยกฎหมายทะเล ค.ศ. ๑๙๘๒ (UNCLOS A.D. 1982) - ศุภณัฐ ปัญศิริ

This short article foregrounds the material infrastructure underlying the global data economy to highlight its entanglement with technological, legal, and social orders. It traces how cables helped shape political thought in the nineteenth century and were in turn shaped by imperial dynamics. Then it discusses the material turn in international law and how it provides ways for reimagining international law’s effects on everyday life. Finally, it discusses how cables have become sites where power and contestation play out, the relationship of international law to undersea cables, and how they have mutually shaped each other. It ends with some thoughts on denaturalizing the relationship between undersea cables, international law, and the global data economy.

The advent of automation and control technologies is capable of redefining the
traditional modalities for performing human activities at sea. Due to their
implementation in the maritime field, the activity of navigation does not necessarily
require anymore the presence of people on board; nowadays, a ship may be automatized
and controlled directly from the shore. This paper investigates whether and how the use
of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) complies with the existing
international rules on safety of navigation. After a short introduction, section 2 provides
a general overview of the design and production of MASS, focusing on their technical
and ergonomic features. Then, section 3 reconstructs the international legal framework
object of analysis. Subsequently, section 4 analyzes the potential inconsistencies of SOLAS, STCW and COLREGs provisions in regulating the use of MASS, paying
particular attention to the relevance of the temporal factor in interpreting written
norms. Finally, the last pages of this study report the most relevant conclusions reached
through the conduction of the above conducted legal analysis.

Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku Mahkemesi, 1982 tarihli Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi tarafından oluşturulan uluslararası nitelikli bir yargı kuruluşudur. Mahkeme; ulaşım serbestisi, gemilerin ve mürettebatının derhal serbest bırakılması, deniz çevresinin korunması, nükleer bir tesisin işletilmesi, radyoaktif maddelerin taşınması, balık avlama faaliyetleri, uyrukluk talepleri, uluslararası hukukta kuvvet kullanma faaliyetlerinin uygulanması, kesintisiz takip gibi deniz hukuku ile ilgili uyuşmazlıkların çözülmesi amacıyla kurulmuştur. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası uyuşmazlıkların barışçı çözümünü sağlayacak bir mekanizma olarak kuruluşundan günümüze kadar faaliyet gösteren Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku Mahkemesi uygulamalarının başarı düzeyinin değerlendirilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Mahkeme’nin yargı yetkisi kapsamına giren uyuşmazlıklara söz konusu olan davalar genel olarak uluslararası hukuk, özel olarak da deniz hukuku açısından incelenecektir

Europe is currently confronted with a unique challenge and a remarkable opportunity! A challenge and opportunity faced also by countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, EU-member and non-EU alike. For the first time ever in Europe’s energy history, the EU is guaranteed an uninterrupted supply of a traditional energy source: The already confirmed and estimated discoveries of substantial hydrocarbon deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean can be complimented by the scientifically estimated deposits within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Greece and in particular those that lie south and southwest of the island of Crete.

The estimated Greek hydrocarbon deposits complete the European energy puzzle as they contribute to a now more than possible (long-term) scenario that envisages an Israel-Cyprus-Greece-Italy pipeline network, dictating a transit route that avoids non-EU countries and thus guaranteeing an uninterrupted energy supply source for the EU, of the EU.

Sustainable fisheries demands the eradication of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The first legally-binding treaty at the global level to target IUU fishing, the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), places the implementation of port state measures at its heart. Apart from article 218 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), port state jurisdiction (PSJ) is the largely customary jurisdiction applied against visiting foreign vessels in or on their way to port. This raises questions for the international legal bases and law of the sea limitations when port state measures are implemented to address foreign extraterritorial IUU fishing. A doctrinal synthesis, analysis and restatement of PSJ will remove current legal ambiguities that may be inhibiting international law’s development. Legal positivism provides the theoretical stance underpinning the methods employed in this manuscript. Port state measures at the global, regional and state level are collected and analysed through the lenses of state jurisdiction and the law of the sea regime. By examining the case of port state measures concerning (in-part) extraterritorial foreign vessel conduct, this manuscript demonstrates that emerging trends of ‘territorial extension’ found within the international law of jurisdiction are equally applicable to port offences. The territorial element of in-port conduct is crafted as the offence for the question of jurisdiction, yet defined extraterritorial conduct remains an essential underlying element triggering the territorial offence. On the other hand, prescribing and enforcing conditions of port privilege must be separated into a domaine réservé-based exception to state jurisdiction if territoriality is to maintain any integrity as an ordering nexus. Both must be exercised in compliance with the rather specific, and therefore narrow, limits and safeguards of the law of the sea. For port state measures the limits include the treaty-based obligations to prescribe and enforce certain conditions of port privilege. These minimum standards are now generally accepted and of increasing global application. This manuscript incorporates an example from the law of the sea into the debate on what the positive law of territorial jurisdiction is. It will therefore be of interest to not only academics, scholars and practitioners within the fields of port state enforcement, fisheries regulation and the law of the sea, but more generally to those concerned with the law of jurisdiction.

The contribution of geopolitics in understanding of the maritime territorial disputes and the
emergence of the Liberal Institutionalism as a useful tool for resolving such disputes are the
main issues that this paper is dealing with. We will analyze the ability of a coastal state to assert rights on its Exclusive Economic Zone. This theme becomes complex when this activity is taking place in a region where a lot of particularities are occurring. According to UNCLOS, an EEZ is an area, which reaches until 200 nm from the baseline, it starts after the territorial sea with which is adjacent, in this area states have rights on the living and non living beings and in the natural resources,. Mediterranean is a semi-enclosed sea, which has special status in the UNCLOS and the distance between the states is less than 400 nm, and so overlapping claims are taking place. Everything started, in the end of 90s when oil and gas were found in the region. The discovery of semantic hydrocarbon deposits in Eastern Mediterranean created new challenges apart from opportunities. RoC has claimed its own Exclusive Economic Zone and has already sign bilateral agreements for the delimitation of Egypt in 2003, with Lebanon in 2007 and with Israel in 2010. Turkey criticizes all the time these actions, arguing that it didn’t consider the Turkish-Cypriot rights and jurisdiction over the maritime areas of the island and Turkey’s continental shelf. To understand the case, the theory of geopolitics will be used, along with its three more relevant attributes: Natural resources, Territory and Power Distribution. Moving to the main part of the paper there is an analysis that advocates Liberal Institutionalism and institutions, with EU being the major one, as key factor for a solution to be found.

The Arctic Ocean remains one of the last frontier regions on earth
to be explored and exploited. “However, due to [climate
change], technological advances, and declining stocks of global
resources, increasing interest and activity in the Arctic is underway.”1
This renewed interest in the Arctic has sparked a new vigor by the
littoral states,2 whose shores border our world’s smallest and most
northern ocean, and by the technologically able non-Arctic states, who
are anxious for access to vast resources beneath the ice-laden surface
of the region.3
The Arctic Ocean isn’t currently governed by any form of
comprehensive, multilateral, and legal framework recognized by the
Arctic nations because, historically, it was never expected to become a
navigable waterway or a site for large-scale, commercial development.4
Recent attempts by the United Nations to address this issue have come
away without ratification by all Arctic nations.5
Scott G. Borgerson (International Affairs Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations and a former Lieutenant Commander in the U.S.
Coast Guard) reports that the Arctic ice caps are melting fast because
of global warming, which is creating access to natural resources and
enabling shortcuts for ships. Additionally, the area does not have any
clear, governing rules, so the Arctic may become an area of armed
conflict. Thus, the United States must form a multilateral, diplomatic
solution.

“The ultimate problem involving the access and sovereignty rights
to the [Arctic Ocean’s seabed] is one of ‘command and control.’ ”7
Namely, who should control access to the vast untapped reserves of
energy and mineral resources the region potentially offers the world,
and similarly, who, if any, should control the important shipping access
to the region?

The earth is materially a watery planet, with 70% of its periphery veiled by water. Though geographically partitioned and labeled as continents, islands, seas and oceans, the earth, when observed from space, seems as an immense body of water dissipated with inferior land masses. The world's oceans thus provide a common segment for the most nations whose shorelines are washed by their waters. Despite these universal characteristics, however, this last frontier of the earth had become an arena for controversy over such matters as fishing rights and varying claims of national precinct, exploitation of deep sea mineral resources, obligation for the conservation of the environment, the right of innocent passage of ships, and free entrance to the ocean for landlocked countries.

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) announced its highly anticipated award on the Philippines’ case against China’s claims in the South China Sea. However China declared that it would accept neither the tribunal’s proceedings, conducted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), nor the award itself. Even though China remained absent throughout the arbitration process, the issued award has had an impact on the conflict as well as on the future of international law itself. Since the Philippines first invoked the tribunal in late 2013, both states have increasingly accused each other of violating international law. Observers tend to use the term “lawfare” in reference to the current relationship between the two states. I will argue that the use of this neologism — a combination of “law” and “warfare” — appears to be a double-edged sword in the context of this dispute. As an analytical tool, lawfare is useful to understand that by invoking international law, military objectives — for example reclamation of territory, access or denial of access to waters — are achievable. The concept may even have a positive impact on international law, as long as the phenomenon to which it refers unfolds within the rule of law. Nevertheless, one has to reflect in a critical manner on a bourgeoning normative and political instrumentalization of the term. While lawfare as an analytical tool is revealing of today’s power reach of international law, the strategic use of this term is at the same time paradoxically also a burden to the future rule of law.

Since 2000, the actions as well as articulations by the stakeholders in the South China Sea (SCS), by those directly involved (claimants) and some with strategic stakes (indirectly), have become particularly assertive. This has led to rising tensions and the serial/frequent occurrences of incidents of confrontationist nature are symbolic of deteriorating regional security environment. The SCS disputes are long-standing with two interesting mixes. Firstly, the combination of history, cartography, and, varying interpretations of doctrines and norms for inter-state delimitation by each claimant. The second mix is the complex web of overlapping, intersecting and intermeshed nature of these claims with varying degrees of sovereignty, territoriality and maritime entitlement implications. This main issues examined are some salient aspects of extant legal framework for deconstructing the sovereignty, territoriality and sovereign rights through the perspective of codified/treaty law and the case law. This paper (pre-publication draft with a few minor typos) forms a chapter of recent;y published edited volume titled "Maritime Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific".

Issues of territorial disputes has been the norms in inter-and extra-regional relations, especially if it involves " invading " the sovereignty of another country. Countries around the world are defined and outlined by the term " border ", be it land, sea or air. Land borders are easy to justify, defined and marked; whilst airspace can also be justifiable through demarcation on agreed air territory. But maritime borders, especially maritime space is very hard to determine. Many countries resolve to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in justifying maritime disputes but some resolve in " defiance " diplomacy: first flag in the disputed area, wins. This paper will examine the issues and challenges of maritime space security and its impacts on national sovereignty, and by referring to the issue specific in the South China Sea.

El Estrecho de Gibraltar es uno de los estrechos internacionales de mayor tráfico marítimo del mundo, que constituye la llave de comunicación del mar Mediterráneo y el Océano Atlántico, así como del continente africano y el europeo. Atendiendo a los espacios marinos proclamados por sus Estados ribereños puede afirmarse que la mayoría de sus aguas están sometidas a la soberanía de estos últimos al formar parte de sus aguas interiores o mar territorial. Precisamente por estas características y por el hecho de que comunica las ZEE de España, Portugal y Marruecos en el atlántico con la de ZEE de éste último y alta mar en el Mediterráneo, puede afirmarse que cae dentro de la categoría de estrechos internacionales regulado en el artículo 37 de la CNUDM y queda, por tanto, sometido al régimen de derecho de paso en tránsito.
España y Marruecos estuvieron de acuerdo en la defensa de la regla del derecho de paso inocente en el seno de la III Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar. Sin embargo, la posición de ambos países fue evolucionando hasta aceptar el nuevo régimen aplicable, el derecho de paso en tránsito. Marruecos pasó por tres etapas: el rechazo del statu especial aplicable al Estrecho derivado de la Convención de 1904, la aplicación de la regla del paso inofensivo y finalmente la aceptación de derecho de paso en tránsito. En este último caso, conviene indicar que la aceptación de Marruecos ha sido implícita, ya que al día de hoy no ha ratificado la CNUDM, a diferencia de España, que no solo la ha ratificado, sino que ha realizado declaraciones interpretativas en relación con el régimen de derecho de paso en tránsito.
Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña, sin embargo, siempre mantuvo una posición muy distinta a España y Marruecos en relación con la navegación en el Estrecho, más cercana a las de las grandes potencias navales que a la de los Estados ribereños y manifestándose favorable desde un principio al nuevo régimen.
Por lo que a la definición de los espacios marinos se refiere, cabe señalar que la situación de las aguas del estrecho presenta no pocos problemas, debido a los distintos puntos de vista que los Estados afectados tienen de una misma realidad: la colonia de Gibraltar en el caso de Reino Unido y España; la ciudad de Ceuta y la isla del Perejil en el supuesto de España y Marruecos. De esta forma, se da la paradoja de que estos tres Estados reclaman desde posiciones muy distintas aguas territoriales, provocando una gran indeterminación por lo que a los límites de los espacios marinos se refiere en su parte oriental: a) El Reino Unido, que defiende su soberanía en la parte nor-oriental más allá de las aguas del puerto, situación que no admite España, b) España que considera que sólo hay dos Estados ribereños, negando cualquier delimitación de las aguas con otro Estado que no sea Marruecos y c) Marruecos que mantiene reivindicaciones sobre los territorios españoles en la costa africana, negando la existencia de aguas españolas a su alrededor, y considerado que la delimitación se debe hacer sin tener en cuenta aquellos, planteamiento que rechaza España. Esta indeterminación, sin embargo, no afecta al paso por el estrecho, aunque no puede negarse que la celebración de acuerdos de delimitación coadyuvaría a una mayor cooperación internacional en la zona.

This paper aims to explore the UNCLOS’ environmental protection clause in its applications to the Montara oil spill by assessing Australia’s conduct in the case and its obligation as a state party of the UNCLOS, and explore whether the Convention provides means for Indonesia to seek for compensation of damages from the spill. The UNCLOS could not apply directly to legal entities nor it regulates on States obligation against legal entities, therefore claims made by Indonesia based on the UNCLOS will not be directed to PTTEPAA, as initially desired, but Australia. This paper is a humble attempt to understand how the UNCLOS’ protection of marine environment is applied in a dispute of transboundary oil pollution in terms of conduct prescribed in the UNCLOS for its State party, in this case Australia, and how does compensation of pollution regulated under the Convention.

It is a well-established principle of international law that applicable law provisions do not expand the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals. Nevertheless, UNCLOS tribunals have not uniformly conformed to this principle. In particular, the tribunals in M/V Saiga (No. 2), Guyana v. Suriname, and M/V Virginia G effectively invoked Article 293(1) to expand their jurisdiction. And although the tribunals in MOX Plant, Chagos, Arctic Sunrise, and Duzgit Integrity have stood by the principle, they all failed to recognize the legal error committed by the other three tribunals. This Comment argues that an express refutation of the erroneous jurisprudence is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of UNCLOS proceedings.

The purpose of this investigation is to assess the historical implications of and potential future outcomes for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the East China Sea between Japan, China (People’s Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China). The focus of the research is on the role of international organizations, particularly the United Nations and affiliated entities, in escalating and supporting resolution of the dispute.

The existing architecture to ensure sustainable development in the high seas in the Indian Ocean exhibits numerous shortcomings. This policy brief addresses the most pressing gaps and proposes a set of policy recommendations, including specific first steps that ought to be taken in the near future. These include Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as part of spatial management of fisheries, the possibilities of creating new or expanding existing governance instruments, and enhancing enforcement measures that are required to make a multilateral, comprehensive governance instrument for the Indian Ocean effective. The policy brief argues that
more advanced forms of governance of regional seas need to be established that will support better cooperation and communication between governments and wider stakeholder communities. Furthermore, sustainable development in the Indian Ocean requires a well-functioning framework that is geographically inclusive and
covers a wide range of species. Developing countries should be given assistance in this process and the private sector, the scientific community as well as local communities should be fully involved. Monitoring, control, and surveillance of any areas covered in existing and future treaties (including MPAs) will also depend on countries and the private sector working together. Uniform standards for fisheries are dependent on effective data collection and reporting, requiring a commitment from all parties involved to gather and share this information. Together, these recommendations aim to create an inclusive and cooperative governance structure for the Indian Ocean in the service of blue growth.

Events such as the UK-Iceland "Cod Wars" and the Peruvian and Chilean seizure of American tuna boats brought fishery and maritime issues to international prominence in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, armed conflicts have erupted over maritime issues between such advanced industrialized democracies as Canada and Spain. Several solutions have been proposed to manage the increasingly contentious world of maritime claims. Stemming from the literature on common property resources, solutions focus on authority, privatization, and institutions. Two primary mechanisms for resolving competing maritime claims are evaluated in this paper: 1) the creation of private ownership of maritime zones in the form of Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs), and 2) the creation of an institution, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to establish standards for maritime claims and resolve disputes. Privatization may promote long-term cooperation and more efficient extraction ...

The nature of legal personality is relative when it comes to the issue of ships. It is mostly accepted that a ship possesses corporate personality by creating a legal fiction under domestic laws. Ships lack legal personality in international law, but their rights and obligations flow directly from the rights and duties their parent state enjoys under international law. This work seeks to explain the concept of legal personality concerning ships and also highlights the primary international legal instrument that provides the nature of duties to be carried out by flag states.

The article analyzes the rationale, context, and implications of the Philippines' landmark arbitration case in the South China Sea. Specifically, it evaluates four important and interrelated issues: (i) the centrality of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to the peaceful management and, if possible, resolution of the South China Sea disputes; (ii) political and strategic factors, which convinced the Aquino administration to embark on a risky and uncertain legal warfare (lawfare) strategy against Beijing, which, in turn, vehemently opposed any third party arbitration visa -vis maritime and territorial disputes; (iii) the merits, outcome, and strategic implications of the Southeast Asian country's arbitration case on the broader geopolitical landscape in the region; and lastly, the divergent South China Sea strategy of the Duterte administration, which decided to soft-pedal and sublimate the arbitral tribunal award in favor of a dialogue-based resolution of the disputes.

Kıta sahanlığı, coğrafi olarak kara ülkesinin deniz altında devam eden doğal uzantısını, hukuki olarak karasularının ötesinde başlayıp belirli bir uzaklık ve derinliğe kadar süren deniz yatağı ve toprak altındaki bölgeyi ifade etmektedir. Bu bölge, devletlerin deniz yatağı ve toprak altındaki doğal kaynakların araştırılması ve işletilmesine imkan vermekte, devletlere belirli ölçülerde ve kurallarda münhasır haklar tanımaktadır. Fakat, kıyıları bitişik veya karşılıklı olan devletler arasında kıta sahanlığının dış sınırı ile yan sınırının tespit edilmesi ve sınırlandırılması, egemen haklarını kullanabilmeleri açısından komşu devletler arasında uyuşmazlıklara sebep olmaktadır. Kıta sahanlığı konusunda ortaya çıkan uyuşmazlıklar, ya uluslararası sözleşmeler uyarınca taraflar arasında diplomasi yoluyla ya da yargı ve hakemlik kararları tarafından hukuksal yöntemle çözüme kavuşturulmaktadır. Günümüze kadar kıta sahanlığı sınırlandırmasına dair birçok dava çözümlenmiştir. Söz konusu davalar, hem kıta sahanlığına ilişkin ilke ve kuralların uygulanması, hem de bu uygulamalar sonucu yeni ilkelerin yerleşmesi açısından önem arz etmektedir. Kıta sahanlığının coğrafi ve hukuksal açıdan tanımlandığı, kıta sahanlığının sınırlandırılmasına ilişkin uluslararası deniz hukuku kurallarının analiz edildiği bu çalışma, günümüze kadar Uluslararası Adalet Divanı ve hakemlik mahkemelerinde karara bağlanan başlıca kıta sahanlığı davalarını dile getirmektedir. Bu kapsamda, kıta sahanlığı konusunda uluslararası yargı hakemlik kuruluşları önüne gelen uyuşmazlıklar, gerek hukukun genel ilkeleri ve gerekse uluslararası deniz hukuku kuralları temel alınarak incelenmiştir.

Despite systemic internal and external differences, Australia and China have shown striking similarities in their pursuit of disputed maritime resource and jurisdictional claims. This high-stakes area of international politics is governed by a codified, globally accepted international legal regime (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), making it an important case for examining the relationship between states' foreign policies and the 'rules-based international order'. In the South China Sea, Beijing is haunted by the legacy of its strong geopolitically driven support for an expansive law of the sea regime in the 1970s.