Military Simulations and Training

Recent researches about public confidence in italian institutions (demos 2018) show a significant drop.
In addition, this fall is strengthened by the media representation that often leverages up to inefficiencies not considering the critical side effects e.g. low educated/informed people tend to avoid public structures, such as sanitary ones, because of generalized beliefs of ineffectiveness.

However, this negative trend is not applicable to the defense administration services and/or members. Military and civil servants, belonging to this italian ministry, are watched admiringly for their efficiency that is the result of a specific, tested internal human resources development program and external reputation enforcement.

THE DUAL-USE OF THE HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT KNOW-HOW

This paper pivots on how the ministry of defense, in collaboration with the Italian National School of Public Administration, has mapped the personal soft skills that constitute the virtuous differences. In particular, if the selection and career program are integrated with a core investment in leadership, teamwork and problem solving skills the Max Weber's steel-gate bureaucracy model will not reach its vicious circle. Then, the outline of a personal-leadership growth program will be designed and implemented to the benefit of the public sector and also offered as a change management path to private companies.

O presente estudo tem como objetivo geral avaliar de que maneira as simulações militares, no âmbito do Polo de Defesa de Santa Maria, podem contribuir para o aumento das capacidades materiais do Brasil na Era Digital. Assim, busca-se descrever como as simulações vivas, virtuais e construtivas impactam na capacitação material e militar do Brasil no terceiro milênio. Para tanto, vale-se da técnica de pesquisa de revisão bibliográfica e de entrevistas e questionários realizados com militares, professores e empresários envolvido com o Polo de Defesa e constituem a tríplice hélice identificada no município. Desta forma, utiliza-se do debate entorno de questões relacionadas à capacidade estatal, à guerra, à digitalização da guerra e à Era Digital. A análise da tríplice hélice do município Santa Maria demonstra que a hélice que simboliza a cooperação entre Forças Armadas (FFAA) e empresas privadas encontra-se, ainda, em estágio inicial, portanto, pouco desenvolvida. A hélice que representa a cooperação das universidades com as Forças Armadas, por sua vez, ganha protagonismo, sobretudo, em decorrência do projeto do simulador Astros 2020, firmado entre a Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) e as FFAA.

Through this study, the Finabel research team has analysed and investigated three key areas of training and simulation (T&S) through the lens of armies' interoperability, to technically feed its essence. The three key areas analysed here are cultural interoperability, European defence industry, and data interoperability

Sebagai bagian dari TNI, tugas pokok TNI AD adalah menegakkan kedaulatan negara, mempertahankan keutuhan wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, serta melindungi segenap bangsa dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia dari ancaman dan gangguan terhadap keutuhan bangsa dan negara di darat . Dalam rangka mendukung tugas pokok tersebut salah satunya dilaksanakan melalui pelaksanaan tugas TNI matra darat di bidang pertahanan, yaitu dengan melakukan operasi militer untuk perang (OMP) dan operasi militer selain perang (OMSP). OMP pada dasarnya dilakukan dengan mengerahkan segenap komponen pertahanan negara, dimana kekuatan matra darat sebagai komponen utama. Dalam kerangka pertahanan militer, TNI AD menyelenggarakan perencanaan strategis dan mengimplementasikannya dalam bentuk gelar kekuatan. Dalam kaitan itu, kekuatan matra darat digelar secara kenyal guna memenuhi tuntutan strategi pertahanan dan strategi militer, untuk kepentingan penangkalan maupun penindakan yang dilakukan secara berdiri sendiri maupun terpadu dengan matra lain. Penggelaran tersebut merupakan implementasi konsep pertahanan militer berlapis yang mengedepankan upaya penangkalan terhadap ancaman yang diikuti oleh penindakan apabila musuh militer memasuki wilayah NKRI. Selanjutnya dikembangkan konsep perang berlarut dengan taktik gerilya apabila musuh berhasil memasuki dan menguasai seluruh atau sebagian wilayah daratan NKRI.

Ethics as espoused by philosophers and employed as a control mechanism by the many instruments of power, seems to be more a construct of what ‘ought’ than what ‘is’ , detracting away from genetically coded Ethical Thinking within regions of the brain associated with the social and individual sense of self. This is perhaps why Ethical control mechanisms, derived from traditional Ethics instruction, often break down when clear thinking is required most. Even under periods of extreme stress however, when higher neuronal functions impacting thought and reasoning are impaired, precluding access to the self-restraint and control introduced through ethics training, those regions of the brain dealing with self-preservation are yet quite active. And central to self-perseveration is the brains native ability to conduct complex Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) with respect to individual survival. Ethical instruction molded to how the brain conducts individualized CBA, and introduced as an integral part of daily training and activity, might very well provide for a more effective means by which to ensure Ethical Thinking when it is absolutely essential.

Ce mémoire a été réalisé dans l’objectif de répondre à des questions relatives au combat à cheval dans le contexte de la guerre moderne. Pourtant, il ne s’agissait pas d’étudier la stratégie relative à la cavalerie, ni même l’histoire de l’équitation, ou encore celle de la charge, bien que tous ces sujets soient connexes. C’est l’histoire du corps à corps dans la guerre moderne, dans les affrontements impliquant des cavaliers et plus particulièrement celle de l’escrime de guerre à cheval qui était au centre de cette étude  et plus particulièrement celle de « l’escrime de guerre » à cheval. Bien que le maniement de la baïonnette, de la lance et du sabre à cheval partagent le nom d’« escrime » avec le sport olympique moderne encore pratiqué, l’« escrime de guerre » et l’« escrime civile» sont deux notions bien différentes. Au contraire du sport olympique qu’est l’escrime actuelle, le maniement des armes militaires est défini dans un seul but : être appliqué sur le champ de bataille par les soldats et les officiers dans le but de tuer (ou de blesser suffisamment), lors de combat en période de guerre. C’est cette forme d’escrime, et particulièrement celle pratiquée par la cavalerie, que nous pouvons nommer « escrime de guerre à cheval ». L’étude fut cantonnée à l’armée française, un sujet déjà vaste dont la précision aurait certainement beaucoup perdu, si elle avait été délayée dans la masse des nations européennes du XIXe siècle.
Les questions auxquelles tentait de répondre ce mémoire sont les suivantes :
L’escrime de guerre française à cheval diffère-t-elle vraiment de l’escrime de guerre à pied ? Si oui en quoi, et quelles en sont les spécificités ? Comment s’organise-t-elle, quand apparaît-elle, comment évolue-t-elle et qui sont les acteurs de ces évolutions ? Et enfin : quand et comment disparaît-elle ?
La première partie fut dédiée à la présentation de l’ensemble des caractéristiques du corps à corps à cheval, son contexte, mais aussi les spécificités de l’interaction cavalier/monture. Dans les deux parties suivantes, l’évolution de l’escrime de guerre dans la cavalerie française fut analysée de manière plus chronologique et moins thématique, en commençant par les premières tentatives de création et d’organisation de l’escrime de guerre à cheval, au début du XIXe siècle. Suivirent les différents personnages et organismes qui contribuent à cette création, les premières démarches d’officialisation de la discipline par le ministère, son évolution à travers le XIXe siècle, et enfin son devenir et la place du corps à corps à cheval dans la première Guerre Mondiale, pour arriver enfin à sa quasi-disparition.


Résumé de la première partie :

Des chevaux et des lames

Il est plus difficile d’aborder le corps-à-corps à cheval qu’à pied, la raison en est simple : les rôles de l’infanterie sont mieux définis, et moins pluriels que ceux de la cavalerie, de plus, l’entité fantassin est plus simple à appréhender que l’entité-cavalier. En effet, là où un seul individu, un homme qui plus est, compose le « fantassin », « le cavalier », lui, est une entité double, composée d’un homme et d’un cheval, c’est-à-dire de deux mammifères aux fonctionnements différents mais capables de communiquer à l’aide de l’outil technique nommé équitation.
Là où le fantassin, au corps-à-corps, possède ses propres jambes et est donc relativement libre de ses mouvements, le cavalier, lui, doit compter sur les jambes de son partenaire, qui n’est pas forcément à sa place au milieu d’une mêlée… Les traités d’escrime de guerre à cheval vont donc devoir prendre en compte ces facteurs supplémentaires (ou tout du moins essayer) pour être efficaces dans les différentes situations dans lesquelles le cavalier est amené à combattre : lors du choc (assez rare), de la poursuite où l’application de techniques peut être facilitée par l’absence de résistance, et surtout lors des affrontements d’escarmouche, de « petite guerre », situation privilégiée de mêlée et de corps-à-corps à cheval.
Nous avons également évoqué la diversité des sabres, et l’apparition des lances, qui peuvent influencer la conception des méthodes d’escrime. L’équitation est aussi un paramètre très variable, surtout au cours du XIXe siècle, ce qui explique sans doute sa dissociation de l’escrime, malgré l’idée partagée par l’ensemble des acteurs que ces deux arts sont intimement liés pour le combat à cheval.
Finalement, nous avons décrit les situations qui mènent au corps à corps, les particularités du cavalier dans cette situation, et bien sûr, ses équipements. « Quand » et « où », « par qui » et « avec quoi », il ne reste donc qu’à nous plonger dans le « comment », avec les méthodes d’escrime de guerre elles-mêmes.


Résumé de la deuxième partie :

Le creuset Napoléonien

Bien que les vétérans, les stratèges et les théoriciens de l’art de la guerre aient recommandé dès le XVIIIe siècle un apprentissage sérieux et efficace de l’escrime au sabre à cheval, il fallut attendre les années 1820 pour que la question fasse l’objet d’études sérieuses par le ministère de la Guerre. Pourtant, avant le choix crucial d’une méthode commune à l’ensemble des corps de cavalerie de l’armée française, des tentatives d’enseignement de cette escrime existaient, bien qu’essentiellement dépendantes des volontés et compétences locales ; elles prenaient la forme de traductions de textes germanophones, d’adaptations de l’escrime civile, ou simplement d’enseignements de l’escrime à pied à l’épée en espérant que cela suffise à préparer les cavaliers pour le combat au sabre à cheval. Certains officiers instructeurs, comme Mottin de la Balme, rechignaient même à enseigner l’escrime, estimant que donner cette maîtrise aux soldats reviendrait à les exposer à un risque de violence, de duel entre eux, ou pire, à mettre les officiers en danger.
Mais certains, officiers, écuyers, vétérans de l’armée napoléonienne ou de ses adversaires, essayèrent progressivement, dès le tout début du XIXe siècle, de proposer différentes visions de ce que devait être, selon eux, l’escrime à cheval. Que ce soit par la traduction de l’allemand, l’adaptation de l’escrime à l’épée ou la mise par écrit de pratiques transmises à l’oral, les méthodes se multiplièrent, et avec elles la rivalité, les rivalités et la course pour l’officialisation. Pendant quatorze ans, de 1816 à 1829, le capitaine Alexandre Müller et le général Durfort s’affrontèrent à coup de procès, de publications, de critiques construites ou de diffamations, de coups bas parfois, pour faire reconnaître officiellement leurs théories respectives (finalement fort semblables), jusqu’à la victoire finale de Durfort, et la lente agonie de Müller.
Leurs disputes, impliquant l’ensemble du monde de la cavalerie, participèrent sans doute à un retard de développement de cet art, en comparaison de l’escrime à la lance, adoptée et institutionnalisée en un éclair.
En moins d’un an, cette arme jusqu’alors disparue de la cavalerie française fut réintroduite, avec la création de nouveaux régiments de chevau-légers lanciers. L’Empereur ayant constaté et apprécié l’efficacité des lanciers polonais demanda au colonel des Polonais de sa garde de rédiger une méthode d’escrime à la lance, simple, efficace, et qui fut adaptée et ajoutée au règlement de manœuvres en à peine quelques mois, sans résistance, sans procès, et sans longue rivalité.
Par la suite, ces deux escrimes évoluèrent de concert, toujours alimentées par des tentatives plus individuelles d’amélioration, formant une partie indispensable de l’enseignement du cavalier, et ce jusqu’à la fin du XIXe siècle.


Résumé de la Troisième partie :

Du manège aux tranchées

Là où la défaite de 1871 eut un impact important sur l’escrime à la baïonnette et sur le corps-à-corps dans l’infanterie, la cavalerie, elle, traversa cette épreuve avec plus de résilience.
Ce fut la lance qui fit tampon, dans les années 1870 comme dans les années 1920 et ce fut elle qui devint obsolète la première. Pourtant, elle perdura, elle aussi, et revint en force au début du XXe siècle.
Comme pour sa cousine de l’infanterie, l’escrime de guerre à cheval fut discutée, évaluée, modifiée et adaptée au gré des conflits extérieurs, et de l’observation des guerres modernes. Son instruction fut débattue, tantôt réduite, tantôt augmentée et des moyens conséquents furent injectés dans sa diffusion au sein des différents régiments.
La cavalerie disposait en effet d’un atout que n’avait pas l’infanterie : si, pour les fantassins, le corps-à-corps n’était qu’une éventualité qui termine la charge, pour les cavaliers, la charge et surtout le choc (physique ou psychologique) était le mode d’action considéré comme « principal », jusqu’en 1914. Or, l’arme blanche est l’outil, et le seul outil, du choc.
L’influence de la culture de la cavalerie et des récits de combats à l’arme blanche dans la culture populaire française est énorme. Dans l’imaginaire français, la cavalerie est éternellement comparée à la gloire des chevauchées napoléoniennes, qui ne se passent jamais du sabre ou de la lance. Un prisme qui a permis de diminuer l’ampleur du choc que fut la Première Guerre mondiale pour la cavalerie française.
Et là où l’escrime à la baïonnette connut un lent déclin avant de disparaître quasi-complètement, le sabre à cheval, lui, survécut aux années 20. Il s’adapte, son escrime se ramasse, les gardes prennent en compte l’évolution technologique, et c’est finalement au cours de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale qu'auront lieu les dernières charges, les derniers engagements au corps-à-corps pour la cavalerie.
Si l’escrime de guerre à cheval a connu un destin différent du corps à corps à pied, c’est sans doute grâce au caractère adaptable et polyvalent de la cavalerie. En s’adaptant à l’évolution des outils et des techniques militaires, elle résista plus longtemps à l’influence du développement matériel de la guerre moderne.

There is something seriously wrong with command and staff college which means that Pakistan Army cannot be an outstandingly effective army unless command and staff college Quetta is reformed. This institutions assessment system is defective , lacks third party audit , not based on any training in field and the biggest conspiracy against all talent and dynamism. My squadron officer Colonel M defined his impressions of staff college . “ first day in class , our instructor colonel F openly stated that he was here because of XX Punjab Regiment and will favor Punjab regiment officers “. These were impressions of countless officers that I interviewed. The rot starts from staff college basis of favoritism , parochialism and lack of merit. War course is not really important as the officer efficiency index of an officer is decided by gradings that he receives at command and staff college Quetta. Castration of rights joined by Pakistan Army officers as inherited from British Indian Army Act An army officer till 1951 could not be retired summarily.However after the so called Pindi Conspiracy affair Pakistan Armys chief Ayub Khan , Pakistani Secretary of Defence Iskandar Mirza advised Pakistani premier to amend rules of service regarding retirement of an officer. From now on an army officer could be retired or dismissed by the government as easily as a sweaper ! This is the simple summing up of why a Pakistan Army officer is programmed to be docile. Any officer of any rank could be retired without any reason and this officer could not go to a civil court while in uniform against this decision. An officer was as good or as bad as a personal slave of the Pakistani state.Job security being Nil ! Even the Pakistani politicians failed to give the army personnel the basic constitutional right to appeal enjoyed in India. Thus while ZA Bhutto did allow this initially in constitution in 1973 , he immediately took it back once the Attock Conspiracy took place. In 1958 when martial law was clamped,Pakistans military dictator Ayub Khan also castrated Pakistans civil servants. Arbitrary interference of an overpowerful executive and no job security.This is Pakistans issue of governance ! The key issues why Pakistani military has remained structurally weak and slavish raised in this book have never been raised by any so called famous analyst of Pakistan Army.

Malgré l'avènement de la bombe atomique à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le char va rester une arme d'intimidation très efficace durant toute la durée de la Guerre froide. Les deux blocs vont en produire et en déployer des milliers dans diverses régions du globe, et plus particulièrement en RFA et en RDA. Comme d'autres armées occidentales, la Belgique participe à cet effort de dissuasion par le déploiement de forces blindées importantes en RFA. Il faut dire que, durant toute la Guerre froide, la Belgique peut se targuer de posséder une arme blindée conséquente. Bien entendu, la présence de chars ne passe pas inaperçue. Malgré la mise à disposition de vastes domaines militaires, il est nécessaire pour les charistes d'effectuer des manœuvres hors des casernes, sur les terrains qu'ils seront amenés à défendre. C'est pourquoi de nombreux exercices FTX (Field training exercise) sont organisés. Lors de ceux-ci, les chars belges évoluent au milieu des civils allemands. La tolérance de ces derniers face à ces blindés chenillés dans les rues des villes et dans les campagnes est assez ambivalente. Même si les citoyens sont bien conscients que ces chars sont ceux qui seront amenés à les défendre face à un raz de marée soviétique, leur patience est mise à rude épreuve. Si certains se montrent compatissants, d'autres, par contre, expriment leur mécontentement par des actions parfois violentes. Malgré les mesures prises par les militaires belges, les véhicules causent beaucoup de dommages aux infrastructures et aux biens privés. Le but de cette contribution est de présenter les relations entretenues entre charistes belges et civils allemands lors des exercices en terrain civil en répondant à cinq questions : Pourquoi organiser de tels déploiements de blindés en milieu civil? Quels sont les dégâts causés par le déploiement de chars? Quelles sont les réactions des civils par rapport à la présence des chars des FBA dans leur environnement de vie? Sont-elles identiques partout? Quels moyens sont mis en place pour limiter le mécontentement des populations?

Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent enough to allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what Matthias has dubbed “the responsibility gap.” We agree with Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow overlooks the possibility of what we term “blank check” responsibility: A person of sufficiently high standing could accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition behind our proposal is that humans can impute relations even when no other form of contact can be established. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the occupation of a given office would come at the price of signing away part of one's freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another (in this case, artificial) agency.

Military training aims to make armed personnel perform effectively on duty. Part of it is focused on the use of (lethal) force, including lessons in marksmanship and methods to reduce strain experienced when harming another human being. Contrarily, military personnel is regarded to refrain from using force unless it is the ultimate remedy. Literature suggests that this training causes changes on the trainee’s perspective and behavior towards the use of force. The duality – to both restrict and widen the ability to apply force in military training – leads to the central question of this thesis: What is the effect of military training on constraints on the use of force by military personnel?

The main goal of this study is to determine, understand and apply theory on: the use of force by military personnel, the constraints and safeguards that influence its application and the effect of training on a soldier’s willingness to use force. This is done by developing a theoretical framework building on an extensive literature study complemented by a case study of the Dutch Military training.

Excellence is not an art, it is a habit. To achieve excellence in preparing for combat, modern military forces train in a Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training environments to create maximum return on training resources. Live training involves people operating real systems on real terrain. Virtual training involves people operating synthetic systems over digitized terrain. Constructive training has synthetic forces operating synthetic systems. Live training at the CTCs is still the most effective training for military units. It is RED TEAMING on a massive scale.

Pistol training, be it military or law enforcement, has traditionally occurred in live-fire environments. However, many agencies are being challenged to find new and innovative ways in which to deliver not only existing pistol training programs, but are being tasked to add more to their training programs without increasing training time. One approach that is beginning to attract attention is how technology can be used to enhance and augment current training practices, while creating efficiencies that address those critical training gaps (Krätzig & Hudy, in press). While the use of heavy artillery and rifle simulation technology within a military setting is well established, the existing body of literature does not adequately address how this technology can be used in a pistol-training program, or whether these skills can be acquired without live-fire exposure. The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence that pistol training in a laser-based synthetic environment is as effective as traditional live-fire training, and that an entire pistol course-of-fire training program can be delivered without live-fire instructional time. An experiment was conducted using 124 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) trainees (cadets) designed to compared live-fire pistol training performance with those cadets who were trained exclusively in a laser-based dry-fire environment. Our results indicate that cadets who were trained in a simulated environment had higher scores than a typical live-fire trained cadet. This paper will systematically discuss methods, measures, and results along with the future research directions.

For the past 17 years the US Army has focussed on fighting counterinsurgency operations. With the growing threat looming in eastern Europe, the Army has shifted to high-intensity combat training to exercise rotational units against a near-peer opponent. The NTC is a cutting-edge CTC that has revolutionized how combat forces are trained and prepared for combat and is a model for what a CTC should be. Established in 1979, the NTC is the major training area for the United States military and is under the command of US Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM). The NTC provides over 1,000 square miles (2,600 km2) for maneuver and ranges, and is the ideal site to conduct high-intensity combat training that pit incoming Blue Forces — Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) and Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) — against “Red Force” or Opposing Forces (OPFOR) units in the most realistic live training available anywhere.

This guide supports viewers in discussing the moral and religious questions raised about killing in war, the military’s process of teaching soldiers how to kill, coping with killing, the concept of conscientious objection, the concept of war being fought on civilians’ behalves, and the moral responsibilities of civilians.

FILM SYNOPSIS: When is it right to kill? In the midst of war, is it right to refuse? Eight U.S. soldiers, some whom have killed and some who have said no, reveal their inner moral dilemmas.

*Served as one of the guide producers.

Modern military training exercises often include an information warfare component. Combat manoeuvres and weapon tests may be combined with large-scale information operations, including attempts at mass deception and cultivation of fear via strategic uses of narratives in media. The ways in which fear is constructed in strategic narratives deserve more detailed discursive analysis. In this article, the authors use the largest recent Russian war games on NATO’s eastern borders, the ‘Zapad 2017’ military exercise, as an example to show how to interpret fear narratives. They identify and analyse three strategic narratives that were formulated by Russian official spokespeople in relation to the exercise and uncover some of their underlying meaning-making tendencies: the logic of antithesis, affirmation through negation and the rhetoric of moral victimhood. Their analysis sheds new light on the uses of fear discourses that are more sophisticated and indirect than straightforward threats o...

LA RESERVA del Ejército de EE.UU. corre el riesgo de perder su capacidad para apoyar, con eficacia, las contingencias en tiempos de guerra y de paz, situación inquietante por cuanto dicha Componente proporciona más del 70 por ciento de los medios de apoyo de combate y apoyo de servicios de combate empleados por el Ejército estadounidense. Con la continua reducción de fondos para entrenamiento y el agotamiento de las existencias requeridas para mantener un adecuado estado de alistamiento, producto de los frecuentes despliegues de la fuerza, cabe preguntarse cómo el Ejército logrará mantener las aptitudes tácticas de sus soldados y unidades de Reserva. A través del empleo de ejercicios de simulación apoyados por computadoras, la Componente de Reserva puede entrenarse con eficacia y eficiencia, siempre y cuando se adhiera a ciertos principios básicos. El presente artículo describe el entrenamiento basado en simulaciones computarizadas y analiza varios imperativos para mejorar el entrenamiento recibido de las unidades.

Urban conflicts will be frequent in 21st century as consequence of World Urbanization.
States' governments, regional and local administrations have to face to new challenges. European Union Member States has to design what will be the Armed Forces’ Role in present and future cities.

Some examples of strategic challenges beyond 2018 are “Plan Sentinelle in France” or “Operazione Strade Sicure” in Italy. Armed Forces must support internal security for the protection of the population, the territory and the critical infrastructures. Departments of Defense must be re-structured in order to accomplish these missions. Strategic challenges for the security of cities beyond 2018 set up the debate about DoD restructuring speed and how develop more fit military urban training.

According to recent studies on simulations and military training, the following paper intents to demonstrate that live simulations are the best tool to ensure a troop's combat readiness. Military maneuver exercises, foot marches and practical shooting stages are a few examples, but they must provide high reality levels in order to ensure the trainees' immersion; otherwise they might not prepare them psychologically, without testing their abilities under real stress, usual component of a battlefield. Therefore, this research is based on the results achieved during Brazilian Army's simulations that took place at the ​ Centro de Instrução de Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem (CIOpGLO), a military training center focused on urban and law enforcement operations. Three live simulations are explored in this article-urban ostensible patrolling operation, stress fire stage and urban offensive operation-, all coordinated by CIOpGLO's team and each tested more than twice, in a total of eight experiences analysed. They had the main objective of creating fully immersible environments, inducting the trainees into combat stress with a wide use of paintball markers, sound devices and explosives. These resources, combined with a special methodology named " Realism Infusion " , have granted excellent results, leading the simulations' attendants to unforgettable experiences, with many tactical lessons learned and, most important of all, the development of their affective attributes, specifically self-control, courage and leadership.

As more systems use open architecture
(nonproprietary computer equipment), it becomes
easier to acquire apparently compatible systems.
Surface compatibility, however, may not
sustain complex simulations, with the lack of
connectivity only clear when an exercise crashes.
Therefore, tested and approved connectivity
of computer systems is critical to the
success of simulation exercises.

Recently, there has been increasing research in intelligent tutoring systems on improving learning by automatically detecting affect and providing affective support. Systems have been developed both to detect affect from physiological sensors, and from students’ interactions with an online learning system. In this paper, we discuss ongoing efforts to construct sensor-free detectors of trainee affect and behavioral engagement for vMedic, an immersive software used to train military trainees in combat medic field procedures. This paper reviews rationale and plans to develop models of affect and engagement based on log files and field observations from a September 2013 study at West Point conducted jointly by the Army Research Lab, Teachers College, and North Carolina State University. Additionally, this paper discusses the preparation for the distillation process, plans for development of the affect detector model, and the implications of future integration into the GIFT Framework’s P...

Evaluating proficiency in simulation-based combat casualty training includes the assessment of hands-on training with mannequins through instructor observation. The evaluation process is error-prone due to high student–instructor ratios as well as the subjective nature of the evaluation process. Other logistical inconsistencies, such as the short amount of time to observe individual student performance, can lessen training effectiveness as well. The simulation-based methodology described in this article addresses these challenges by way of quantitative assessment of training effectiveness in combat casualty training. The methodology discusses adaptation of Lempel–Ziv (LZ) complexity indexing to quantify psy-chomotor activity that is otherwise only subjectively estimated by an instructor. LZ indexing has been successfully used to assess proficiency in related studies of simulation-based training conducted by Bann et al. at the Imperial College of Science Technology and Medicine in London, and more recently by Watson at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This type of analysis has been applied to using simulation as a tool to assess not only mastery of a task, but as a method to assess whether a particular simulator and training approach actually works. Data have been gathered from nearly 100 military combat medic trainees at Joint Base Lewis McChord Medical Simulation Training Center. Participant hand-acceleration data from an emergency surgical cricothyrotomy reveals a statistically significant difference in ability between expertise levels. The higher the LZ scores and self-reported expertise level, the better the participant performed. The results show that when presented with demographic and video performance-based data, it is possible to gauge experience by applying LZ scoring to motion data. The methodology provides an objective measure that complements the subjective component of simulation-based cricothyrotomy training assessments. Further study is needed to determine whether this methodology would provide similar assessment advantages in other medical training in which speed and accuracy would be significant factors in determining procedural expertise.

The paper proposes the development of an integrated system of biometric tools which can be used to track and assess individuals and teams in the conduct of realistic and immersive tactical, technical and ethical problem-sets that could be varied in complexity, intensity, duration, and context. Biometric data collected on physiological responses could then be analysed to determine how effectively an individual or team has performed. Importantly, for the full utility of this approach to be realised, Army requires a paradigm shift in its approach to training.

In 1942, the first “Village Fighting Course” was constructed in Texas to mimic the structures of a typical German village, thus beginning a cycle of culturally specific urban replications to train for the ever increasing probability of combat in cities. With the onset of the Vietnam War, a new series of constructions attempted to replicate both the endemic structures and landscape of Southeast Asia. This now widespread practice continues at a seemingly ad-hoc level, lacking overall oversight or standardization, and often accomplished through local initiatives at army posts instead of institutional directives. Further, with the need to operate against asymmetric forces and without a clearly defined theater of war, the design of the facilities, the shape of their stage, has become more of a mutable form than a concrete shape.

The training of military personnel that occurs at these sites involves a breakdown of previously ingrained behaviors, and their subsequent reconstruction into tactics through a process that closely mirrors Victor Turner’s tripartite definition of the qualities that identify a liminal space, and therefore the space of ritual. However, here it is the physical construction of an specialized and situationally specific environment to be de-coded through training that requires the development of a new action-specific and context-dependent, literacy. This is attained through the conditioning of individuals and units by repetition (of actions) and progression (both in the parameters and control of their performances and in the movement from ‘virtual’ to ‘live’ environments). Since their inception, these facilities have occasioned arguments over realism and fidelity: how best to train soldiers and simulate expected environments so that their actual performances, their transposed trainings, would be no more than encores.

This paper addresses the duality of the theater of war, using scenographic revolutions of the early 20th century, the move from the mimetic claims of naturalism to the coherence of constructivism, to explore the shifting representational, performative, and pedagogical tactics deployed in simulated urban areas that often reflect the outer realities of their local contexts. It argues that despite the contradictions present within the 21st century urban training facility, comprised of decentralized, and partially composed environments, it accurately reflects the underlying realities of both warfare and the world and, moreover, the social forces that produce them. It comments further on the effects of such training, extended beyond the bounds of the army post: addressing embodied experience through the ambiguities among ‘exercise,’  ‘drill,’ and ‘play.’