Ancient Philosofy

HIJOS DE TITANES · EL SECRETO ÍBERO, es el libro en el cual Enrique Cabrejas nos relata de modo llano su experiencia personal con un descubrimiento extraordinario. El 21 de Abril de 2012 consiguió lo que parecía imposible: DESCIFRÓ LA LENGUA IBÉRICA. Un hito sin precedentes en la historia de la escritura, solo al alcance de los grandes y comparable a los realizados por Champollion al descodificar la escritura jeroglífica egipcia o Michael Ventris con la escritura de Creta. Desde este instante la obra de Enrique Cabrejas lo convierte en un referente destacado a nivel mundial en historia y lingüística. Las innumerables pruebas y significados que nos reporta, antes desconocidos, son una referencia obligada para todos aquellos que quieran comprender la historia, la lengua antigua e, incluso, también la moderna de nuestro país, o para quienes en el futuro deseen estudiarla e investigarla en profundidad, más si cabe desde el mundo académico. Hasta la fecha, el significado de esas enigmáticas escrituras no se conocía, aunque desde la comunidad científica se le dio validez a un origen indiscutible celta. Estas páginas nos revelan qué hay de cierto en todo ello. La transcripción, resuelta de numerosos textos íberos y celtíberos nos sorprende con un desenlace tan inesperado como fascinante que va más allá del descifrado de una lengua antigua. Capaz de responder a las preguntas que se han formulado los historiadores, lingüistas, investigadores y expertos durante décadas y nunca supieron ni acertaron responder: ¿Quiénes fueron los íberos y los celtíberos? ¿Cómo se llamaban? ¿De dónde vinieron? ¿Cómo llegaron? ¿Cuáles fueron sus costumbres? ¿Qué escritura es la ibérica? ¿Cuál es la ancestral y extraordinaria cultura que nos legaron?

This paper focuses on one of the major criticisms made to Aristotle's virtue ethics, namely that it lacks explicit moral action guidance. The same criticism has been addressed to later developments of virtue ethics. There have been several attempts to overcome this objection and to demonstrate that modern theories of virtue ethics do provide principles of right action. In this paper, I discuss mainly two such major attempts: the exemplarist approach and the virtue rules approach. My aim is to examine whether, if applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, these two approaches can provide a convincing answer to the criticism that Aristotle’s ethics does not offer explicit moral action guidance .

A word-by-word explanation of the translation of the so-called creation hymn of Rigveda. The translation is very different from traditional ones.

As I demonstrate, the hymn has been completely misunderstood by previous translators.

The hymn has nothing to do with the origin or creation of the Universe. It is in fact, simply a prayer to God.

Com reflexões universais, que ultrapassam o tempo
e as fronteiras, esta obra trata da sutil diferença entre o
bajulador e o amigo. Nesta obra, Plutarco instrui seu leitor
sobre os malefícios do bajulador, que, pela ilusão da
amizade, por ser divertido e simpático, traz àquele que
escolhe como alvo de sua bajulação. Plutarco demonstra
que existem vários modos de distingui-lo de um amigo,
pois ele sabe imitar seus sentimentos e suas ações. O bajulador
está presente somente nos momentos de prosperidade
e de alegria e é incapaz de ajudar sem cobrar um
alto preço, pois se aproxima para usufruir da riqueza do
seu alvo, diferentemente do amigo, que está presente em
todas as ocasiões.

This is a comparison of Agathon’s role in Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae and Plato’s Symposium. Firstly, I examine the Platonic version, and the unique, idiosyncratic part Plato gives Agathon to play, as a host to all, and a hostage to Socrates. Secondly, I discuss his interaction with Inlaw, the ordinary Athenian, in Aristophanes’ play. Such parallel reading allows us not only to refine our outlook on the dramatic construction both of the “talking party” and of the comic performance, but also to capture how really poikilos, for better or worse, that urban love could be. Finally, I analyze the significance of this juxtaposition, as an intertext. Plato, I argue, produces a proper palinode of Agathon, as an erotikos and a mimetic poet. By taking seriously the face-to-face between Agathon and Agathon, two dissonant and yet compatible variations on one man, our picture of Athenian erotic culture emerges sharper, and in greater detail. 
Key words:
Eros, sensuality, praise, blame, softness, manliness, effeminacy, body, language.

Ce livre constitue la première étude du rôle de la génération dans les systèmes philosophiques d’Aristote et d’Averroès (1126-1198). En s’appuyant sur de nombreux textes traduits du grec, de l’arabe et du latin, l’auteur propose une nouvelle lecture de la théorie aristotélicienne de la génération, ainsi qu’une interprétation de son renouvellement par le Commentateur. Les traités majeurs consacrés par Averroès à la physique générale, à la théorie des éléments et à la biologie d’Aristote sont, pour la première fois, examinés dans leur rapport mutuel et dans celui qu’ils entretiennent à la métaphysique. Cette étude transversale révèle les nouveaux enjeux philosophiques et épistémologiques au fondement du système d’Averroès : dans la lignée de l’aristotélisme essentialiste d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise et tout en réfutant la doctrine créationniste de certains théologiens de l’Islam, le philosophe cordouan établit le fondement a posteriori de tout savoir humain. La philosophie d’Averroès est ainsi réinterprétée comme un jalon fondamental d’une histoire qui, du monde grec à la modernité, scelle le destin commun de la philosophie naturelle et de la métaphysique.

Nei dialoghi de divinatione (1.7) e de natura deorum (2.162), Cicerone presenta la polemica di Carneade contro la divinazione come una polemica antistoica. In questo articolo, che si ispira ad un studio di D.N. Sedley sugli argomenti teologici carneadei (Cic. nat. deor. 3.29-52; Sext. Emp. adv. math. 9.138-90), mi propongo di dimostrare che tale presentazione non corrisponde pienamente alle reali intenzioni di Carneade. Gli stoici furono senza dubbio i piu grandi teorici della divinazione, ragion per cui e legittimo supporre che essi fossero tra i bersagli preferiti da Carneade. Tuttavia, la loro concezione della divinazione e molto vicina a quella comunemente accolta nell’antichita e testimoniata da poeti e filosofi: propongo dunque che gli argomenti di Carneade siano considerati come un attacco alla divinazione per se, e non solo al modo in cui gli stoici la giustificarono filosoficamente.

¿Qué hace que la creación sea fundamental en la cosmología y en la teología, pero también en la poesía y en el arte? ¿Qué es lo que ha llevado a que se ocupe la misma palabra, creación, para responder a las preguntas tanto por la génesis metafísica del mundo como por la formación artística del poema? En este excepcional ensayo, Andrés Claro examina cómo las figuras dominantes de creación en el poema configuran nuestras concepciones características de la creación del mundo. Mediante un
preciso y singular análisis comparativo entre las dos cosmogonías fundacionales de Occidente –la concepción de la creación como separación en partes que se corresponden en el Génesis hebreo y la concepción de la creación como participación analógica de la imagen sensible en la Idea en el Timeo de Platón–, el autor muestra hasta qué punto esas configuraciones espaciotemporales del mundo dependen del hábito de representación que promueven las figuras poéticas dominantes en sus respectivas tradiciones –como lo son el paralelismo semántico para la antigua poesía hebrea, que separa partes relativas, y la sustitución metafórica en la poesía arcaica griega, que remite la comparación de la imagen a la idea. El lector asiste así a una escena ejemplar de los modos en que las formas poéticas exploran la representación de lo real y sintetizan mundos posibles.

This paper explores how Aristotle rejects some Eleatic tenets in general and some of Zeno’s views in particular that apparently threaten the Aristotelian “science of nature.” According to Zeno, it is impossible for a thing to traverse what is infinite or to come in contact with infinite things in a finite time. Aristotle takes the Zenonian view to be wrong by resorting to his distinction between potentiality and actuality and to his theory of mathematical proportions as applied to the motive power and the moved object (Ph. VII.5). He states that some minimal parts of certain magnitudes (i.e., continuous quantities) are perceived, but only in potentiality, not in actuality. This being so, Zeno’s view that a single grain of millet makes no sound on falling, but a thousand grains make
a sound must be rejected. If Zeno’s paradoxes were true, there would
be no motion, but if there is no motion, there is no nature, and hence, there cannot be a science of nature. What Aristotle noted in the millet seed paradox, I hold, is that it apparently casts doubt on his theory of mathematical proportions, i.e., the theory of proportions that holds between the moving power and the object moved, and the extent of the change and the time taken. This approach explains why Aristotle estab- lishes an analogy between the millet seed paradox, on the one hand, and the argument of the stone being worn away by the drop of water
(Ph. 253b15–16) and the hauled ship, on the other.

In this study, we show how, in the bid of fostering harmony and cohesion in the ideal city presented in his Republic, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato invented the so-called myth of the Noble Lie. It aims at convincing people of their common origin in order to ignite in them the desire to love and defend their common city but also to make them accept the division of society into classes. We then compare Plato's vision of the political community to Augustine's ideal of a Statesman to expose what the Bishop of Hippo consider as the criteria for ruling the earthly city with the heart fixed on the eternal promises. In a last step, we took a critical look at the situation of the politics in Nigeria after 60 years of independence, to indicate that most politicians do not even use the Noble Lie, but rather go for the "Ignoble" one to satisfy their greed, to the detriment of the people they are meant to serve.

Descripción. Este curso busca que los estudiantes entren en contacto con variadas tradiciones literarias tomando como eje conceptual de lectura y análisis la figura del “monstruo”. Estos seres imaginados por la literatura en diferentes sociedades son útiles para reflexionar sobre los miedos y las ansiedades culturales de la humanidad, desde la Grecia clásica hasta el presente. Los monstruos hacen circular mitologías que responden a cuestiones morales, éticas, políticas y religiosas de cada sociedad y de cada momento histórico. Los monstruos también nos permiten comprender el funcionamiento de estas mitologías y los temores de cada sociedad frente a problemas concretos (enfermedades, hambrunas, la relación con lo divino, con lo prohibido, con la política, etc.). Estos seres, particularmente movilizan actos de resistencia, son muchas veces manifestación de la opresión, de la tiranía y marginalidad. El monstruo encarna la transgresión, el desorden y su existencia subvierte los límites que determinan lo que resulta aceptable desde un punto de vista físico, biológico e incluso moral. Por ello, estos personajes conceptuales suponen, casi siempre, una amenaza social. El curso trabaja con un conjunto de textos (literarios, jurídicos, religiosos), grabados, pinturas y películas que corresponden a múltiples tradiciones culturales y genéricas en un amplio recorrido por distintas etapas históricas.

Eduard Zeller y la ruptura de la
perspectiva dialéctica de Hegel




En los números 81 y 82, de diciembre de 1843 (páginas 321-323 del número 81 y páginas 326-328 del número 82), de los Jahrbücher der Gegenwart (Anuarios del presente; fundado por el propio Zeller) pública Eduard Zeller "Die Philosophie und die Praxis"

En ese breve artículo Zeller revoca la dialéctica hegeliana y la reemplaza por una ordenación doxógráfica secuencial de los distintos momentos de la evolución histórica de la filosofía.

The complete Lightning Storm Mind: Pre-Ancientist Meditations, extensively illustrated with images by Michel Varisco, is forthcoming from Autonomedia.  The few excerpts included here were published in Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination, Vol 6, No 1 & 2 (2016): 55-56 in an issue on "The Mediterranean Imaginary."

Nel presente saggio tenterò di affrontare il problema delle relazioni tra filosofia, felicità e amicizia nel pensiero di Epicuro, con particolare riferimento alla sua concezione del lathe biōsas e alle possibili ragioni sottese ad una simile scelta di vita. Nella prima parte di questo contributo sosterrò che l’allontanamento dalla vita politica come misura di felicità non sia una regola universale prescritta da Epicuro, bensì una semplice e ragionevole conseguenza dell’osservazione della realtà a lui contemporanea. In secondo luogo, tratterò alcuni aspetti della concezione epicurea della sapienza, intesa come bene raggiungibile dagli esseri umani in una dimensione mondana, e dell’attività di analisi comparativa di piaceri e dolori che essa implica. Infine, avvalendomi di alcune suggestioni aristoteliche, tenterò di operare in via puramente congetturale una ricostruzione delle dinamiche attraverso le quali l’amicizia consente la realizzazione di una versione congiunta e potenziata della sapienza e felicità umane. Alla luce di una possibile ricostruzione dei legami concettuali tra sapienza, amicizia e vita felice, la rete di esperienze di vita intessuta nella dimensione del “vivi nascosto” apparirà ben lontana dal rappresentare un rifugio consolatorio dalle conflittualità della sfera politica e dalle pulsioni desiderative scomposte che la ricerca del potere alimenta.

This article proposes an analysis of the use of emotions, in particular shame, characterizing the elenctic method performed by Socrates in the dialogue with Callicles in the third part of Plato’s Gorgias. The elenchus aims at improving the interlocutor through a process of purification that is capable of changing his whole existence. However, Plato’s dialogues only rarely give testimony of a successful transformation occurring in the interlocutor. This is due to the interlocutor’s attitude towards shame : the feeling of shame can be accepted as a means for self‑transformation or hidden to protect a social status. The article will explore the way in which this fundamental difference is delineated within the dialogue by providing appropriate textual examples. Arguably, by outlining the distinction between the types of shame, it is possible to notice how the purification of the interlocutor implies a turning point for the public. This is what I call „outreach elenchus”, a specific hermeneutic figure that allows understanding a form of purification of the audience and the spectators witnessing the debate. This type of elenchus steps in at the very moment in which the Socratic interlocutor attempts to protect his social image, concealing his shame. The audience, thanks to Plato’s literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished.

The article investigates the nature of knowledge which, according to Aristotle, the recipient of poetry, and more specifically of tragedy, acquires (Poetics, ch.4). Within this context the philosopher highlights that at the theatre we gain pleasure by viewing events which in reality would cause us sorrow. He justifies this phenomenon as such: at the theatre as well as in poetry we experience the aesthetic pleasure, because we are actually learning something. In the article the technical terms that are used by Aristotle (μανθάνειν, συλλογίζεσθαι) are emphatically investigated and it is shown that learning through poetry consists a form of recognising individual elements and tracing them to broader concepts and realities.

The festival of the Auspicious Ármaiti falls on February 18 th in the Zoroastrian sacred calendar. Per our age-old tradition, every year, we write verses from the Avesta ("sacred songs/poetry" of the Zoroastrians) on a piece of parchment paper and affix the written charms to the door of the home on this auspicious day. The sacred verses act as an amulet for bringing blessings and good fortune of Heavens. At the same time, the powerful Avestan words act as protective shield against negative energies.

This paper aims to discuss to what extent Plato develops in the Phaedrus the idea of a "true rhetoric" which has been brought up several times in the Gorgias (503a-b, 504d-e, 517a, 521d-522a). In addition it will examine which conditions Plato specifies for it being practiced as tekhnē. I will propose that in the Phaedrus Plato attempts to respond straightforwardly to the main objection to rhetoric as flattery, a position advanced by Socrates' character in the Gorgias. According to Socrates, rhetoric, at least as practiced in Athenian democracy, constitutes an irrational activity insofar as (a) it does not understand the nature of the soul to which its speeches are directed nor does it understand the subject of its speeches (that is to say, the just and the unjust, the fine and the shameful, the good and the bad: Grg. 459d); and (b) it is unable to give explanations of each thing and of its own actions (Grg. 465; 501a-b). In the Phaedrus, in turn, Plato advances three methodological principles so that rhetoric can be taught as a tekhnē. If "the rhetorical art as a whole is a kind of psychagōgia by means of speech" (Phdr. 261a8) and if it is directed towards the souls of the listeners, then the rhetor must (i) examine with precision the nature of the soul; (ii) discern the natural actions and affections of the soul; (iii) divide and explain the kinds of speeches and the kinds of soul. He thus must coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it, and explain why a certain kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by one particular kind of speech, whereas another one is not (Phdr. 271a-b). This methodology based on division and collection (Phdr. 265d-266b) is precisely the domain of the dialectician as highlighted by Socrates' character (Phdr. 266c). My ultimate aim therefore is to argue that in the Phaedrus Plato subordinates rhetoric to dialectics which are considered to be a sine qua non condition whenever rhetoric is to be taught and practiced as tekhnē. In addition we may read this as Plato's critical response to Isocrates' model of education insofar as Socrates refers to him explicitly at the end of the dialogue (Phdr. 278e-279b).

This paper tries to demonstrate how F. Nietzsche uses rhetoric, and more especially Roman rhetoric as a weapon agains Platonic philosophy and how he refuses all the doctrines that in Antiquity tried to reconcile rhetoric and philosophy. There is also in his presentation of Roman asianic rhetoric something as a distant echo of the distinction between dionysiac and apollinian attitudes.

According to Aristotle, human beings are by nature political animals. It is now common knowledge that being political is not a human privilege for him: bees, wasps, ants and cranes are other political species. Although they are not the only political animals, human beings, for Aristotle, are still more political than the other political animals. The present article investigates the precise sense of this comparison; and it claims that the higher degree of human politicalness is not to be explained by reference to those exclusively human features like having capacity for speech and moral perception. It is claimed that human beings are more political rather because they live in a multiplicity of communities differing in form.

Neste artigo, pretendo analisar na filosofia de Tomás de Aquino (i) se a “essência absolutamente considerada” (ou “natureza comum”) pode desempenhar papel de fundamento do universal na coisa singular ou indivíduo e (ii) se ela é obtida simultaneamente com a abstração inteligível da essência com intenção de universalidade ou por uma “dupla abstração”. Além disso, procurarei ponderar se a “essência absolutamente considerada” prescinde ou não de certa apropriação tomasiana de uma teoria das ideias e se relacioná-la com as ideias é necessário para a fundamentação da “similitude” entre os universais e os indivíduos. Por fim, abordarei algumas recepções díspares de Tomás de Aquino nos séculos XX e XXI, como realista direto, essencialista, realista indireto, representacionalista etc.

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions – Greek, Latin, and Arabic – and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This first volume focuses on sense perception and discusses philosophical questions concerning the external senses, their classification, and their functioning, from Aristotle to Brentano.

In this technical note, I analyze the meanings, ambiguities and equivocities of saeculum in Confessions, XI, and The city of God, XIII, i; XV, i and XXI, to better understand the Augustinian conceptions of “eternity”, “time”, “universal history”, “cosmic time”, “historical time” and “world”.