Cardinal Virtues

The purpose of this paper is to exemplify the outstanding potential of literary narrations, and particularly the fairy tales, to foster resilience among primary school students. The starting point of these reflections is the mimetic-cathartic vision of a literary narration proposed already by Aristotle and then developed by such contemporary authors as Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre, David Carr, etc. The specific application of the general idea, according to which great literary stories have a powerful intrinsic pedagogical potential, is depicted with the use of the example of a classic tale by the Grimm brothers, The Girl Without Hands, which is a clear mimesis in both textual and figurative sense of a resilient character. Moreover, the traumatizing circumstances against which the resilient attitude develops in the protagonist are related to family background, which makes the story particularly up-to-date at present times in which we observe an outstandingly high divorce rate as well as many other types of problems affecting large numbers of children in relation with their families. A variety of “pillars” or “factors” of resilience are easily observable in the behaviour of the “girl without hands,” which converts the story into a remarkable and encouraging example of overcoming all sort of difficulties and obstacles which our students encounter on their own way towards a more complete integration and happiness.

This paper compares two basic concepts of two outstanding players of philosophical world: Plato's moderation and Aristotle's temperance. Comparing occurs in two terms: the positions that both of them place their own concepts in human nature and among other virtues and the meaning of concepts according to them are different.

TILL KINZEL Der Schmerz des Menschen in der Welt Überlegungen zu einem unvollständigen Dialog zwischen Ernst Jünger, C. S. Lewis und Josef Pieper Der Schmerz ist das, was den Menschen erst dann zum Problem wird, wenn er auftritt. Erst im Zustand des Schmerzes wird die Selbstverständlichkeit der Schmerzlosigkeit, die der gesunde Mensch empfindet und daher voraussetzt, aufgehoben. Nur die Schmerzlosigkeit läßt es möglich erscheinen, die Welt in gewissem Maße objektiv in sich aufzunehmen. Denn die Realität des Schmerzes scheint in einer Spannung zu stehen mit der Realität der Welt. Der Schmerz, der den Menschen bis in das Innerste seines Wesens erschüttert, zieht ihn auch aus der Welt zurück auf sich selbst. Denn im Schmerz denkt der Mensch nur an diesen Schmerz und damit an sich selbst als das Objekt des Schmerzes. Mit dem Schmerz ist der Mensch allein. So scheint es jedenfalls zunächst. Schauen wir also zu, wie sich die Philosophie zum Problem des Schmerzes stellt und wie sich dieses Problem mit der hier interessierenden Frage nach dem Menschenbild verbindet. Der Schmerz steht als Phänomen der Grenzerfahrung bemerkenswerterweise nicht im Zentrum anthropologischer Betrachtung, auch wenn es selbstverständlich eine lange philosophische Tradition der Auseinandersetzung damit gibt, bis hin zu der Leidensphilosophie eines Arthur Schopenhauer. 1 Das neueste Handbuch Anthropologie des Metzler-Verlages enthält keinen Eintrag oder Indexverweis auf das Phänomen des Schmerzes. Ebenso erwähnt das Handbuch Ethik desselben Verlages den Schmerz nicht eingehender, sondern nur gleichsam en passant. 2 Immerhin hat die sogenannte Historische Anthropologie, die sich emphatisch gegen die allgemeine Rede von dem Menschen und damit eigentlich gegen jede Anthropologie im eigentlichen Sinne wendet, das Phänomen in den Blick genommen, denn in der historischen Realität ist es unausweichlich, den Schmerz als einer Form des Leidens gewahr zu werden. Hans-Peter Dreitzel bietet in seinem ausführlichen Artikel in dem voluminösen Handbuch Vom Menschen eine Art Phänomenologie des Schmerzes. Schaut man jedoch in die dort abgedruckte Bibliographie des Artikels, stellt man mit einigem Erstaunen fest, daß weder Ernst Jünger noch C. S. Lewis, von Josef Pieper ganz zu schweigen, hier berücksichtigt werden. 3 Das ist ein doch immerhin überraschender Befund, wenn man um den erheblichen Tiefgang weiß, den die Betrachtungen der genannten Schriftsteller und Philosophen aufweisen. Um eben diese drei soll es aber im Folgenden gehen, unter der vorausgesetzten Vermutung, daß sich bei diesen Denkern und Schriftstellern Impulse zu einem Verständnis des Problems des Schmerzes finden, die bisher im philosophischen Denken noch nicht eingeholt worden sind. Ohne diesen Anspruch hier selbst einholen zu können, möchte ich wenigstens Prolegomena zu diesem Themenkreis vortragen, die sinnvollerweise nur zur weiteren Auseinandersetzung anregen

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Cycle of International and Interdisciplinary Webinars "Dialogues of Art, History and Law"

The Webinars Cycle “Dialogues of Art, History and Law” is organized by the Institute of Medieval Studies (IEM- NOVA/FCSH), together with the IUS ILLUMINATUM research team (https://iusilluminata.fcsh.unl.pt) and in partnership with the Portuguese Heraldry Institute (IPH), the Capitular Library of Verona and the Capitular Library of Vercelli.
This initiative, organized by a scientific and organizational committee composed of members of the IUS ILLUMINATUM research team, coordinated by researcher Maria Alessandra Bilotta, PI of the team, aims to establish a fruitful dialogue between different scientific disciplines, namely History of Art, History and History of Law, necessary for the study of illuminated legal manuscripts and documents.
This initiative also aims to facilitate synergies between different areas of knowledge and to disseminate the results of research to a wider audience, always maintaining scientific rigor, in order to promote the importance of an interdisciplinary approach in the study of manuscripts and medieval legal documents, drawing attention to the importance of conserving that heritage.
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Justice and Final Judgment: Some Questions of Monumental Representations in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
(coord. Maria Alessandra Bilotta IEM-NOVA/FCSH)

Moderator: Gerardo Boto Varela (Universitat de Girona)

Marcello Angheben (Université de Poitiers; CESCM) - De un juicio a otro: la representación del juicio inmediato en los Juicios Finales de los siglos XII-XIII

Bertrand Cosnet (Université de Lille; IRHiS) - Essor et variations de l'iconographie de la Justice à la balance dans les cités-états de l'Italie du XIVe siècle

Felsefî bir terim olarak temel erdem, verili bir ahlâk felsefesi içerisinde çeşitli nedenlerle ve farklı açılardan diğerlerine nispetle daha önemli, dolayısıyla da ayrıcalıklı görülen erdemi ifade etmektedir. Felsefe tarihinde ilk kez Sokrates (M.Ö. 469-399) ile karşımıza çıkan ayrıcalıklı erdem fikrinin, diğer bir deyişle temel erdem kavramının Sokrates’i müteakiben başta Platon (M.Ö. 427-347) ve Aristoteles (M.Ö. 384-322) olmak üzere önde gelen filozoflarda ve felsefe okullarında değişik biçimlerde karşımıza çıktığını, erdem konusunun önemini nispeten yitirdiği modern dönemlere değin gelişerek ve elbette ki aynı zamanda değişerek varlığını sürdürmeye devam ettiğini görmekteyiz. Bu tebliğ, ilgili kavramın bu uzun serüveni içerisindeki ana duraklardan birine odaklanmaktadır. Söz konusu durak, kabaca M.Ö. 4. yüzyıl ile M.S. 2. yüzyıl arası zaman dilimini kapsadığını belirtebileceğimiz Helenistik dönemin dört felsefe okulundan biri olan ve gerek etki gerekse yaygınlık itibariyle Stoacılıkla birlikte diğerleri arasında öne çıktığını söyleyebileceğimiz Epikürcülüktür. Epikürüs (M.Ö. 342-271) tarafından kurulan ve hayatın gayesini mutluluk olarak vaz edip onu da haz (hêdonê) ile özdeşleştiren bu felsefe okulu, teklif etmiş olduğu ahlâkî yaşam içerisinde ayrıcalıklı görülmeye aday iki ahlâkî değeri öne plana çıkartmaktadır. Bunlar dostluk (philia) ve amelî hikmettir (phronesis). Tebliğimizde onlardan her birini konumuz çerçevesinde değerlendirmeye ve anılan felsefe okulunun temel erdemini yahut erdemlerini belirlemeye gayret göstereceğiz. Böylelikle de Epikürcülüğün ahlâkî yaşamın temeline hangi erdem veya erdemleri yerleştirdiğini tespit etmiş olacağız. Böylesi bir tespitin ise bize, Epikürcü felsefenin idealize ettiği ahlâkî failin tam olarak nasıl bir mahiyete sahip bulunduğunu ve dolayısıyla da okul müntesiplerine ne türden bir ideal ahlâkî yaşam vadedildiğini daha iyi anlama noktasında katkı sağlayacağını düşünmekteyiz.

The cardinal virtue, as a philosophical term, refers to the virtue seen from different perspectives and for different purposes more valuable and privileged than others in the certain moral philosophy. The idea of privileged virtue, in other words, the concept of cardinal virtue manifested itself for the first time in the history of philosophy with Socrates (B.C. 469-399). Following him, we confront this concept in different ways within the philosophy of prominent philosophers, like Plato (B.C. 427-347) and Aristotle (B.C. 384-322), and philosophical schools. The concept of cardinal virtue had maintained its existence by flourishing and also changing until modern times when the issue of virtue relatively lost its importance. This paper focuses on one of the main stops in this long adventure of that concept. The aforementioned stop is Epicurean philosophy, which was one of four philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period (roughly B.C. 4.-A.D. 2) and became prominent alongside Stoicism among others in terms of influence and predominance. Epicurean school, established by Epicurus (B.C. 342-271), defined the principal goal of life as happiness and identified it with pleasure (hêdonê). This school highlights two moral values which may be seen as privileged within the moral life that it offers. These are friendship (philia) and practical wisdom (phronesis). In this paper, I will try to evaluate each of them in the framework of the topic and specify the cardinal virtue or virtues of Epicurean philosophy. In this way, I hope to uncover which virtue or virtues Epicurean school placed at the foundation of moral life. As a consequence, such a determination, I think, will contribute to the better understanding about both the essential character of the moral agent that Epicurean philosophy idealizes and which kind of ideal moral life Epicurean school promises to its followers.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

La personificación de la Justicia en diferentes divinidades antiguas se tradujo a partir del medievo en la justicia divina, es decir, el poder de Dios para impartir esta virtud. La justicia divina se ha representado tomando como referencia la visualidad propia de la justicia humana, compartiendo algunos atributos y sus significados, pero también añadiendo algunos propios que la distinguen de esta. Aunque su representación se originó en el medievo, su presencia se incrementó a partir de la Edad Moderna como consecuencia de la secularización de la justicia. A partir de estas premisas, podemos distinguir dos tipos iconográicos de la alegoría de la Justicia divina, los cuales analizaremos mediante sus atributos principales y el significado de los mismos.

La Templanza, como una de las Virtudes Cardinales, ha sido objeto de reflexión por parte de los pensadores  desde la Antigüedad, cuando se sentaron las bases de este concepto. A pesar de la ausencia de unos claros precedentes visuales, la Templanza configuró su visualidad en el medievo al igual que sus compañeras. Dicha ausencia motivó una gran variedad de concreciones icónicas de esta virtud mediante diferentes y numerosos atributos. Las famosas “iconologías” no recogen la mayoría de estos atributos y tipos iconográficos, al igual que la bibliografía. Por este motivo, proponemos un estudio diacrónico de la visualidad de la Templanza desde sus orígenes hasta el siglo XIV, atendiendo al significado de sus atributos a partir de las fuentes escritas. Además, las combinaciones de atributos nos permiten ofrecer
una propuesta de clasificación de los tipos iconográficos más frecuentes de la Templanza, concretados a partir de las
concepciones teóricas del concepto.

La Prudencia, como parte de las virtudes cardinales, ha sido tema a tratar por diferentes pensadores desde la Antigüedad. Su amplia consideración, en relación a diferentes aspectos, como el tiempo, el gobierno, la elección o el consejo, ha sido fruto de numerosas representaciones visuales que muestran gran variedad de atributos, cuyos fundamentos encontramos en las fuentes escritas.

Marek Piechowiak's book Plato's Conception of Justice and the Question of Human Dignity is the first comprehensive study of Plato's conception of justice. It shows that Plato already referred to something we today call "dignity" and made it the foundation of his conception of justice. In Piechowiak's interpretation Plato is far from any form of totalitarianism, he praises human freedom, he cherishes the visible universe and the concrete human being. Justice is shown to be crucial for understanding the individual and his relationship with the state and law. This book proves that Plato's philosophy is strikingly contemporary and may provide foundations for modern-day human rights protection.

RÉSUMÉ – L’auteur montre l ’existence d’une structure mnémique dans le Purgatoire, en s’intéressant à la distribution très précise de symboles chromatiques et lumineux, tout particulièrement le “smeraldo”, le “purpureus”, et la “lucerna”. En plus de la Bible, cette architecture symbolique trouve ses fondements théoriques dans la hiérarchie des vertus chez Macrobe et dans la doctrine des Dons du Saint Esprit chez saint Thomas d’Aquin.
MOTS-CLÉS – Dante Alighieri, littérature du Moyen-âge, théologie, symbolisme des couleurs, philosophie du Moyen-âge, littérature italienne

ABSTRACT – The author shows the existence of a mnemic structure in Purgatorio, focusing on the very precise distribution of colorful and bright symbols, especially the smeraldo, the purpureus, and the lucerna. Along with the Bible, this symbolic architecture finds its theoretical foundations in the hierarchy of virtues in Macrobius and in the
doctrine of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit as according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

KEYWORDS – Dante Alighieri, medieval literature, theology, symbolism of colors, medieval philosophy, Italian literature

Nessa pesquisa monográfica, investigamos as representações iconográficas das virtudes cardeais e teologais na série de gravuras As sete virtudes, publicada por Hieronymus Cock, entre 1559 e 1560 em Antuérpia, a partir dos desenhos de Pieter Bruegel e das gravações de Philip Galle. A série representa as alegorias de Caridade, Esperança e Fé, como virtudes teologais, e de Prudência, Justiça, Fortaleza, Temperança, como virtudes cardeais. Nosso interesse tem sido explorar a mudança iconográfica nas representações de virtude a partir das disputas confessionais das décadas de 1550 e 1560, bem como problematizar se essas disputas projetaram uma mudança na iconografia de As sete virtudes. Baseado em análises iconográficas, textuais e materiais da série, bem como processo de produção coletiva, impressão e circulação das gravuras, propomos que a As sete virtudes se constituiu como exemplar retórico-visual pedagógico e catequético, que propunha um modelo prático e didático de vida em virtude, supostamente alinhado a uma chave erasmiana de espiritualidade. Por seu turno, esses objetos manifestavam opiniões político-religiosas específicas diante dos processos mais rígidos de disciplinamento social e Confessionalização, da segunda metade do século XVI.

The question about the concept of moral education is one of the most important questions within the discipline of pedagogy. There are numerous answers that vary depending on the cultural context as well as anthropological, epistemological or ethical assumptions dominant within it. As a response to this issue, ancient thinkers developed the theory of moral virtues, which are the culmination of moral education and whose development is included in the teleology of education. A concept of the development of virtues was formulated, for instance, by Aristotle. It was then creatively advanced by Thomas Aquinas, and these days Alasdair MacIntyre and neo-Thomists refer to it. However, in today’s discussions about moral education it is the category of moral competence that is more often mentioned and it is based mainly on the theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas. This category appears, for instance, in the official documents that describe the effects of education. The author of this article raises a question of whether moral education can be reduced to the development of moral competency. In an attempt to answer this question, the author describes characteristic features of both categories and then analyses pros and cons of various solutions.

Analizy podjęte w artykule mają na celu udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie, jakie jest znaczenie cnoty umiarkowania z perspektywy rozwoju jednostki, a w związku z tym, jaka jest wartość owej cnoty jako celu wychowania. Badania przeprowadzono metodą hermeneutyczną. Przedmiotem analizy było ujęcie umiarkowania zaproponowane przez Tomasza z Akwinu i współczesnych neotomistów. Horyzont poznawczy stanowiła refleksja nad teleologią wychowania. W punkcie pierwszym przedstawiono dyskusję nad celami wychowania. Punkt drugi zawiera charakterystykę cnoty umiarkowania jako warunku działania dobrego moralnie. W punkcie trzecim omówiono uwarunkowania cnoty umiarkowania związane z jakością rozumowania i pożądań rozumnych (woli). W ostatnim punkcie autor wraca do pytania głównego i stara się wykazać, jakie jest znaczenie umiarkowania dla rozumnych i moralnie dobrych działań. Należy podkreślić, że umiarkowanie nie jest ograniczaniem doświadczenia przyjemności, ale polega na rozumnym korzystaniu z przyjemności w celu realizacji dobrych celów. W niektórych przypadkach unikanie przyjemności może być złe. W innych sytuacjach dobro moralne może być zrealizowane tylko wówczas, gdy jednostka zrezygnuje z przyjemności. Analizy prowadzą również do wniosku, że we współczesnej pedagogice znaczenie wychowania do umiarkowania nie jest rozumiane.

When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something.  Could the reasons for OBJECTIVELY outweigh the reasons against, in the sense that someone who thought otherwise would simply be wrong?  (This is not the same question as that of whether any of the competing reasons could be objectively valid in itself.)  Three seemingly relevant kinds of ethical theory are examined: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and moral absolutism.  It is suggested that the proponents of these have all so far failed to show that they can give compelling objective reasons for acting on certain reasons rather than others.  We so far lack any conception of what sort of second-order considerations could adjudicate between competing reasons.  This is not so much an ‘error theory’ in J. L. Mackie’s sense as an admission of ignorance.

Con motivo del 35º aniversario de la encíclica Humanae Vitae de Pablo VI (25 de julio de 2003) y el 75º cumpleaños de Germain Grisez (30 de septiembre de 2004), uno de los teólogos morales contemporáneos más importantes de habla inglesa, la presente obra inaugura una serie de artículos sobre la anticoncepción en el pensamiento de Grisez. El presente artículo presenta la crítica de Grisez respecto a los tres errores más comunes sobre la esencia del acto anticonceptivo y su malicia intrínseca. Los tres errores en cuestión consisten en considerar la anticoncepción como: 1) un tipo de conducta externa, que consiste en utilizar determinados métodos o en obtener determinados resultados en relación con la fecundidad del acto conyugal; 2) una especie de intrusión artificial contra la fecundidad del acto conyugal; 3) una acción que va en contra de la naturaleza biológica o fisiológica del acto conyugal. Grisez muestra cómo ninguna de estas opiniones logra tocar el verdadero núcleo del problema. Suponen una concepción errónea de la moralidad de la acción humana como acción moral.

In honor of the upcoming 35th anniversary of the encyclical Humanae Vitae by Paul VI (July 25, 2003) and the 75th birthday of Germain Grisez (September 30, 2004), one of the most important contemporary English speaking moral theologians, the present work inaugurates a series of articles on contraception in the thought of Grisez.
The present article presents Grisez’s critique regarding the three most common errors in presenting the essence of the contraceptive act and its intrinsic incorrectness. The three equivocations in question consist in considering contraception as: 1) a type of external conduct either of using certain methods or of obtaining certain results in relation with the fertility of the conjugal act; 2) a sort of artificial intrusion against the fertility of the conjugal act; 3) an action that goes against the biological or physiological nature of the conjugal act. Grisez shows how none of these opinions succeeds in touching the true core of the problem. They suppose an erroneous conception of the morality of human action as moral action.

Three great fi gures of the latin patristic philosophy – Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine –
connected the fourfold scheme of the cardinal virtues with the notion of Christian salvation.
Isidore of Sevilla is one of the few authors of the Late Antiquity – Early Middle Ages, which do
not follow this line of interpretation of the cardinal virtues. The other point is that Isidore wrote
two different passages on the four virtues: one in Differentiae II that contains some Christian
elements and the other in Etymologiae that possesses pure stoic character. To explain these two
peculiarities the investigators pointed out that his writings were mere compilations. The main
disadvantage of this explanation is that all these features of Isidorian teaching on cardinal virtues
are explained externally. This article offers another interpretation of this teaching on the basis
of comparative analysis (comparing them with each other and with their sources) of Isidore’s
passages on the four virtues. The article argues that Isidore’s conception of the cardinal virtues
is common for Differentiae II and Etymologiae. Isidore considers stoic defi nitions of the four
virtues as universal in Etymologiae and expand them in Differentiae II, adding some Christian
elements to general stoic defi nitions.

One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed to be excellences. One way to understand this is to claim that the virtues always yield correct moral action and that we cannot be "too virtuous": the virtues cannot be had in excess or "to a fault". If we take this seriously, however, it yields the surprising conclusion that many traits which have been traditionally thought of as "virtues" fail to make the grade. The most prominent solution to the problem, reminiscent of Aristotle's view, is found to generate more problems than it solves.

I present systematically the teaching of Nicetas Stethatos on the Platonic cardinal virtues (φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη) with the focus on his treatise On the Soul. Sources are examined, where I emphasize on Ambiguum ad Ioannem 21 of Maximοs Confessor. I attempt to contextualize this teaching in the philosophical developments of the 11th century in Constantinople. A recent study by D. Shlenov on this topic is critically reviewed.

La Justicia, como una de las Virtudes Cardinales, ha sido objeto de reflexión por parte de los pensadores desde la Antigüedad, cuando se sentaron las bases de este concepto. Esta virtud consta de importantes antecedentes visuales y teóricos que contribuyeron a configurar su visualidad durante el medievo. Los atributos de la Justicia son las concreciones visuales de sus características, los cuales ofrecen combinaciones dando lugar a tipos iconográficos determinados por las consideraciones teóricas que definen a la Justicia. Por este motivo, proponemos un estudio diacrónico de la visualidad de la Justicia desde sus orígenes hasta el siglo XIV, atendiendo al significado de sus atributos a partir de las fuentes escritas. Además, las combinaciones de atributos nos permiten ofrecer una propuesta de clasificación de los tipos iconográficos más frecuentes de la Justicia, concretados a partir de las concepciones teóricas del concepto.
Palabras clave: Justicia-Alegoría-Virtudes cardinales-Iconografía

The theme of being a subject is one of the most important themes in contemporary pedagogical discussions. There is a problem appearing in these discussions connected with understanding the term ‘being a subject’. Some philosophers and theorists of education maintain that each human being is a subject. Others indicate that people become the subjects in a process of individual development, in consequence of development of the rationality and the freedom. In the article the author tries to explain how Thomistic philosophy and pedagogy understand ‘being a subject’. He indicates that it is necessary to differentiate being a subject in the metaphysical sense (in this sense each human being is a subject) from being a subject in the functional sense (in this sense a human being can become a subject). A lot of problems result from using one word to describe two different subjects. The author indicates also the Thomistic theory of moral habits as the theory which refers to the theme of ‘being a subject’ in the functional sense and discuses the Thomistic theory of knowledge in the context of the thesis of poststructuralism that it is impossible to become a subject because the human mind is violated by different concepts of the world and in consequence of this fact the human being is unable to autonomous activity. Referring to the thinking of the Thomistic philosophers and theorists of education the author argues that education based on experience of the truth and the goodness of the reality, which isn’t connected with any ideology, make it possible to help young people to become the subjects.

There is stock argument against libertarianism: that the indeterminism it postulates makes human choice a matter of chance and this is no better as a basis for practical rationality and moral responsibility than the most rigid determinism.  I suggest that a similar problem arises on deterministic assumptions: although human choice is no longer a matter of mere chance, it remains arbitrary since whatever explains a person’s choice to act on the reasons for an action rather than those against, it is not a matter of reasons that were reasons FOR THAT PERSON.  The explanatory gap is closed in the wrong way for the impression of sheer arbitrariness to be cancelled.  I discuss (via a digression on F. H. Bradley) whether Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ would, if correct, necessitate any modification to this conclusion.  I also ask how the problem addressed in this paper relates to Galen Strawson’s rejection of the possibility of complete autonomy or self-determination.

Este artículo presenta el pensamiento de Germain Grisez sobre la anticoncepción. La primera sección muestra brevemente cómo este autor percibe los actos anticonceptivos como la elección de impedir el comienzo de una nueva vida. Por lo tanto, estos actos son siempre contrarios a la vida («a contralife act»). 
La segunda sección de este trabajo analiza el vocabulario de Grisez sobre el acto humano: la elección, “la propuesta adoptada por la elección” (finis operis, objeto del acto), la intención (“inmediata” y “ulterior”), y su aplicación al acto anticonceptivo. 
La tercera sección consiste en una valoración de la posición de Grisez. Su análisis del acto humano es tomista y sólido, pero el objeto o el sentido del acto anticonceptivo no es impedir el comienzo de una nueva vida posible, sino hacer infecundas las relaciones sexuales. El acto anticonceptivo acto anticonceptivo se dirige contra los actos conyugales, no contra el hijo inexistente. Además, la intención de evitar el comienzo de una nueva vida no es ilícita en sí misma. Puede ser lícita, como en los casos de abstinencia periódica por razones graves de paternidad responsable y en las situaciones de agresión sexual.

This article presents Germain Grisez’s thought about contraception. The first section shows briefly how this author perceives contraceptive acts as choosing to prevent the beginning of a new life. Therefore, these acts are always against life («a contralife act»). 
The second section of this work analyses Grisez’s vocabulary about the human act: choice, «the proposal adopted by choice» (finis operis, object of the act), intention (‘immediate’ and ‘ulterior’), and it’s application to the contraceptive act. 
The third section consists in a valuation of Grisez’s position. His analysis of the human act is thomistic and sound, but the object or meaning of the contraceptive act is not to prevent the beginning of a new possible life, but to make infertile the sexual relations. The contraceptive act is directed against the conjugal acts, not against the nonexistent child. Moreover, the intention about avoiding the beginning of a new life is not illicit in itself. It can be licit, as in the cases of periodic abstinence due to serious reasons of responsible paternity and in the situations of sexual aggression.

Resumen: Tanto la Sabiduría como la Prudencia han sido tratadas como términos sinónimos desde la Antigüedad. Ambos conceptos se personifica-ban mediante la diosa Atenea/Minerva. Estas correspondencias han dado lugar a un intercambio de papeles, siendo considerada la Sa-biduría como una de las Virtudes Cardinales. Asimismo, en las alegorías de la Prudencia y la Sabiduría encontramos atributos idénticos que responden al mismo significado y función, concretamente: el aspecto armado, el libro, la lechuza, la criba o cedazo y la presencia de algún objeto lumínico.
Abstract: Both Wisdom and Prudence have been treated like synonyms terms since Antiquity. Both concepts were personified through the goddess Athena/Minerva. These correspondences have led to an exchange of roles, being considered Wisdom as one of Cardinal Virtues. Likewise, in the allegories of Prudence and Wisdom we can find identical attributes which cater to the same meaning and function , concretely: the armed appearance, book, barn owl, sieve and the presence of some luminous object.

La Prudencia, como una de las Virtudes Cardinales, ha sido dividida por los pensadores en diferentes partes, las cuales exponen y especifican los objetivos y funciones de esta virtud. La imagen de la Prudencia se
traduce en una alegoría portadora de diferentes atributos que constituyen la propia visualización de sus partes. Asimismo, muestra conexiones visuales con la imagen de la Prudencia.

Prudence, like one of the Cardinal Virtues, has been divided by the thinkers in different parts, which expose and specify the objective and functions of this virtue. Prudence’s image is translated in an allegory that carries different attributes which constitute the own visualization of its parts. Likewise, the visualization of Prudence’s parts shows visual connections with Prudence’s image.

Özet
Antik Yunan ve Helenistik dönem felsefe gelenekleri hikmet, iffet, şecaat ile adaletten müteşekkil bulunan dört erdemi ideal bir ahlâkî yaşam sürdürebilmek açısından diğerlerinden daha ayrıcalıklı ve önemli kabul etmiştir. Bu kabul, kadîm dünyanın sahip bulunduğu felsefe-bilim birikimini tevarüs eden İslam felsefesi tarafından da dikkate alınmıştır. Tevarüs sonrası oluşan felsefî alanyazında bahsi geçen erdemler yaygınlıkla temel erdemler (el-fezâilu’l-asliyye) şeklinde nitelendirilmiş ve onlar etrafında daha önce gündeme gelen soruların pek çoğu İslam filozofları tarafından da birer felsefî mesele haline getirilmiştir. Böylesi meselelerden biri de ilgili dört temel erdemin birbirleri ile irtibatı problemidir. Kendisini daha çok “erdemler var olabilmek için birbirlerine muhtaç mıdır?” sorusu üzerinden dışa vuran bu problem, felsefe tarihinin erken dönemlerinden itibaren inceleme konusu olmuş ve kendisine yönelik değişik çözüm önerileri ileri sürülmüştür. Ne var ki, filozoflarca sunulan cevapların detayları değişse de teklif edilen çözüm önerileri genel itibariyle ortak bir ana fikir, erdemlerin kendi aralarında bir çeşit birlik/bütünlük arz ettiği fikri etrafında şekillenmiştir. Aynı şekilde, klasik dönem İslam filozoflarının da söz konusu irtibat problemine ürettikleri kendi cevaplarında erdemlere yönelik benzer bir bütüncül yaklaşımı muhafaza ettikleri görülmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle onlar da erdemleri birleştirmekte/bütünleştirmektedir. Bu tebliğ, öncelikle temel erdemlerin birbirleri ile irtibatı probleminin İslam ahlâk düşüncesinin yenilenme döneminde de değerini koruyup korumadığı sorusuna bir yanıt bulmaya çalışacak, şayet bu sorunun cevabı olumlu ise akabinde de probleme dair ortaya konulan çözümlerde önceki bütüncül yaklaşımın sürdürülüp sürdürülmediğini tespite gayret edecektir. Konuya ilişkin incelemeler ise Adudüddin el-Îcî (öl. 756/1355) tarafından telif edilen ve yenilenme dönemi İslam ahlâk düşüncesinin önemli eserlerinden olan el-Ahlâku’l-‘Adudiyye ile onun şerhleri çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilecektir.

Abstract
Philosophical traditions of the ancient Greek and the Hellenistic period accept the four virtues, which are composed of wisdom (hikmah), courage (shajā‘ah), temperance (‘iffah) and justice (‘adālah), as more privileged and important from others in terms of living an ideal moral life. This acceptance was considered by Islamic philosophy which inherited the accumulation of philosophical-scientific knowledge of the ancient world. In the literature arose after this inheriting, the mentioned virtues commonly named as cardinal virtues (al-fadāil al-asliyyah), and many of the questions asked about them before were also tackled as philosophical problems by Islamic philosophers. One of them is the problem of the interconnectedness of the four virtues. This problem, which manifests itself mostly through the question of “do virtues need each other to be able to exist”, has become a subject of study from the early period of the history of philosophy, and different solutions have been provided to it. However, although the details of answers given by philosophers change, the provided solutions have generally taken shape around a common main idea, the idea that the virtues constitute a kind of unity/integrity among themselves. Likewise, it seems that the Islamic philosophers of the classical period uphold a similar holistic approach to the virtues when they give their answers to the aforementioned interconnectedness problem. In other words, they unite/integrate the virtues too. This paper, firstly, will try to find an answer to the question of whether the problem of the interconnectedness of the cardinal virtues sustain its value or not in the regeneration period of Islamic ethical thought; then, if the answer is in the affirmative, it will strive to determine whether the former holistic approach is maintained or not in the solutions given to that problem. Researches on this will be conducted within the framework of both al-Akhlāk al-‘adudiyyah by ‘Adud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d.756/1355), which is a significant work of the regeneration period of Islamic ethical thought, and its commentaries.

This article explores the implications for Christian religious education of the theory of moral virtues formulated by Thomas Aquinas and developed by the contemporary Neo-Thomists. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part introduces Thomistic virtue theory and presents cardinal virtues crucial for Thomistic ethics: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude, as the reference points for moral education. This part also includes analysis of the relationship between cardinal and theological virtues, leading to the conclusion that Christian religious education also requires the development of theological virtues. The second part explores, through Thomistic theory, what factors condition the development of a person’s moral character (i.e. his/her moral virtues) and what those factors mean for supporting moral education within Christian religious education, initially within the context of Polish schooling. Particular attention is given to three issues: introducing the concept of responsibility for community members, introducing knowledge of moral virtues, and building a relationship with God.

Germain Grisez considera que un acto de anticoncepción es un acto contra la vida, similar –no igual–- al homicidio deliberado, dentro del contexto del quinto mandamiento y del bien de la vida. Este artículo examina cómo este autor conceptualiza la relación entre la anticoncepción y la sexualidad. Grisez indica justamente que la anticoncepción no es un acto sexual, sino una acción que pretende privar a los actos sexuales de su fecundidad. Se trata, efectivamente, de elecciones diferentes. Nuestro autor afirma, además, que aunque la anticoncepción es moralmente ilícita por otras razones relacionadas con la sexualidad y el matrimonio, lo es sobre todo y esencialmente porque va contra la vida. En este sentido, la relación de la anticoncepción con los actos sexuales sería accidental.
Además, la lógica de la «intención inmediata» lleva a Grisez a hablar de anticoncepción no sólo cuando forma parte de las propias relaciones sexuales, sino también cuando se ejerce sobre las relaciones sexuales de otras personas, como podría hacer un dictador sobre toda una población o alguien que es responsable de una institución para personas mentalmente incapaces sobre los internos de esa institución. 
Tras la presentación del pensamiento del autor, el artículo termina con algunas observaciones críticas. En primer lugar, al no ser un acto contra de la vida, sino contra la castidad, la relación de la anticoncepción con la sexualidad es esencial: se dirige a anular la fecundidad de los actos sexuales. En segundo lugar, sólo se puede hablar de anticoncepción cuando actúa contra la fecundidad de los propios actos sexuales. Si actúa contra la fecundidad de los actos sexuales de otros, no sería un acto contra la castidad, sino contra la justicia. En tercer lugar, se demuestra que la intención –inmediata o ulterior– de que no se inicie una nueva vida no es necesariamente inmoral.

Germain Grisez believes that an act of contraception is an act against life, similar — not equal — to deliberate homicide, within the context of the fifth commandment and the good of life. This article examines how he conceptualizes the relation between contraception and sexuality. Grisez justly indicates that contraception is not a sexual act, but an action that intends to deprive sexual acts of their fecundity. These are, effectively, different choices. Our author affirms, also, that even though contraception is morally illicit because of other reasons related to sexuality and marriage, it is above all and essentially because it is against life. In this sense, the relation of contraception with sexual acts would be accidental.
In addition, the logic of «immediate intention» leads Grisez to speak of contraception not only when it is part of one’s own sexual relations, but also when it is exercised upon the sexual relations of other persons, as could be done by a dictator over an entire population, or someone who is responsible for an institution, for persons mentally incompetent, over the inmates of that institution. 

After the presentation of the author’s thinking, the article ends with some critical observations. In first place, not being against life, but against chastity, the relation between contraception with sexuality is essential: it is directed toward nullifying the fecundity of sexual acts. In second place, contraception may be spoken of only when it acts against the fecundity of one’s own sexual acts. If it acts against the fecundity of sexual acts of others, it would not be an act against chastity, but against justice. In third place, it is shown that the intention — immediate or ulterior — that a new life may not begin is not necessarily immoral.

La visualidad de la Templanza surge en el medievo con el predominio de las tendencias italianas. Durante los siglos XV y XVI, surgió un nuevo tipo iconográfico para la Templanza dentro del ámbito francés de la "nueva visualidad", aportando nuevos atributos. Dicha innovación no es más que la manifestación icónica de las características que los pensadores atribuyen a esta virtud. El presente estudio versa sobre la aparición, análisis, continuidad y variación del tipo iconográfico de la Templanza en la "nueva visualidad". De este modo, la innovación visual es explicada a partir de su relación con las fuentes escritas y la continuidad y variación de las imágenes.

El presente trabajo procura explicitar, por medio de un recorrido analítico a la vez que descriptivo, la fundamentación de Pedro Lombardo acerca del tema de las cuatro virtudes cardinales en su Ordo Sententiarum III, d.33. Sobre la base de  tal exposición, se examinará también de qué manera ese mismo asunto es retomado y comentado tanto por Alberto Magno cuanto por Tomás de Aquino. El objetivo es descubrir ciertas constantes, rupturas o novedades doctrinales entre discursos  que, a pesar de su distancia cronológica, comparten empero un tópico del mismo tenor.

Mackie’s claim that in general courage benefits its possessor seems inconsistent with his ‘error theory’ of value.  But how plausible is it in itself?  I suggest that his arguments for the claim fail in the same way as the arguments of those who more explicitly embrace ‘virtue ethics’ fail.  We do not know any way of objectively weighing risks against other considerations, of deciding whether something is ‘worth the risk’.  Since I have no PROOF that there could not be a way, I prefer to speak of ‘ignorance’ rather than ‘error’ here.

Este estudio es la continuación de un artículo anterior, en el que se analizaba el pensamiento de Germain Grisez acerca de la dignidad de la vida corporal humana y la procreación desde una perspectiva filosófica, a la luz de la razón. Sin embargo, es bajo la luz de la fe cuando adquieren su valor definitivo y más sublime, su carácter “santo”, debido a la especial relación de la persona humana con el Creador.  Este estudio examina la brillante síntesis teológica de Grisez sobre la sacralidad de la vida humana corpórea y de la procreación, que se opone a todo dualismo y a toda instrumentalización del cuerpo, de la vida humana y de la sexualidad.  Destaca la agudeza de sus observaciones y la originalidad de algunas de sus reflexiones.
Al final del artículo se incluyen unas breves observaciones críticas, teniendo en cuenta todo lo que se dice en este artículo y en el anterior: 1) la “vida” que podría ser concebida y que es impedida por las medidas anticonceptivas, y la “vida” ya concebida que es asesinada durante un aborto, no pueden incluirse bajo la misma categoría de “vida”; 2) la procreación no consiste tanto en la “vida en cuanto transmitida”, sino en la transmisión de la vida, en el conjunto de actos y procesos que hacen posible que un nuevo ser humano llegue a existir.  Es contra la fecundidad de estos actos que se dirigen las medidas anticonceptivas; no contra la nueva vida que podría llegar a existir.

This study is the continuation of a previous article, which analyzed the thinking of Germain Grisez about the dignity of human corporeal life and procreation from a philosophical perspective, under the light of reason. It is, nevertheless, under the light of faith that they acquire their definitive and most sublime value, their ‘holy’ character, due to the special relation of the human person with the Creator.  This study examines the brilliant theological synthesis of Grisez about the sacredness of corporeal human life and procreation, which stands against all dualism and all instrumentalization of the body, human life and sexuality.  The acuity of his observations and the originality of some of his reflections stand out.
At the end of the article are included some brief critical observations, taking into account all that is said in this article as well as the previous: 1) “life” that could be conceived and that is impeded by contraceptive measures, and “life” already conceived that is killed during an abortion, cannot be included under the same category of “life”; 2) procreation does not consist so much in “life as being transmitted” but in the transmission of life, in the set of acts and processes which make it possible for a new human being to come into existence.  It is against the fecundity of these acts that contraceptive measures are directed; not against the new life that could come into existence.

I present systematically the teaching of Nicetas Stethatos on the Platonic cardinal virtues (φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη) with the focus on his treatise On the Soul. Sources are examined, where I emphasize on Ambiguum ad Ioannem 21 of Maximοs Confessor. I attempt to contextualize this teaching in the philosophical developments of the 11th century in Constantinople. A recent study by D. Shlenov on this topic is critically reviewed.