Augusto C . Dall'Agnol

Queda e Ascensão da Rússia brinda os seus leitores em um ano que marca os 30 anos da Federação Russa e da Guerra do Golfo. Espera-se que esta obra satisfaça os interesses pessoais e acadêmicos de seus leitores a partir de uma visão ponderada acerca do papel da Rússia no sistema internacional. Isso porque não são raras as interpretações demasiadamente russofóbicas em torno do assunto em análise — especialmente após o envolvimento russo na crise da Ucrânia e na guerra civil da Síria. De forma similar, evita-se a retórica russófila acerca da necessidade de um mundo multipolar. Finalmente, este livro enfatiza o contínuo papel da competição interestatal e das elites políticas em torno da queda e ascensão da Rússia ao longo desses 30 anos, a fim de evitar determinismos tecnológicos e econômicos. Diante disso, o leitor tem em suas mãos uma obra transversal que oferece material tanto àqueles interessados em elementos teórico-metodológicos quanto àqueles interessados em aspectos específicos do processo de construção do Estado russo e de suas reformas militares.

Red Arctic provides a comprehensive examination of Russia’s Arctic policies, particularly under President Vladimir Putin’s leadership. Rather than following the expected narrative of an imminent Arctic conflict or Russia’s pursuit of dominance, Elizabeth Buchanan skilfully asserts that Moscow’s strategy in the region is fundamentally one of cooperation. She compellingly underscores the significance of cooperative efforts and demonstrates the Arctic’s importance for Russia’s strategic objectives and economic interests. Throughout the book, the author considers the realities of the Cold War period and its implications for the region.

Since the early 1990s, there has been a renewed interest in Russia's traditional strategic thinking. This has been accompanied by significant bias from western scholars who regularly misunderstand Soviet and Russian strategic thinking. Ofer Fridman's first book Russian hybrid warfare (London: Hurst, 2018) provided an original contribution to this debate and his latest book, Strategiya: the foundations of the Russian art of strategy is equally timely and relevant. His effort to translate, for the first time, six Russian strategic thinkers from prerevolutionary Russia provides a great contribution to those interested in understanding current Russian strategic thinking.

Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare present the reader with a clear and elegant understanding of artificial intelligence as it provides a robust technical foundation concerning key technological advances in the evolution of AI for a non-technical audience. The author emphasizes that artificial intelligence is a force multiplier for both offense and defense capabilities – despite the paradoxical underdeveloped nature of counter AI capabilities.

"War in Space" is unquestionably a must-read book to all those interested in spacepower beyond Netflix’s Space Force series. By combining a robust critical view on former spacepower theories with his deep understanding of the “continental school”, Bowen now offers the public a vigorous and brand-new Clausewitzian spacepower theory that definitely establishes itself side by side with previous well-known contributions on the field, such as those of Dolman, Sheehan and Klein.

In 2008, Russia began to implement its largest military reform since the creation of the Red Army in 1918. Previous attempts at reforms in 1992, 1997, and 2003 did not result in fundamental transformations to the country's military. Why was the 2008 military reform successful while others were not? This article uses the comparative-historical method to identify the causal mechanisms between Russia's level of external threat, state capacity, and internal balancing strategies adopted since 1991. It advances Neoclassical Realism's systemic and unit-level variables by building on the long-established contributions from Strategic Studies and Historical Sociology instead of relying on other International Relations theories. It concludes that the success of Russia's military reforms in the post-Cold War period depended on the simultaneous existence of three conditions: the possibility of disrupting strategic stability, its ability to extract and mobilize societal resources, and the presence of some event of proven ineffectiveness. Under scenarios in which only one or two of these conditions were present, Russia carried out only partial military reforms. The article sheds light on three often-neglected drivers of Russia's military reform by Western analysts: its enduring emphasis on interstate competition, strategic stability, and mid-to-high intensity conventional warfare.

The burden-sharing debate has been a main issue for NATO since its creation. Even during the Cold War, the United States repeatedly demanded a more equal burden-sharing formula within NATO, although it never carried out its threats to disengage from the Alliance. Scholars have developed alliance models and collective-action theories to address the issue. Nonetheless, there are few dialogues between security and political economy perspectives. This article advances such discussion by proposing the incorporation of a bargaining conceptual framework since members of an alliance have to make decisions taking into account historical and geographic contingencies. Hence, it addresses the organization’s decision-making process and common budget as well NATO’s burden-sharing historical experience. Finally, it draws conclusions and raises problems concerning defense-burden in NATO and the future prospects of this debate within a changing geopolitical scenario.

This article explains changes in strategic stability through a path dependence framework, discussing its antecedent conditions, increasing returns, cleavages, critical junctures, reactive sequences, and legacy. We identify the leading causes of its formation, reproduction, modification, and, eventually, its end. Such an analysis is relevant as far as we observe significant changes in cornerstone’s aspects of strategic stability after the abrogation of the ABM Treaty and the INF Treaty. We argue that strategic stability as an institution passes through radical modifications produced by reactive sequences breaking the causal loop that allowed its reproduction since its formation.

O presente artigo analisa as contradições da manutenção da ordem liberal em um cenário de retorno de competição entre grandes potências. Apesar da atual crise na ordem liberal, entende-se que tal crise seja acompanhada também de um movimento de mudanças materiais na estrutura sistêmica. Em termos materiais, a possibilidade do fim do comando dos comuns e da existência de zonas contestadas cede espaço ao retorno de esferas de influência, com implicações diretas para a ordem internacional. Neste sentido, analisa-se a relação entre mudanças na ordem liberal e o crescente processo de endogenização de componentes críticos e de cadeias de suprimentos globais por parte dos Estados Unidos e China, a partir de documentos oficiais, relatórios e aspectos empíricos. Em suma, a crise da ordem liberal é fruto de mudanças materiais do sistema internacional e as diferentes respostas de diferentes países frente ao aumento da competição interestatal terão efeitos duradouros na própria reordenação da ordem vindoura.

Through a critical bias, this article aims to analyze the implications of unipolarity for balancing behavior. In order to do so, it discusses the dynamics of balance of power theory, assumed to be inoperative in the post-Cold War period by main academic debates over unipolarity: i) unipolar stability; ii) balance of threats; iii) soft balancing; iv) liberal institutionalism. We argue that these approaches, including the unipolar illusion view, tied to the balance of power theory, overestimate the effects of unipolarity on balancing behavior of other states. In this sense, we assume here that issues related to the unipolar moment are directly connected to discussions on hegemonic interregnum. Concluding that balance of power dynamics, especially those of hard balancing, are still observed in the post-Cold War era, we criticize two main conclusions from the literature: i) that balancing became inoperative and; ii) that the only available strategies to other states are soft balancing and bandwagoning. In sum, this conclusion has directly implication on strategies available both to the United States and to its main competitors.

O presente trabalho busca descrever e analisar um possível “retorno geopolítico”, consensual na literatura norte-americana, da Rússia na América Latina. Para isso, divide-se o artigo em duas partes principais. Na primeira seção, apresenta-se um breve histórico da cooperação técnico-militar entre a Rússia e alguns países da América Latina no pós-Guerra Fria. Investiga-se, nesse sentido, o desenvolvimento bilateral no que tange principalmente à exportação de equipamentos militares russos para os países latino-americanos. Na segunda seção, destaca-se o relacionamento bilateral entre a Rússia e o Brasil no que se refere à cooperação militar. Nesse sentido, apresenta-se um breve histórico das relações diplomáticas entre os dois países, no intuito de elucidar o contexto do desenvolvimento da “parceria estratégica” entre Moscou e Brasília. Além disso, no limiar desta parceria, procura-se explorar os principais acordos bilaterais em matéria de defesa e os entraves que impedem uma cooperação mais efetiva nesta área. Por fim, o artigo encerra-se com algumas observações finais.

El presente artículo aborda la hipótesis, generalizada en la literatura de EUA, del «retorno geopolítico» de Rusia a Latinoamérica. Para hacerlo, el artículo está dividido en dos secciones principales. En la primera sección, se presenta una breve historia de la cooperación técnico-militar entre Rusia y algunos países latinoamericanos después de la Guerra Fría. En este respecto, se analiza el desarrollo de las exportaciones bilaterales de equipamiento militar ruso a Latinoamérica. En la segunda sección, se destacan las relaciones bilaterales entre Rusia y Brasil en cuanto a la cooperación militar. Se ofrece una visión general de sus relaciones diplomáticas, clarificando el contexto en que en que se estableció la «asociación estratégica» entre Moscú y Brasilia. Además, se intenta explorar los acuerdos bilaterales principales sobre los asuntos de defensa y los obstá- culos que dificultan la cooperación eficaz en esta área. Se concluye el artículo con algunos comentarios finales.

On March 1st, 2018 Putin made its yearly statement at the Federal Assembly of Russia. The reactions of international specialist were diverse, mostly because of the emphasis given in the address to the new line of weaponry developed by the country: hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles nuclear-powered, undersea drones nucleararmed and nuclear-powered, and other diversity of equipment were presented to the world. The major discussion between those scholars is related to the responsibility, both of Russia and the U.S., in possibly triggering another arms race. Most analysis focus on a short-term view of the events, especially on empirical facts and, therefore, lacking a theoretical frame to evaluate the situation. This paper seeks to understand the dynamics that resulted in the precipitation of this new competition, using theories that embrace internal balancing, military emulation, innovation and offsetting. Our focus is then, less a description of what was addressed by Putin, and more a theoretical review of the impacts of the deployment of such weaponry for the international politics.

The question that guides this paper is: how Russia and the world order are described by the american Think Tank Council
on Foreign Relations? The main hypothesis is that: the discursive patterns of CFR toward Russia and the world order are associated
with its liberal values and consequently seek to shape them into these values. Therefore, the main objective of this work is to
describe and analyze how Putin’s Russia and the liberal order are represented in thematic Foreign Affairs magazine published by
the CFR. In addition, there is two specific objectives: i) analyze the patters of consensus and discursive dissent about both themes
in each of the dossiers and; ii) anaylze the hypotheses that could be related to the predominance of a givern discursive pattern
observed in the dossiers. The work is justified insofar as: i) there is a moment of change in the Relations of the United States with
Russia and the world order and; ii) it seeks to analyze the discursive production of a Think tank that has great influence in the
agenda setting of the foreign policy of the United States.

The rise of China and power transition: conflict among the neorealist and the neoliberal theories Augusto César Dall'Agnol 2 RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é comparar duas abordagens teóricas sobre a ascensão da China e a possível transição de poder decorrente da mesma, especificamente as perspectivas de Joseph S. Nye e John J. Mearsheimer. Expor-se-á, portanto, as distintas abordagens em relação a ascensão chinesa e aos reajustes de poder no sistema internacional. ABSTRACT This article focuses on the rise of China and the power transition through the two main approaches that the international relations theories have about this subject, specifically from Joseph S. Nye and John J. Mearsheimer. Finally, this paper shows the diferents approaches about the rise of China and the rearrange of power in the international system.

As the world enters a new era of great power competition, many of the illusions created by unipolarity are fading away. After the Cold War and under unipolarity, liberal internationalism and primacy strategies of the United States aimed at rendering balance of power dynamics inactive failed. Here I analyze the changing theoretical divide between competing American grand strategies. Despite many scholars claiming that “America first” resembles a strategy of primacy or neo-isolationism, I argue that it is revealing itself to be a balance of power strategy. Contrary to what its critics advocate, I also argue that this adjustment in strategy adequately fits current structural changes and is not an irrational strategy, although it carries its own risks in a world of intense interstate competition.

The broader subject of this study relates to the reasons why states emulate the military technologies and organizational structures one another. It focuses on large-scale emulation, those that encompasses the entire military system, instead of the mere adoption of weapons systems or punctual adjusts in the existing practices. In this sense, its main goal is to analyze and to explain the absence and the presence of a large-scale military reform in Russia after the post-Cold War period, with a special emphasis on what regards its level of external threat, state capacity, proven ineffectiveness and the large-scale emulation process that began after the Russo-Georgian War. In order to do so, this master thesis makes use of Neoclassical Realism as well as Historical Comparative Method and use of process tracing tool. It aims to answer the following question: why Russia set in motion its military reform in 2008? The hypothesis is that Russia has initiated it military reform in 2008 due to concomitant existence of: i) a high level of external threat (absence of strategic stability or in risk); ii) high level of state capacity (state capable of extracting and mobilizing resources) and; iii) presence of proven ineffectiveness (Russo-Georgian War). Finally, it argues that to equate the absence of a balanced distribution of material capacities in the international system, during the post-Cold War, to the lack of balancing by other states and, consequently, decreeing the end of the dynamics of the balance of power in unipolarity is only possible if one ignores the main dynamics of the balance of power, namely internal balancing. In sum, the dynamics of the balance of power did not cease in the post-Cold War period, especially if Russia's military reform is understood as an internal balancing strategy of large-scale military emulation aimed at balancing the United States in order to maintaining strategic stability.

O presente estudo tem como objetivo geral avaliar de que maneira as simulações militares, no âmbito do Polo de Defesa de Santa Maria, podem contribuir para o aumento das capacidades materiais do Brasil na Era Digital. Assim, busca-se descrever como as simulações vivas, virtuais e construtivas impactam na capacitação material e militar do Brasil no terceiro milênio. Para tanto, vale-se da técnica de pesquisa de revisão bibliográfica e de entrevistas e questionários realizados com militares, professores e empresários envolvido com o Polo de Defesa e constituem a tríplice hélice identificada no município. Desta forma, utiliza-se do debate entorno de questões relacionadas à capacidade estatal, à guerra, à digitalização da guerra e à Era Digital. A análise da tríplice hélice do município Santa Maria demonstra que a hélice que simboliza a cooperação entre Forças Armadas (FFAA) e empresas privadas encontra-se, ainda, em estágio inicial, portanto, pouco desenvolvida. A hélice que representa a cooperação das universidades com as Forças Armadas, por sua vez, ganha protagonismo, sobretudo, em decorrência do projeto do simulador Astros 2020, firmado entre a Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) e as FFAA.

Através de revisão bibliográfica e pesquisa em fontes primárias, o presente artigo aborda as relações de cooperação entre a Universidade Federal de Santa Maria e as Forças Armadas Brasileiras ­ Marinha do Brasil, Exército Brasileiro e Força Aérea Brasileira ­ no período recente. A cooperação tecnológica entre as duas instituições transborda a mera utilização de uma pela outra, caracterizando-se como um importante elo entre a comunidade acadêmica e as Forças Armadas. Tal parceria acaba por influenciar o desenvolvimento do município e de tecnologia nacional a ser utilizada pelas Forças Armadas. Palavras chave: ​ UFSM; Forças Armadas Brasileiras; Cooperação