Elitism

Abstract
This article clarifies how elitist elements are integrated into populist discourse by analyzing political speeches using this incongruent style. First, it introduces a method to identify populist, elitist, and pluralist discourse based on a shared logic, defining populism at an intercontextual level. Second, speeches by Donald Trump (US), Boris Johnson (UK), and Thierry Baudet (NL) are analyzed in their contexts to clarify their political styles and are then compared to see where these styles meet. The populism-elitism mix goes well with nationalism, as all three politicians combine the style with a nationalist ideology, which unites the people with the elite. Coalitions are created between the people and the “good” elite to fight the “bad” elite. Furthermore, the mix has rhetorical-strategic advantages, such as profiling oneself as unique on the political field. Overall, the blend shows political significance, justifying thoughtful academic consideration alongside the broad attention for full populism.

In his influential book Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy Jacques Ranciere builds a substantial critique of liberal regimes present in most Western countries. He finds  them defective because: (1) they allow wealth and economic power of groups and individuals to influence public decision-making, making those with economic power an elite group; (2) they allow knowledge and expertise of groups and individuals to influence public decision-making, making those with epistemic power an elite group; (3) they allow and encourage social and economic conditions that make people inappropriate for decision-making on important issues, making those with certain characteristics thus acquired an inferior group. We focus on the Ranciere’s second objection by relying on Estlund’s epistemic proceduralis approach and claim that one does not have to embrace postmodernist idea of reducing reason to relations of power in order to present a substantial critique of our contemporary society. Furthermore, we argue that one does not have to base egalitarian democracy on postmodernist ideas that reject the truth-tracking potential of democratic procedures – egalitarian democracy is perfectly compatible with the idea of truth in politics.

Meritocracy functions in Singapore as the key principle of governance and educational distribution. However, the concept of meritocracy itself contains a number of inherent contradictions, most evidently witnessed in the tension between its egalitarian and elitist strands. This tension is documented in the recommendations of Singapore’s recent primary education review, already accepted by the Ministry of Education and to be implemented in the coming years. This article considers these recommendations against the backdrop of a tentative movement towards egalitarianism in educational distribution. Specifically, it provides a preliminary and provisional assessment of how far they would go towards providing for greater educational equity and, therefore, in recovering the ideology of meritocracy in the nation-state.

Plato's Republic clearly outlines his ideal of state eduction for the three classes in his state — the hoi polloi & merchants, the guardians, & the philosopher king(s). But who and what is the education ultimately for? IF it leads to the actual transcendence of the Philosopher King(s) (one or two) into the sunlike realization of the Good, then the entire Republic will benefit from this enlightened wise & compassionate rule. IF, however, the goal is only to maintain order & the continuation of the state via top-down power, then the Republic is a totalitarian state ruled by an elite.

There's no text, for I just winged it based on the PP, and beginning with an explanation of transcendent consciousness, based on Maslow's ancient Pyramid of Needs. In this case transcendence suggests ego-self transcendence, perhaps unity with God, like a saint is said to experience.

In the journal articles, historiographical essays, and numerous references to the political thought of Adriano Olivetti, the term constantly used to characterize his thinking is ‘utopia’. It is from this word, or rather, the misuse of this word, where one can begin to shed light on Olivettian political thinking. The term ‘utopia’, which has come to designate an entire vein of political literature, has also entered into common usage to define an impossible project, a wide-eyed dream; and a ‘utopian’ is that individual who longs for abstract projects instead of concrete ideas. It would be unproductive to resort to the diverse arguments of Firpo, of Mannheim, or of Bloch, of the philosophers of the Frankfurt School or others, since, as Giovanni Sartori has observed, after the word ceases to exist – where utopia is understood to mean impossibility – the impossibilities still remain. So, precisely because the literature on the political thought of Olivetti appears to suffer greatly from ‘empirical’ influences, it seems necessary to confront the complexities of his presumed utopianism with a methodological approach. This book investigates the inherent ‘impossibilities’, if they indeed exist, in the political thought of Olivetti. It also seeks to understand, as a result, if the Olivettian ideal is lacking in any true consistency, since it is secluded from an adequate analysis of historical reality, or if it is, rather, an idealism which does not lose sight of reality, in an attempt to overturn it as the basis for a plausible global vision.

In the present article we discuss three studies aimed at better understanding elitism in the context of fan groups. The studies assess different facets of elitism, predictors of elitism and the potential outcomes associated with holding elitist beliefs. The survey studies were conducted on members of three distinct fan groups: furries (fans of media featuring anthropomorphized animal characters), bronies (adult fans of the television series My Little Pony) and anime fans (fans of Japanese animation). Elitism was found to include both self-inflation and other-derogation and is predicted by two components of fan identity (fanship and fandom). Elitism was also significantly associated with pro-gatekeeping attitudes and behaviours. Practical and theoretical implications for fan culture are discussed. We also discuss the limitations of the studies and their ability to contribute to a discussion about creating inclusive fan spaces.

Manin se pregunta en su texto sobre la “Metamorfosis de la Representación”,  cuál es el lazo representativo entre los representantes y los representados, o en otras palabras, entre gobernantes y gobernados. A su vez, el politólogo francés se pregunta si estos lazos son sólidos, y si pueden dar cuenta de un vínculo entre estas dos partes. En una primera aproximación, Manin dirá que no.

El autor realiza su aporte a través del estudio de tres casos de gobierno(s) representativo(s): Inglaterra, Francia y los Estados Unidos. Sobre estos campos de estudio, Manin analizará sus experiencias políticas, para dar cuenta de los problemas de la representación política y de la actual crisis de la representatividad, que para el autor, es una característica de nuestro tiempo.

A compilação dos textos que compõem esta coletânea está bem longe da busca do marxismo puro e duro ou do “verdadeiro Marx”. Essa miragem filosofante, responsável por parir no século XX tantos marxismos quantos analistas disponíveis, implicou em uma glorificação desmedida do autor e praticamente só isso. As ideologias teóricas que surgiram daí, cujo efeito foi encerrar a discussão e não permiti-la, criaram uma série de campos de força que dividiram artificialmente as ciências sociais em “Sociologia burguesa”, de um lado, e Teoria Marxista, de outro. A primeira, supostamente derivada de uma epistemologia positivista e de uma metodologia empirista, foi condenada e banida por sua inexplicável ignorância da dialética materialista.
Não é só um pouco desconcertante quando uma descobre a outra. O prejuízo contabilizado por essa separação bizantina, que parece ter mais a ver com as vantagens simbólicas que cada partido teórico retira dessa luta ideológica, implicou no isolamento provinciano de ambas as partes – e ele foi muito mais prejudicial ao marxismo acadêmico.
Este livro parte dessa presunção. Deixando de lado a política revolucionária e os pouquíssimos escritos que se incumbiram de falar do mundo pós-capitalista e da estratégia dessa reengenharia social, os ensaios reunidos aqui pretendem tomar o pensamento de Marx como uma ciência social normal. Essa postura implica numa compreensão diferente dos textos canônicos, mais interessada nas suas operações analíticas do que na monumental parafernália teórica sobre a qual se apoiam. Além disso, assume, para todos os efeitos, que os postulados do marxismo devem ser entendidos como hipóteses, não como princípios; e hipóteses são por definição verificáveis, ou seja, passíveis de serem confirmadas – ou refutadas. Só assim os estudos marxistas conseguirão deixar de ser o que frequentemente tem sido: ilustração de teoria.

The article discusses the problem of equality in education, particularly in
the field of access to education. It presents contemporary philosophical trends in regard to this subject matter, explaining the difference between formal equality and substantive one. The conception of educational adequacy is also presented. What is more, the author shows how previously elitist views are still – in a legitimate way – part of principles
governing the problem. When it comes to legal considerations, the paper delivers comprehensive outlook on provisions guaranteed in the United Nations system of protection of human rights with respect to equality in education. Inefficiency of these provisions is portrayed as one of the causes of recent changes in the area of right to education, that afflicts also the problem of educational equality.

This paper represents the only document that outlines the connection between the elite Zarzian shamanic priests and their subjects the Natufians as those who constructed Gobekli Tepe. These findings were accomplished by mapping the origins of an ancient obsidian and chlorite trade in the Anatolians and the Levant, which points to a Zarzian elitism and a Natufian subservient relationship between the two cultures. A relationship that compelled the Zarzians from their Neolithic site at Shanidar cave and Zawi Chemi to travel down the Batman river to establish Kortik Tepe and establish an outpost at El Qaramel that I have designed as Gobekli Tepe I.

After Gobekli Tepe I was destroyed at El Qaramel by fire, Zarzian shamanic priests from Kortik Tepe founded what I have designated as Gobekli Tepe II near Sanliurfa, Turkey. From where they would establish the first shamanic priesthood and begin to initiate both Natufian and Zarzian initiates into their a Zarzian shamanic religion at Gobekli Tepe. At Kortik Tepe, I then demonstrate through academic papers that Zarzian shamanic priests exclusively manufactured the ritual paraphernalia I have called chlorite ‘Shaman Phalluses’ and the bags found on the ‘Vulture Stone’ that were used at Gobekli Tepe.

This Neolithic relationship has also revealed for the first time the contents of the (3) bags and their power animals etched into the ‘Vulture Stone’; which are a Bird, Goat, Turtle and lastly a Bee. A Bee cult that disintegrates the Zarzian and Natufian’s relationship; and effectuates the demise of Gobekli Tepe. Furthermore, this paper will be the first to connect Kortik Tepe’s Zarzian shamanic priests to the winged deities the Apkallus, and the Natufians “fisher-tortoisemen” to the Oannes, discuss the triangle pattern found by an Israeli archeologist at Gobekli Tepe, skull cults, a bone plaquette indicating a ritual performed with a ‘Shaman Phallus’ at Gobekli Tepe and much, much more.

In light of the recent political tendencies in multiple regions across the globe, including Europe  and Northern America, populism has become one of the most prominent subjects of research among  political scientists. However, in Russia populism studies still remain unsystematic, and many scholars  tend to define populism as “rhetoric”, while paying little attention to its role in the political process.  By contrast, we argue that one should combine an ideational approach with an approach considering  populism as a strategy of political mobilization in order to grasp the populist phenomenon in the Russian  context. By focusing on the main political actors in today’s Russia, who are often described as populists,  we seek to clarify the relationship between two forms of modern demagoguery, i.e. populism, based on  the flattering of “the people”, and elitism which disdains “the people” in one or another way. Thus, we  demonstrate that the major problem in Russia is elitism, not populism. On the other hand, we argue  that populism is not an essentially negative phenomenon and can have positive impacts on the political  process both in liberal democracies and non-democracies. Instead of regarding populism as a dangerous  threat to democracy, it is more fruitful to consider it as a “simplified” vision of democracy. As such,  populism, both in its social and national forms, can contribute to spread basic democratic principles  among the population under authoritarian and post-authoritarian conditions, when political pluralism  is significantly restrained, ideological attitudes are poorly differentiated, and civil society is weak.

В связи с ростом влияния популистских движений и настроений в разных  странах и регионах мира популизм в последние годы стал одним из ключевых  объектов изучения политической науки. Однако применительно к российскому кейсу  исследования этого явления пока что остаются крайне редкими и несистематическими.  В статье предпринимается попытка преодолеть ряд спорных трактовок популизма,  рассматривающих его как сугубо риторический феномен и обращающих недостаточное  внимание на его содержательную роль в политическом процессе. Анализ наиболее  влиятельных подходов к определению сущности популизма позволил авторам  предложить собственное понимание данного явления в российском обществе,  сочетающее идейный и мобилизационный подходы. Опираясь на политическую  теорию, а также межстрановые сравнения и эмпирические данные, исследователи  рассматривают действия ключевых политических акторов в современной  России, характеризуемых, по преимуществу, как популистов. Авторы впервые  поднимают вопрос о взаимосвязи между двумя видами современной демагогии,  а именно популизмом, основанном на заигрывании с “народом”, и элитизмом,  выражающим (в той или иной форме) презрение к “народу”, и приходят к выводу,  что в России наибольшую проблему представляет именно элитизм в двух его  разновидностях – “патерналистской” и “снобистской”. Авторы считают, что популизм  не следует расценивать как исключительно негативное явление, он может иметь  позитивные последствия как в странах с либерально-демократическим режимом,  так и в странах с отсутствующей или крайне слабо проявленной демократической  культурой. Поэтому популизм более продуктивно рассматривать в качестве  “упрощенного” представления о демократии. Именно в этом качестве он может  способствовать массовому усвоению базовых демократических ценностей в условиях,  когда политический плюрализм существенно ограничен, идеологические предпочтения  населения низко дифференцированы, а гражданское общество слабо в институциональном отношении.

¿Cuál es la relación entre ciencia e ideología?. ¿Son dos cosas incompatibles, complementarias o son la misma cosa?. ¿Debe evitar la ciencia dejarse “contaminar” por la ideología?. ¿Hay una única manera de hacer ciencia?. ¿Todas conducen a los mismos resultados y nos dan la misma visión del mundo?. Nos centraremos en la figura de Alexander Bogdanov, médico y filósofo ruso, para debatir sobre estos y otros temas de relevancia actual. Sus teorías dieron origen a lo que después se denominó la “teoría de las dos ciencias”, que da título a este trabajo.

Cet article se focalise sur la reproduction, en Russie contemporaine, d’un discours opposant une minorité libérale, « civilisée » et pro-européenne au « peuple » jugé archaïque, incivil et hostile aux valeurs libérales. Sur fond d’une marginalisation extrême du libéralisme dans l’espace public russe depuis les années 2000, deux moments-clés durant lesquels ce discours élitiste a atteint son apogée sont distingués : les manifestations d’opposition de l’hiver 2011-2012 et la révolution en Ukraine de 2014, suivie par l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie et le déclenchement d’un conflit armé dans le Donbass. L’argument avancé est double : d’une part, la barbarisation symbolique des « masses populaires » relève des aspirations de l’intelligentsia pour affirmer son statut social, d’autre part elle est un moyen d’imputer l’échec de la « transition démocratique » postsoviétique et l’impopularité des idées libérales à la prétendue « mentalité archaïque » d’une grande majorité des Russes. Cette stratégie discursive s’avère donc contre-productive dans la mesure où elle contribue à renforcer l’image du libéralisme russe, appuyée par le discours politique officiel, comme étant une idéologie « anti-populaire » ou « anti-nationale » et dont le corollaire n’est autre qu’une opinion libérale encline au pessimisme.

The article focuses on the reproduction of a discourse opposing a liberal, “civilized” and pro-European minority to “the people”, disdained as archaic, uncivil and hostile to liberal values in contemporary Russia. In the context of increasing marginalization and blatant stigmatization of liberalism in the Russian public sphere, I distinguish two key moments when this elitist discourse reached his peak: first, during the 2011-2012 anti-government mass protests and, second, in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution followed by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and an armed conflict in the Donbass region. I argue that the symbolic barbarization of the “popular masses” not only stems from the intelligentsia’s aspirations to affirm its social status, but also serves as a tool to blame the alleged “archaic mentality” of the majority of Russians for the failure of post-Soviet democratic transition and/or the unpopularity of the liberal agenda. In conclusion, I speculate that this discursive strategy is deeply counter-productive since it reinforces the image of Russian liberalism, backed by the official political discourse, as an “anti-popular” or “anti-national” ideology and drives the Russian liberal-minded public to despair.

The concept of meritocracy is unstable as its constituent ideas are potentially contradictory. The egalitarian aspects of meritocracy, for example, can come into conflict with its focus on talent allocation, competition, and reward. In practice, meritocracy is often transformed into an ideology of inequality and elitism. In Singapore, meritocracy has been the main ideological resource for justifying authoritarian government and its pro-capitalist orientations. Through competitive scholarships, stringent selection criteria for party candidacy, and high ministerial salaries, the ruling People's Action Party has been able to co-opt talent to form a “technocratic” government for an “administrative state.” However, as Singapore becomes more embedded in the processes of globalization, it will experience new forms of national crisis, alternative worldviews through global communications technology, and a widening income gap, all of which will force its ideology of meritocracy to unravel.

What is the relation between science and ideology? Are they incompatible, complementary or the same thing? Should science avoid “contamination” from ideology? Is there an only way to do science? Does anyone of them lead to the same results and give us the same worldview? We will focus on the figure of Alexander Bogdanov, Russian physician and philosopher, in order to discuss these and other relevant topics. His theories gave birth to what may be called later “the theory of two sciences”, which entitles this work.

In contemporary criticism, interpretation gained a safe position because it was almost free of judgment. With writers like Daniil Kharms, this became a significant issue. Some scholars saw his absurd stories as defensive, irrational, or political. According to Henri Bergson, the main source of inspiration for Kharms, comic effect is a psychological reaction to an idea that the recipient cannot process at the time. As I will argue, Kharms’s method is not to dismiss human ratio but to test the limits of perception. Absurd is not irrational but rather a-logical, so to say, analogical. Therefore, absurd disguises and transcends logic that must be recovered before the critic interprets the text. I am challenging critics with Kharms’s short story “Black Water” (“Chernaya Voda”). By applying Jean Piaget’s approach from Experiments in Contradiction, I am going to prove that any interpretation goes through the following stages: brain-storming when a critic tries to make sense of the content; then, creating of a binary opposition and broadening it to explain the hardest contradictions; and, finally, making exceptions and defending the hypothesis despite any remaining incongruence. Therefore, this paper has two goals: first, to show the latent capacity of the absurd to behold and encrypt defined meanings; second, to position interpretation as the process of creating knowledge within which fallacies can be consciously addressed.

П. Шаран нь Энэтхэгийн нэр цолгорсон улс төр судлаач нэгэн болно. Энэ удаад түүний "Харьцуулсан улс төр судлалын онол" (Theory of Comparative Politics) бүтээлийн бүлгийг дээжлэн хүргэж байна. Таалан болгооно уу. ЭЛИТИЗМ Аливаа нийгэмд хүн амын олонхыг захирах цөөнх оршин байдаг тухай элитийн үзэл баримтлалыг Италийн социологич В. Парэто (1848-1923 он), Г. Моска (1858-1941 он) нар хөгжүүлсэн байна. Элитийн судалгаа улс төрийн шинжлэх ухааны хүрээнд багтаж, XIX зууны шувтарга XX зууны эхэн үед бүрэлдэхүүн хэсэг нь болжээ. Либерал нийгэм дэх элитийн улс төрийн чиг үүргийн тухай асуудлыг XIX зууны шувтарга үед нээлттэйгээр авч үзэж, улс төрийн шинжлэх ухаан, социологи, улс төрийн болон нийгмийн сэтгэлгээний томоохон чиглэл болсон байна. Элитйн тухай үзэл санааны хэлэлцүүлэгт улс төрийн институт, улс төрийн зан үйл, улс төрийн засаглал, улс төрийн үзэл суртал гэх мэт ойлголтууд томоохон байр суурь эзэлдэг байна. Элитийн онол Парэто. Элит гэдэг нь Парэтогийн үзсэнээр, засаглал, баялаг, мэдлэг гэх мэт нийгмийн үнэт зүйл буюу бүтээгдэхүүнээр хэмжигдэх тодорхой шатанд хамгийн дээд эрэмбийн байр суурь эзэлдэг этгээдийг оноочилсон үнэлэмжгүй ухагдахуун юм. Нийгмийн дээд давхарга нь түүний үзсэнээр засгийн газрыг бүрдүүлэхэд шууд болон шууд бусаар оролцох засаглагч элит, засаглагч бус элит гэсэн хоёр хэсгээс бүрддэг байна (302-р хуудас). Парэто элитийн зонхилогч "үлдмэрүүд" (МУИС-ийн гэрган, доктор, профессор Ч. Өлзийсайхан авхайн орчуулгад остаток хэмээхийг "үлдэж ирсэн" гэж монголчилсон байх (Өлзийсайхан 2012, 5) бөгөөд эрхэм багшийн саналтай утга дайлган үлдмэр гэж толмочлов)-ийг өөрчлөх элитийн халаа, сэлгээний үзэл баримтлалыг боловсруулсан байна. Энэ нь бататган бэхжүүлэгчид шинийг эрэлхийлэгчдийг, шинийг эрэлхийлэгчид бататган бэхжүүлэгчдийг орлох онол юм. "Элитийн уналт, өсөлт" нэрт алдарт бүтээлдээ Парэто "Хүн төрөлхтний түүх гэгч элитийн байнгын халаа, сэлгээний түүх болно: Нэг хэсэг нь өсөж өндийж байхад өөр нэг хэсэг нь унаж доройтож байдаг" гэж бичжээ. Халаа, сэлгээний шалтгааныг дайн, элит нөхөн үйлдвэрлэх явцад үүсэх билэг чадварыг хомсдол гэж нэрлэжээ. Дайн бол хүн амын олонхтой харьцуулахад элитийн үлэмжхэн хэсгийг үгүй хийх зүйл юм. Хүн амын бусад хэсгээ бодвол хүүхэд цөөхөн байдаг тул элитийн гэр бүл устах хандлагатай байдаг. Товчоор хэлбэл, нэг хэсэг элит нөгөөгөөр солигдож байдаг. Солигдох үндсэн нөхцөл нь элитийн шинжид байх сэтгэл зүйн өөрчлөлтийн туслалцаатайгаар бий болно. Энэ ч учраас уг хандлагыг сэтгэл зүйн хандлага гэж нэрлэдэг (303-р хуудас). Парэтогийн гол ололт нь хүмүүс оюун ухаан, авьяас чадвар, хөдөлмөрч зан, нэр алдарт дурлах хандлага, оюун санааны чадавх, гуа зүйн хүмүүжлийн хувьд харилцан адилгүй байдаг гэдгийг тогтоосонд оршино. Тийм ч учраас нийгэм өөрөө олон бүрдэлт шинжтэй байдаг. Тэрээр нийгмийн элитийг засаглагч болон засаглагч бус гэж ангилсан байх бөгөөд цөөнхийн чухам үүрэг нь нийгмийн улс төрийн үйл хэргийг хөтлөн явуулахад оршино гэжээ. Элит уналтад орох үед элит бус давхарга элитийн үүргийг гүйцэтгэх болно. Ийнхүү түүх өөрөө "язгууртны булш" болж байдаг. Гэвч элитийн халаа, сэлгээний зарчим нь хуучин элит унахтай зэрэгцээд нийгэм бүхэлдээ уналтад орно гэдгийг илэрхийлдэггүй байна.

Le populisme n’est qu’un aspect ou un élément d’un phénomène plus large ou plus complexe. Plutôt que de spéculer sur « le » populisme en général, il est donc plus judicieux d’essayer de repértorier ses formes particulières et d’analyser ses causes spécifiques. Concernant plus particulièrement le phénomène du « parti d’entrepreneur » à la Berlusconi: il ne constitue pas, à mon avis, un populisme opposant le peuple « pur » aux élites « corrumpues », mais  plutôt une sorte de vision technocratique : ces « entrepreneurs » politiques veulent diriger l’Etat comme une entreprise (firme), ils dénoncent le « bavardage parlementaire » etc.
Le populisme, tout comme son complèment logique qu’est le leadership charismatique, est par nature instable et passager. S’il se maintient plus longuement, c’est qu’il se produit alors un divorce durable entre les « élites » politiques et la société. Ceci tient au fait que les principaux partis établis depuis longtemps font régulièrement l’objet de nombreux scandales de corruption et de clientélisme.
Pour cette raison, l’alternance politique (typique des systèmes partisans bipolaires) freine le populisme, alors que l’absence de l’alternance favorise le populisme de l’opposition, notamment le populisme « protestataire » (« anti-establishment »). Il va de soi qu’on détecte également des raisons sociales ou économiques du populisme. Les excès du néolibéralisme économique actuel incitent directement au discours populiste.
La démocratie implique un certain « populisme ». En s’acharnant contre le populisme, on risque de glisser vers son contraire, l’élitisme « démocratique », qui comporte un danger tout aussi redoutable pour la démocratie. Cet élitisme « démocratique » risque non seulement de vider la démocratie de sa substance, mais peut apporter aussi de l’eau au moulin des ... populistes ! Il faut plutôt chercher, à la manière d’Aristote, un "milieu" entre le populisme et l’élitisme. Malheureusement, comme le fit Aristote remarquer dans son Ethique à Nicomaque, un tel point d’équilibre est malaisé à atteindre.

Considering recent re-assessments of Pareto and Mosca, I discuss whether these thinkers' socio-political orientations contribute to the 'disfiguration' of democracy (in: Urbinati, Democracy disfigured: opinion, truth, and the people, Harvard, Cambridge, MA, 2014) or provide a resource for the renewal of democratic institutions. Femia (Pareto and political theory, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006) presents Pareto as being in the "Machiavellian tradition of sceptical liberalism," revealing the liberal potential of Pareto's realist political theory. Finocchiaro (Beyond right and left, Yale, New Haven, London, 1999) ameliorates the conservative consequences of Mosca's thought by reinterpreting him as a 'democratic elitist,' who holds a conception of political liberty "as a relationship such that authority flows from the masses to the elites." Highlighting the significance of internal tensions within each thinker's work foregrounded by these readings, between the causal primacy of psychic states and the 'mutual dependence' of social factors (Pareto), and between the elite principle and 'balanced pluralism' (Mosca), I ask whether the 'sceptical liberal' Pareto or the 'democratic elitist' Mosca elude Urbinati's unpolitical, populist and plebiscitarian 'disfigurations' of democracy.

The English edition of the book “Eternity does not live here anymore – a glossary of museum sins” (Zagreb, 2012) is written in a rather self-ironic tone, relaxed and polemical in character and deliberately "naive," as I overtly claim in the Introduction. It is very much intentionally idealistic. After decades of international lecturing on critique of theory and practice, having collected some scattered notes and texts, I have felt tempted to put these together in one volume and add necessary clarifications.
As with any criticism, it hurts the best those whom it neither describes nor concerns and who certainly do not deserve it, and it enrages the others who recognize themselves in it. But, as I was never very successful in gaining sympathies, I guess it was logical that the book happened. It seems to have been, at the time of the publishing, the only book entirely dedicated to the critique of museums. 

I was ever very keen to contribute to the usable science that would serve museums and, apparently, all other public memory institutions. It was always a difficult task to offer a theory that would be equally relevant to the West and the East to (as I claimed in a lecture in India) - stand equally the challenges of desert storm and the tropical rain.

In the world of diversity and inequality this critical glossary for some will serve as a reminder of past mistakes, but for most of the world (alas) it will be a warning upon the problems, mistakes and dilemma waiting for them in trying to improve the activities of museums and other heritage institutions.

In the meantime, the book was published in Spanish, Russian and Latvian language. I have made it available to all interested readers  ( https://www.mnemosophy.com/the-vault ) but academia.edu site is well frequented by the student population which remains my favourite audience.

I intend to offer the book in chapters as the readers might be reluctant to download the entire book and so would be able to deal with the reading more easily, deciding if the rest would interest them at all.

Being equipped with photographs and diagrams, it might be a good read for other colleagues in public memory institutions and, probably, even to some readers generally interested by the rising importance of heritage in the contemporary society.

(Excuses to the readers: I have been able to offer only the version prior to printing and prior to the last turn of language editing)

I greet the benevolent reader!

In the Netsiv's commentary on the Torah, העמק דבר, the Netsiv lays out a two-tiered approach to the nature of humanity. Based on this division it is possible to pick out a parallel two-tiered approach to education. With this background we can speculate fruitfully about the Netsiv's opinion on the study of secular subjects in Jewish society and, relatedly, on the closing of the Volozhin Yeshiva under his leadership in 1892.

The word populism has been associated to (very) different meanings in the last years. The " populist " label is still used to describe parties, leaders, movements, attitudes and political regimes, too. Moreover, the adjective " populist " is used in a normative fashion in the public debate to denigrate those movements or parties which contrast the mainstream views. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I conduct a non-normative analysis to avoid a biased vision of the concept. On the other hand, I advocate the understanding of populism as a thin-centered ideology, according to which it is based on two necessary features, namely, (a) an anti-elite(s) mindset and (b) the criticism of representative politics. Resumen El término populismo ha sido asociado a significados muy diferentes en los últimos años. La eti-queta de populista se sigue utilizando para describir partidos, líderes, movimientos, actitudes y regímenes políticos. Además, el adjetivo populista se utiliza también con una inclinación norma-tiva en el debate público para denigrar a esos movimientos o partidos que contrastan con las ideo-logías dominantes. Este artículo tienes dos objetivos principales: por un lado, desarrollo un análisis conceptual no normativo para evitar una visión sesgada del concepto. Por otra parte, abogo por una consideración del populismo como una ideología débil, según la cual se basa en dos caracte-rísticas necesarias, a saber, (a) el anti-elitismo y (b) la crítica de la política representativa. Palabras clave: populismo, política comparada, análisis conceptual, ideología débil.

Anti-intellectualism is fashionable among intellectuals today as a means of disavowing “elitism.” Such positions typically fail to distinguish, however, between privilege as a personal attribute and a structural one. They imply that desirable social leveling is achieved by asserting “equality,” or by denying the existence of any “transcendent” position from which social orders can be judged. This essay argues instead that no true social equality is possible without universalizing material condi- tions of intellectual life—a position anticipated by Thomas More’s Utopia, where all citizens are educated alike, but also fed, clothed, housed, and nurtured according to their needs, and—crucially—accorded equal access to the leisure that examined life requires. At the same time, More’s text recognizes the difficulty of imagining the details of utopian social order in a “corrupt” present through the contradiction between the “ordered” life of the Utopians and the “liberty” that Hythloday associates with philosophy. This unresolved contradiction insists that we understand Utopia as praxis rather than goal. Utopia’s content argues that total material social transformation is required to achieve equality, but its ironic form cautions us to approach such transformation dialectically—moving from a world of privileged collectives to a world of common—universal—“privilege.”

This book contends that liberalization is troubled in new Europe. It investigates Hungary to depict the disaggregate nature of liberalization due to elitism and the prioritization of economic liberalization. Despite the favorable historical circumstances in Hungary, there was no consensus on the virtues of liberalism after 1989. The proponents of liberalism disengaged the public, lost credibility, and failed to convince the public of the advantages of progressive politics and Europeanization. In reaction, conservative populist politics disparages the achievements of both liberalization and Europeanization. Finally, the global economic crisis demonstrates the demise of economic liberalization and puts political liberalization in peril.

See the link below for sample chapter for more information:
http://www.palgrave.com/PDFs/9780230114593.pdf"""

Socialist Slovakia did not pay much attention to medieval Occitan poetry, of which only one translation was accessible in book format – the anthology Danteho trubadúri (The troubadours of Dante), published in 1972 by Jozef Felix and Viliam Turčány. This article seeks to reconstruct its ethical background, drawing mainly (but not exclusively) on contemporary approaches to the anthology as a concept. It responds to such questions as: Do the translators fall prey to cultural isolationism and plagiarize concrete foreign-language (especially French) sources? Does their selection of poems encourage ethnocentrism rather than a true exchange of literary values? Why is Dante’s name included in the title? To what extent are the accompanying paratexts marked by ideological manipulation? Perhaps not surprisingly, the editorial gesture is not discredited by the ordeal, proving that aesthetic elitism can be a powerful antidote to totalitarian practices.

CITATION DETAILS: Thurlow, C. (2016). Queering critical discourse studies or/and performing post-class ideologies. Critical Discourse Studies, 13(5), 485–514. DOI:10.1080/17405904.2015.1122646

Please see final publication for properly typeset, fully proofed version.

Elitist, Cumhuriyet'in kuruluş argümanlarıyla birlikte ortaya çıkan bir refleks olarak gelişen ve Cumhuriyet'in temel dinamiklerinden birini teşkil eden Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin milliyetçilik yaklaşımıyla Kürt halkının yürütmekte olduğu mücadelenin eşdeğer tutulması çabası, "her türlü milliyetçiliğe karşı olma" şeklinde gelişti ve bu da kendisini Türk Milliyetçiliği ile "Kürt Milliyetçiliği"ni bir tutma eğilimi şeklinde kendisini ortaya koydu. Bu yazıda, bu durum eleştirilmeye çalışıldı ve daha iyi anlama çabası ortaya kondu.

This report about oppression of personal autonomy, neglect of human rights in Ukraine is prepared by Autonomous Advocacy, Ukrainian Council of Freethinkers and Believers, and Institute of Open Religion in March 2017 for Joint Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Ukraine (Third Cycle, 28th session 2017) in United Nations Human Rights Council, and amended in July 2017 due to swift degradation of situation with human rights in Ukraine.

Key problems revealed are: war, poverty, impunity of the most crimes against person, poor implementation of human rights in judicial practice, economic barriers in access to justice, authoritarian practices harmful for national, cultural, religious and dissenting minorities, oppression of free speech, violations of privacy and property rights by state policies, predatory monopolism and elitism.

Key propositions are: to amend Constitution of Ukraine, recognizing universal unalienable nature and autonomous meaning of human rights; to reduce court fees in typical cases of human rights violation, especially by officials and law enforcers; allow lawyers to develop pluralism of legal opinions and create alternative independent bar associations without coercive membership in Ukrainian National Bar Association; stop blocking social networks; stop force people and media to use Ukrainian language by violence; stop dictate religious organizations how to worship and manage, comply obligations, noted in §§ 86-91 of decision of European Court of Human Rights in the case of Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine (No. 77703/01 by 14 June 2007); stop involve people to aggressive war, don't discriminate pacifists, comply obligations, noted in UN Human Rights Committee Resolution No. CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7 by 22 August 2013, especially stop violence against minorities and dissenters, provide right to conscientious objection on non-discriminative basis; stop censorship of online petitions; allow people to participate in inclusive public dialogue.

Only Australia, it seems, could have produced Shane Warne. A man of the people who became "a citizen of the world", Warne was a 'bogun' as Merv Hughes called him during his beautifully poised memorial service at the Melbourne Cricket Ground: The People's Ground. Cricket, in Australia at least, is a people's game and I couldn't help wondering, as I wiped tears from my eyes (yet again), if the world would ever have had the pleasure and privilege of witnessing Warne's unnatural abilities and endlessly generous spirit had he been born in England?