Tax Havens

Article published by Tax Justice Network Blog april 10th 2017 in: https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/04/10/tax-haven-blacklisting-13-latin-american-countries/

As governments (slowly) get to grips with the fact that tax havens are inflicting great harm on economies and democracies across the globe, facilitating mega amounts of tax dodging, and vast movements of criminal money by way of the secrecy services some of them offer, the question of our times is how we deal with them. Attempts to create tax haven blacklists (in order to potentially implement sanctions for non-cooperative jurisdictions) have so far been farcical as we’ve noted many times, most recently commenting on the European Union’s current work compiling its own blacklist system, here and here. So far the criteria for inclusion in tax haven blacklists has been weak, such lists have been ineffective and it’s been far too easy for some of the world’s worst offenders to wriggle their way out of them, or simply be big and bad enough not to worry about being included in the first place – for example – Tax Haven USA. If the EU, or anyone else really wanted to do this properly, the work’s already been done for them – with the best objective ranking available – the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index.

Anyway, we were very interested to see that Brazil attempted to tackle Irish tax havenry in September 2016 by putting Ireland on its tax haven blacklist, effective more or less immediately.

Today we’re happy to share an article by Macroeconomics Professor Juan Valerdi[1] (of La Plata National University and El Salvador University) based on the conclusions of his research looking at the approaches of 13 Latin American governments to tackling tax havens. The full document is available here and was part of the campaign “Que las trasnacionales paguen lo justo”. The Spanish version of this article was published by ALAI Magazine earlier this month and is available here. (You can read the Professor’s blog here).
While this article looks at what’s happening in Latin America, the conclusions and recommendations represent an approach to solve what he refers to as the ‘Tax Haven Networks’ problem at a global level. His research focused on 13 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru.

Mientras los organismos multilaterales parecen ser incapaces de utilizar los avances tecnológicos para identificar y culpar a los responsables del fraude fiscal mundial -estimado en un mínimo de 130.000 millones de euros por año (Zucman, 2015)-, los mismos organismos han promovido en varios Estados el empadronamiento biográfico y biológico de más del 15% de la humanidad -por primera vez en su historia-, en función de ahorros fiscales de resultados discretos o desconocidos. La creación de grandes bases de datos poblacionales biométricas -a veces ilegalmente-, en función de crear perfilados para fines sociales, comerciales, policiales y/o militares, ha aumentado el control empresarial y estatal sobre sus ciudadanos, y el poder de ciertos países sobre otros. De manera que, mientras los ultra ricos fortalecen su opacidad y derecho de presunción de inocencia -e incluso son premiados por sus ilegalismos-, las mayorías poblacionales debemos transparentar cada día más nuestra vida, entregando copia de nuestra biología y biografía -nuestra  zoe y bio (Agamben, 1998)- al Estado.
Este trabajo, enmarcado en el proyecto de investigación “La Promesa Represiva” (FSOC-UBA), apunta a reflexionar desde la óptica de biopoder de Foucault y Agamben, cómo estas prácticas redefinen la ciudadanía y el estado de derecho en el mundo y el caso de Argentina, así como también plantean la idea de autodeterminación informativa ya no como un derecho acotado a una perspectiva individual/liberal, sino ligado al derecho de los pueblos.

Embora as agências multilaterais parecem incapazes de usar os avanços tecnológicos para identificar e culpar aos responsáveis da evasão fiscal global -estimada em um mínimo de 130.000 milhões de euros por ano (Zucman, 2015)-, as mesmas agências têm promovido em vários estados o registo biográfico e biológico de mais do 15% da humanidade -pela primeira vez em sua história-, com a finalidade de obter poupanças fiscais discretas ou desconhecidas. A criação de grandes bases de dados biométricos da população -por vezes, de forma ilegal- a fim de criar perfis sociais, comerciais, policiais e / ou militares, tem aumentado o controle das corporações e do Estado sobre seus cidadãos, e o poder de certos países sobre outros. Assim, enquanto os ultra-ricos reforçam a sua opacidade e direito de presunção de inocência -e até são recompensados ​​por seus ilegalismos-, as maiorias populacionais devem ser cada dia mais transparentes, entregando uma cópia da nossa biologia e biografia -nossa zoe e bio (Agamben, 1998)- ao Estado.
Este papel, enquadrado no projecto de investigação "A Promesa repressiva" (FSOC-UBA), tem como objetivo refletir a partir da perspectiva do biopoder de Foucault e Agamben, como essas práticas redefinem a relação entre cidadania e o Estado de Direito no mundo e no caso da Argentina, e como levantam a idéia de autodeterminação informativa não mais como um direito delimitada a uma perspetiva liberal/individual, mas ligado ao direito dos povos.

While multilateral agencies seem to be unable to use technological advances to identify and blame those responsible for global tax fraud -estimated at a minimum of 130 billion euros per year (Zucman, 2015)-, the same agencies have promoted in several states the biographical and biological registration of more than 15% of humanity -for the first time in its history-, to achieve discrete or unknown fiscal savings. The creation of large biometric population databases -sometimes illegally- in order to create profiles for social, commercial, police and / or military purposes, has increased business and state control over its citizens, and the power of certain countries over others. So while the ultra rich strengthen their opacity and right of presumption of innocence -and are even rewarded for their illegality-, the majorities of the population must make our life more transparent, delivering a copy of our biology and biography -our zoe and bio (Agamben, 1998)- to the State.
This work, framed in the research project "The Promise of Repression" (FSOC-UBA), aims to reflect from the perspective of Bio-Power of Foucault and Agamben, how these practices redefine citizenship and the rule of law in the world and the case of Argentina, as well as raising the idea of ​​informational self-determination, no longer as a right limited to the individual / liberal perspective, but linked to the right of peoples.

Апстракт
Даночен рај нуди на странски инвеститори, правни и физички лица, ниски или никакви даночни обврски со дополнителна погодност да финансиските информации не се споделуваат со странски даночни служби. Даночен систем на една држава е начин на финансирање на државата , додека деградација на истиот, со нeплаќање и настојување на луѓето за избегнување на даночните обврски, поради можноста за едноставен и брз трансфер на капитал но и поради стабилниот правен систем, т.е преку давање на легалност на деловните операции, ги прави даночните раеви се попривлечни. Во овој труд ќе бидат бидат анализирани основите начела на даночните раеви како и специфичниот начин на работење преку истите, историскиот развој, улогата на Организацијата за економска соработка и развој во дефинирање на даночните раеви како и проблемот со даночната евазија која е присутна во истите. Клучни зборови: даночен рај, даночна евазија, offshore компании, деловни тајни, индекс на финансиска тајност

Abstract
Tax haven offers foreign investors, legal entities and individuals, low or no tax obligations with the additional convenience that financial information is not shared with foreign tax authorities. A state's tax system is a way of financing the state, while its degradation, by not paying and pushing people to evade taxes, also the possibility of simple and fast capital transfer and a stable legal system, i.e by giving the legality of business operations, makes tax havens more attractive. This paper will analyze the basic principles of tax havens as well as specific way of working through them, their historical development, the role of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in defining tax havens, and the tax evasion problem that is present there.

CINCO ACTORES PROTAGONIZAN HOY EL MUNDO
OFFSHORE: LAS “GUARIDAS FISCALES” (PIADOSAMENTE
LLAMADAS “PARAÍSOS” POR LOS MEDIOS MASIVOS);
LA BANCA GLOBAL; LAS RESTANTES CORPORACIONES
MULTINACIONALES; LAS GRANDES CONSULTORAS
GLOBALES EN AUDITORÍA E IMPUESTOS; Y LOS ESTUDIOS
LEGALES ESPECIALIZADOS. SON LOS FACILITADORES
(ENABLERS) DE LA FUGA DE CAPITALES, LA EVASIÓN
TRIBUTARIA Y EL LAVADO DE ACTIVOS POR PARTE DE LAS
GRANDES CORPORACIONES Y LOS “RICOS GLOBALES”.
LEJOS DE CONSTITUIR UNA EXCEPCIÓN, LA ARGENTINA
SE MANTIENE EN LA “VANGUARDIA” –DICHO ESTO CON
IRONÍA– DE ESTOS “DESARROLLOS”. EL RECIENTE
DESEMPEÑO DEL PAÍS A PROPÓSITO DEL DESAFÍO QUE
PLANTEAN LAS “GUARIDAS FISCALES” AL EJERCICIO DE
SU CADA VEZ MÁS MENGUADA AUTORIDAD SOBERANA
RESULTA DIGNO DE ESPECIAL ANÁLISIS.

This article explores the question of what happened to European assets in the process of decolonization. It argues that decolonization created a money panic of sorts that led white settlers, businessmen, and officials to seek to liquidate assets they owned and move funds out of the colonial world. Instead of being repatriated to metropolitan countries with high tax rates and exchange controls, money moved to tax havens. Decolonization thus provided an important share of early postwar tax haven business in a period when tax havens and offshore finance expanded during the 1950s and 1960s. In turn, the withdrawal of Euro-American investments from the decolonizing world set the stage for the politics of development and modernization in the coming decades. Ironically, the outflow of funds during decolonization and the subsequent return of some funds in restructured form as investments by multinational and other companies soon caused difficulties in newly independent developing countries. Companies soon found ways to rebook profits to have occurred in a tax haven rather than in the developing world, thus depriving low-income countries from tax revenue. The withdrawal of Euro-American investments from the colonial world during decolonization moreover had implications for the growth of portfolio investment, as funds removed from colonies were often invested through a tax haven onwards in US securities. All in all, decolonization was an economic and financial event that is only beginning to emerge in full detail.

The contemporary conceptions of universal basic income (by Guy Standing), tax havens extraction (by Gabriel Zucman), and climate emergency (by Christiana Figueres) are briefly presented in the form of exposition in Massive Attack's Eutopia EP. These conceptions address the most concerning issues of today's world, while the concept of eutopia, proposed by Massive Attack's Robert Del Naja and Mark Donne, represents "a place of wellbeing, as a practical aspiration," a realistic utopia in which those issues are resolved. The present paper discusses the conceptions presented in Eutopia, assessing the possibility of the materialisation of eutopia. As suggested by Massive Attack, the ideas of Eutopia can be traced back to More's Utopia, being rooted in a humanistic endeavour of improving humanity, inspiring engagement and search for a better and just society. Apart from discussing Eutopia, the paper explores Another Now, the political science-fiction novel by Yanis Varoufakis. Varoufakis' critique of capitalism and the alternative he proposes in the novel Another Now argue along the same line as Eutopia, encouraging engagement in today's world.

Abstract published on Tax Justice network Blog april 10th 2017:

https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/04/10/tax-haven-blacklisting-13-latin-american-countries/

Tax haven blacklisting in Latin America

As governments (slowly) get to grips with the fact that tax havens are inflicting great harm on economies and democracies across the globe, facilitating mega amounts of tax dodging, and vast movements of criminal money by way of the secrecy services some of them offer, the question of our times is how we deal with them. Attempts to create tax haven blacklists (in order to potentially implement sanctions for non-cooperative jurisdictions) have so far been farcical as we’ve noted many times, most recently commenting on the European Union’s current work compiling its own blacklist system, here and here. So far the criteria for inclusion in tax haven blacklists has been weak, such lists have been ineffective and it’s been far too easy for some of the world’s worst offenders to wriggle their way out of them, or simply be big and bad enough not to worry about being included in the first place – for example – Tax Haven USA. If the EU, or anyone else really wanted to do this properly, the work’s already been done for them – with the best objective ranking available – the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index.
LatAm
Anyway, we were very interested to see that Brazil attempted to tackle Irish tax havenry in September 2016 by putting Ireland on its tax haven blacklist, effective more or less immediately.
Today we’re happy to share an article by Macroeconomics Professor Juan Valerdi [1] (of La Plata National University and El Salvador University) based on the conclusions of his research looking at the approaches of 13 Latin American governments to tackling tax havens. The full document is available here and was part of the campaign “Que las transnacionales paguen lo justo”. The Spanish version of this article was published by ALAI Magazine earlier this month and is available here. (You can read the Professor’s blog here).
...
...
Current and future politicians must assess whether they are willing to confront the Tax Haven Network system and its powerful direct and indirect beneficiaries, or continue to be partners and face the social consequences in their countries, ultimately ending in violent repression. At the heart of this battle that is taking place and will continue to be fought in the next few years is the financing of politics. As long as the political system continues to be linked to illegal activities, donations from the beneficiaries of the Tax Haven Network and support from the media multinationals, the battle will be clearly defined, as well as the consequences.

[1] Juan E Valerdi Economist, Macroeconomic Professor in the La Plata National University and El Salvador University. Formerly part of Jorge Gaggero’s research team on capital flows and tax havens in the CEFID-AR; Consultant in Argentina for UNPD, BID, BIRF; former advisor to the President of the Argentinian National Bank, President of the Argentinian Central Bank, President of the Financial Information Unit, National Deputies of the Argentine Federal Congress; Fiscal Coordinator of the Fiscal and Social Information System (SINTyS); part of the Tax Justice Together Europe Tour 2016 and representative of the Argentinian Central Bank on the Advisor Council of the Federal Tax Administration (AFIP).
[2] This is the case, for example, of Gabriel Zucman perspective on his book “The hidden wealth of the nations” (2015) when he presents the territories that belong to the Tax Havens Network as a group of isolated and weak islands that can be easily attacked with commercial or financial measures without considering them as several networks that benefit powerful forces in central countries and financial centres. That myopic diagnosis explains why Zucman proposes the IMF as part of the solution.

Since the last decade of the 20th century, fiscal competition and tax havens have been the focus of attention of many policymakers all over the world. After the world financial crisis in 2008, those issues started to be perceived – together with tax cooperation and bank secrecy laws – as some of the most pertinent topics in the economic and financial discourse and even deemed partially responsible for financial crime and the crisis itself.

This paper provides an overview of modern fiscal competition topics, discussing its drawbacks and benefits for economic agents (consumers and firms) as well as governments. We start by defining the phenomenon of fiscal competition and describing its main characteristics. Next, we address the various aspects of its impact on economy based on the analysis of published papers handling the topic.
The notion of the tax haven is regarded in this essay as an instance of tax competition. After giving its definition, we discuss its qualities listing the aspects  of countries which could potentially become tax havens. After that, we discuss the pro and contra of tax havens which coincide in many ways with those proposed in the analysis of tax competition.

In this paper, we reference to published papers from Journal of Public Economics, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, National Tax Journal and other sources. The assumptions proving our opinion are thus based on the arguments expressed there which are based on the analysis of economic models and treatment of empirical data.

Despite its reputation for the toughest anti-money laundering (AML) enforcement in the world, the United States remains the leading jurisdiction for the incorporation of anonymous shell companies used in grand corruption schemes. States like Delaware and Nevada have become notorious secrecy jurisdictions, frequently used by criminals and kleptocrats for money laundering. This thesis investigates why some U.S. states and not others have become the most secretive incorporation jurisdictions in the world. By employing the metrics from corporate secrecy scholars and NGOs and never-before-collected cross-sectional data on U.S. state incorporation fee revenue, this work reveals the correlates of U.S. state corporate secrecy. Moreover, through an interest group analysis of the corporate policymaking of two states (Delaware and Nevada) it posits a causal logic behind corporate secrecy in the most secretive U.S. states. It highlights how pro-secrecy interests in the United States have gained control over incorporation policymaking in Delaware and Nevada.

Shadow economy is a concept encompassing various illegal activities, logistical support system and money laundering jurisdictions and institutions that help processing proceeds from illegal activities and re-entering them into regular lawful economical circulation.
The big five shadow industries are illegal weapons trade, illicit drug trade, human trafficking and prostitution, naval piracy and trafficking of endangered species. In addition, illicit money revenues come from corruption.
Further and indispensable tools of this process are tax havens and various money laundering schemes that allow the proceeds from illegal activities to be legalized to re-enter our legit financial markets. North Korea is a good example where these schemes are being used by a whole nation’s economy.
All these illegal activities take a major toll the quality of life and security of many communities all around the world.

This book looks at 100 years of taxation legislation in Australia. From the introduction of the first Federal Income Tax Assessment Act of 1915, to the introduction of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2000, and how the Federal Government proposed to re-introduce State Income Tax Acts in 2016.

On January 1 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia was empowered to impose income tax on its citizens. However this book considers that it was not until September 3 1915 that the century of ‘tax reform’ began when the Australian Government introduced its first Income Tax Assessment Act. This book studies the transformation of tax reform over the 100 years from 1915 – 2016 of how Australia ‘reviewed and reformed’ its tax legislation which was driven by the winds of various political and social interests.

To do that, this book considers the oldest of British tax planning entities – the Trust. The British laws governing Trusts was ‘received‘ into Australia as part of the British Colonial Laws at colonisation in 1788 and applied in the Commonwealth of Australia at Federation in 1901. Therefore this book considers the trading trust to be the earliest form of ‘tax planning’ structure in Australia.

To provide broad context to the study of tax reform the book examines the introduction of Australia’s ‘reformed’ consumption tax, its Goods and Services Tax (GST), in 2000. It looks at the impact of the introduction GST by comparing it to its Pacific neighbours.

For many years the Cooks Islands held itself out as a Tax Haven in the South Pacific and the main vehicle of tax planning was the International Trading Trust, a key feature of the Spotless Services Ltd’s investment scheme to avoid tax in 1987. Therefore the Independent State of Cook Islands became central to one of Australia’s landmark tax avoidance schemes – the Spotless Case 1996.

This book uses the Cook Islands legislation as a comparative to the examination of Australian tax reform. Further, the Cook Islands introduced its Income Tax Act and Value Added Tax Acts in 1997 and, in 2000, that legislation, provided a convenient, recent comparative.

The book moves to an analysis of tax avoidance schemes in Australia and finally it examines government taxation reform activities over the century to the end of 2015. The books notes that, just one year, into a new century of taxation, in 2016, the Australian Federal Government put forward a proposal to go forward to the Past by repealing certain sections of the Income Tax Assessment Act and transferring Income Taxing powers back to the States, a position which existed prior to 1936.

In conclusion, this book looks at how Australia’s tax legislation was grounded, added to, avoided, and evolved, until ultimately it went ‘Back to the Future’.

Les développements qui suivent sont un résumé de ma thèse, sous la direction d’Alberto ALEMANNO, défendue le 25 février 2014 à HEC Paris.

L’objectif de notre travail était double. D’abord démontrer la pertinence économique, puis, dans un second temps, l’impertinence juridique d’un contrôle de l’ingénierie offshore dans la perspective d’une sortie de crise.
Ce sujet académique souhaitant apporter un éclairage au monde professionnel - cabinets d’avocats comme directions juridiques - s’est attaché à donner des réponses à ce paradoxe qui semblait, à première vue, ne pas en avoir. De la théorie à la pratique, nous identifions ainsi en dernière partie certains dispositifs pouvant inspirer une appréhension de l’offshore - sans réduire aveuglément cette lutte à l’endroit des multinationales mais objectivement en une appréhension plus juste de la richesse qu’elles génèrent malgré tout. Laissant ainsi espérer la résilience avec la crise, nous en concluons que la pertinence économique d’un contrôle de l’offshore aurait raison de son impertinence juridique.

A la recherche de l’inévitable et mythique synthèse, reprenons notre raisonnement.

La pertinence économique d’un contrôle de l’offshore dans la perspective d’une sortie de crise s’illustre tout d’abord par une estimation chiffrée. La proportion représentée par cette économie parallèle sur la dette publique est telle que son appréhension permettrait le recouvrement nécessaire au respect de la stabilité budgétaire – celle-ci constituant le plus grand enjeu de demain.
Cette influence de l’offshore sur l’économie mondiale s’explique par le droit. Tout d’abord le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, fondement du principe de souveraineté, autorisant chaque Etat à établir le régime fiscal de son choix. Conjugué à l’influence de l’Ecole de Chicago des années 1980, puis la financiarisation de l’économie des années 2000, cette autodétermination, disposée au rang le plus élevé de la hiérarchie des normes, permit d’instituer un chevauchement accru des législations à l’origine de l’élimination de la double imposition internationale.
Une analyse purement juridique nous permet alors d’expliquer l’érosion des bases fiscales comme les notions de « territorialité », de « mondialité » et d’ « établissement stable », conduisant à une imposition artificielle des bénéfices dans les territoires à faible fiscalité et une déduction tout aussi artificielle des pertes de source étrangère dans les pays à forte fiscalité.

Une appréhension de ces zones économiquement agressives s’avère donc indispensable pour plusieurs raisons.
Contrôler ces juridictions ne rendrait plus possible une externalisation du risque qui conduirait à un nouveau chaos économique, financier et social.
Plus encore, appréhender l’offshore permettrait de répondre aux conséquences dramatiques qu’a eu cette première crise subprime sur la seconde crise budgétaire. En effet, un contrôle des prix de transfert - qui représentent 60% du commerce mondial - dans les secteurs où leur manipulation est la plus dommageable comme l’économie numérique assurerait une plus juste répartition de l’impôt.
Ce nouveau paradigme permettrait alors une réduction des inégalités de richesses (entre les personnes morales elles-mêmes, FMN/PME) et de développements (entre les pays du Nord et le Tiers-Monde, stimulant l’émergence de l’Afrique).

L’impertinence juridique d’un contrôle de l’offshore dans la perspective d’une sortie de crise s’illustre par une analyse approfondie de l’efficience exceptionnelle de la Common law en droit offshore et, à première vue, l’absence de dispositifs capables de l’appréhender.
Il est prouvé que la recrudescence du système anglo-saxon s’illustre dans les faits par des territoires majoritairement américains ou britanniques - qu’il s’agisse d’Etats à part entière comme les IVB ou les Caïmans ; d’Etats fédéraux américains comme le Delaware ou la Floride ; voire d’Etats simplement sous ascendance étasunienne comme le Panama. Plus encore, la recrudescence de la Common law s’illustre par l’Euromarket abrité à la City et régit par ses principes ; ainsi que l’usage d’entités d’interposition également sous tutelle de la Common law telles ques l’IBC, la holding, la fondation ou le contrat prête-nom, tous autorisant le contribuable à écrire la loi par la situation qu’il construit par ces mécanismes juridiques.
Le trust, auquel nous avons porté une attention particulière, cristallise cette recrudescence de la Common law aux dépends de la fiducie et des véhicules juridiques de droit continental en général. Le dédoublement de propriété dont il dispose assure une telle opacité entre le détenteur légal d’un actif et son bénéficiaire réel qu’il remplacerait aujourd’hui le secret bancaire mis à mal par la communauté internationale.
La fiducie, cette entité tripartite propre à la Civil law, est donc distancée par le trust constituant pour les législations de droit continental, un patrimoine sans propriétaire auquel il est complètement étranger. Contraint, le législateur romano-germanique tente d’opérer un legal transplant du mécanisme anglo-saxon, mais en vain.

Le paradoxe que renferme notre thèse apporte néanmoins une réponse qui se veut exhaustive et dynamique pour gérer cette insolence des mécanismes juridiques abusivement légaux. Conformément aux dispositions qui pourraient être prises par le prochain G20 de Brisbane en novembre 2014, en réponse au « projet BEPS » de l’été 2013, nos dispositions s’organisent autour de trois leviers de court, moyen et long termes.
A savoir, d’ici la fin de l’année, prévenir les délocalisations et inciter au rapatriement de façon à (re)territorialiser un maximum de richesse sur le territoire national; mais encore renforcer le pouvoir des autorités de contrôle, et ne pas s’en contenter. Exiger ainsi des multinationales françaises un « reporting » pays par pays, voire filiales par filiales, de façon à rendre aux transactions intragroupes toute leur réalité, et enfin calquer, sur le modèle américain, un « FATCA national ». Disposées au PLF 2015, ces mesures redonneraient de son éclat au leadership français pour inciter les Etats membres à agir dans le même sens.
A moyen terme, d’ici fin 2015, établir un prélèvement automatique des avoirs dans le cadre d’accords « Rubik » généralisés à l’ensemble de l’Union européenne. Combiner ainsi le  « FATCA français » à ce « Rubik européen » pour impulser un « FATCA européen ».
Cette dernière partie assure qu’il serait ainsi possible de tendre progressivement, à long terme d’ici 2020, vers un « FATCA mondial » d’échange automatique d’informations - unique dispositif susceptible de mettre un terme définitif aux pratiques fiscalement dommageables.

This thesis examines Papua New Guinean attitudes to money and modernity through an exploration of contemporary “fast money schemes” (Ponzi scams). The largest of these, U-Vistract Financial Systems, collected millions of Kina from 100,000s of “investors” on the promise of monthly returns on deposits of 100%. The scheme was declared bankrupt in 2000 but its founders escaped imprisonment, fleeing first to Solomon Islands and then to the “no go” zone of Bougainville, where the scheme re-established itself as the Royal Kingdom of Papala.

U-Vistract claimed to be a Christian reform of global finance systems that would deliver abundant prosperity to Papua New Guineans. U-Vistract cultivated a moral vision of its middle-class investors as compassionate Christian patrons whose coming wealth would deliver “development” to a nation disillusioned with social inequality and the postcolonial state.   

U-Vistract investors emerge from this study as morally engaged members of a transnational Christian civil society. This is a surprising conclusion to draw from studying fraud but it is all the more surprising in Papua New Guinea where anthropological interest has historically constructed the “village” as the central place where social meanings are generated. Here, urban Melanesians demonstrate moral and relational sensibilities that combine global aspirations for prosperity with Papua New Guinean disillusionment with the nation. In doing so, perhaps a more individualistic rendering of Melanesia emerges but these are individuals who are also more cosmopolitan in sentiment.

Durch Steuerflucht und Steuervermeidung gehen nicht nur erhebliche Summen verloren. Im weiteren Sinne ist ein paralleles Rechtssystem entstanden, das Privilegierte systematisch nutzen. Trotz der Relevanz hat sich die Soziologie bislang wenig mit der Thematik beschäftigt. Dieser Beitrag soll a) einen Überblick über die Thematik vermitteln und b) den Stand der Regulierung und ihre Erfolgsaussichten diskutieren. Aufbauend auf interdisziplinäre wissenschaftliche Forschung zu Steuerflucht und -vermeidung, Publikationen internationaler Organisationen und von NGOs und auf Analysen der Politik beschreibt der Artikel folgende Facetten des Themenfeldes: 1. Die Institutionalisierung von Offshore-Ökonomie; 2. das Begriffsfeld der Offshore-Ökonomie; 3. Techniken der Steuerflucht und -vermeidung; 4. GewinnerInnen, VerliererInnen und Folgen von Steuerflucht und -vermeidung; 5. politisch-technische Maßnahmen der Steuerflucht und -vermeidung und 6. gesellschaftliche Ursachen von Offshore-Praktiken und mögliche Handlungsansätze.
Die Übersicht und die Bewertung der Maßnahmen zeigen, dass Institutionen der Offshore-Ökonomie nicht nur unter Ausnutzung struktureller Bedingungen, d.h. nationaler Gesetzesrahmen durch international tätige WirtschaftsakteurInnen entstehen, sondern auch aus dem systematischen Handeln von Eliten. Nachdem Offshore-Ökonomie jahrzehntelang geduldet wurde, geht die Politik derzeit von einer primär symbolischen zu einer stärker substantiellen Regulierung über. Eine Rücknahme dieser Regulierung und ein Rückfall in Standortkonkurrenz ist jedoch ein mögliches Szenario, weil strukturelle Kräfte wie institutionalisierte Konkurrenz v.a. im Rahmen der EU, zunehmende Ungleichheit, Probleme der Regulierung komplexer Systeme und Pfadabhängigkeiten, asymmetrische Machtverhältnisse und sich daraus ergebende Regulierungslücken und langfristige Interessen von Eliten die Regulierung konterkarieren. Rein technische Regulierungsansätze reichen nicht aus, um das Momentum zur Bekämpfung von Offshore-Ökonomie auszunutzen; die Bekämpfung hat bessere Chancen als breiter angelegtes gesellschaftliches Projekt.

Tax havens are among the biggest challenges faced by developing countries in achieving their national development goals. States, international organisations, multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organisations have all made several efforts at compiling ‘lists’ of tax havens at the multilateral and national levels, with varying levels of seriousness and outcomes. This research paper examines these efforts by analysing the objectivity of criteria used and the clarity of the final outcome in a comparative manner. The paper is organized into four sections dealing with the tax haven blacklisting by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the countries of the South, the European Union (EU) and an analysis across lists. The concluding section offers some suggestions.

Se analizan los criterios que ha seguido el ordenamiento tributario español para otorgar a un territorio la consideración de paraíso fiscal y en especial,  la nueva situación creada con la Ley 24/2014. Para ello mostraremos  cronológicamente las distintas etapas que ha seguido el marco regulador, estableciendo una clara correlación entre los trabajos y las recomendaciones de la OCDE y del Foro Global sobre transparencia e intercambio de información y las distintas reformas normativas que se han acometido en nuestro país. Parece probable una revisión de la lista de paraísos fiscales conforme a los trabajos que se están llevando a cabo en estas instituciones y en la UE para establecer una lista de territorios no cooperativos en 2017.

This study aims to examine the incentives of multinational enterprises (MNEs) for setting up tax-haven subsidiaries. Based on the firm-specific advantage-country-specific advantage (FSA-CSA) framework, we have conducted our research hypotheses. Using a sample of 165 MNEs from six emerging countries spanning the years 2014-2016, we document that firms with greater investments in intangible assets have a higher likelihood of owning subsidiaries in tax havens. Concerning the home-country specific advantages, we provide evidence that firms are more likely to set up tax-haven subsidiaries when their home country has lower required book-tax conformity and a worldwide-tax system. With respect to the host-country advantages, we show that the lowest corporate-tax rate usually offered by tax havens constitutes a motivation for foreign MNEs to establish tax-haven subsidiaries. In summary, our findings indicate that firm's home-country tax system characteristics (a worldwide tax system, book-tax conformity) are seen as the most critical determinants for setting up tax-haven subsidiaries.

Taxation in general and tax evasion in particular are inherently geographical in nature but only a small number of geographers have focused on them. In this progress report I present geographers' research on offshore financial centres alongside the work of researchers from other disciplines to present an overview of what we know about the geographies of tax evasion and avoidance. It is argued that not only much regulatory work but also much research remains to be done on tax havens.
Keywords: offshore financial centre, taxation, tax avoidance, tax evasion, tax haven, economic geography, political geography

Much of the academic work produced on corruption has disregarded the role of the world’s largest financial centres in providing financial secrecy and constraining development. In examining corruption through the lens of illicit financial flows, a very different picture emerges in which the spotlight turns to the receivers and facilitators of corruption that provide the structures for illicit money to be hidden. The relatively lax regulatory policies to attract capital in OECD countries have contributed towards the housing of some of the
worlds’ largest inflows of finance in these countries, but does this also invite the proceeds of corruption? In extending the research to examine this phenomenon, this mixed methods thesis will analyse whether there is a relationship between financial secrecy and deregulation. The quantitative results will show that to some degree, there is a positive relation between the two, particularly in what concerns the ability to shift profits and the levels of taxation. The examination of preferences within coalition patterns in the United States will show that to
understand the causality of the quantitative results, both the international market structures and the domestic politics shaping deregulation must be analysed in unison, as they mutually interact with each other to create financial secrecy.

Based on primary research in company accounts and fieldwork in Ghana, this report set out how one company used intercompany transfer pricing transactions to shift taxable profits out of Ghana and into low-tax jurisdictions. It was the first such case study to focus on a developing country, and became a reference work in the debate on taxation in developing countries, not least among African policymakers.

Publicado en:
https://www.latindadd.org/2017/03/17/mira-que-paises-en-la-region-luchan-contra-las-guaridas-fiscales/

Introducción
El presente documento pretende brindar una guía para los especialistas que quieran
abordar la cuestión de las “Listas negras” de “Guaridas Fiscales” (LGF) en trece países
latinoamericanos1 y que desean tener acceso a un mapeo de las intrincadas y dispersas
normas que definen a estas LGF y las consecuencias de estar en ellas o, en el caso
de algunos de los países analizados, las normas relacionadas con la ausencia de las
mismas, o con “listas blancas”.
En el prefacio del capítulo II se relata cuál es el objetivo del presente documento,
cómo surgió en el autor la idea de realizar el proyecto de investigación marco que
se inicia con este primer trabajo, cómo se consiguió el apoyo de las Organizaciones
auspiciantes para la propuesta y cuáles podrían ser los pasos siguientes del proyecto.
En el capítulo III, se hace una descripción de algunos de los alcances y limitaciones
del documento, complementando los ya esbozados en el prefacio y en el marco de
algunas de las ventajas y desventajas de realizar la investigación desde fuera de las
estructuras estatales, con financiamiento proveniente de ONGs internacionales.
En el capítulo IV se inicia el análisis detallado por países, comenzando por el grupo
de seis países que cuentan con algún tipo de LGF: Brasil2, Colombia, Ecuador, El
Salvador, México y Perú. Si bien todos los países presentan igual relevancia para
los efectos del análisis, por cuestiones de limitación de recursos se expondrá con
mayor detalle la génesis y estado actual de las listas de Brasil y México ya que son las
mayores economías de Latinoamérica y representan el 33% y 21%, respectivamente,
de la población de la región.
Se pondrá especial atención al caso de Ecuador debido a que, más allá de su normativa
interna, es un país cuyo presidente tiene, en el presente, considerable protagonismo
en la promoción de acciones internacionales para luchar contra la “Red de Guaridas
Fiscales”.
En el capítulo V se describe el caso de Argentina, que es el único país de los trece
analizados que ha cambiado su “Lista negra” de “Paraísos fiscales”3 por una “Lista
blanca” de “Jurisdicciones Cooperantes” en cuya versión 2016 se encuentran más de
la mitad de las “Guaridas Fiscales” que estuvieron en la “Lista Negra” merced al solo
hecho de haber firmado un Convenio de Intercambio de Información o incluso estar
negociando su firma (como es el caso de Panamá4). El caso de Argentina se presenta interesante interesante para el análisis no solo porque es el tercer país de la región en
términos económicos y el cuarto en población (luego de Brasil, México y Colombia)
sino porque además su cambio de 180 grados en la política referente al tratamiento
de las “Guaridas Fiscales” es un precedente muy peligroso para la región al estar
supuestamente reflejando los dictados de la OCDE.
En el capítulo VI se hace un breve análisis de los países que no cuentan con normativas
de “Lista negra” o semejantes en relación con las “Guaridas Fiscales” o que, contando
con normativa que las prevé, no han avanzado en establecerlas efectivamente,
como es el caso de Nicaragua y Honduras.
En el capítulo VII se exponen algunas conclusiones.
Finalmente se menciona bibliografía consultada y sugerida en relación al tema de
“Guaridas Fiscales”, la lista de siglas y acrónimos, un Anexo final con los listados
detallados publicados por los países analizados respecto de las “Guaridas Fiscales”
en sus diversas denominaciones, algunos listados complementarios referidos a la temática
de “Guaridas Fiscales” y “listas negras” o “listas grises” de ONGs, bibliografía
especializada y organismos nacionales no tributarios u Organismos Internacionales.

The article defines the essence of the mechanisms of functioning of offshore jurisdictions, which include: the stepping stone method, which consists in the division of assets among different jurisdictions; credit scheme, which involves providing loans at interest and makes it possible to transfer funds to offshore; transfer pricing, which provides for the sale of goods to the OFC residents at a lower price for subsequent resale for profit, which will be declared in the OFC (trading scheme); payment of royalties, which centers around the registration of copyrights, followed by the transfer of rights to a resident of a full-tax jurisdiction in exchange for the corresponding payments; the application of tax hybrids. The methods and schemes specified can only be applied in case of the presence of double taxation conventions among the jurisdictions involved in the schemes; they can be integrated into more complex mechanisms. Double Irish is the most famous mechanism that has simultaneously absorbed several methods. However, the mechanisms specified are not unitary or unique.

The Cayman Islands is a key node in contemporary global finance, yet it is severely under-researched. This paper compiles the first 'anatomy' of the Cayman offshore financial center (OFC), utilizing all sources of publicly available data about the three main segments: banking, direct investment, and portfolio investment. The analysis is performed both diachronically to see when large inflows occurred and geographically to determine what role certain countries play in different segments. This dissection of the Cayman OFC shows that the United States is the largest counterparty in all segments with Japan playing an important role too. In fact, when excluding long-term Treasuries, Cayman is the largest holder of US securities in the world. Hedge funds are the main factor for this strong Cayman-US link. About 60 percent of global hedge fund assets are legally domiciled in Cayman – an extraordinary spatial concentration in such a tiny jurisdiction. A novel contribution to the analysis of the Cayman OFC is the introduction of the Anglo-America/Anglosphere approach. This approach provides one plausible explanation for the unparalleled rise of the Cayman OFC by seeing this jurisdiction as one node in an Anglo-American triangle together with the US and the UK, Cayman's sovereign power.

Two global transparency initiatives are underway that could help tackle financial crimes including tax evasion, money laundering and corruption: registration of beneficial ownership for companies (to identify the real
persons owning or controlling such companies) and automatic exchange of bank account information between tax administrations. The European Union has made progress in both respects, with the adoption of a 4th anti-money laundering Directive (in May 2015) and by committing to implement the OECD’s common reporting
standard for automatic exchange of financial account information. The United States (U.S.), in contrast, has done neither so far.

Purpose: The main objective of this research paper is to look at Pakistan's legal, administrative, and judicial framework in terms of countering money laundering and tax evasion. Money laundering and tax evasion are two financial crimes that have been linked, either directly or indirectly, to one other. Money laundering was formerly solely associated with the crimes of narcotics trafficking and terrorism financing. At present, it has been also associated with tax evasion.

Methodology: The framework regarding tax evasion and money laundering is varied. In Pakistan, two different mechanisms exist to combat both crimes. This article analytically studies the parliamentary statutes and ordinance, the working of investigating and prosecuting agencies and judicature structure concerning tax evasion and money laundering in Pakistan.

Findings: This article concludes that the problem of tax evasion and money launder are causing financial instability in Pakistan. There is an urgent need of revamping the current tax administration to detect tax evasion and frauds.

Implication: this article recommends potential reforms in the existing legal, administrative and judicial framework to control and curb both crimes more effectively.

This essay explains the importance of tax havens, either to the detriment of economies suffering from significant capital flight, or to the benefit of jurisdictions declared as paradises, whose economy has been favored by the inflow of capital and investment Foreign. A brief analysis of the implications of tax havens for Venezuela and the current regulations is made. Taxes are instruments whose role is fundamental as a counter-pressure of the necessary common services that are received in a society, when more developed and advanced a society plus taxes are required to satisfy the collective needs that citizens of individual way will not be able to attend. Tax havens are mechanisms of defense of wealthy taxpayers who seek to escape with their wealth from state taxes with progressive tax systems for the financing of social protection, education and security of their population. For its elaboration, it was made use of the type of documentary research, with a bibliographic design, in a level of argument, which favored to define concepts and establish criteria. Much of the study had to be based on the analysis of the information collected in order to make clear the importance and importance of the constitution, laws, treaties and international conventions governing the matter. As the main conclusion, it was argued that governments should continue their transparency campaigns to prevent the continued use of money of public origin as a consequence of illegal acts, without affecting the sovereignty of each country.

Automatic exchange of information (AEoI) for tax purposes has become the global standard for international tax cooperation in 2013. As a tool for containing offshore tax evasion, it has encountered opposition in the past and continues to be fraught with challenges. This paper recapitulates the rationale for AEoI, including estimates on the magnitudes of assets held offshore, with a specific focus on Turkish assets held in Germany (chapter 1). Subsequently, chapter 2 summarises the recent history and describes the processes and milestones until breakthrough for global AEoI in 2013. Chapter 3 then discusses three current challenges, including the de facto exclusion of developing countries; how to incentivise recalcitrant jurisdictions to participate, such as the USA; and issues around the implementation of the CRS, including OECD’s Global Forum of Transparency and Exchange of Information, the peer reviews and public statistics. Chapter 4 concludes.

As a discussion piece, I see if a case can be made for tax havens as an integrated part of the global economy. Tax avoidance, it argues is a legal means to increase global profits through investment in markets around the world which create jobs. These havens, far from hoarding unpaid tax revenues act as conduits for flows of capital in search of the best investment opportunities and so make us all richer. Taking advantage of their good communications as tourist destinations and low public expenditure, havens attract investment, but to think of these jurisdictions as pots of money is to misunderstand the corporate ethos. Corporations, it is argued legally exploit tax loopholes that governments under pressure from the electorate could close, so that ultimate authority rests with the people and their elected representatives. Finally, it recognises problems surrounding transparency, morality, and considers Professor Ronen Palan’s case against tax havens.

Esta opinión consultiva fue requerida en el mes de mayo de 2016 por la Fiscalía Federal N°6 Argentina (Fiscal Federico Delgado) y en ese requerimiento se consulto al Lic. Juan Valerdi sobre distintos aspectos de las Guaridas Fiscales (Tax Havens) y su utilización por parte de personas físicas y jurídicas con fines de evasión y elusión fiscal.

Tax havens and tax flight have lately received increasing attention, while interest toward multilateral trade policies has somewhat diminished. We argue that more attention needs to be paid exactly to the interrelations between trade and tax policies. Drawing from two case studies on Panama’s trade disputes, we show how World Trade Organization (WTO) rules can be used both to resist attempts to sanction secrecy structures and to promote measures against tax flight. The theory of new constitutionalism can help to explain how trade treaties can ‘lock in’ tax policies. However, our case studies show that trade policy not only ‘locks in’ democratic policy-making, but also enables tax havens to use their commercialized sovereignty to resists anti-secrecy measures. What is being ‘locked in’ are the policy tools, not necessarily the policies. The changing relationship between trade and tax policies can also create new and unexpected tools for tackling tax evasion, underlining the importance of epistemic arbitrage in the context of new constitutionalism. In principle, political actors with sufficient technical and juridical knowledge can shape global tax governance to various directions regardless of their formal position in the world political hierarchies. This should be taken into account when trade treaties are being negotiated or revised.

Es handelt sich um die im Januar 2016 akzeptierte/korrigierte Beitragsfassung für den auf 2018 angekündigten Band:
Günther Schulz (Hg.): Ordnung und Chaos. Trends und Brüche in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. Erträge der 26. Arbeitstagung der Gesellschaft für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte / des 1. Deutschen Kongresses für Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Münster vom 11. bis 14. März 2015. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2018 (im Druck).

This paper contributes to recent discussions of corporate tax avoidance and global wealth chains. Drawing on multiple case studies, we outline the key strategies adopted by Finnish mining companies as they seek to lower their tax burden. After screening the accounts of the companies mining metallic ores in Finland, we provide an in-depth analysis of the tax avoidance arrangements at three of these mines. The mines were operated by two Canadian enterprises that utilized seven different tax avoidance arrangements. The multiple case study approach adopted in this paper is helpful in developing both quantitative and qualitative tax avoidance research, since our findings highlight major deficiencies of datasets commonly used in the dominant quantitative tax avoidance research. Our qualitative approach helps tackle some of the limitations imposed on tax researchers as a result of the considerable secrecy surrounding tax matters. In particular, we argue that the existing tax avoidance research has focused too much on statutory corporate income tax rates even though today, tax minimization relies mostly on specific tax incentives and other loopholes in tax laws. We argue that the arrangements we describe mirror a wider phenomenon where multinational enterprises exert societal power commonly associated with sovereign states. Crossing the disciplinary boundaries of accounting, political economy and tax law, we also contribute to the emerging research agenda on global wealth chains. We call for more attention to the intersections between accounting and tax law for understanding how enterprises can separate their value chains from the intra-firm flows of wealth.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1045235417300084

Introduction: The Continuing Imperialism of Free Trade, Jo Grady and Chris Grocott. Part 1: The Imperialism of Free Trade in Historical Context. 1. Gladstone, Suakin and the Imperialism of British Liberalism, James Fargher. 2. Spain and Britain’s Informal Empire, Nick Sharman. 3. Economic Imperialism in Cuba, 1898-2017: Hegemony and Embargo, Adam Burns. Part 2: Periphery-Metropolitan Relationships. 4. Imperialism　and the Military-Peasantry Complex, Gibson Burrell. 5. The Good Friday Agreement and Britain’s ‘Deep State’: Britain’s Long Goodbye and Speedy Return, Paul Stewart and Tommy McKearney. Part 3: Supra-National Agents of Imperialism. 6. Policy as a Tool of Economic Imperialism?, Martin Quinn. 7. The Role of Troika in the Greek Economic Crisis and its Social and Political Consequences, Costas Eleftheriou and Orestis Papadopoulos. 8. Lessons from Marikana? South Africa’s Sub-Imperialism and the Rise of Blockadia, Jasper Finkeldey. 9. Chile's trade policies in the context of US contemporary imperialism: The Free Trade Agenda and the loss of National Autonomy, José Miguel Ahumada. Part 4: Financialisation and the Continuing Imperialism of Free Trade. 10. Imperialism, Dirty Money Centres and the Financial Elite, Matthew Higgins, Veronica Morino and Nigel Iyer. 11. Commissioning Imperialism: EU Trade Deals Under Neoliberalism, Mark Dearn.

This article examines why Vanuatu creates a congenial legal environment for an offshore financial centre (OFC). There are four structural reasons. The OFC turns Vanuatu into a legal transplant laboratory. It makes significant contributions to its small local economy. The OFC's subculture plays an important role in the country's domestic politics. Vanuatu contains few interest groups which are inclined to oppose tax haven development. Vanuatu is a significant tax haven or offshore financial centre 1 (OFC) and it is important to focus on it as a financial centre, a nested community and culture of legal interpretation, not just as a 'market'. 2 Vanuatu's OFC gives the archipelago a prominence in global finance that is greatly disproportionate to its size 3. The principle of sovereignty (particularly its ability to pass its own tax laws) allows Vanuatu to create structures which attract a wide range of wealthy and powerful clients and produce a new kind of global political economy. Vanuatu's tax haven has often surprised, amused or scandalized metropolitan outsiders if they become aware of the situation. This microstate is often criticized for encouraging rich metropolitan clients to pretend to be something else-to