Carlo Ierna
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Early Edmund Husserl, Franz Brentano, History of Mathematics, Phenomenology, History of Logic, Edmund Husserl, and 33 more19th Century Philosophy, School of Brentano, Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Austrian Philosophy, History of Humanities, Carl Stumpf, Husserl, 19th-century German philosophy, Metaphysics Of Number, Intentionality, Formal Ontology (Philosophy), Philosophy as Science, Intentional object, History of Analytic Philosophy, Kazimierz Twardowski, Philosophy, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Logic, Gestalt Psychology, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl (Philosophy) (Philosophy), Husserl Gestalt, Philosophy As Rigorous Science, Husserl Stumpf, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Realist Phenomenology, History of Science, History of Philosophy, and Brentanist Philosophy of Mathematicsedit
- I’m an assistant professor in history of philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 2019-2024 I was part of the ... moreI’m an assistant professor in history of philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
2019-2024 I was part of the HERMES consortium at the Radboud University Nijmegen.
I’ve previously been part-time, fixed-term lecturer at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Utrecht University, Leiden University, Radboud University Nijmegen, and the University of Groningen.
From 2012 to 2016 I was a postdoctoral researcher at Utrecht University with an NWO VENI research project on the renewal of the ideal of “Philosophy as Science” in the School of Brentano.
I have an MA in Philosophy (2002) and an MSc in Cognitive Artificial Intelligence (2008) from Utrecht University, and a PhD in Philosophy from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2009).edit
Franz Brentano’s dissertation On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, which this year celebrates the 150th year since its first publication, and his habilitation thesis dedicated to Aristotelian psychology have had an enduring... more
Franz Brentano’s dissertation On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, which this year celebrates the 150th year since its first publication, and his habilitation thesis dedicated to Aristotelian psychology have had an enduring influence on the School of Brentano and on young Heidegger’ thought on being. At the same time, these two works encompass Brentano’s main areas of interest in philosophy: metaphysics and psychology. The studies comprising this volume examine the relevance of these topics for contemporary philosophical research and substantiate the complexity and the historical dimension of a legacy whose richness and diversity still await full discovery.
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The centenary of Brentano’s death provides the opportunity to witness the leading position carved out by his thought within the centennial history of «Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica», seeking to point out in what extent Brentano’s... more
The centenary of Brentano’s death provides the opportunity to witness the leading position carved out by his thought within the centennial history of «Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica», seeking to point out in what extent Brentano’s philosophy can be still considered ‘contemporary’. Specifically, most of the contemporary studies addressed to Brentano’s philosophy clearly show that the role of utmost importance he played, and still plays, within the history of philosophy is not only due to his introduction and discussion of the notion of intentionality. In the last decades indeed, specific attention has been payed (a) to Brentano’s ethical theory, (b) to his overall assessment of philosophy and (c) in arguing for the idea that psychology should to be considered in the same manner as a rigorous science.
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This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they engage with the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is a broad anthology addressing many major topics in phenomenology and philosophy... more
This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they engage with the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is a broad anthology addressing many major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general, including articles on phenomenological method; investigations in anthropology, ethics, and theology; highly specialized research into typically Husserlian topics such as perception, image consciousness, reality, and ideality; as well as investigations into the complex relation between pure phenomenology, phenomenological psychology, and cognitive science.
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In this article I will begin by discussing recent criticism, by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer, of the ontological interpretation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality, as formulated by i.a. Roderick Chisholm. I will then... more
In this article I will begin by discussing recent criticism, by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer, of the ontological interpretation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality, as formulated by i.a. Roderick Chisholm. I will then outline some apparent inconsistencies of the positions advocated by Antonelli and Sauer with Brentano’s formulations of his theory in several works and lectures. This new evaluation of (unpublished) sources will then lead to a sketch of a new approach to Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it will be argued that the notion of “intentional object” is inherently and un- avoidably ambiguous in every act of external perception, due to the fact that we can only have improper intentions directed at the external world.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Christian von Ehrenfels.
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This present collection of (translations of) reviews is intended to help obtain a more balanced picture of the reception and impact of Edmund Husserl's first book, the 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic. One of the insights to be gained from... more
This present collection of (translations of) reviews is intended to help obtain a more balanced picture of the reception and impact of Edmund Husserl's first book, the 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic. One of the insights to be gained from this non-exhaustive collection of reviews is that the Philosophy of Arithmetic had a much more widespread reception than hitherto assumed: in the present collection alone there already are fourteen, all published between 1891 and 1895. Three of the reviews appeared in mathematical journals (Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Mathematik, Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik, and Zeitschrift für mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht), three were published in English journals (The Philosophical Review, The Monist, Mind), two were written by other members of the School of Brentano (Franz Hillebrand and Alois Höfler). Some of the reviews and notices appear to be very superficial, consisting merely of paraphrases (often without references) and lists of topics taken from the table of contents, presenting barely acceptable summaries. Others, among which Höfler might be the most significant, engage much more deeply with the topics and problems that Husserl addresses, analyzing his approach in the context of the mathematics of his time and the School of Brentano.
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Among the correspondence between Husserl and Brentano kept at the Houghton Library of Harvard University there is a letter from Husserl to Brentano from 29 XII 1889, whose contents were completely unknown until now. The letter is of some... more
Among the correspondence between Husserl and Brentano kept at the Houghton Library of Harvard University there is a letter from Husserl to Brentano from 29 XII 1889, whose contents were completely unknown until now. The letter is of some significance, both historically as well as systematically for Husserl’s early development, painting a vivid picture of his relation and indebtedness to his teacher Franz Brentano. As in his letter to Stumpf from February 1890, Husserl describes the issues he had encountered during the elaboration of his habilitation work into the Philosophy of Arithmetic, but also announces that he has finally found "clarity" regarding the arithmetica universalis.
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Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano’s discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which... more
Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano’s discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which suggests that Brentano had more than a superficial familiarity with mathematics. Indeed, considering the authors and works quoted in his lectures, Brentano appears well-informed and quite interested in the mathematical research of his time. I specifically address his lectures here as there is much less to be found about mathematics in his published works. Besides Brentano’s own work, it is quite remarkable to see that practically all of his better-known students sooner or later produced a work on the philosophy of mathematics. This also encourages the supposition not just of a common interest in the matter, but of a common theoretical core. All this prompts the question: Can we speak of a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics?
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In the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen Husserl claims to have investigated higher order objects and Gestalt qualities before anyone else in the School of Brentano. Indeed, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik we find a... more
In the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen Husserl claims to have investigated higher order objects and Gestalt qualities before anyone else in the School of Brentano. Indeed, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik we find a discussion of figural moments and fusion that could lend some support to such a claim. By considering the concepts of Gestalt and Verschmelzung in their relevant historical context, the latter especially in connection to Stumpf, we find that Husserl indeed gave a quite original and interesting account of such higher order phenomena.
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The article introduces and discusses an unpublished manuscript by Edmund Husserl, conserved at the Husserl-Archives Leuven with signature K I 26, pp. 73a–73b. The article is followed by the text of the manuscript in German and in an... more
The article introduces and discusses an unpublished manuscript by Edmund Husserl, conserved at the Husserl-Archives Leuven with signature K I 26, pp. 73a–73b. The article is followed by the text of the manuscript in German and in an English translation. The manuscript, titled “The Transition through the Impossible” (Der Durchgang durch das Unmögliche), was part of the material Husserl used for his 1901 Doppelvortrag in Göttingen. In the manuscript, the impossible is characterized as the “sphere of objectlessness” (Sphäre der Gegenstandslosigkeit) and Husserl addresses the question whether and when it is warranted to perform a transition through the impossible to obtain valid results for the sphere of objectivity.
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The concept of a Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl has been given various interpretations, due to its shifting role in his works. Many authors have been misled by this term, placing it in the context of Husserl’s early period in Halle, while... more
The concept of a Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl has been given various interpretations, due to its shifting role in his works. Many authors have been misled by this term, placing it in the context of Husserl’s early period in Halle, while writing the Philosophy of Arithmetic, as a friend and colleague of Georg Cantor.Yet at the time, Husserl distanced himself explicitly from Cantor’s definition and rather took Bernhard Riemann as example, having studied and lectured extensively on Riemann’s theories of space. Husserl’s Mannigfaltigkeitslehre would then not be a Cantorian set-theory, but come rather closer to topology. Then, in the Prolegomena, Husserl introduces the idea of a pure Mannigfaltigkeitslehre as a meta-theoretical enterprise which studies the relations among theories, e.g. how to derive or found one upon another. When Husserl announces that in fact the best example of such a pure theory of manifolds is what is actually practiced in mathematics, this sounds slightly misleading. The pure theory of theories cannot simply be the mathematics underlying topology, but should rather be considered as a mathesis universalis. Indeed, while this might not have been fully clear yet in 1900/1901, Husserl will explicitly tie together the notions of pure theory of manifolds and mathesis universalis. The mathesis universalis in this sense is formal, a priori and analytic, as theory of theory in general. It is an analysis of the highest categories of meaning and their correlative categories of objects. In my paper I try to understand the development of the notion of Mannigfaltigkeit in Husserl’s thought from its mathematical beginnings to its later central philosophical role, taking into account the mathematical background and context of Husserl’s own development.
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Presentazione: In this article the author discusses F. Brentano's theory of intentionality and the ontological status of the intentional object specifically with respect to symbolic presentations. The role and function of intentionality... more
Presentazione: In this article the author discusses F. Brentano's theory of intentionality and the ontological status of the intentional object specifically with respect to symbolic presentations. The role and function of intentionality are compared to the process of semeiosis. Several interesting parallels can be found between fundamental problems in the interpretation of the Brentanian notion of intentionality and issues in semiotics.
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In this article we will address the issue whether and in how far Anton Marty had a significant influence on the development of the phenomenological movement. As “the phenomenological movement” is not a clearly defined and circumscribed... more
In this article we will address the issue whether and in how far Anton Marty had a significant influence on the development of the phenomenological movement. As “the phenomenological movement” is not a clearly defined and circumscribed notion, we need to provide an appropriate context for any comparison. The phenomenological movement grew out of the School of Brentano and we take this larger whole as our starting point.
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The article examines the development of Husserl’s early philosophy from his Habilitationsschrift (1887) to the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891). An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift (of which only the... more
The article examines the development of Husserl’s early philosophy from his Habilitationsschrift (1887) to the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891).
An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift (of which only the first chapter survives, which we know as Über den Begriff der Zahl). The examined sources show that the original version of the Habilitationsschrift was by far broader than the printed version, and included most topics of the PA.
The article contains an extensive and detailed comparison of these texts to illustrate the changes in Husserl’s position before and after February 1890. This date is taken as a turning point in his development, because of Husserl’s announcement in a letter to Carl Stumpf that he was mistaken in his basic assumption, i.e. that the (psychological) analysis of the concept of Anzahl would yield a foundation for arithmetic. Some interesting conclusions in this respect can also be drawn from an unpublished lecture that Husserl held in the WS 1889/90, in which he anticipates aspects of his position hitherto deemed to belong to the last phases of the PA.
An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift (of which only the first chapter survives, which we know as Über den Begriff der Zahl). The examined sources show that the original version of the Habilitationsschrift was by far broader than the printed version, and included most topics of the PA.
The article contains an extensive and detailed comparison of these texts to illustrate the changes in Husserl’s position before and after February 1890. This date is taken as a turning point in his development, because of Husserl’s announcement in a letter to Carl Stumpf that he was mistaken in his basic assumption, i.e. that the (psychological) analysis of the concept of Anzahl would yield a foundation for arithmetic. Some interesting conclusions in this respect can also be drawn from an unpublished lecture that Husserl held in the WS 1889/90, in which he anticipates aspects of his position hitherto deemed to belong to the last phases of the PA.
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Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the... more
Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the Philosophy of Mathematics), which he gave twice, once in the WS 1889/90 and again in WS 1890/91. As Husserl reports in his letter to Carl Stumpf of February 1890, he lectured mainly on “spatial-logical questions” and gave an extensive critique of the Riemann-Helmholtz theories. Indeed, in K I 28 many lectures on this subject can be found, which are for the greater part published in Husserliana XXI. The lecture contained in K I 28/4-12 at the Husserl-Archives Leuven, however, was left out of the selection, because the lecture contained “an analysis of the concept of number” whose content is “already known” from the Philosophie der Arithmetik. Indeed, since the lecture is from the WS 1889/90, the manuscript allows a glimpse of Husserl’s ideas halfway between his Habilitationsschrift (1887) and the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891).
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Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the... more
Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the Philosophy of Mathematics), which he gave twice, once in the WS 1889/90 and again in WS 1890/91. As Husserl reports in his letter to Carl Stumpf of February 1890, he lectured mainly on “spatial-logical questions” and gave an extensive critique of the Riemann-Helmholtz theories. Indeed, in K I 28 many lectures on this subject can be found, which are for the greater part published in Husserliana XXI. The lecture contained in K I 28/4-12 at the Husserl-Archives Leuven, however, was left out of the selection, because the lecture contained “an analysis of the concept of number” whose content is “already known” from the Philosophie der Arithmetik. Indeed, since the lecture is from the WS 1889/90, the manuscript allows a glimpse of Husserl’s ideas halfway between his Habilitationsschrift (1887) and the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891).
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Both Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl wrote about relations in their early works, in periods in which they were still influenced by Franz Brentano. However, besides the split between Brentano and Meinong, the latter also accused Husserl... more
Both Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl wrote about relations in their early works, in periods in which they were still influenced by Franz Brentano. However, besides the split between Brentano and Meinong, the latter also accused Husserl of plagiarism with respect to the theory of relations. Examining Meinong’s and Husserl’s early works and the Brentanist framework they were written in, we will try to assess their similarities and differences. As they shared other sources besides Brentano, we will consider very carefully whether we should speak at all of influence or plagiarism. Despite Meinong’s accusations it seems that both he and Husserl took over some elements from Brentano and, partially through him, from John Stuart Mill, who appears to be the most probable source on relations.
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In the article Husserl’s view of the infinite around 1890 is analysed. I give a survey of his mathematical background and other important influences (especially Bolzano). The article contains a short exposition on Husserl's distinction... more
In the article Husserl’s view of the infinite around 1890 is analysed. I give a survey of his mathematical background and other important influences (especially Bolzano). The article contains a short exposition on Husserl's distinction between proper and symbolic presentations in the "Philosophie der Arithmetik" and between finite and infinite symbolic collections. Subsequently Husserl’s conception of surrogate presentations in his treatise "Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiotik)" is discussed. In this text Husserl gives a detailed account of infinity, using surrogate presentations. The conclusion is that with surrogates we can only operate according to blind psychological rules.
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Like most of Franz Brentano’s students, Carl Stumpf showed an interest in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular, Stumpf wrote his habilitation thesis On the Foundations of Mathematics, used mathematical examples in central parts of... more
Like most of Franz Brentano’s students, Carl Stumpf showed an interest in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular, Stumpf wrote his habilitation thesis On the Foundations of Mathematics, used mathematical examples in central parts of his lectures, and later returned to the topic in the posthumously published Erkenntnislehre. I will try to show the development and the continuity of Stumpf’s position on the basis of his writings and (unpublished) lectures on logic and psycholo- gy, taking into account the Brentanist approach to the philosophy of mathematics that developed in the 1880s and 1890s in the School of Brentano.
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This article explores the idea of philosophy as science in the philosophy of Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and his school. Brentano claimed that the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences and claimed a... more
This article explores the idea of philosophy as science in the philosophy of Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and his school. Brentano claimed that the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences and claimed a specific field of enquiry for philosophy: mental phenomena defined as phenomena that contain an object intentionally, which are distinct from natural phenomena. This view of philosophy was meant to provide a scientific foundation for the humanities independently from the natural sciences, and proved to be a successful research paradigm itself.
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Brentano's Science of Consciousness. Franz Brentano’s 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint presents us with a framework and methodology for performing scientific research in psychology. Moreover, this project provides the... more
Brentano's Science of Consciousness.
Franz Brentano’s 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint presents us with a framework and methodology for performing scientific research in psychology. Moreover, this project provides the foundation for the more ambitious ideal of the renewal of philosophy as a science, which had been Brentano’s aim ever since defending his habilitation thesis that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences”. Brentano therefore needs to carefully articulate the precise position and role of his scientific psychology among the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften. What does his ideal of philosophy as science consist in? What is the relation between his scientific psychology and philosophy? How is psychology related to the natural sciences, in particular psycho-physics and physiology?
Franz Brentano’s 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint presents us with a framework and methodology for performing scientific research in psychology. Moreover, this project provides the foundation for the more ambitious ideal of the renewal of philosophy as a science, which had been Brentano’s aim ever since defending his habilitation thesis that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences”. Brentano therefore needs to carefully articulate the precise position and role of his scientific psychology among the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften. What does his ideal of philosophy as science consist in? What is the relation between his scientific psychology and philosophy? How is psychology related to the natural sciences, in particular psycho-physics and physiology?
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Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano’s discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which... more
Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano’s discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which suggests that Brentano had more than a superficial familiarity with mathematics. Indeed, considering the authors and works quoted in his lectures, Brentano appears well-informed and quite interested in the mathematical research of his time. I specifically address his lectures here as there is much less to be found about mathematics in his published works. Besides Brentano’s own work, it is quite remarkable to see that practically all of his better-known students sooner or later produced a work on the philosophy of mathematics. This also encourages the supposition not just of a common interest in the matter, but of a common theoretical core. All this prompts the question: Can we speak of a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics?
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In this paper I will discuss Edmund Husserl’s critique of Franz Brentano’s interpretation of categorical judgments as Double Judgments (Doppelurteile). This will be developed mostly as an internal critique, within the framework of the... more
In this paper I will discuss Edmund Husserl’s critique of Franz Brentano’s interpretation of categorical judgments as Double Judgments (Doppelurteile). This will be developed mostly as an internal critique, within the framework of the school of Brentano, and not through a direct contrast with Husserl’s own theory of judgment, as presented e.g. in the Fifth Investigation. Already during the 1890s Husserl overcame the psychologistic aspects of Brentano’s approach, advocating the importance of analysing the logical structure underlying language independently from psychology. Moreover, Husserl’s critique seems to be also applicable to Bertrand Russell’s analysis, which shares an important aspect of Brentano’s theory. I will try to avoid going too deep into the various theories of judgment and keep mostly to the issue of double judgments.
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This volume contains an English translation of Edmund Husserl's first major work, the Philosophie der Arithmetik,(Husserl 1891). As a translation of Husserliana XII (Husserl 1970), it also includes the first chapter of Husserl's... more
This volume contains an English translation of Edmund Husserl's first major work, the Philosophie der Arithmetik,(Husserl 1891). As a translation of Husserliana XII (Husserl 1970), it also includes the first chapter of Husserl's Habilitationsschrift (Über den Begriff der Zahl)(Husserl 1887) and various supplementary texts written between 1887 and 1901.
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“The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences”: this was the famous thesis of Franz Brentano (1838– 1917) that bound his first students to him and became the north star of his school. It is the cornerstone... more
“The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences”: this was the famous thesis of Franz Brentano (1838– 1917) that bound his first students to him and became the north star of his school. It is the cornerstone of his project of renewing philosophy as science, and the answer to the questions: what makes science science and what would make philosophy science?
Nowadays Brentano is probably remembered mostly (if at all) for re-introducing the concept of intentionality in philosophy: that all mental acts (believing, fearing, willing, etc.) are directed at something or have something as content. However, though often forgotten and overlooked due to contingent historical circumstances, the scientific paradigm of the School of Brentano was very fruitful and highly
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influential, throughout the second half of the 19th and into the 20th century. Brentano already started to attract disciples such as Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty to his cause right after his passionate defence of his thesis. His fame and influence increased when he was called to the chair of philosophy in Vienna and published his Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint in 1874. During the two decades in Vienna he taught ea. Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl, and Kazimierz Twardowski. Brentano’s students put his ideals into practice in the movements and schools they founded and influenced: i.a. the Berlin and Graz schools of Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, the phenomenological movement and Polish logic. Their diversity and success eclipsed the common background and shared origin of the underlying ideal and their unity as a school, acknowledging Brentano merely as precursor. Brentano’s central role was also insufficiently recognized because his theories had spread mostly through his unpublished teachings and the division of labour he had established in his School obscured the underlying methodological unity. This has even led scholars to speak of “Brentano’s invisibility”. Yet Brentano’s project of the renewal of philosophy as science formed the core of the general framework for doing scientific research in philosophy that all his students started out with. What did this framework consist in?
While philosophy would use the method of natural science, its domain would not be nature, but consciousness: a full-blooded science of the mind that did not require a reduction to the physical in order to be scientific. For Brentano, such a science of consciousness was empirical, but not necessarily purely experimental, and relied mostly, though not exclusively, on subjective methods, but was not introspective. Using intentionality as a criterion we can distinguish natural and mental phenomena, i.e. physical and psychical phenomena, or in other words, phenomena of external and internal perception. Physical phenomena would be colour, tone, warmth, etc.; psychical phenomena would be the seeing of the colour, the hearing of the tone, the feeling of the warmth, etc. Hence, philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften in general would be the sciences that deal primarily with the mind, with consciousness, with its acts, contents, objects and its expressions. While making a clear distinction between the sciences of physical and the sciences of psychical phenomena, the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften broadly understood, Brentano argues that they are essentially founded on the same empirical method, again broadly understood, and based on perception and experience. Brentano points out that both the sciences of the psychical and the physical have a common source in the analysis of sensations. From this common starting point we can then proceed inductively in both directions, outward and inward, in finding the laws of coexistence and succession of all phenomena. More specifically, we can first induce more general laws, then deduce more specific ones, and finally verify them through concrete experience. For Brentano, philosophy is not done by grandiose speculation, but by humble, detailed investigation. “We are taking the first steps towards the renewal of philosophy as science” he told his students, not by building up “proud systems”, but by humbly “cultivating fallow scientific ground”.
As we can see from the success and influence of his students and their schools, Brentano’s project of renewing philosophy as science turned out to be quite fruitful in highly disparate fields. My main goal is to provide a reconstruction and reassessment of Brentano’s project as a foundational and unifying factor in the School of Brentano. Brentano’s ideal of philosophy as science is to all effects “a programme for scientific research” showing that it is possible to conduct scientific research in philosophy and that the Geisteswissenschaften can be understood to be indeed full-blooded sciences in their own right: unnatural sciences.
Nowadays Brentano is probably remembered mostly (if at all) for re-introducing the concept of intentionality in philosophy: that all mental acts (believing, fearing, willing, etc.) are directed at something or have something as content. However, though often forgotten and overlooked due to contingent historical circumstances, the scientific paradigm of the School of Brentano was very fruitful and highly
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influential, throughout the second half of the 19th and into the 20th century. Brentano already started to attract disciples such as Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty to his cause right after his passionate defence of his thesis. His fame and influence increased when he was called to the chair of philosophy in Vienna and published his Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint in 1874. During the two decades in Vienna he taught ea. Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl, and Kazimierz Twardowski. Brentano’s students put his ideals into practice in the movements and schools they founded and influenced: i.a. the Berlin and Graz schools of Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, the phenomenological movement and Polish logic. Their diversity and success eclipsed the common background and shared origin of the underlying ideal and their unity as a school, acknowledging Brentano merely as precursor. Brentano’s central role was also insufficiently recognized because his theories had spread mostly through his unpublished teachings and the division of labour he had established in his School obscured the underlying methodological unity. This has even led scholars to speak of “Brentano’s invisibility”. Yet Brentano’s project of the renewal of philosophy as science formed the core of the general framework for doing scientific research in philosophy that all his students started out with. What did this framework consist in?
While philosophy would use the method of natural science, its domain would not be nature, but consciousness: a full-blooded science of the mind that did not require a reduction to the physical in order to be scientific. For Brentano, such a science of consciousness was empirical, but not necessarily purely experimental, and relied mostly, though not exclusively, on subjective methods, but was not introspective. Using intentionality as a criterion we can distinguish natural and mental phenomena, i.e. physical and psychical phenomena, or in other words, phenomena of external and internal perception. Physical phenomena would be colour, tone, warmth, etc.; psychical phenomena would be the seeing of the colour, the hearing of the tone, the feeling of the warmth, etc. Hence, philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften in general would be the sciences that deal primarily with the mind, with consciousness, with its acts, contents, objects and its expressions. While making a clear distinction between the sciences of physical and the sciences of psychical phenomena, the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften broadly understood, Brentano argues that they are essentially founded on the same empirical method, again broadly understood, and based on perception and experience. Brentano points out that both the sciences of the psychical and the physical have a common source in the analysis of sensations. From this common starting point we can then proceed inductively in both directions, outward and inward, in finding the laws of coexistence and succession of all phenomena. More specifically, we can first induce more general laws, then deduce more specific ones, and finally verify them through concrete experience. For Brentano, philosophy is not done by grandiose speculation, but by humble, detailed investigation. “We are taking the first steps towards the renewal of philosophy as science” he told his students, not by building up “proud systems”, but by humbly “cultivating fallow scientific ground”.
As we can see from the success and influence of his students and their schools, Brentano’s project of renewing philosophy as science turned out to be quite fruitful in highly disparate fields. My main goal is to provide a reconstruction and reassessment of Brentano’s project as a foundational and unifying factor in the School of Brentano. Brentano’s ideal of philosophy as science is to all effects “a programme for scientific research” showing that it is possible to conduct scientific research in philosophy and that the Geisteswissenschaften can be understood to be indeed full-blooded sciences in their own right: unnatural sciences.
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Research Interests: Ethics and Franz Brentano
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Brentano’s claim that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences” rallied his students to his flag in a period in which the natural sciences were making great progress and becoming increasingly... more
Brentano’s claim that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences” rallied his students to his flag in a period in which the natural sciences were making great progress and becoming increasingly specialized. Brentano’s project of the renewal of philosophy as science was a central issue in the School of Brentano, which could provide an independent foundation for the human sciences, while preserving the unity of science.
Brentano meant to give an empirical foundation to philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften through his well-known re-introduction of the concept of intentionality as criterion to distinguish internal and external perception. While philosophy would use the empirical methods of the natural sciences, its domain would not be nature, but consciousness. The philosophical psychology Brentano envisioned would then be a full-blooded science of the mind that did not require any further reduction to a physical level in order to be scientific. This science of consciousness would be empirical i.e. based on perception and experience, but not necessarily experimental, and it would use subjective methods, but without being introspective.
Brentano’s students Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and others adapted and spread his theories far and wide in the schools and movements they founded and influenced: Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, phenomenology, etc..
Though often forgotten and overlooked due to contingent historical circumstances, the scientific paradigm of the School of Brentano was very fruitful and highly influential in philosophy and the human sciences in general, throughout the second half of the 19th and into the 20th centuries. Still today it can offer a radical perspective on the independent scientific dignity of the humanities.
Brentano meant to give an empirical foundation to philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften through his well-known re-introduction of the concept of intentionality as criterion to distinguish internal and external perception. While philosophy would use the empirical methods of the natural sciences, its domain would not be nature, but consciousness. The philosophical psychology Brentano envisioned would then be a full-blooded science of the mind that did not require any further reduction to a physical level in order to be scientific. This science of consciousness would be empirical i.e. based on perception and experience, but not necessarily experimental, and it would use subjective methods, but without being introspective.
Brentano’s students Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and others adapted and spread his theories far and wide in the schools and movements they founded and influenced: Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, phenomenology, etc..
Though often forgotten and overlooked due to contingent historical circumstances, the scientific paradigm of the School of Brentano was very fruitful and highly influential in philosophy and the human sciences in general, throughout the second half of the 19th and into the 20th centuries. Still today it can offer a radical perspective on the independent scientific dignity of the humanities.
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Edmund Husserl's first work, the Philosophy of Arithmetic, has been given a varying treatment in the long history of its reception. Some dismiss it as entirely psychologistic, others see the seeds of phenomenology in it. Accordingly,... more
Edmund Husserl's first work, the Philosophy of Arithmetic, has been given a varying treatment in the long history of its reception. Some dismiss it as entirely psychologistic, others see the seeds of phenomenology in it. Accordingly, Husserl's development has been understood as marked either by a series of radical changes or by a strong continuity and progressive evolution. One of such radical changes is considered to be his "conversion" from psychologism to anti-psychologism, often attributed to Gottlob Frege's negative review of the Philosophy of Arithmetic. Contrary to this view, I think that we should consider the role and nature of psychology, and its relation to logic and philosophy, in Husserl's first work much more carefully. Indeed, in this work Husserl makes the transition from mathematics to the philosophy of mathematics, specifically to a philosophy heavily based on the methods of descriptive psychology of the School of Franz Brentano. When considering the development of the Philosophy of Arithmetic in its appropriate historical and theoretical context, we can notice what other commentators, such as Frege, might have missed and give a more balanced and positive assessment of the psychological methods and insights contained in the work. This, in turn, will also enable us to determine more correctly the connections to later developments in Husserl's thought, i.a. by showing the early origin of fundamental intuitions, such as the parallelism between subjective acts and their objective correlates, a theory of higher order acts, objects and relations, and the sharp distinction between the psychological and the logical "attitude".
The paper starts with a portrayal of Franz Brentano’s theory of judgement, outlining his proposed reform of classical logic, aiming at a simplification of traditional syllogistic logic, basing it purely on existential judgements. For... more
The paper starts with a portrayal of Franz Brentano’s theory of judgement, outlining his proposed reform of classical logic, aiming at a simplification of traditional syllogistic logic, basing it purely on existential judgements. For Brentano, all categorical judgements (“S is P”) could be reduced to forms of existential judgements (“S is”) by reinterpreting them as double judgements consisting of two combined judgements: a simple affirmative, existential judgement and then the ascription or denial of a predicate, as a dependent part, to the sub ject. The categorical articulation in subject and predicate would be merely a superficial linguistic form of our assertion, expressing of a more complex deep structure of mental acts of judging. This closely related to the linguistic interpretation of Aristotle’s categories given by Brentano’s mentor Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg. According to Trendelenburg, the grammatical sub ject would correspond to the first of the Aristotelean categories, the substance or essence (ousia), and the predicate to the other nine. The categories would be the most general concepts and show a strong correlation to grammatical relations, making language the central issue in Aristotle’s theory. The connection of sub ject and substance and their autonomy with respect to the other categories is explicitly endorsed by Brentano and his student Anton Marty in their account of double judgements. Marty addressed the theoretical and practical aspects of logic as “the art of judging correctly” in a rather orthodox Brentanist fashion, arguing that the theoretical part would consist in a psychology of language while the practical part would not only involve aesthetical, ethical, and even political aspects of language, but also the pro ject of a “scientific ideal language”. This conception was heavily criticised by Edmund Husserl. Where Brentano and Marty equated truth and correct judgement, Husserl distinguishes between ob jective truth and sub jective correct judgement. By appealing to the notion of assumption, Husserl provides a more sophisticated account of how we can understand the existence that according to Brentano and Trendelenburg seems to be implied in every categorical judgement. We conclude by pointing out and interesting parallel between Russell and Brentano, which makes Russell vulnerable to some of Husserl’s objections. Russell’s well-known analysis of the assertion “The king of France is bald” is formally similar to Brentano’s analysis of categorical judgements as double judgements, in that we first assert that there is a really existent object (the king of France), that this ob ject is uniquely identified by a definite description and, finally, that it has the property of being bald. According to Husserl, both Brentano and Russell wrongfully construe simple names as existential assertions. When we judge that “Zeus is the king of gods” we do not judge that Zeus exists – we are perfectly aware that he does not –, nevertheless we correctly predicate of him that in the context of Greek mythology he is the king of gods.
Husserl started out with the idea of founding the validity of arithmetic on an analysis of the concept of number, an analysis that, in line with both Weierstrass and Brentano, was quite philosophical and psychological. In the beginning... more
Husserl started out with the idea of founding the validity of arithmetic on an analysis of the concept of number, an analysis that, in line with both Weierstrass and Brentano, was quite philosophical and psychological. In the beginning Husserl held a relatively simplistic position, which can be found in several early chapters of the Philosophy of Arithmetic and is also critically described in his famous letter to Stumpf of February 1890. Recognising the significant epistemological and ontological problems posed by his approach when dealing with entities such as imaginary numbers (i.e. √-1 ), Husserl slowly distanced himself from his former masters and vastly improved his position in the last phases of writing the Philosophy of Arithmetic. Through various influences, among which we count Kronecker and Riemann, he came to conclude that the justification of calculating with imaginary concepts was due to the properties of the system of axioms or operations, i.e. their being definite. The problem of justifying the use of imaginary concepts in mathematics will be a lasting problem for Husserl, appearing prominently as the main topic of his lecture for the mathematical society in Göttingen (the famous Doppelvortrag) and also in later lectures, such as an advanced mathematical seminar in 1905. We begin our analysis of Husserl’s position concerning the justification of the imaginary in mathematics when he was still a student in Berlin.
In this presentation I will discuss Edmund Husserl’s critique of Franz Brentano’s analysis of categorial judgments as double judgments (Doppelurteile). Husserl overcame Brentano’s psychologism, advocating the importance of a logical... more
In this presentation I will discuss Edmund Husserl’s critique of Franz Brentano’s analysis of categorial judgments as double judgments (Doppelurteile). Husserl overcame Brentano’s psychologism, advocating the importance of a logical structure in language that is independent from psychology. Moreover, Husserl’s critique is also applicable to Bertrand Russell, who shares important aspects of Brentano’s analysis.
This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they engage with the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is a broad anthology addressing many major topics in phenomenology and philosophy... more
This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they engage with the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is a broad anthology addressing many major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general, including articles on phenomenological method; investigations in anthropology, ethics, and theology; highly specialized research into typically Husserlian topics such as perception, image consciousness, reality, and ideality; as well as investigations into the complex relation between pure phenomenology, phenomenological psychology, and cognitive science.
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Preface by U. Melle
PART I The Nature and Method of Phenomenology
1 Husserl on First Philosophy by R. Sokolowski
2 Le sens de la phénoménologie by M. Richir
3 Transzendentale Phänomenologie? by R. Bernet
4 Husserl and the ‘absolute’ by D. Zahavi
5 Husserls Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus by U. Melle
6 Phenomenology as First Philosophy: A Prehistory by S. Luft
7 Der methodologische Transzendentalismus der Phänomenologie by L. Tengelyi
PART II Phenomenology and the Sciences
8 Husserl contra Carnap : la démarcation des sciences by D. Pradelle
9 Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse by D. Lohmar
10 Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano by D. Fisette
11 Mathesis universalis et géométrie : Husserl et Grassmann by V. Gérard
III Phenomenology and Consciousness
12 Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned by N. de Warren
13 Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity by H. Jacobs
14 Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind by S. Crowell
15 “So You Want to Naturalize Consciousness?” “Why, why not?” – “But How?” Husserl meeting some offspring by E. Marbach
16 Philosophy and ‘Experience’: A Conflict of Interests? by F. Mattens
PART IV Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy
17 Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia by J. Drummond
18 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Handelns: Überlegungen zu Davidson und Husserl by K. Mertens
19 Husserl und das Faktum der praktischen Vernunft:Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person by S. Loidolt
20 Erde und Leib: Ort der Ökologie nach Husserl by H.R. Sepp
PART V Reality and Ideality
21 The Universal as “What is in Common”: Comments on the Proton-Pseudos in Husserl’s Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence by R. Sowa
22 Die Kulturbedeutung der Intentionalität: Zu Husserls Wirklichkeitsbegriff by E.W. Orth
23 La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience by C. Majolino
24 Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution by A. Serrano de Haro
25 Phenomenology in a different voice: Husserl and Nishida in the 1930s by T. Sakakibara
26 Thinking about Non-Existence by L. Alweiss
27 Gott in Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie by K. Held"
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Preface by U. Melle
PART I The Nature and Method of Phenomenology
1 Husserl on First Philosophy by R. Sokolowski
2 Le sens de la phénoménologie by M. Richir
3 Transzendentale Phänomenologie? by R. Bernet
4 Husserl and the ‘absolute’ by D. Zahavi
5 Husserls Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus by U. Melle
6 Phenomenology as First Philosophy: A Prehistory by S. Luft
7 Der methodologische Transzendentalismus der Phänomenologie by L. Tengelyi
PART II Phenomenology and the Sciences
8 Husserl contra Carnap : la démarcation des sciences by D. Pradelle
9 Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse by D. Lohmar
10 Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano by D. Fisette
11 Mathesis universalis et géométrie : Husserl et Grassmann by V. Gérard
III Phenomenology and Consciousness
12 Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned by N. de Warren
13 Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity by H. Jacobs
14 Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind by S. Crowell
15 “So You Want to Naturalize Consciousness?” “Why, why not?” – “But How?” Husserl meeting some offspring by E. Marbach
16 Philosophy and ‘Experience’: A Conflict of Interests? by F. Mattens
PART IV Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy
17 Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia by J. Drummond
18 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Handelns: Überlegungen zu Davidson und Husserl by K. Mertens
19 Husserl und das Faktum der praktischen Vernunft:Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person by S. Loidolt
20 Erde und Leib: Ort der Ökologie nach Husserl by H.R. Sepp
PART V Reality and Ideality
21 The Universal as “What is in Common”: Comments on the Proton-Pseudos in Husserl’s Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence by R. Sowa
22 Die Kulturbedeutung der Intentionalität: Zu Husserls Wirklichkeitsbegriff by E.W. Orth
23 La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience by C. Majolino
24 Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution by A. Serrano de Haro
25 Phenomenology in a different voice: Husserl and Nishida in the 1930s by T. Sakakibara
26 Thinking about Non-Existence by L. Alweiss
27 Gott in Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie by K. Held"
Research Interests: Phenomenology and Husserl
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Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano's discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique... more
Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano's discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which suggests that Brentano had more than a superficial familiarity with mathematics. Indeed, considering the authors and works quoted in his lectures, Brentano appears well-informed and quite interested in the mathematical research of his time. I specifically address his lectures here as there is much less to be ...
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Like most of Franz Brentano's students, Carl Stumpf showed an interest in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular, Stumpf wrote his habilitation thesis On the Foundations of Mathematics, used mathematical examples in central... more
Like most of Franz Brentano's students, Carl Stumpf showed an interest in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular, Stumpf wrote his habilitation thesis On the Foundations of Mathematics, used mathematical examples in central parts of his lectures, and later returned to the topic in the posthumously published Erkenntnislehre. I will try to show the development and the continuity of Stumpf's position on the basis of his writings and (unpublished) lectures on logic and psychology, taking into account the Brentanist approach to the philosophy of mathematics that developed in the 1880s and 1890s in the School of Brentano.
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The chapter contains a brief intellectual biography of Herbert Spiegelberg, building on his numerous autobiographical remarks. It provides a survey of Spiegelberg’s early life and works and his German period, focusing more extensively on... more
The chapter contains a brief intellectual biography of Herbert Spiegelberg, building on his numerous autobiographical remarks. It provides a survey of Spiegelberg’s early life and works and his German period, focusing more extensively on his American period. The chapter considers in some detail three important themes in Spiegelberg’s works. First, Spiegelberg’s role in spreading and developing the phenomenological method in the United States through the organization of his workshops, based on ideas from his teachers Reinach and Pfander to phenomenologize “co-subjectively”. Second, his life-long concern with the development of a phenomenological ethics and the detailed development of the core notion of “deontic state of affairs” (Sollverhalt). Last but not least, his monumental contribution to the historiography of phenomenology with his The Phenomenological Movement. The chapter takes a critical look at the early controversies with Farber on the idea of a phenomenological “movement” in order to clarify and qualify Spiegelberg’s own conception of phenomenology. The chapter is meant as a companion piece to the translation of Karl Schuhmann’s unpublished article “Phenomenological Ontology in the Work of Herbert Spiegelberg: Ideas and Ontic and Deontic States of Affairs” which will appear in the second volume.
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This chapter outlines some of the influences and background of Christian von Ehrenfels's conception, briefly discusses his notion of Gestalt, explains how it was taken up by others, and then considers how Ehrenfels himself further... more
This chapter outlines some of the influences and background of Christian von Ehrenfels's conception, briefly discusses his notion of Gestalt, explains how it was taken up by others, and then considers how Ehrenfels himself further applied and developed it. On Ehrenfels's account, virtually any change, process, or movement that has some unity to it, involves a Gestalt quality. At the closing of his 1890 article, Ehrenfels claims that, ultimately, the concept of Gestalt "would yield the possibility of comprehending the whole of the known world under a single mathematical formula". The chapter explains how Ehrenfels's application of the notion of Gestalt in cosmology informs his metaphysics of the human mind. By 1916, the discussion of Gestalt qualities in psychology had moved on, with the two schools in Graz and Berlin having already produced significant results. In the debates between the two schools, Ehrenfels's own more philosophical and theoretical approach to the theory of Gestalt was however mostly disregarded.
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The present article provides a critical analysis of Christian von Ehrenfels’ dissertation Uber Grossenrelationen und Zahlen. Eine psychologische Studie. As many other students of Brentano, Ehrenfels engaged repeatedly with the philosophy... more
The present article provides a critical analysis of Christian von Ehrenfels’ dissertation Uber Grossenrelationen und Zahlen. Eine psychologische Studie. As many other students of Brentano, Ehrenfels engaged repeatedly with the philosophy of mathematics, but until now his dissertation remained nearly completely unknown. Ehrenfels’ dissertation, however, fits perfectly within the Brentanist philosophy of mathematics and actually occupies an important place therein, precisely because it occurs outside of the vertical master - student lineage that goes from Brentano via Stumpf to Husserl. Indeed, Ehrenfels dissertation shows many parallels and anticipations to Husserl’s early works in the philosophy of mathematics.
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The following pages contain a partial edition of Husserl’s manuscript A I 35, pages 1a-28b. The first few pages are dated on May 1927 and are included mostly for completeness’ sake. The bulk of the manuscript convolute, however, is from... more
The following pages contain a partial edition of Husserl’s manuscript A I 35, pages 1a-28b. The first few pages are dated on May 1927 and are included mostly for completeness’ sake. The bulk of the manuscript convolute, however, is from 1912. Four pages of the convolute, 31a-34b, have been published as Beilage XII (210, 2–216, 2) in Hua XXXII. The manuscript was excluded from the text selection of Husserliana XXI based on its much later date of composition. A I 35/24a is mentioned in Husserli- ana XXII (p. xxi, n. 4) as confirmation for Zermelo’s 1902 “oral report” to Husserl of his own independent discovery of the paradox. The text presented here for the first time has already been the target of at least three extensive commentaries, while still unpublished, by Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo Rosado Haddock. These present a good survey in english of the central issues on the text and contain many translated quotations.
Research Interests: Philosophy and DDC
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This present collection of (translations of) reviews is intended to help obtain a more balanced picture of the reception and impact of Edmund Husserl's first book, the 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic. One of the insights to be... more
This present collection of (translations of) reviews is intended to help obtain a more balanced picture of the reception and impact of Edmund Husserl's first book, the 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic. One of the insights to be gained from this non-exhaustive collection of reviews is that the Philosophy of Arithmetic had a much more widespread reception than hitherto assumed: in the present collection alone there already are fourteen, all published between 1891 and 1895. Three of the reviews appeared in mathematical journals (Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Mathematik, Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik, and Zeitschrift für mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht), three were published in English journals (The Philosophical Review, The Monist, Mind), two were written by other members of the School of Brentano (Franz Hillebrand and Alois Höfler). Some of the reviews and notices appear to be very superficial, consisting merely of paraphrases (often without references) and lists of topics taken from the table of contents, presenting barely acceptable summaries. Others, among which Höfler might be the most significant, engage much more deeply with the topics and problems that Husserl addresses, analyzing his approach in the context of the mathematics of his time and the School of Brentano.
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The following pages contain diagrams and lists that should be helpful as a map to the phenomenological movement. In the first diagram, you will find a display of the “original” movement, mostly composed of direct students, colleagues and... more
The following pages contain diagrams and lists that should be helpful as a map to the phenomenological movement. In the first diagram, you will find a display of the “original” movement, mostly composed of direct students, colleagues and assistants of Husserl.The separation between Munich, Gottingen and Freiburg is canonical, but does not really reflect any strict doctrinal separation. In any approach, there will be grey areas, exceptions and overlaps.The division based on Husserl’s institutional affiliation and the provenance of his students is merely a convenient and familiar one.
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The idea of a mathesis universalis plays a prominent role in Edmund Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic (FTL). It is clear that at this mature stage of his philosophy the idea he refers to with “mathesis universalis” is in large... more
The idea of a mathesis universalis plays a prominent role in Edmund Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic (FTL). It is clear that at this mature stage of his philosophy the idea he refers to with “mathesis universalis” is in large part due to Husserl’s own development and cannot be straightforwardly derived from one single author or source anymore. In a historical respect, of course, the idea is most strongly associated with Leibniz, and indeed we see that Husserl does re- fer repeatedly to him in FTL when discussing the mathesis universalis (e.g. § 23b). However, Leibniz is not the only author that is relevant for the specific way in which Husserl fills out the notion of mathesis universalis, since he also repeatedly refers to more recent 19th century authors such as Bolzano and Lotze, as well as early modern authors such as Vieta and Descartes. Here, as elsewhere, we see Husserl’s eclecticism at work.
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Associatie KULeuven. ...
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In this chapter I concentrate on the notion of intentionality and its relation to consciousness. Ever since its re-introduction into contemporary philosophy in the works of Franz Brentano, intentionality has been associated in various... more
In this chapter I concentrate on the notion of intentionality and its relation to consciousness. Ever since its re-introduction into contemporary philosophy in the works of Franz Brentano, intentionality has been associated in various ways with consciousness. In the continental and analytic traditions the notion of intentionality has undergone divergent developments, although more recent authors try to tie them together once again. I outline Brentano’s conception of intentionality and its immediate reception in his school, then I look at the later developments in the twentieth century by focusing on J. R. Searle’s (1983) Intentionality. By critically analysing and comparing Searle’s discussion with Brentano’s original introduction and Husserl’s elaboration, various fundamental questions come to the fore: Are all conscious mental acts intentional? In what way is intentionality representational? Can intentionality be naturalized?
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Associatie KULeuven. ...
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Arithmetic
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"Brentano’s claim that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences” rallied his students to his flag in a period in which the natural sciences were making great progress and becoming... more
"Brentano’s claim that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences” rallied his students to his flag in a period in which the natural sciences were making great progress and becoming increasingly specialized. Brentano’s project of the renewal of philosophy as science was a central issue in the School of Brentano, which could provide an independent foundation for the human sciences, while preserving the unity of science. Brentano meant to give an empirical foundation to philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften through his well-known re-introduction of the concept of intentionality as criterion to distinguish internal and external perception. While philosophy would use the empirical methods of the natural sciences, its domain would not be nature, but consciousness. The philosophical psychology Brentano envisioned would then be a full-blooded science of the mind that did not require any further reduction to a physical level in order to be scientific. This science of consciousness would be empirical i.e. based on perception and experience, but not necessarily experimental, and it would use subjective methods, but without being introspective. Brentano’s students Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and others adapted and spread his theories far and wide in the schools and movements they founded and influenced: Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, phenomenology, etc.. Though often forgotten and overlooked due to contingent historical circumstances, the scientific paradigm of the School of Brentano was very fruitful and highly influential in philosophy and the human sciences in general, throughout the second half of the 19th and into the 20th centuries. Still today it can offer a radical perspective on the independent scientific dignity of the humanities."
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Associatie KULeuven. ...
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Associatie KULeuven. ...
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In this article we will address the issue whether and in how far Anton Marty had a significant influence on the development of the phenomenological movement. As “the phenomenological movement” is not a clearly defined and circumscribed... more
In this article we will address the issue whether and in how far Anton Marty had a significant influence on the development of the phenomenological movement. As “the phenomenological movement” is not a clearly defined and circumscribed notion, we need to provide an appropriate context for any comparison. The phenomenological movement grew out of the School of Brentano and we take this larger whole as our starting point. Since Marty did not found his own school or movement, but remained a Brentanist, it is quite difficult to ...
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Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the... more
Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the Philosophy of Mathematics), which he gave twice, once in the WS 1889/90 and again in WS 1890/91. As Husserl reports in his letter to Carl Stumpf of February 1890, he lectured mainly on “spatial-logical questions” and gave an extensive critique of the Riemann-Helmholtz theories. Indeed, in K I 28 many lectures on this subject can be found, which are for the greater part published in Husserliana XXI. The lecture contained in K I 28/4-12 at the Husserl-Archives Leuven, however, was left out of the selection, because the lecture contained “an analysis of the concept of number” whose content is “already known” from the Philosophie der Arithmetik. Indeed, since the lecture is from the WS 1889/90, the manuscript allows a glimpse of Husserl’s ideas halfway between his Habilitationsschrift (1887) and the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891).
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Die vorliegende Edition wurde angefertigt aufgrund einer neuen Transkription von Reinhard Fabian. Als Vorlage der Transkription diente das handschriftliche Exemplar der Dissertation, das im Archiv der Karl-Franzens-Universitat Graz... more
Die vorliegende Edition wurde angefertigt aufgrund einer neuen Transkription von Reinhard Fabian. Als Vorlage der Transkription diente das handschriftliche Exemplar der Dissertation, das im Archiv der Karl-Franzens-Universitat Graz aufbewahrt wird. Rechtschreibung, Setzung der Satzzeichen und Gliederung der Absatze sind von der Originalvorlage unverandert ubernommen worden, offensichtliche Schreibfehler in den Fusnoten vermerkt. Die inkonsistente „ss“- und „s“- Schreibung wurde uber den gesamten Text hin wie im Original belassen. Die Dis- sertation wurde in deutscher Kurrentschrift verfasst, einzelne Worter und Buch- staben in lateinischer Handschrift werden in der Transkription durch Kursivierung wiedergegeben. Die Originalpaginierung ist in eckigen Klammern [ ] in den Text eingefugt. Erganzungen oder Korrekturen sind ebenfalls durch eckige Klammern [ ] kenntlich gemacht. Die originale Textgestaltung wurde soweit als sinnvoll und moglich beibehalten, zu Anderungen kam es hier vor allem bei Formeln, die zur besseren Lesbarkeit aus dem Fliestext genommen und in eigene Zeilen gesetzt wurden. Samtliche Fusnoten wurden vom Editor oder Transkriptor hinzugefugt.
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In this article I connect two concepts that played central roles in the School of Meinong: the notion of impossible objects and that of Gestalt. Ehrenfels claims that Widerspruch or incompatibility would be a temporal Gestalt quality,... more
In this article I connect two concepts that played central roles in the School of Meinong: the notion of impossible objects and that of Gestalt. Ehrenfels claims that Widerspruch or incompatibility would be a temporal Gestalt quality, specifically the trying and failing to build an intuitive presentation. Where, when, and how does this process break down exactly? Meinong’s Graz students developed a more detailed production theory for the presentation of Gestalten (Vorstellungsproduktion) which can help to determine how the failure to produce one Gestalt can generate another, which moreover is typical of impossible objects. There are three contributions to Meinong’s 1904 volume Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, the ones by Mally, Benussi, and Ameseder, that provide helpful analyses to clarify the incompatibility Gestalt. These suggest three options to refine the analysis of the Gestalt of impossible objects. The conclusion is that the failure of the Vorstellungsproduktion itself is not enough, the incompatibility relation between the foundations must also play a role.
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Both Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl wrote about relations in their early works, in periods in which they were still influenced by Franz Brentano. However, besides the split between Brentano and Meinong, the latter also accused Husserl... more
Both Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl wrote about relations in their early works, in periods in which they were still influenced by Franz Brentano. However, besides the split between Brentano and Meinong, the latter also accused Husserl of plagiarism with respect to the theory of relations. Examining Meinong's and Husserl's early works and the Brentanist framework they were written in, we will try to assess their similarities and differences. As they shared other sources besides Brentano, we will consider very carefully whether we should ...
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In this article the author discusses F. Brentano's theory of intentionality and the ontological status of the intentional object specifically with respect to symbolic presentations. The role and function of intentionality are compared... more
In this article the author discusses F. Brentano's theory of intentionality and the ontological status of the intentional object specifically with respect to symbolic presentations. The role and function of intentionality are compared to the process of semeiosis. Several interesting parallels can be found between fundamental problems in the interpretation of the Brentanian notion of intentionality and issues in semiotics. In particular, the author focuses on the theory of C.W. Morris and attempts to apply core notions of his semiotics to clarify Brentano's ambiguous account of intentional reference, the role of signs in symbolic presentations and how this relates to outer perception.
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Edmund Husserl began his academic career as a mathematician, studying with some of the best mathematicians of his time (like Weierstrass and Kronecker). Subsequently, he turned to philosophy, field in which he also had the extraordinary... more
Edmund Husserl began his academic career as a mathematician, studying with some of the best mathematicians of his time (like Weierstrass and Kronecker). Subsequently, he turned to philosophy, field in which he also had the extraordinary opportunity to work with one of the most influential philosophers of the nineteenth century: Franz Brentano. In Husserl's early work these two influences generate a unique mix and I think that it is very interesting to investigate the way in which Husserl deals with some of the most fundamental problems of ...
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Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the... more
Among the various lecture courses that Edmund Husserl held during his time as a Privatdozent at the University of Halle (1887-1901), there was one on Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Philosophie der Mathematik (Selected Questions from the Philosophy of Mathematics), which he gave twice, once in the WS 1889/90 and again in WS 1890/91. As Husserl reports in his letter to Carl Stumpf of February 1890, he lectured mainly on “spatial-logical questions” and gave an extensive critique of the Riemann-Helmholtz theories. Indeed, in K I 28 many lectures on this subject can be found, which are for the greater part published in Husserliana XXI. The lecture contained in K I 28/4-12 at the Husserl-Archives Leuven, however, was left out of the selection, because the lecture contained “an analysis of the concept of number” whose content is “already known” from the Philosophie der Arithmetik. Indeed, since the lecture is from the WS 1889/90, the manuscript allows a glimpse of Husserl’s ideas halfway between his Habilitationsschrift (1887) and the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891).
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In this paper I will discuss Edmund Husserl's critique of Franz Brentano's interpretation of categorical judgments as Double Judgments (Doppelurteile). This will be developed mostly as an internal... more
In this paper I will discuss Edmund Husserl's critique of Franz Brentano's interpretation of categorical judgments as Double Judgments (Doppelurteile). This will be developed mostly as an internal critique, within the framework of the school of Brentano, and not through a direct contrast with Husserl's own theory of judgment, as presented eg in the Fifth Investigation. Already during the 1890s Husserl overcame the psychologistic aspects of Brentano's approach, advocating the importance of analysing the logical structure ...
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"The article examines the development of Husserl’s early philosophy from his Habilitationsschrift (1887) to the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891). An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift (of which only... more
"The article examines the development of Husserl’s early philosophy from his Habilitationsschrift (1887) to the Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891). An attempt will be made at reconstructing the lost Habilitationsschrift (of which only the first chapter survives, which we know as Über den Begriff der Zahl). The examined sources show that the original version of the Habilitationsschrift was by far broader than the printed version, and included most topics of the PA. The article contains an extensive and detailed comparison of these texts to illustrate the changes in Husserl’s position before and after February 1890. This date is taken as a turning point in his development, because of Husserl’s announcement in a letter to Carl Stumpf that he was mistaken in his basic assumption, i.e. that the (psychological) analysis of the concept of Anzahl would yield a foundation for arithmetic. Some interesting conclusions in this respect can also be drawn from an unpublished lecture that Husserl held in the WS 1889/90, in which he anticipates aspects of his position hitherto deemed to belong to the last phases of the PA."