State Business Relations

As primeiras duas seções deste trabalho definem um conceito referencial para o planejamento estratégico governamental e a relação entre planejamento e orçamento. As seções 3 e 4 desenvolvem e analisam os mecanismos e a dinâmica de funcionamento do núcleo de governo ou centro de governo, para entender o processo de formação da agenda estratégica que se materializa, encontra substância e concretude, no planeja- mento estratégico. As seções 5, 6, 7 e 8 analisam o processo de planejamento público federal, a importância política institucional, a relação com a formação de agendas do planejamento estratégico e a construção de cenários de longo prazo. A seção 9 aborda questões metodológicas e ferramentas de aplicação do PEG no contexto da administração pública federal. Finalmente, as seções 10, 11 e 12 concluem o texto, explorando o papel da burocracia pública na implementação do planejamento estratégico governamental e sugerindo uma agenda de conteúdos didáticos para a sofisticação do processo formativo.

The article argues that the Russian authorities downplay the influence of big business on the policymaking process, which remains strong. The sources of business influence lie in the potential for individual and collective lobbying (instrumental power), but also in the state's structural dependence on capital, which forces the authorities to anticipate the investment decisions of capital holders (structural power). The article shows how changes in both the structural and the instrumental power of large firms correspond to major shifts in the country's political economy: the 1998 economic crisis, the turn to dirigiste policies in 2003-2004, and the beginning of the confrontation with the West in 2014. The article concludes that the business elite in Putin's Russia corresponds to Jeffrey Winters and Benjamin Page's definition of "oligarchy" as a narrow group of the super-wealthy that dominates certain policy areas in the context of extreme wealth and income inequality.

(English version below)

Cette thèse traite de la restructuration du secteur de la moto au Burkina Faso, qui s’opère, dès le début des années 2000, sous pression de l’arrivée massive des produits chinois. Fournissant de  nouvelles  opportunités  commerciales,  l’arrivée  de  ces  produits – moins  chers – coïncide avec  l’émergence d’une  multitude  de  nouveaux  entrepreneurs  transnationaux  africains. Leur émergence  dans  le  secteur  des  cycles  va  contribuer  à remettre  en  question  les  hiérarchies commerçantes  et  les  structures  de  pouvoir  qui  le  traversaient  depuis l’indépendance.  Pour prendre la mesure de ces bouleversements, cette thèse s’appuie sur un cadre théorique faisant dialoguer  les  travaux  s’inspirant  de  la  «mondialisation  par  le  bas»  et  les  contributions  de sociologie  politique  sur  l’Etat  en  Afrique.  Outre  le  fait  d’offrir  des présentations  détaillées des  itinéraires  d’accumulation  et  des  stratégies  commerciales  de nombreux  marchands transnationaux,  et  d’amener  une  compréhension  fine  de  la  transformation  des pratiques  et logiques  de  consommation  burkinabé,  cette  thèse  s’attache  ainsi avant  tout  à  évaluer l’influence  de  la  multiplication  de  ces  entrepreneurs  transnationaux sur  la  gestion  d’un élément  central  du  pouvoir  en  Afrique:  les  rentes  de  l’extraversion.  Historiquement,  le secteur  de  la  moto  constituait  en  effet  une  position  d’accumulation rentière  pour  les  élites politiques et économiques burkinabé. Observer comment se partagent désormais les rentes de l’extraversion dans le secteur nous permet de mettre en lumière un glissement vers une forme de  gestion  plus  indirecte.  A  bien  des  égards,  ce  nouveau  partage rentier  se  fait  l’écho  d’une multipolarisation  du  processus  d’extraversion  lui-même,  qui  s’opère  sous  la  pression combinée  d’une  multitude  de  «cadets  sociaux»  (consommateurs,  entrepreneurs  et représentants de l’appareil d’Etat). En somme, au travers de l’analyse de la restructuration du secteur  de  la  moto  au  Burkina  Faso  se  dévoilent  les  conséquences  de  l’accroissement  des échanges sino-africains en termes d’économie politique.

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This thesis deals with the restructuring of the motorcycle sector in Burkina Faso, which arose in the beginning of the 2000s under the pressure of the massive import of Chinese products. Providing  new  business  opportunities,  the  arrival  of  these – cheaper – products  coincided with  the  emergence  of  many  new  African  transnational  entrepreneurs. Their  emergence contributed to put into question the trading hierarchies and power structures in the motorcycle sector that  were  in  place  since  the  independence.  To  measure  these changes,  this  thesis  is based on a theoretical framework that fosters dialogue between works inspired by the concept of  "globalization  from  below"  as  well  as  political  sociology contributions  on the  State  in Africa.  In  addition  to  providing  detailed  presentations  of  itineraries  of accumulation  and business  strategies  of  many transnational  traders  and  bringing  a  fine  understanding  of transformation  in  Burkinabe  consumption  practices  and  logics,  this  thesis  focuses  primarily on  assessing  the  impact  of  the  proliferation  of  these  transnational entrepreneurs  on  the management  of  a  central  element  of  power  in  Africa:  extraversion rents.  Historically,  the motorcycle  industry  was  a  rent-seeking  sector  for Burkinabe  political  and  economic  elites. Observing  how  the  extraversion  rents  are  now  shared  between  many actors  allows  us  to highlight  a  shift  towards  a  more  indirect  form  of  management.  In many  ways,  this  new  rent sharing echoes the multipolarization of the extraversion process itself, which occurs under the combined  pressure  of  a  multitude  of  "cadets  sociaux' (consumers,  entrepreneurs  and representatives  of  the  state  apparatus).  In  sum,  the  analysis  of  the restructuring  of  the motorcycle sector in Burkina Faso unveils the consequences of the increase of Sino-African trade in terms of political economy.

Import substitution has been marginalised from development policy discourse since the 1970s. This paper examines the Rwandan government’s recent attempt at reintroducing industrial policy with some attention devoted to ‘recapturing the domestic market’ – a term used to replace the ignominy associated with ‘import substitution.’ The paper examines two cases – cement and textiles – where such
policies have been recently established in Rwanda.
The paper argues that any attempt at recapturing the domestic market will require a strategy close to the policies of East Asian developmental states in terms of ‘picking winners.’ However, strategically maintaining reciprocity through state-business relationships is only part of the challenge. Though foreign investors have been leant on initially, actions must be put in place to develop local capitalist partners who may step in if foreign investors leave once incentives are reduced. This is further
complicated by the government’s failure to develop partnerships with existing local capitalist partners. The Rwandan government is also constrained by a small market size. Any attempt at import substitution must occur in the context of accessing larger markets through the East African Community (EAC). This paper demonstrates that
such regional trade agreements constitute a much greater constraint on the use of industrial policy than multilateral trade agreements or bilateral trade agreements with the United States of America or European countries (although pressure from donors may also contribute to reducing policy space). Such challenges showcase how the
Rwandan government has sought to build reciprocal control mechanisms while attempting to access large markets through regional integration. Though the Rwandan government has made some progress recently, state intervention is required to reintroduce import substitution in the 21st century and must be balanced by the need to meet domestic and international political constraints.

The environmental damage that plastic waste is causing has catalysed government action against plastic bags around the world. Despite anti-plastic bag policies gaining traction globally, there has been limited investigation of how the implementation of bans has varied. This paper is the first to comparatively examine why there has been variation in implementing bans on plastic bags, using the examples of three East African countries: Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda. Explanations of why anti-plastic bag policies have been blocked in other countries usually rely on business power-based explanations, with the assumption that plastic manufacturers (and the broader manufacturing sector) have obstructed implementation. The comparatively limited strength and size of plastic manufacturers in Rwanda, as compared to Kenya and Uganda, suggests that business power may partly explain why the ban in Rwanda has been implemented. However, business power-based arguments do not explain the variation between implementation in Kenya and Uganda. In both countries, anti-plastic bag actions have been announced repeatedly but implementation has stuttered, with commitment to implementation stronger and less contested in Kenya than in Uganda. Criticisms of the existing business power literature tend to be weak on examining why governments may go ahead with policies that are against the interests of businesses. This paper argues that developing country government’s ecological modernisation initiatives may be shaped by pressures from three levels – business power, the local environment and the external environment – to explain why implementation of plastic bag bans has varied in Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda.

Ukrainian big business has preserved its influence in Ukraine's politics despite the political turmoil of the critical democratising junctures and reverse autocratic trends. Still, its relations with politics have changed from president to president. The article elaborates how the political embeddedness of Ukrainian big business evolved and what model of state-business relations developed in each presidential period. It demonstrates that Ukrainian big business increasingly relies on its ties with the country's parliament to counterbalance the President's powers. As a result, state-business relations have changed from a concentrated model to a diffuse one.

The revival of industrial policy discussions has operated in parallel to reports of increasing domestic wealth accumulation across the African continent. Regional and continent-wide industrialisation has begun to be rhetorically linked to discussions of regional common markets and through the African Continental Free Trade Area. Yet, there is barely any mention of integrating African capital into the African industrial policy agenda. Where such discussions have appeared, they have emerged through the ‘Africapitalism’ narrative, which ignores the role of the state and politics in
supporting and sustaining domestic business groups. Instead, the re-imagination of industrial policy on the continent relies on foreign investors, particularly the relocation of Chinese industry to various parts of the continent.
This paper has two core objectives. The first is to explain why the study of African capitalists – popular in the 1980s and 1990s – has remained relatively dormant since then. Dominant narratives – through neopatrimonalism and dependency-inspired arguments – have been pessimistic about the potential of African capitalists to deliver
structural transformation. Gradually, these narratives, alongside intellectual trends within mainstream social science and African studies, have discouraged the study of politics of state–business relations in Africa. Yet African capitalists have become increasingly prominent in popular culture. Many of the wealthiest and most prominent capitalists have emerged through owning diversified business groups across the continent. This paper argues that more attention should be dedicated to the study of
the politics of the emergence and sustenance of African diversified business groups (DBGs). To achieve this goal, a fluid categorisation of DBGs is introduced, building on Ben Ross Schneider’s previous work. By examining three country case studies – Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania – this paper highlights how a range of DBGs are emerging across three very different political contexts.

How does a globalized context influence domestic development policies and the allocation of government resources in an authoritarian country like China? This study explores the coalitional politics in China's transition from foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction to domestic technology upgrading, which created winners and losers in the local allocation of government resources. Drawing on comparative case studies, semi-structured interviews and newly compiled data across 300 cities, the study finds that the varied levels of government support for domestic upgrading are shaped by coalitions for or against the transition. The major obstacle for bureaucrats within a city government to garner resources for domestic technology does not directly depend on the overall level of FDI. Rather, it comes from the vested interest of international commerce bureaucrats. These bureaucrats are more likely to form a cohesive coalition when the export share of foreign firms is large. At the same time, such a coalition is more likely to gain political influence when industrial sales are concentrated in large firms. The direction and magnitude of foreign capital influence, therefore, is channeled and manifested through local bureaucratic coalitions. This study sheds light on the politics of implementing development policies in an era in which globalization has cultivated fragmented interests within the local bureaucracy.

The paper examines the transformation of state corporatism in the Arab region cross regionally. Gauging the continuous reproduction of state power in the Arab region requires dual focus on structural (economic variables) and conjuncture factors (electoral dynamics and party systems) factors to examine how they enabled the state to hone in on its strategic toolkit to debilitate social forces and ensure the autonomy of politics. I argue that the legacy of popular incorporation strategy of depoliticization and demobilization on the one hand, and continuity with the composition of the ruling elites on the other, precluded the emergence of independent forces that would seriously threaten the established patterns of political authority. The state –before the outbreak of the Arab uprisings– had delineated the basic contours of political action. The state prevented formation of independent opposition to articulate new demands and bring out new issues in social realm, rendering any challenging events largely erratic or callously suppressed. The statist party had remained the prime political agency. Changing the mode and scope of social integration and cooptation, counterintuitively, helped it to court segments of social groups (most notably working class and business associations) while vigorously suppressing others. The absence of autonomous intermediary organizations and lack of viable coalitional options (with the dominant party behaving as a cartel and opposition parties incapable of striking roots in society), the state perpetuated its autonomous position and produced a network of coopted and/or complicit forces that obviated creation of challenging social constituencies. I deploy comparative historical analysis to show how political variables of the legacy and the strategy of populist elites along with the lack of alternative political opposition in the Arab region enabled old military-technocratic elites to loosen up their control over society and maintain their grip on power. I examine the four republic regimes that ushered in state-led development policies but varied in degrees of state autonomy and societal subordination: Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Algeria. I use process-tracing to identify opportunities and constraints that shaped elites’ political strategies and contributed to subsequent institutional configurations. I also use paired comparisons and put the Arab countries in cross-regional perspective with the two similar Latin American countries (Mexico and Peru) that had the same initial conditions but divergent pathways (with the demise of one-dominant party rule in Mexico and institutionalizing politics without predominant power in Peru).

This study uses the latest 2011 round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for the Russian Federation to take a closer look at regional-level factors influencing the business environment in Russia. Specifically, the study explores the role of regional administrations and variables of administrative continuity and governor origin in shaping regional business environment. The findings reveal that regional businesses in Russia are (1) acutely anxious about administrative transitions (as expressed in gubernatorial replacements) and favour administrative continuity, and (2) favour government officials that are locally embedded. The analysis suggests that many localities in Russia have witnessed the emergence of mutually beneficial state-business arrangements that are inimical to economic competition., the two anonymous reviewers and the participants of the PONARS political economy workshop for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The financial support of the World Bank is greatly acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this paper are of the authors' alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its Board of Directors and the Member States.

Abstrakt W artykule dokonano porównania relacji między państwem a biznesem w przed-(1962-1978) i porewolucyjnym Iranie (1979-2005). Wskazano, że pomimo daleko idących różnic w instytucjonalnych uwarunkowaniach, relacje charakteryzują tożsamościowe podobieństwa pozwalające mówić o jednym typie (wzorcu) relacji w całym badanym okresie. Do najważniejszych cech relacji należy zaliczyć: daleko posunięte rozmycie między tym, co prywatne, a tym, co publiczne; egzystencjalną zależność biznesu od państwa; bezwarunkowy protekcjonizm oraz stosowanie podobnych, aczkolwiek w różnej skali, instrumentów polityki gospodarczej. W obu okresach biznes kontrolowany był przez oligarchiczne grupy, które dzięki wpływom politycznym korzystały z uprzywilejowanej pozycji, nie tworząc szerszych korzyści dla reszty gospodarki i społeczeństwa. Inaczej niż w azjatyckich państwach rozwojowych, relacje państwo-biznes miały pasożytniczy, a nie symbiotyczny charakter. Słowa kluczowe: rewolucja irańska, relacje państwo-biznes, zakorzeniona autonomia, ciągłość i zmiana

This article presents a large-scale, systematic study of politically connected firms in China. It was conducted by compiling a database of all the publicly traded firms in China in 1993, 2002 and 2012 that codes the biographies of hundreds of thousands of board members. I find that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years. This casts doubt on a popular argument that businesses in China have primarily relied on “local protectionism.” I interpret this as a result of firms’ need to connect with powerful and stable institutions. I test this by examining the impact of the fall of Chen Liangyu on firms in Shanghai.

Political mobilization of business forces in the post-communist world has crucial implications for economic development and civil society. The emergence of strong cross-sectoral business associations during Putin's presidency challenges the prevailing view of Russia's political economy as an informal, particularistic state–business exchange. At the theoretical level, collective action by socio-economic groups is linked to severe principal-agent dilemmas common to many ex-socialist bureaucracies. Given institutionally incoherent state structures, the state as principal facilitates collective action by business actors to create a parallel, non-state platform for policy formation and implementation. Such a dynamic of “debilitated dirigisme” should be understood in the comparative contexts of business mobilization in Latin America, Asia, and the advanced industrialized world. The argument developed here stands in contrast to two conventional approaches to business mobilization, “threat theory,” in which firms organize to resist various anti-capitalist forces, and “political entrepreneurship theory,” which holds that business is the passive object of mobilization by the state.

This study uses the 2011 beeps survey for the Russian Federation to study factors influencing corruption perceptions in Russian regions. Specifically, the analysis relies on Henry Hale's theory of patronal presidentialism to explore the effects of the institutional environment and, particularly, of regional political uncertainty, on the perceptions of economic actors embedded in it. The analysis reveals that political instability – when measured by the recent political turnover in the region and the presence of regional inter-elite conflicts – works to increase corruption perceptions among economic actors. These findings support earlier literature on the importance of informal rules and 'insider entrepreneurship' in Russia.

Imperialism dates back to the dawn of political history and it has been driven by a multitude of factors, including human nature and, first and foremost, power politics. Yet there is a specificity of modern imperialism that cannot be ignored: imperialism in the modern era, say at least since the 1870s but we might maybe go back till the XVII century Holland, is understandable only in close connection with the development of capitalism. As Callinicos writes: “capitalist imperialism is constituted by the intersection of two forms of competition, namely economic and geopolitical”.
It follows that to understand oil imperialism it is crucial to clarify the nature of the interrelation between political power and big business, the sphere of relations that Braudel identified with capitalism tout court.
This was a two-way relations: the oil majors jumped on the boat of the expansion of the US hegemony and gained access to immensely profitable resources, while the US as an international power profited from the control of a key energy source. The paper sketches out the consolidation of this relationship throughout the first half of the XXth century as the main driver of oil imperialism.

The Financing for Development Addis Abeba Consensus 2015 calls on the donor community to pledge not billions but trillions of dollars. This article illustrates the breakdown of avaliable financial flows in Sub Sahara African countries over the last decennium. It concludes that domestic revenues are by far the most important (and most stable) source of income in the majority of countries. The annex to the article shows in infographics how financial flows are composed per country.

In order to meet its ambitious solar targets India has sought to boost local production of solar cells. However, Pritish Behuria highlights how it has come up against problems, as America, the WTO and others have restricted the country's ability to develop its domestic manufacturing capabilities. He writes that if solar cell production is to survive in India, much more government action will need to be taken. Last month, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruled against India's efforts to boost local production of solar cells, which was a key component of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM). The JNNSM aimed to " promote ecologically sustainable growth while addressing India's energy security challenge " and constituted " a major contribution by India to the global effort to meet the challenges of climate change. " The American government had indicated public support for this mission. However, since February 2013, it had been kicking away the ladder by blocking any Indian attempts to build domestic manufacturing capabilities in the sector. There is an all-too-familiar story of hypocrisy here. One BBC article claimed that the United States did not practice what it preached at home and " half of all US states have subsidies for renewables. " The JNNSM was a way for the Indian government to address its domestic energy deficit and would have helped India achieve its pledge of developing 40 per cent of its renewables by 2030. Though the expansion of India's solar energy sector will continue, priorities including acquiring technological capabilities among domestic producers and reducing dependency on foreign technology have taken a backseat. The JNNSM was launched in 2010 by the Manmohan Singh government. Its initial target was achieving an ambitious target of 22 GW by 2022. The mission adopted a 3-phase approach. Phase 1 concluded in 2013, with the Indian government successfully increasing installed solar energy capacity from 30 MW to 2000 MW. By 2014, the Narendra Modi government has raised targets by 75 per cent by setting the goal of achieving national installed capacity of 15 GW by 2017. By 2016, the government has already secured installed capacity of 5.7GW. Modi also made ambitious plans of reaching 100 GW of installed capacity by 2022 (more than four times the goal set by the Manmohan Singh government). No country has ever expanded its installed solar energy capacity to this extent before. China's solar capacity stands at around 40GW. If targets are met, India will become the biggest solar country in the world. These ambitions have drawn the attention of the business community in India, with several new entrants in the sector. Modi has also spearheaded the establishment of The Global Solar Alliance, which includes participation from 120 countries and industry representatives. As part of the alliance, Bill Gates, Mukesh Ambani, Jack Ma and other investors have backed the establishment of a Breakthrough Energy Coalition, which will act as a vehicle for investing in clean energy projects. Within India, this project is perceived to be a top priority for Modi. He has also received acclaim for previous success in the sector, having supported the establishment of Asia's largest solar park in Gujarat – The Chankara Solar Park.

Do more mobile firms pay lower taxes? Conventional wisdom argues that capital mobility creates downward pressure on corporate taxes, as firms can threaten to exit. Nevertheless, empirical findings are highly mixed and hard to reconcile, partly due to a lack of data at the micro-level. Using two comprehensive panel data sets with more than 780,000 Chinese firms over two decades, we find that firms with higher shares of mobile capital pay higher effective tax rates. We contend that this counter-intuitive finding results from the strategic interaction between firms and governments. Knowing their vulnerability and sunk cost, firms with more fixed assets were more active in protecting themselves by bribing and colluding with local officials. Meanwhile, officials were more willing to seek bribes from these firms in exchange for tax cuts. In contrast, mobile firms were disadvantaged. Although capital mobility may provide additional bargaining power, firms with fixed assets can overcome this advantage through state-business collusion. Our quantitative and qualitative evidence show that fixed firms paid lower taxes in cities with cozy government-business relations. However, such advantages decreased after the launch of anti-corruption campaigns and in cities with higher fiscal transparency.

Cette communication vise à souligner les conséquences économiques et politiques de l'arrivée des produits chinois en Afrique en terme de gestion de l'extraversion, au travers d'un matériel ethnographique recueilli sur le secteur de la moto au Burkina Faso entre 2010 et 2013. L'importation de motos chinoises au Burkina Faso a subi une augmentation significative depuis 2000. Cette réorientation des filières d'approvisionnement a mené à une restructuration du secteur, marquée par le retrait des acteurs industriels et commerciaux historiques sous pression de l'émergence d'une nouvelle génération de commerçants transnationaux africains. Avant cela, ce secteur était un secteur rentier pour les élites burkinabé. En insistant sur la création et la captation d'une rente générée par la dépendance, la théorie de l'extraversion nous permet de comprendre qui profite dorénavant de la rente liée à l'importation de motos. Dans cette communication, nous soutenons l'idée que, derrière le processus de redistribution des positions d'accumulation, le contrôle de la rente n'a été que partiellement modifié par l'arrivée des motos chinoises. En fait, elle a mené à une redéfinition des modalités de gestion de l'extraversion, mais pas à une subversion de ses logiques. La rente reste au bénéfice des élites politiques burkinabé, mais celles-ci sont désormais enclines à abandonner une part de leurs espaces rentiers afin de maintenir la stabilité.

This article discusses two basic strategies of Russian companies—isolation from, and close cooperation with the state. The author analyses several ways in which companies realise these strategies, drawing analogies with the ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ strategies suggested by A. Hirschman. It is shown that under the conditions of a weak state these strategies lead either to an expansion of the shadow economy or to ‘state capture’. Both the privatisation of the state and the lack of its privatisation result in budget crises as well as drastic social and political shocks, leading to calls for a ‘strong hand’ in the business community itself. However, as there is little political competition and the mechanisms of democratic control are weak, state consolidation takes place as a bureaucratic consolidation accompanied by new opportunities for informal ‘business capture’ by the authorities. Nevertheless, the high degree of openness of the economy and the remaining heterogeneity of political actors provide business with a wide range of possible strategies of interaction with the state. This article explores how these strategies are becoming more formal and public compared to the 1990s. Strategies of isolation from the state now take place as legal strategies of internationalisation. Cooperation strategies, on the other hand, currently seem to be more efficient when switching from the traditional lobbying of private interests to more rational and collective actions aimed at providing the necessary conditions for sustainable economic development.

Widespread sentiment that the government had forsaken ‘Main Street’ to advance the interests of the financial sector led to significant investigation into the nature of business-state relations with respect to TARP’s formation and implementation. This paper seeks to explore the possibility that the United States finance sector influenced the implementation of TARP. Using a theoretical framework drawn from the works of Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Ben Schneider, and David Broockman, this paper analyzes quantitative research for the use of pathways of influence by the finance sector on the TARP legislation. This paper aims to evaluate the possibility that TARP’s implementation was influenced by the finance sector to achieve its preferred policy outcomes. This paper finds evidence that instrumental mechanisms such as political contributions, lobbying, and networking were all both incentivized by the opportunity structure of the US political system and intensively used by actors in the finance sector. Additional evidence suggests that structural power complemented and compounded instrumental mechanisms of influence, contextualizing their usage.

State-business relationships in pre-2011 Syria were strongly dominated by the Assad regime. Due to the conflict, millions of Syrians, including thousands of businesspeople, were forced to leave Syria. Home countries have been argued to play a crucial role in a diaspora’s development. Even though many Syrian businesspeople have emigrated to Turkey, long-term strict state-business relationships continue to affect the interactions of the Syrian businesspeople in Turkey. This paper examines how Syrian state-business ties shape the behaviors of the Turkey-based Syrian businesspeople. The paper argues that, although the activities of the business diaspora might need to be conducted cautiously due to their ties with the home government, and in order to improve economic activity in the host country, the businesspeople have developed specific ways to balance the impact of their home government.

This article is devoted to analysing the evolution of corporate governance mechanisms in Russia. Special attention is paid to the causes of dramatic discrepancies between the expected outputs of institutional reforms implemented by the Russian government with World Bank and IMF support and the actual behaviour of Russian companies. Why was the model of interaction between enterprises and investors, owners and managers, which had been successful in other countries, rejected by Russian business in the 1990s? And how can we evaluate certain positive changes that have occurred recently in corporate policies of major Russian companies? These questions are answered on the bases of analysis of economic agents' motivation at different stages of development of corporate structures in Russia. The article argues that the need for comprehensive organisational and technological restructuring of enterprises led to the need for a concentrated ownership structure. The formation of such a structure in the late 1990s (which occurred, in fact, contrary to the government's activities) created preconditions for extending the time horizon of dominant owners and managers and for positive qualitative changes in the relations between major Russian companies and their shareholders and investors.