- Department of Political Science
University of British Columbia
C425-1866 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z1, Canada
Xiaojun Li
University of British Columbia, Political Science, Faculty Member
- University of British Columbia, Institute of Asian Research, Department Memberadd
- Xiaojun Li is an associate professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. He holds a PhD in po... moreXiaojun Li is an associate professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. He holds a PhD in political science from Stanford University and was a Princeton-Harvard China and the World postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. His research focuses on the domestic and international political economy of China.edit
Token forces – tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions – have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace... more
Token forces – tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions – have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace operations despite its limited relevance for missions' operational success. It conceptualizes token forces as a path-dependent unintended consequence of the norm of multilateralism in international uses of military force. The norm extends states' participation options by giving coalition builders an incentive to accept token forces; UN-specific types of token forces emerged as states learned about this option and secretariat officials adapted to state demand for it. The Element documents the growing incidence of token forces in UN peacekeeping, identifies the factors disposing states to contribute token forces, and discusses how UN officials channel token participation. The Element contributes to the literatures on UN peacekeeping, military coalitions, and the impacts of norms in international organizations.
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This book intends to make sense of how Chinese leaders perceive China’s rise in the world through the eyes of China’s international relations (IR) scholars. Drawing on a unique, four-year opinion survey of these scholars at the annual... more
This book intends to make sense of how Chinese leaders perceive China’s rise in the world through the eyes of China’s international relations (IR) scholars. Drawing on a unique, four-year opinion survey of these scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing from 2014–2017, the authors examine Chinese IR scholars’ perceptions of and views on key issues related to China’s power, its relationship with the United States and other major countries, and China’s position in the international system and track their changes over time. Furthermore, the authors complement the surveys with a textual analysis of the academic publications in China’s top five IR journals. By comparing and contrasting the opinion surveys and textual analyses, this book sheds new light on how Chinese IR scholars view the world as well as how they might influence China’s foreign policy.
Research Interests: International Relations, International Relations Theory, Chinese Studies, International Trade, South Korea, and 12 moreRealism (Political Science), China, Chinese foreign policy, Survey Research, China and Africa, Korea (North and/or South), ASEAN, Us-China Relations, Russia, Japanese Foreign Policy, The South China Sea dispute, and China-Latin America Relations
Global supply chain integration is not only a rapidly growing feature of international trade, it is responsible for fundamentally changing trade policy at international and domestic levels. Given that final goods are produced with both... more
Global supply chain integration is not only a rapidly growing feature of international trade, it is responsible for fundamentally changing trade policy at international and domestic levels. Given that final goods are produced with both domestic and foreign suppliers, Ka Zeng and Xiaojun Li argue that global supply chain integration pits firms and industries that are more heavily dependent on foreign supply chains against those that are less dependent on intermediate goods for domestic production. Hence, businesses whose supply chain would be disrupted as a result of increased trade barriers should lobby for preferential trade liberalization to maintain access to those foreign markets. Moreover, businesses whose products are used in the production of goods in foreign countries should also support preferential trade liberalization to compete with suppliers from other parts of the world.
Fragmenting Globalization uses multiple methods, including time series, cross-sectional analysis of the pattern of Preferential Trade Alliance formation by existing World Trade Organization members, a firm-level survey, and case studies of the pattern of corporate support for regional trade liberalization in both China and the United States. Zeng and Li show that the growing fragmentation of global production, trade, and investment is altering trade policy away from the traditional divide between export-oriented and import-competing industries.
Fragmenting Globalization uses multiple methods, including time series, cross-sectional analysis of the pattern of Preferential Trade Alliance formation by existing World Trade Organization members, a firm-level survey, and case studies of the pattern of corporate support for regional trade liberalization in both China and the United States. Zeng and Li show that the growing fragmentation of global production, trade, and investment is altering trade policy away from the traditional divide between export-oriented and import-competing industries.
Research Interests: International Economics, International Relations, International Business, International Trade, Political Science, and 15 moreInternational Political Economy, European Union, Regionalism, China, Japan, China studies, Supply Chain, Us-China Relations, Global Production Networks, Canada, Free trade agreements, United States, International Business and Trade, Preferential Trade Agreements, and Global Economic Governance
Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's public... more
Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's public view this strategy? With tensions rising in South China Sea territorial disputes, are more nationalistic individuals more likely to oppose hedging? Using an original public opinion survey conducted in the Philippines, we find that while an overwhelming majority of respondents were concerned about the territorial disputes, more nationalistic Filipinos were no more concerned than less nationalistic ones. Further, more nationalistic Filipinos were more likely to view economic relations with China as important for the Philippines and to approve of Duterte's China policy, which follows the logic of hedging. These surprising findings suggest that under the shadow of great-power competition, the link between domestic politics and foreign policy is nuanced in the Philippines, and Southeast Asia in general.
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Recent public opinion polls conducted in Europe and the United States show increasingly negative views of China. Does the Chinese public hold similar views of "the West"? Conducting a two-wave survey in China, we found great divergence... more
Recent public opinion polls conducted in Europe and the United States show increasingly negative views of China. Does the Chinese public hold similar views of "the West"? Conducting a two-wave survey in China, we found great divergence and asymmetries in Chinese public perceptions. First, Chinese views of European countries and the US diverge sharply, despite these countries being typically grouped together as "the West" in mainstream English and Chinese discourses; the Chinese viewed the US much more negatively than Europe. Second, whereas the Chinese reciprocated American antipathy, there was an asymmetry in public perceptions between China and Europe, with the Chinese expressing much greater favourability towards European countries than the other way around, though the degree of favourability still varied by country. Analyses of respondent attributes also yielded insights that both confirm and challenge some of the conventional wisdom regarding age, education, and party membership in Chinese public opinion.
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as well as the ten ASEAN countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest regional free trade agreement (FTA) to date, accounting for a third of the world's population and 30% of the global gross... more
as well as the ten ASEAN countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest regional free trade agreement (FTA) to date, accounting for a third of the world's population and 30% of the global gross domestic product (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore 2020). On January 1, 2022, the RCEP went into effect, following the ratification of the agreement by six ASEAN signatories
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries such as India and China is often met with domestic backlash by the citizens of the host country, and backlash in the form of protests and other disruptive behavior has increased... more
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries such as India and China is often met with domestic backlash by the citizens of the host country, and backlash in the form of protests and other disruptive behavior has increased the salience of public opinion in FDI policy. As one of the first survey experiments assessing Chinese citizens’ attitudes toward FDI, this paper adopts a novel conjoint design to evaluate the impact, in the present project, of individual respondent characteristics and specific FDI features on respondents’ preferences. Importantly, we find that low-skilled respondents are not necessarily more likely to support labor-intensive FDI, a result that challenges the conventional wisdom that individuals in developing countries abundantly endowed with labor should be more likely to support low-skilled FDI. Instead, citizens are more concerned about FDI projects’ country of origin and impact on the local job market when forming their preferences.
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Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a... more
Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative percep...
Research Interests: Public Opinion, International Trade, Immigration, British Politics, Political Science, and 12 moreIdentity politics, Nationalism, British Foreign Policy, European Union, China, Survey Research, Internationalism, United Kingdom, Free trade agreements, Public Policy and Administration, Affairs, and Brexit
Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We... more
Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these puzzles, and in many of the most intractable territorial disputes, such a belief may arise from the claim of historical ownership over these territories. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we investigate whether historical ownership engenders in respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and whether such a belief contributes to more hardline policy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that historical ownership does play a significant role in the respondents’ perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with an alternative scenario involving no such prior ownership. Furthermore, those who hold a belief in indivisibility are more likely to support hardline poli...
Research Interests: International Relations, International Law, International Security, International Arbitration, South Korea, and 11 moreChina, Public Opinion (Political Science), Survey Research, Japan, Russia, International Dispute Settlement, Territorial Disputes, History and Territorial Claim, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Conflict, Dokdo/Takeshima, and Kurile Islands
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional... more
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. This article takes a deeper dive into a series of surveys conducted in Canada that covered a wide range of topics, from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of “favorable versus unfavorable,” especially as one moves from overall impressions to more specific policy issues. Second, misperceptions of China are widespread and may be difficult to overcome, especially among those who already view China negatively. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanding global footprint, failure to account for these features in pu...
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Research Interests: Business, Law, Comparative Politics, Political Economy, Environmental Law, and 13 moreRegulation And Governance, Political Science, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Environmental Policy and Governance, Environmental Politics, Chinese Politics, China studies, Contemporary China, Environmental Pollution, Bureaucracy, Public Administration and Policy, Fixed Assets, and Public Policy
A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States. While much has been discussed and debated about the prospects... more
A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States. While much has been discussed and debated about the prospects for and consequences of war, we know little about how ordinary Chinese evaluate the full set of policy tools that Beijing could potentially leverage against Taipei in the near term. Drawing from a unique public opinion survey in China, we find that armed unification, or ‘wutong’, garners only a slim majority (55%) of support, no more than for a range of less aggressive policy options, from using small-scale warfare, to coercing Taipei into negotiating, to simply maintaining the status quo. Only one out of one hundred rejected all but the most extreme option of ‘wutong’. Analyses of respondent attributes further reveal that aggressive policy preferences are primarily driven by nationalism and peer pressure, but dampened by concerns about the economic, human, and reputational costs of non-peaceful unification and the likelihood of US intervention.
Numerous public opinion surveys have found that Americans' views of China have become extremely negative in recent years. Much less is understood about the trends in Chinese views of the United States and the countries' bilateral... more
Numerous public opinion surveys have found that Americans' views of China have become extremely negative in recent years. Much less is understood about the trends in Chinese views of the United States and the countries' bilateral relations. As leaders in both countries have come under public pressure about their policy stances toward the other side, it is critical to fill the gap. This study develops a theoretical argument about how a concern for political legitimacy may allow public opinion to influence foreign policy making in authoritarian countries, and it presents findings from a two-wave public opinion survey in China conducted before and after the 2020 US presidential election. The results show that Chinese evaluations of the bilateral relationship and of the United States slumped during the Trump era but rebounded somewhat after Biden took office. In addition, the majority of Chinese respondents believed their country to be the world's largest and leading economy and favored China being the world's leading power, either by itself or alongside the United States. Furthermore, younger and more educated respondents held more negative views, although these were mitigated by personal connections with and experiences in the United States. These findings have important policy implications.
Research Interests: International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Nationalism, Legitimacy, Public Opinion (Political Science), and 7 moreChinese foreign policy, Survey Research, Contemporary China, Authoritarian regimes, Domestic Politics and International Relations, Us-China Relations, and International Leadership
Political connection between the state and firms in the context of China’s corporate restructuring has been little explored. Using the clientelist framework and unpacking the incentives of both firms and the state, we analyse political... more
Political connection between the state and firms in the context of China’s corporate restructuring has been little explored. Using the clientelist framework and unpacking the incentives of both firms and the state, we analyse political connection as repeated patron-client exchanges where the politically connected firms can help the state fulfil its revenue imperative, serving as a failsafe for local authorities to ensure that upper-level tax quotas are met. Leveraging original surveys of the same Chinese firms over an eleven-year period and the variations in their post-restructuring board composition, we find that restructured state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with political connection pay more tax than assessed, independent of profits, in exchange for more preferential access to key inputs and policy opportunities controlled by the state. Examining taxes rather than profits also offers a new interpretation for why China continues to favour its remaining SOEs even when they are less profitable.
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How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional... more
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. This article takes a deeper dive into a series of surveys conducted in Canada that covered a wide range of topics, from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of "favorable versus unfavorable," especially as one moves from overall impressions to more specific policy issues. Second, misperceptions of China are widespread and may be difficult to overcome, especially among those who already view China negatively. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanding global footprint, failure to account for these features in public opinion about China may lead to misguided policies.
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On March 15, 2019, the National People’s Congress passed the long-anticipated Foreign Investment Law (FIL), after a short deliberation period of only three months. The expedited legislative process seems unusual, considering that the... more
On March 15, 2019, the National People’s Congress passed the long-anticipated Foreign Investment Law (FIL), after a short deliberation period of only three months. The expedited legislative process seems unusual, considering that the original draft of the FIL proposed by the Ministry of Commerce in January 2015 was tabled indefinitely after a brief period of public consultation. How can we explain the stark differences? Comparing the legislative processes and contents of the two laws, this article shows that, like many previous laws, bureaucratic politics likely contributed to the impasse of the 2015 draft, whereas external shocks, in this case the escalating trade war between China and the United States, helped accelerate the deliberation process and the passage of the new FIL. These two cases demonstrate the durability of the lawmaking institutions and procedures under Xi Jinping despite the recentralization of power in the executive after the constitutional change.
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What drives consumer activism during trade disputes? We investigate this important and timely question using a survey experiment in the context of the recent Canada-US trade dispute. We find that Canadians are more likely to express... more
What drives consumer activism during trade disputes? We investigate this important and timely question using a survey experiment in the context of the recent Canada-US trade dispute. We find that Canadians are more likely to express willingness to take punitive actions in the form of boycotting during a trade conflict when they learn that Americans are taking such actions (retaliation), when many fellow citizens are taking such actions (peer pressure), and when they are rallied by their government (elite cue). Among the three conditions, peer pressure has the largest effect. These findings contribute to our understanding of the micro-foundations of consumer activism during international trade disputes. They also have important policy implications in a world where both protectionism and populism are rising.
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Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of excluded parties. But what does this exclusivity mean for firms if production networks are internationally organized? This paper analyzes... more
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of excluded parties. But what does this exclusivity mean for firms if production networks are internationally organized? This paper analyzes the effect of PTA exclusion on firms embedded in the global supply chains, focusing on the case of China's exclusion from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Drawing on a survey of a sample of Chinese firm managers during the TPP negotiations, we find that firms anticipated the exclusion and made adjustments accordingly, which led to a general sense of optimism toward the agreement. When presented with the prospect of expanded membership, however, firms are divided depending on how their own positions in the global supply chain complement or compete with the new member. These findings, validated with interviews in the field, suggest that PTA exclusion will have effects even before implementation, but that the effects will not equate to an unalloyed loss for the affected firms.
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China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often regarded as a push to expand the country's influence overseas. Introduced amidst domestic economic slowdown in late 2013, however, the BRI is also a domestic investment drive, in which... more
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often regarded as a push to expand the country's influence overseas. Introduced amidst domestic economic slowdown in late 2013, however, the BRI is also a domestic investment drive, in which domestic firms are encouraged to go abroad in search of new markets and investment opportunities. While domestic firms are likely to play a leading role in the BRI, there has been surprisingly little systematic analysis of domestic businesses' perception of the BRI. We undertake such a task in this study using a unique survey that explores Chinese firms' decision to participate in the BRI as a function of firm-level and host country characteristics as well as the firms' perceived benefits and challenges from BRI participation. The results confirm some conventional wisdoms but also reveal a number of surprising findings. Given the relative dearth of research about Chinese firms' perceptions of the BRI, this study contributes to a better understanding of the challenges faced by Chinese firms that need to be addressed in order for Beijing to more effectively carry out the initiative.
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Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes seem to display the characteristic of so-called issue indivisibility, with at least one side of a dispute taking a position of all-or-nothing. Moreover, historical ownership is... more
Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes seem to display the characteristic of so-called issue indivisibility, with at least one side of a dispute taking a position of all-or-nothing. Moreover, historical ownership is frequently invoked in such disputes to justify uncompromising policy stances. We investigate these phenomena by developing a theoretical argument for how historical ownership can be a source of a perception of territorial indivisibility, which then can cause bargaining failure and war. We implement a survey experiment in China to test the hypotheses derived from the theory. We find that historical ownership plays a significant role in the respondents' perception of territory indivisibility compared with the alternative scenario of no such ownership. Furthermore, those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military solutions to the dispute, and much less likely to support bilateral negotiation and IO arbitration. These findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations and have significant policy implications.
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Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders’ backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience... more
Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders’ backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience costs. We investigate this question by implementing a series of survey experiments in China, a single-party authoritarian state. Findings based on responses from 5375 Chinese adults show that empty threats and commitments expose the Chinese government to substantial disapproval from citizens concerned about potential damage to China’s international reputation. Additional qualitative evidence reveals that Chinese citizens are willing to express their discontent of leaders’ foreign policy blunders through various channels. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate over whether and how domestic audiences can make commitments credible in authoritarian states.
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The rapid increase in Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years has prompted growing scholarly interest in its economic and political implications for host countries. However, relatively little attention has been... more
The rapid increase in Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years has prompted growing scholarly interest in its economic and political implications for host countries. However, relatively little attention has been directed to how concerns over the rise of China may be shaping public attitudes toward such investment. This paper tests the link between threat perception and preferences for FDI in the United States. We argue that perceptions of the China threat negatively affect how the American public views the impact of incoming Chinese FDI, due to heightened geopolitical concerns and nationalism. Using a survey experiment, we show that respondents are indeed less likely to support Chinese FDI when primed with information that highlights the security and economic threats posed by China than when they receive no such priming. Furthermore, causal mediation analyses reveal that the treatment effects of security and economic threats are mediated by respondents' concerns about the challenges that Chinese FDI poses to national security and American jobs.
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Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision making, especially with its relationship with United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on... more
Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision making, especially with its relationship with United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers such as China. Our study addresses this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative perceptions of Chinese global leadership and be more suspicious of China as a military threat. In contrast, those who espouse a Remain identity-that is, they believe that Britain would be better served within the EU and with more immigrants-are more likely to prefer closer engagement with China and to have a more positive overall outlook on China's place within the global community.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) from China has recently met with increasing public opposition in many host nations. Why does the public respond less favourably to Chinese FDI than to FDI from other countries? We explore this question by... more
Foreign direct investment (FDI) from China has recently met with increasing public opposition in many host nations. Why does the public respond less favourably to Chinese FDI than to FDI from other countries? We explore this question by conducting a series of survey experiments in Canada, where the majority of the public holds a negative opinion of Chinese investment. We find that the bias can be attributed to innumeracy about the relative size of China's FDI and misinformation about investment rules that govern FDI projects in Canada. Correcting both misperceptions substantially reduces the bias of respondents against FDI projects from China. These results suggest that corrective information can lead to positive change in public attitudes, a finding that has important policy implications for Canadian leaders hoping to expand the country's business ties with China.
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Zhubajie/Witmart and other online crowdsourcing platforms have proliferated in China and researchers have increasingly used them for subject recruitment. One critical question remains, however: what is the generalizability of the findings... more
Zhubajie/Witmart and other online crowdsourcing platforms have proliferated in China and researchers have increasingly used them for subject recruitment. One critical question remains, however: what is the generalizability of the findings based on these online samples? In this study, we benchmark the demography of an online sample from Zhubajie to nationally representative samples and replicate commonly asked questions in national surveys. We find that online respondents differ from the general population in many respects. Yet, the differences become smaller when comparison is made with the internet users in benchmark surveys. Importantly , when predicting attitudes, our online sample is able to produce similar coefficients in most cases as these internet-active subsamples. Our study suggests that online crowdsourcing platforms can be a useful tool for subject recruitment, especially when researchers are interested in making inferences about Chinese netizens. We also analyze the political and social desirability issues, and we discuss caveats.
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This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1990 as a result of its changing national interests. We conclude that China is unlikely to abandon its... more
This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1990 as a result of its changing national interests. We conclude that China is unlikely to abandon its long-held foreign policy principle of non-interference. However, motivated by a desire to be seen as a responsible global power, Beijing is seriously considering a more proactive approach to humanitarian crises, which may include direct intervention. Furthermore, as a significant contributor of troops and financing, China is uniquely positioned to represent the perspectives of both developing and developed countries in UN peacekeeping. To do so, Beijing will need to increase its leadership role in UN peacekeeping operations and offer creative ideas about how to promote reconciliation and development in post-conflict societies.
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What is the relationship between political tensions and economic relations? In this study, we explore this question by examining how Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a territory much disputed with China, has affected... more
What is the relationship between political tensions and economic relations? In this study, we explore this question by examining how Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a territory much disputed with China, has affected bilateral trade between the world's second-and third-largest economies. Using monthly data, we find that the nationalization imbroglio has negatively affected the amount of goods Japan exports to China, with the effect being most pronounced for highly salient and visible products such as automobiles and cameras; these experienced immediate and dramatic drops lasting up to 12 months. In contrast, raw materials and intermediate goods were not affected at all; some even experienced increased exports. These findings suggest that consumer and corporate responses to political tensions may follow different logics. For consumers, certain political tensions, especially those involving enduring territorial disputes, could override entrenched economic interests and preferences, at least in the short term. In these instances, it will no longer be business as usual.
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Many fear that with Trump taking the helm, the United States will scale back its international leadership role in global governance, leaving a void that is too big for any single country to fill. Others are hopeful that emerging powers... more
Many fear that with Trump taking the helm, the United States will scale back its international leadership role in global governance, leaving a void that is too big for any single country to fill. Others are hopeful that emerging powers such as China will be able to step in and provide international leadership to solve global governance challenges, from climate change to nuclear nonproliferation. In this study, we explore the Chinese and American publics’ perceptions and views on international leadership in the Trump era. Results from two parallel surveys conducted in China and the United States shed light on how ordinary citizens in these two countries conceptualize international leadership and how their views contrast with conventional wisdom and with each other. Given the increasingly larger role played by public opinion in the foreign policies of both democratic and authoritarian countries, the findings of this study will have important policy implications.
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State owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have undergone significant restructuring since the mid-1990s. To date, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the constraints and motives of corporate restructuring in China. Yet the... more
State owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have undergone significant restructuring since the mid-1990s. To date, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the constraints and motives of corporate restructuring in China. Yet the majority of the existing studies treat restructuring as a simple ownership transfer from the state to non-state entities without differentiating the resulting ownership structure of the firm. Consequently, we know relatively little about why otherwise similar SOEs were restructured at different times and through different means. This study intends to fill this gap by examining the determinants of both the timing and methods of restructuring in a unique longitudinal survey of 145 SOEs over an eleven-year period. Using a competing-risks model, we demonstrate that political as well as economic factors determine the possibility, nature, and speed of restructuring. In particular, we show that political constraint about worker retention increases the likelihood that an SOE will be restructured as shareholding as opposed to direct transfer of ownership to private hands. These findings shed new light on the economic and political logic of corporate restructuring in China.
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Previous studies have found that the democratizing effect of conditional aid is temporally contingent: the collapse of the Soviet Union as an alternative source of aid enhanced the effectiveness of Western aid conditionality on the... more
Previous studies have found that the democratizing effect of conditional aid is temporally contingent: the collapse of the Soviet Union as an alternative source of aid enhanced the effectiveness of Western aid conditionality on the adoption of democratic reforms in Africa during the post-Cold War period. Does conditionality still work with the rise of China as a major donor in Africa since the early-2000s? Building from earlier work on aid conditionality and the credible commitment problem in donor-recipient relationships, this article argues that the increased availability of Chinese aid would encourage African recipients to resist pressure from Western donors to improve democratic governance. In the meantime, traditional donors may also feel compelled to compete with the new donors, reducing their credibility in enforcing the conditions. Consequently, the positive relationship between Western aid and democracy in the African recipients would dissipate as the amount of Chinese aid increases. To empirically examine this argument, this article leverages the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 as the temporal dividing point and new measures of China's development assistance to Africa based on expert opinions and media reports. The results show that the democratizing effects of the OECD's development aid in Sub-Sahara Africa has indeed diminished in this century. Furthermore, results from a synthetic control analysis suggest that major recipients of Chinese economic assistance have registered smaller improvement in political freedom than other comparable countries in the post-FOCAC period. These findings support the thesis that aid conditionality works only during a period when recipient countries do not have other alternative sources of aid, allowing donors to more credibly commit to enforce aid conditionality. The findings also suggest that the propitious conditions for democracy-promoting aid generated by the end of the Cold War may have been weakened by new geoeconomic realities.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries like India and China is often met with domestic backlash by the citizens of the host country, and backlash in the form of protest and other disruptive behavior has raised the... more
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries like India and China is often met with domestic backlash by the citizens of the host country, and backlash in the form of protest and other disruptive behavior has raised the salience of public opinion in FDI policy. As one of the first survey experiments of Chinese citizens' attitudes toward FDI, this paper adopts a novel conjoint design to evaluate the impact of both individual characteristics and specific features of the proposed project on FDI preferences. Importantly, we find that skill level is not a significant predictor of public support for labor-intensive FDI, a result that challenges the conventional wisdom that individuals in developing countries abundantly endowed in labor should be more likely to support low-skilled FDI. Instead, citizens are more concerned about the country of origin, entry mode, and FDI project's impact on the local job market when forming their preferences.
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Although distrust has often been cited as a major reason for growing tensions in East Asia, few studies have systematically explored exactly how trust, or the lack of it, influences international cooperation in the region. In this study,... more
Although distrust has often been cited as a major reason for growing tensions in East Asia, few studies have systematically explored exactly how trust, or the lack of it, influences international cooperation in the region. In this study, we examine the sources and consequences of international trust in East Asia by analyzing an original survey of Chinese urban residents’ attitudes toward Japan and South Korea. We find that generalized trust, the belief that other nations have benign intentions, is the most crucial driving force of trust toward Japan and South Korea, which in turn has a positive effect on preferences for interstate cooperation. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, nationalism and historical memory have little or no effect on international trust. These results enhance our understanding of international trust in general and its dynamics in East Asia in particular, and lead us to offer some important policy implications for Sino-Japanese relations and Chinese foreign policy.
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The intensification of corruption in China has led to a recent surge of scholarship examining the causes and consequences of corruption within the country. Nevertheless, no consensus exists as to how corruption should be measured at the... more
The intensification of corruption in China has led to a recent surge of scholarship examining the causes and consequences of corruption within the country. Nevertheless, no consensus exists as to how corruption should be measured at the local level. In this article, I evaluate the internal and external validity of three major groups of measures for local-level corruption in China, namely: perception-based measures, demand-side measures, and supply-side measures. In applying these measures to a model that examines the effect of corruption on local economic growth in China, I show that the results are highly dependent on the choice of the corruption measure. In conclusion, I suggest that future research using local-level corruption as a key variable should at least explore alternative measures to check for the robustness of the findings.
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What is the relationship between ownership type and environmental performance in Chinese firms? Using a survey of over 1,000 industrial firms in 12 Chinese cities in 2006, this article tests a number of competing hypotheses linking... more
What is the relationship between ownership type and environmental performance in Chinese firms? Using a survey of over 1,000 industrial firms in 12 Chinese cities in 2006, this article tests a number of competing hypotheses linking ownership type to environmental performance. The results show that small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on average spend less on pollution abatement technologies and are less likely to meet national emissions standards, compared to privately owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). However, the environmental performance of the largest SOEs matches that of their private and foreign counterparts. These findings are complemented by qualitative interviews and archival research conducted in 2012.
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What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military... more
What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.
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This article reviews China's change from cautious observer to active participant in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement system over the past decade. It argues that normative, rather than material, constraints deterred... more
This article reviews China's change from cautious observer to active participant in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement system over the past decade. It argues that normative, rather than material, constraints deterred China from WTO litigation in the initial years of its membership.
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A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States. While much has been discussed and debated about the prospects... more
A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States. While much has been discussed and debated about the prospects for and consequences of war, we know little about how ordinary Chinese evaluate the full set of policy tools that Beijing could potentially leverage against Taipei in the near term. Drawing from a unique public opinion survey in China, we find that armed unification, or ‘wutong’, garners only a slim majority (55%) of support, no more than for a range of less aggressive policy options, from using small-scale warfare, to coercing Taipei into negotiating, to simply maintaining the status quo. Only one out of one hundred rejected all but the most extreme option of ‘wutong’. Analyses of respondent attributes further reveal that aggressive policy preferences are primarily driven by nationalism and peer pressure, but dampened by concerns about the economic, human, and reputational costs of non-peaceful unification and the likelihood of US intervention.
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Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's... more
Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's public view this strategy? With tensions rising in South China Sea territorial disputes, are more nationalistic individuals more likely to oppose hedging? Using an original public opinion survey conducted in the Philippines, we find that while an overwhelming majority of respondents were concerned about the territorial disputes, more nationalistic Filipinos were no more concerned than less nationalistic ones. Further, more nationalistic Filipinos were more likely to view economic relations with China as important for the Philippines and to approve of Duterte's China policy, which follows the logic of hedging. These surprising findings suggest that under the shadow of great-power competition, the link between domestic politics and foreign policy is nu...
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Recent public opinion polls conducted in Europe and the United States show increasingly negative views of China. Does the Chinese public hold similar views of “the West”? Conducting a two-wave survey in China, we found great divergence... more
Recent public opinion polls conducted in Europe and the United States show increasingly negative views of China. Does the Chinese public hold similar views of “the West”? Conducting a two-wave survey in China, we found great divergence and asymmetries in Chinese public perceptions. First, Chinese views of European countries and the US diverge sharply, despite these countries being typically grouped together as “the West” in mainstream English and Chinese discourses; the Chinese viewed the US much more negatively than Europe. Second, whereas the Chinese reciprocated American antipathy, there was an asymmetry in public perceptions between China and Europe, with the Chinese expressing much greater favourability towards European countries than the other way around, though the degree of favourability still varied by country. Analyses of respondent attributes also yielded insights that both confirm and challenge some of the conventional wisdom regarding age, education, and party membershi...
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What drives consumer activism during trade disputes? We investigate this important and timely question using a survey experiment in the context of the recent Canada–US trade dispute. We find that Canadians are more likely to express... more
What drives consumer activism during trade disputes? We investigate this important and timely question using a survey experiment in the context of the recent Canada–US trade dispute. We find that Canadians are more likely to express willingness to take punitive actions in the form of boycotting during a trade conflict when they learn that Americans are taking such actions (retaliation), when many fellow citizens are taking such actions (peer pressure), and when they are rallied by their government (elite cue). Among the three conditions, peer pressure has the largest effect. These findings contribute to our understanding of the microfoundations of consumer activism during international trade disputes. They also have important policy implications in a world where both protectionism and populism are rising.
Research Interests: International Trade, Political Science, Nationalism, Populism, Consumer Behavior, and 13 moreSurvey Research, Consumer Research, Medicine, Canada-US relations, Canada, United States, Microfoundations, Punitive Damages, Protectionism, Public Administration and Policy, Trade protectionism, Consumer Boycott Behavior, and Trade war
This study examines the heretofore-unexplored costs of political connections in the context of China’s corporate restructuring. Leveraging original surveys of the same Chinese firms over an eleven-year period and the variations in their... more
This study examines the heretofore-unexplored costs of political connections in the context of China’s corporate restructuring. Leveraging original surveys of the same Chinese firms over an eleven-year period and the variations in their post-restructuring board composition, we find that restructured state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with political connections, measured as current or former government officials on the firm board, receive more preferential access to key inputs and policy opportunities controlled by the state, but they also pay more tax, independent of profits. We argue this is repayment by politically connected firms for the state’s “helping hand.” Our findings suggest that state-firm relations be recast as a reciprocal exchange rather than a one-sided provision of benefits from the state to its politically connected firms. Shifting the focus from profits to taxes also offers an explanation as to why China continues to favour SOEs over the private sector even when they are less profitable.
Research Interests: Political Economy, Corporate Governance, Taxation, Politics, Corporate Income Taxation, and 11 moreChina, Chinese Politics, Fiscal policy, Contemporary China, Firm Performance, Social Science Research Network, Privatization, Corporate Restructuring, Value Added Tax, Political Clientelism, and State Owned Enterprises
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Over the past decade, Chinese law has experienced a considerable number of major reforms, ranging from high-profile constitutional amendments to the implementation of multiple online platforms, which have significantly altered legal... more
Over the past decade, Chinese law has experienced a considerable number of major reforms, ranging from high-profile constitutional amendments to the implementation of multiple online platforms, which have significantly altered legal practice and the judicial process. While the scholarly debate remains split over whether China is turning away from law or becoming more legalistic, there is little empirical understanding of how Chinese law and legal reforms are perceived by those most affected by it, namely, the Chinese citizens. The present study fills this critical gap by leveraging an original public opinion survey of more than 5,000 Chinese adults to examine their views on issues such as the importance of law and the status of legal development in relation to economic growth. The findings suggest that Chinese citizens with actual experience of the legal system, whether from study, practice, or personal involvement in litigation, hold vastly different views on many of these issues from those without such experience. The findings also suggest that important policy initiatives introduced by the Chinese leadership and the judiciary, such as the emphasis on constructing a socialist rule of law and the potential introduction of some system of case law, may enjoy popular support.
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The Covid-19 pandemic since early 2019 has drastically disrupted economic activities throughout the world. According to the World Trade Organization, global merchandise trade flows decreased by 5.3% in 2020. Against this backdrop,... more
The Covid-19 pandemic since early 2019 has drastically disrupted economic activities throughout the world. According to the World Trade Organization, global merchandise trade flows decreased by 5.3% in 2020. Against this backdrop, however, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN bucked the trend and reached $684.6 billion, a 6.7 percent increase from 2019. This propelled ASEAN to dethrone the European Union as China’s largest trading partner for the first time, making China ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 12 years in a row. But there is more going on beneath the surface. The purpose of this Perspective is to move beyond the aggregate trade measures to uncover additional patterns in China’s trade with ASEAN countries during the global pandemic. Using monthly export and import data disaggregated by country and commodity, released by the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of China, this Perspective seeks answers to the following questions: (1) What factors contributed to ASEAN becoming China’s number one trading partner? (2) How did the pandemic and related measures imposed by governments affect bilateral trade between China and ASEAN member countries? (3) What has or has not changed in the trade pattern between China and ASEAN as a result of the global pandemic?
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Numerous public opinion surveys have found that Americans’ views of China have become extremely negative in recent years. Much less is understood about the trends in Chinese views of the USA and the countries’ bilateral relations. As... more
Numerous public opinion surveys have found that Americans’ views of China have become extremely negative in recent years. Much less is understood about the trends in Chinese views of the USA and the countries’ bilateral relations. As leaders in both countries have come under public pressure about their policy stances toward the other side, it is critical to fill the gap. This study develops a theoretical argument about how a concern for political legitimacy may allow public opinion to influence foreign policy making in authoritarian countries, and it presents findings from a two-wave public opinion survey in China conducted before and after the 2020 US presidential election. The results show that Chinese evaluations of the bilateral relationship and of the USA slumped during the Trump era but rebounded somewhat after Biden took office. In addition, the majority of Chinese respondents believed their country to be the world’s largest and leading economy and favored China being the wor...
Research Interests: International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Political Science, Nationalism, Legitimacy, and 9 morePublic Opinion (Political Science), Chinese foreign policy, Survey Research, Chinese Politics, Contemporary China, Authoritarian regimes, Domestic Politics and International Relations, International Leadership, and Us China Relations
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of the public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional... more
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of the public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. In this article, I explore both perceptions and misperceptions of China held by the Canadian public through a series of surveys that cover a wide range of topics from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of “favorable vs unfavorable”. Second, misperceptions of China are widespread but they may be remedied by corrective information. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanded global footprint, failure to account for either of these features in the public opinion of China may lead to misguided policies.
Research Interests: Perception, Public Opinion, Foreign Policy Analysis, Chinese Studies, Human Rights, and 12 moreInternational Trade, China, Canadian Politics, Survey Research, Chinese Politics, Social Science Research Network, Canadian Foreign Policy, Free trade agreements, United States, Foreign Direct Investment ( FDI ), Misinformation, and Us China Relations
This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1990 as a result of China’s changing national interests. We conclude that China is unlikely to... more
This brief examines how the motivations and goals of China’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have evolved since 1990 as a result of China’s changing national interests. We conclude that China is unlikely to abandon its long-held foreign policy principle of non-interference. However, motivated by a desire to be seen as a responsible global power, Beijing is seriously considering a more proactive approach to humanitarian crises, which may include direct intervention. Furthermore, as a significant contributor of troops and financing, China is uniquely positioned to represent the perspectives of both developing and developed countries in UN peacekeeping. To do so, Beijing will need to increase its leadership role in UN peacekeeping operations and offer creative ideas about how to promote reconciliation and development in post-conflict societies.
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Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders’ backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience... more
Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders’ backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience costs. We investigate this question by implementing a series of survey experiments in China, a single-party authoritarian state. Findings based on responses from 5375 Chinese adults show that empty threats and commitments expose the Chinese government to substantial disapproval from citizens concerned about potential damage to China’s international reputation. Additional qualitative evidence reveals that Chinese citizens are willing to express their discontent of leaders’ foreign policy blunders through various channels. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate over whether and how domestic audiences can make commitments credible in authoritarian states.
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Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of excluded parties. But what does this exclusivity mean for firms in nonmember states if production networks are internationally organized?... more
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of excluded parties. But what does this exclusivity mean for firms in nonmember states if production networks are internationally organized? This paper analyzes the effect of PTA exclusion on firms embedded in the global supply chains, focusing on the case of China's exclusion from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Drawing on a survey of Chinese firm managers during the TPP negotiations, we find that productive and downstream firms anticipated the exclusion and made adjustments accordingly, which led to a general sense of optimism toward the agreement. When presented with the prospect of an expanded TPP, however, firms are divided depending on how their own positions in the global supply chain complement or compete with the new member. These findings, validated with interviews in the field, suggest that the effects of PTA exclusion depend on the ability and need for firms to adjust....
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The Covid-19 pandemic since early 2019 has drastically disrupted economic activities throughout the world. According to the World Trade Organization, global merchandise trade flows decreased by 5.3% in 2020. Against this backdrop,... more
The Covid-19 pandemic since early 2019 has drastically disrupted economic activities throughout the world. According to the World Trade Organization, global merchandise trade flows decreased by 5.3% in 2020. Against this backdrop, however, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN bucked the trend and reached $684.6 billion, a 6.7 percent increase from 2019. This propelled ASEAN to dethrone the European Union as China’s largest trading partner for the first time, making China ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 12 years in a row.
But there is more going on beneath the surface. The purpose of this Perspective is to move beyond the aggregate trade measures to uncover additional patterns in China’s trade with ASEAN countries during the global pandemic. Using monthly export and import data disaggregated by country and commodity, released by the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of China, this Perspective seeks answers to the following questions: (1) What factors contributed to ASEAN becoming China’s number one trading partner? (2) How did the pandemic and related measures imposed by governments affect bilateral trade between China and ASEAN member countries? (3) What has or has not changed in the trade pattern between China and ASEAN as a result of the global pandemic?
But there is more going on beneath the surface. The purpose of this Perspective is to move beyond the aggregate trade measures to uncover additional patterns in China’s trade with ASEAN countries during the global pandemic. Using monthly export and import data disaggregated by country and commodity, released by the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of China, this Perspective seeks answers to the following questions: (1) What factors contributed to ASEAN becoming China’s number one trading partner? (2) How did the pandemic and related measures imposed by governments affect bilateral trade between China and ASEAN member countries? (3) What has or has not changed in the trade pattern between China and ASEAN as a result of the global pandemic?
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Research Interests: International Relations, Political Economy, Supply Chain Management, International Business, International Trade, and 8 moreSouth-East Asia, Nationalism, International Political Economy, Consumer Behavior, China, China studies, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Global Supply Chain Management strategy
A new survey shows small but important changes after the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
Research Interests: International Relations, Public Opinion, Foreign Policy Analysis, Chinese Studies, International Security, and 8 moreInternational Political Economy, China, Public Opinion (Political Science), Domestic Politics and International Relations, Us-China Relations, Australia-China relations, Japan-China relations, and Donald Trump
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In October 2020, a Pew Research Center survey found that a median of 61% of citizens in 14 major economies hold unfavorable views of China. In countries such as the United States and Canada, negative views have reached historic highs. We... more
In October 2020, a Pew Research Center survey found that a median of 61% of citizens in 14 major economies hold unfavorable views of China. In countries such as the United States and Canada, negative views have reached historic highs. We investigated the other half of the story: How do ordinary Chinese view the rest of the world? Is a similar plunge in public opinion occurring in China toward the United States and its traditional allies? With these questions in mind, we conducted a survey of 1,064 Chinese adults right before the U.S. presidential election. We asked them about their feelings toward the same 14 countries covered by the Pew study. The results are presented in this short article.
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There is nothing inherently good or bad about China’s aid and investment, though the “no political attached” approach means that the potential benefits can more easily be compromised by corruption and local politics. This points to... more
There is nothing inherently good or bad about China’s aid and investment, though the “no political attached” approach means that the potential benefits can more easily be compromised by corruption and local politics. This points to opportunities for more coordinated efforts for China and traditional donors tp each focus on what they do best — building infrastructure and institutions at the same time. This type of cooperation potentially can amplify the benefits for local communities in Africa.
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Les Québécois seraient tournés vers l’Atlantique, et plus anxieux que les reste des Canadiens face à la montée de la Chine? Pas du tout, selon un sondage d’opinion publique réalisé en mars 2018 auprès 521 Québécois et qui révèle que les... more
Les Québécois seraient tournés vers l’Atlantique, et plus anxieux que les reste des Canadiens face à la montée de la Chine? Pas du tout, selon un sondage d’opinion publique réalisé en mars 2018 auprès 521 Québécois et qui révèle que les Québécois ont une attitude plus positive envers la Chine, démontrent plus d’optimisme quant aux opportunités et sont moins inquiets par rapport aux risques que le reste du Canada.
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A new survey shows that Quebecers have views of China even more positive than in the rest of Canada.
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Dealing with China is going to be more difficult as it becomes more important. Canadian opinion is showing a strong strand of pragmatism favouring working with China as we must and partnering as we can, born out of a profound worry about... more
Dealing with China is going to be more difficult as it becomes more important. Canadian opinion is showing a strong strand of pragmatism favouring working with China as we must and partnering as we can, born out of a profound worry about our neighbour to the south and an unravelling global order.
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Over the past decade, China has become a major source of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in both developing and developed countries. Chinese takeovers and China-funded projects in the host countries, however, have met with increasing... more
Over the past decade, China has become a major source of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in both developing and developed countries. Chinese takeovers and China-funded projects in the host countries, however, have met with increasing public opposition in recent years. Why does the public respond less favourably to Chinese FDIs than to FDIs from countries such as Japan and the United States? We explore this question by conducting a series of survey experiments in Canada, where the majority of the public holds a negative opinion of Chinese investment. We find that the bias is largely due to misperceptions about (1) the relative size of China’s FDIs in Canada and (2) investment rules and practices that govern FDI projects in Canada. Correcting these misperceptions leads to a 70 per cent increase in the odds that respondents would favour FDI projects from China over comparable ones from Japan, the Netherlands, or the United States. These results suggest that providing factual information to correct misperceptions can lead to positive change in public attitudes, a finding that has important policy implications for Canadian leaders hoping to expand the country’s business ties with China.
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At a time of global turbulence and at the mid-way point of a Liberal government facing significant decisions about the direction and pace of developing bilateral relations with China, there are signs of growing public support for deeper... more
At a time of global turbulence and at the mid-way point of a Liberal government facing significant decisions about the direction and pace of developing bilateral relations with China, there are signs of growing public support for deeper economic relations and partnerships coupled with significant anxiety about greater Chinese military activities and its expanding presence inside Canada.
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Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We... more
Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these puzzles, and in many of the most intractable territorial disputes, such a belief may arise from the claim of historical ownership over these territories. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we investigate whether historical ownership engenders in respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and whether such a belief contributes to more hardline policy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that historical ownership does play a significant role in the respondents' perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with an alternative scenario involving no such prior ownership. Furthermore, those who hold a belief in indivisibility are more likely to support hardline policies and are much less likely to support bilateral negotiation. Finally, arbitration involving international organizations receives a high level of support irrespective of the divisibility of a disputed territory.
Research Interests: International Relations, International Law, International Security, International Arbitration, South Korea, and 11 moreChina, Public Opinion (Political Science), Survey Research, Japan, Russia, International Dispute Settlement, Territorial Disputes, History and Territorial Claim, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Conflict, Dokdo/Takeshima, and Kurile Islands
State owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have undergone significant restructuring since the mid-1990s. To date, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the constraints and motives of corporate restructuring in China. Yet the... more
State owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have undergone significant restructuring since the mid-1990s. To date, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the constraints and motives of corporate restructuring in China. Yet the majority of the existing studies treat restructuring as a simple ownership transfer from the state to non-state entities without differentiating the resulting ownership structure of the firm. Consequently, we know relatively little about why otherwise similar SOEs were restructured at different times and through different means. This study intends to fill this gap by examining the determinants of both the timing and methods of restructuring using a unique longitudinal survey of 145 SOEs over an eleven-year period. Findings of this study will shed new light on the economic and political logic of corporate restructuring in China.
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Many observers see mutual distrust as a major reason for increasing tensions in East Asia, but few studies systematically explore exactly how trust, or the lack of it, influences international cooperation in the region. We examine the... more
Many observers see mutual distrust as a major reason for increasing tensions in East Asia, but few studies systematically explore exactly how trust, or the lack of it, influences international cooperation in the region. We examine the microfoundations of international trust in East Asia by analyzing an original survey of Chinese urban residents' attitudes toward Japan and South Korea. We find that generalized trust, or the belief that other nations have benign intentions, provides the most important driving force of trust toward Japan and South Korea. This, in turn, has a positive effect on preferences for interstate cooperation. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, nationalism and historical memory have little or no effect on international trust. Our analysis enhances our broader understanding of international trust by clarifying its sources and consequences. It also suggests some important policy implications for Sino–Japanese relations and Chinese foreign policy.
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What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military... more
What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.
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What contributes to the growing pessimism among foreign investors, despite positive changes in China’s foreign investment regulatory framework? What can Beijing do to keep attracting FDI in an era of significant domestic and global... more
What contributes to the growing pessimism among foreign investors, despite positive changes in China’s foreign investment regulatory framework? What can Beijing do to keep attracting FDI in an era of significant domestic and global economic shifts? These are the two central questions addressed in this chapter, which is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the data on China’s inward FDI over time, both at the aggregate level and in terms of their geographical and sectoral compositions. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the evolution of China’s FDI regulatory regime. Section 4 discusses China’s challenges in maintaining its attractiveness for foreign investment and possible solutions to these challenges. Section 5 proposes bilateral investment treaties as a potential new driver for FDI. Section 6 concludes with some policy suggestions.
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Why do some firms face more environmental regulatory actions than others? We present a theory focusing on firm fixed asset intensity. High fixed asset intensity makes a firm less mobile. A less mobile firm cannot present a credible exit... more
Why do some firms face more environmental regulatory actions than others? We present a theory focusing on firm fixed asset intensity. High fixed asset intensity makes a firm less mobile. A less mobile firm cannot present a credible exit threat, making it more susceptible to stringent enforcement. Analysis of key-monitored firms in Jiangsu province, China of 2012-2014 shows that higher fixed asset intensity is associated with more pollution levies and a higher chance of receiving a punitive action. This result holds in a battery of robustness checks and an instrumental variable analysis. Further, our 2018 online survey of Chinese firm managers shows that those from high fixed asset intensity firms indeed consider their firms less mobile and they pay more environment-related operating costs. Finally, data from 2004 Chinese Firm-Level Industrial Survey demonstrates that fixed asset intensity is positively associated with pollution levies in a national sample of 201,926 manufacturing firms.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Economy, Environmental Law, Regulation And Governance, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, and 9 moreEnvironmental Policy and Governance, Environmental Politics, Chinese Politics, China studies, Contemporary China, Environmental Pollution, Bureaucracy, Fixed Assets, and Public Policy
This study examines the heretofore-unexplored costs of political connections in the context of China's corporate restructuring. Leveraging original surveys of the same Chinese firms over an eleven-year period and the variations in their... more
This study examines the heretofore-unexplored costs of political connections in the context of China's corporate restructuring. Leveraging original surveys of the same Chinese firms over an eleven-year period and the variations in their post-restructuring board composition, we find that restructured state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with political connections, measured as current or former government officials on the firm board, receive more preferential access to key inputs and policy opportunities controlled by the state, but they also pay more tax, independent of profits. We argue this is repayment by politically connected firms for the state's "helping hand." Our findings suggest that state-firm relations be recast as a reciprocal exchange rather than a one-sided provision of benefits from the state to its politically connected firms. Shifting the focus from profits to taxes also offers an explanation as to why China continues to favour SOEs over the private sector even when they are less profitable. 2
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How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of the public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional... more
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of the public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. In this article, I explore both perceptions and misperceptions of China held by the Canadian public through a series of surveys that cover a wide range of topics from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of "favorable vs unfavorable". Second, misperceptions of China are widespread but they may be remedied by corrective information. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanded global footprint, failure to account for either of these features in the public opinion of China may lead to misguided policies.
Research Interests: Public Opinion, Foreign Policy Analysis, Chinese Studies, Human Rights, International Trade, and 10 moreChina, Canadian Politics, Survey Research, Chinese Politics, Us-China Relations, Canadian Foreign Policy, Free trade agreements, United States, Foreign Direct Investment ( FDI ), and Misinformation
Trade conflict is on the rise worldwide. Since taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump has been ramping up rhetoric of protectionism followed up by tariff hikes against rival as well as allied states. These measures have not only... more
Trade conflict is on the rise worldwide. Since taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump has been ramping up rhetoric of protectionism followed up by tariff hikes against rival as well as allied states. These measures have not only prompted retaliatory tariffs from trading partners, but also led to grassroot actions in the target countries, as consumers strike back with small acts of resistance. Why do some consumers take it upon themselves in a trade dispute, even if doing so means changing their habitual behaviors and paying higher prices? Under what conditions are consumers more likely to boycott foreign goods and services? This study aims to answer these questions by implementing a survey experiment in Canada. We find that Canadian consumers are more likely to boycott American goods (1) when their counterparts in the rival state are boycotting; (2) when many of their fellow citizens are boycotting; and (3) when they receive a boycotting cue from their government. These findings contribute to our understanding of the micro-foundations of the political economy of trade conflict between nations.