Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

This book deepens the study of the law of treaties by offering specific solutions to current legal problems. It provides a high-level theoretical and practical approach, touching upon all major current issues of the law of treaties. It is noteworthy that each subject-matter discussed in this work was thoroughly analyzed and supported by a rigorous methodology, including the use of the most accurate terminology and a well-reasoned explanation of each of the issues addressed in accordance with the most authoritative legal scholarly writings. This work is also a helpful reference for governmental and diplomatic officials, legal practitioners and the legal academia at large in trying to understand how international acts are negotiated and adopted, what the rules are for the formulation of reservations and introduction of amendments to conventional texts, how a State is definitely deemed to be bound by an international act or treaty, which the effects are of a treaty that came into force and how treaties should be applied at the international level, etc.

Ratifikasi adalah segala sesuatu yang mengacu pada semua bentuk persetujuan resmi atas suatu negara dalam suatu perjanjian. Ratifikasi dapat pula hadir sebagai suksesi, adhesi, persetujuan, atau dengan membuat Negara menjadi terikat. Sebagai contoh adalah ketika sebuah negara yang telah meratifikasi Konvensi Jenewa harus mematuhi perjanjian karena mereka telah terikat dengan konvensi tersebut. Ini berarti bahwa negara harus mematuhi semua Perjanjian-perjanjian, konvensi, pakta, piagam, dan protokol yang telah mereka kirimkan dalam instrumen Ratifikasi, aksesi, adhesi, persetujuan, ataupun suksesi. Persetujuan sendiri dapat diartikan sebagai istilah generik yang mencakup semua tindakan yang menunjukkan kesediaan negara untuk diikat. Ratifikas juga dapat diartikan sebagai proses dimana sebuah negara terikat secara hukum dengan sebuah perjanjian yang telah ditandatangani. Ratifikasi di tingkat internasional, yang mengindikasikan komitmen masyarakat internasional untuk menjalankan kewajiban berdasarkan sebuah perjanjian, tidak boleh disalahartikan dengan ratifikasi di tingkat nasional, dimana suatu negara harus bertindak sesuai dengan ketentuan konstitusinya sendiri. Arti ratifikasi sendiri dalam konteks konstitusional atau konteks nasional adalah proses dimana sebuah negara secara hukum menunjukkan penerimaan / persetujuan atas kewajiban yang tercantum dalam perjanjian. Dalam pengertian konstitusional, ketika legislatif atau otoritas nasional (nasional) yang ditunjuk memutuskan apakah akan meratifikasi tindakan pemerintah maka mereka akan melakukan penandatanganan perjanjian. Sebuah negara tidak harus dan tidak diwajibkan untuk meratifikasi suatu perjanjian. Bahkan negara tersebut diperbolehkan untuk menolak, atau mungkin juga tunduk pada ratifikasi tersebut berdasarkan kesamaan penafsiran atau interpretasi terhadap instrument atas perjanjian yang diajukan.

O crescimento extraordinário do número de tratados internacionais concluídos nas últimas décadas tem feito despertar em todo o mundo o estudo do Direito dos Tratados. No Brasil, em especial, o assunto ganhou maior relevo apenas recentemente, dada a tardia ratificação pelo país da Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados. De fato, desde a assinatura da Convenção em 23 de maio de 1969, mais de quarenta anos se passaram até o engajamento definitivo do Brasil ao texto de Viena, ocorrido apenas em 25 de setembro de 2009. É certo que antes dessa dada a Convenção já era utilizada pela diplomacia brasileira, se não como norma convencional formal, como costume internacional reduzido a termo. Seja como for, o certo é que a doutrina internacionalista brasileira – talvez à custa do largo período de tempo que o Direito Internacional Público restou apenas como disciplina optativa em nossas faculdades de direito – parece não ter se dedicado ao estudo dos tratados como deveria. Hoje, depois de ter sido a Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados formalmente ratificada pelo Brasil, mais do que nunca é chegado o momento de estudar a teoria dos tratados e compreender os problemas jurídicos que suscita. É também necessário apontar respostas práticas às demandas crescentes que envolvem os tratados internacionais ratificados e em vigor no Estado. Este livro – que é o primeiro a ser publicado entre nós depois da ratificação brasileira à Convenção de Viena de 1969 – vem suprir esta grande lacuna na doutrina pátria. Escrito por um dos mais respeitados internacionalistas brasileiros, o livro que chega agora às mãos dos leitores versa com profundidade todos os temas relativos à teoria dos tratados, como demonstra o sumário detalhado. Cada tema estudado na obra mereceu rigoroso tratamento, desde a utilização precisa das palavras no texto e do rigor metodológico utilizado, até a fundamentação de cada ponto versado com o que há de melhor em nível doutrinário. A obra serve ao governo, à diplomacia, aos operadores jurídicos e à academia em geral, no auxílio e esclarecimento de como se processam os atos internacionais, como podem ser negociados e adotados, quais as regras para as reservas e emendas ao texto, como se engaja definitivamente o Estado, quais os efeitos do tratado em vigor, como devem ser internamente aplicados etc. Numa época em que a doutrina jurídica parece cada vez mais render-se à superficialidade, livros como este que agora vem à luz reacendem a esperança de que o Direito brasileiro ainda há de contar com juristas de substância e preocupados com a realização da ciência.

The topics of armed conflict and annexation have to date not attracted much attention when it comes to international investment law and investor-state arbitration. However, a series of recent events, ranging from investment claims under Soviet and Yugoslav investment treaties to claims against Russia for investments in Crimea, has drastically altered the importance of the law of state succession in investor-state arbitration. Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, also provides the medium for an examination of the impact of armed conflict on international investment law. As of the writing of this article, eight claims have beenfiled by Ukrainianinvestors againstRussia under the Russia-Ukraine bilateralinvestment treaty (BIT), over the alleged breach oftheir investments in Crimea. For its part, Russia has decided not to participate in the proceedings. Regardless, these claims bring about significant questions with respect to the law of state succession in general and the application of Russian investment treaties to Crimea in particular. Furthermore, it has to be examined whether armed conflicts can affect the operation of investment treaties, and in particular, whether the conflict in Crimea left the operation of Russian and Ukrainian investment treaties intact or suspended the operation of such treaties. Setting out from these questions, this article provides the foundational elements on the importance of the impact of armed conflict and the law on state succession on investor-state arbitration.

Treaties constitute a major source of both public and private international law; it is hardly possible to imagine international law and international relations without them. There is no area of international law that is not, to a lesser or higher extent, regulated by a treaty. This course offers a comprehensive overview of the foundations, principles (including pacta sunt servanda) and sources of the law of international treaties (LIT), clarifies the role of bilateral and multilateral treaties between states as well as treaties of international organizations, and explains the very notion of a “treaty”, together with the key role it plays in the system of international law. The main sources of treaty law such as the Vienna Conventions of 1969 (VCLT), 1978 and 1986 are considered and characterized. Key issues such as the treaty-making process, stages and the role played by domestic law, treaty parties, the relationship between treaties, customary international law and rules of jus cogens, as well as the role of the language in treaty-making are discussed.

The rules on reservations found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and the concept of the persistent objector in relation to customary international law.
The ICJ supports the idea that an existing customary law rule would not apply to a State if it objected at the initial stage and in a consistent manner.
No State has maintained persistent objection in relation to a peremptory norm, whereas many have in relation to non- peremptory human rights norms, implying gaps in the standard protection.

This paper will discuss the following questions referring to the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [1951] ICJ Advisory Opinion.
I. Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the Convention while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others?
II. If the answer to Question (I) is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the reservation as between the reserving State and: (a) the parties which object to the reservation? (b) Those which accept it?
III. What would be the legal effect as regards the answer to Question (I) if an objection to a reservation is made: (a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified? (b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so?
IV. Is it permissible under the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties 1969 to give a reservation which is incompatible with the object and purpose of a Convention?

What happens when a secret trust fails in English law? Secret Trusts are a conundrum. That is why they feature iso prominently in LLB Trust examinations. Let's take an example. Adam [a Testator age 80] contacts his friend Bruce to ask him a favour. He asks Bruce if he can be a legatee for him for a property he wishes to hold and distribute for Claire, his long-time secret lover with whom he has a child Debbie. He does not want Eve his wife to know that this property is to be held for Claire. So he swears Bruce to secrecy. He intends Bruce to hold this property cottage on the Gower Peninsula for Claire, who in turn is instructed to hold on a life interest, with residual for her daughter Debbie. Adam then dies and in his will he leaves £400,000 in cash for his wife Claire, and a cottage on the Gower Peninsula worth £180,000 to his friend Bruce. So we can see a few problems from the start. The first is has Bruce told Claire that he is legatee for her life-tenancy in the Gower Cottage and that she is told hold the residual estate for her daughter Debbie? If she is unaware of Adam's intention for her to benefit from a life interest in the cottage and residual for Debbie, , then how evidentially can this property be held for Claire? It is somewhat of a waste of time and a good lawyer would not propose such a trust solution. Furthermore, as we know from §53(1)b LPA 1925, all transfers of real property must be "evidenced" in writing. Was there any writing? But the big issue is whether this is an express trust that can be recognized consistent with §9 of the Wills Act 1837 which require compliance with formalities, absent in this case, [2 witnesses who are not beneficiaries to attest to Adam's signature on the Will]. Equity cannot allow statute to be used as an instrument of fraud. The fraud here would be that if no-one knows that Bruce holds for Claire, then Bruce can just ignore the oral trust. He can justify this by stating that §9 of the Wills Act requires a signed and witnessed will for the legacy to be valid. WHAT ARE THE STEPS FOR RECOGNIZING A SECRET TRUST.

Il progetto di integrazione europea, a lungo emblema di pace ed esemplare compromesso tra prosperità ed equità sociale, attraversa oggi tempi duri: crisi economica, rinnovati nazionalismi, spinte xenofobe ed un assetto istituzionale frequentemente in balía della ragion di Stato dei propri membri sottopongono l'Unione Europea a inediti stress tests, tali da metterne in dubbio persino la sopravvivenza: scenari come il recesso dall'UE o l'uscita dall'euro da parte di uno Stato membro, un tempo tanto improbabili da meritare a malapena menzione all'interno dei trattati appaiono oggi come spade di Damocle pendenti sulle sorti dell'Unione. Seguendo una struttura idealmente bipartita, il presente lavoro si articola in quattro capitoli volti a indagare con approccio teorico-pratico le questioni giuridiche sottese al recesso dall'Unione Europea e dall'euro da parte di uno Stato membro. Il Capitolo I si occupa, a fronte del silenzio dei trattati europei, della ricostruzione della disciplina applicabile all'uscita dall'euro: vengono esaminate le principali posizioni dottrinali e l'applicabilità, controversa, delle soluzioni offerte dal Diritto Internazionale, concludendosi per l'indisponibilità – al di fuori del recesso in toto dall'Unione ex art. 50 TUE e, teoricamente, di una revisione ad hoc dei trattati ex art. 48 TUE – di strade in grado di assicurare un recesso pacificamente legittimo dalla moneta unica. Speciale attenzione è riservata, nel Capitolo II, all'ipotesi del Grexit ed agli ingranaggi normativi che muovono tre scenari pratici: Grexit volontario, forzato e accidentale. La seconda parte di questo lavoro, dedicata al recesso dall'Unione Europea, è inaugurata dal Capitolo III attraverso l'analisi della disciplina vigente. Punto focale è la clausola di recesso ex art. 50 TUE, introdotta a Lisbona. L'iter e gli effetti del recesso sono presi in considerazione sia nel caso in cui questo avvenga tramite Withdrawal Agreement tra Unione e Stato interessato, sia ove il recesso avvenga in assenza di accordo tra questi ultimi. Il Capitolo IV studia la minaccia del Brexit, soffermandosi sulle problematiche giuridiche sollevate dalle proposte di riforma dell'UE avanzate da David Cameron e su quelle che un eventuale recesso britannico potrebbe scatenare. Sono oggetto di studio anche le alternative alla membership UE a disposizione del Regno Unito ed il ruolo potenziale dell'Italia nelle trattative volte ad impedirne l'addio. Nelle conclusioni è infine lasciato spazio, alla luce degli elementi emersi, ad una riflessione sul complessivo stato di salute dell'Unione Europea e della comunità di destino ad essa sottesa.

This chapter explores the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the targeting of members of armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. It attempts to flesh out points of convergence between these two branches concerning their respective frameworks on the use of lethal force against persons. In this regard, the chapter analyzes the role played by ‘conduct’ and ‘function’ in determining the lawfulness of the use of lethal force in both legal regimes and demonstrates that these are not as far apart on this issue as it is generally believed. Hence, by applying the principle of systemic integration, it attempts to use these points of convergence to find a space in human rights law for a quasi- regime of status-based targeting of members of armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. The chapter nonetheless cautions against any exercise of interpretation that overstretches and distorts international human rights law or international humanitarian law. It thus highlights the limits in some circumstances of incorporating the abovementioned status- based regime, as well as guarding against attempts to align both legal branches to the detriment of their object and purpose.

This article deals with one of the most ancient and firmly consolidated grounds of invalidity of treaties. A treaty concluded through the coercion exerted against State representative, be it a single human being or a group thereof, is without any legal effect. Moreover, the act of coercion itself can amount to an international wrongful act.

Abstract: Some scholars argue that the Court of Justice of the European Union, when it interprets international legal norms, is comparable to a domestic court. Analogies, however, must be handled with care and cautiously justified. This contribution investigates if, and to what extent, the Court of Justice can be likened to a domestic court that interprets international legal norms. It analyses the Court’s interpretation of norms stemming from the main sources of international law: international treaties, customary international law and general principles. This contribution claims that the Court faces similar interpretative challenges to those encountered by domestic judges. Moreover, the Court’s normative role is comparable to that of domestic courts from the perspective of the sources of international law. The Court of Justice and domestic courts also contribute to clarifying the relationship between their respective domestic legal orders and international law. However, some changes in the Court’s interpretative reasoning are necessary for it to develop its full potential as a “domestic court”. Like for domestic judges, enhancing its reasoning will also allow the Court to increase the procedural legitimacy of its decisions. The “domestic court”-analogy, therefore, seems indeed fruitful and well worth reflecting upon.

Note: a copy of this book can be ordered at https://www.schulthess.com/verlag/detail/ISBN-9783725585502/Besson-Samantha-Hrsg.-Levrat-Nicola-Hrsg./LUnion-europeenne-et-le-droit-international---The-European-Union-and-International-Law

The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect. Bibliography: A. Cavaglieri, 'La violenza come motivo di nullità dei trattai' R.

Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) play a central role in assuring the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) the right to implement public health measures. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is also an important element for the interpretation of any provision of the TRIPS Agreement that may have public health implications. The most recent and prominent example of the use of articles 7 and 8 for interpretation in WTO law can be found in the WTO Panel decision of 2018 on the Australia Tobacco Plain Packaging dispute.

Despite the lack of a precise meaning of the term, the investment tribunals have developed some broad principles for the application of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard. These broad principles include good faith along with other principles. This article focuses on role of good faith as a means to interpret the FET standard. It discusses how the notion of good faith as referred by the arbitral tribunals has at least two distinct functions. Firstly, a more subjective function of good faith requires the parties to a treaty to comply with their obligations in a candid and loyal manner. Secondly a more objective function of good faith rather concerns the process of decision making being committed-while not distinguishable from the concept of equity to general considerations of justice. In the context of FET standard, the later function is especially connected with the approach of balancing the interests between host states and foreign investors. The article concludes with an analysis of the arbitral awards that shows that in interpreting and applying the FET standard they have identified among many other elements, the principle of good faith which singly or in combination have been encompassed in the standard. Finally it is stated that, the arbitral tribunals have found that FET standard encompasses the general obligation to act in good faith. This would include protection against the use of legal instruments for uses other than their intended purpose and any conspiracy by government authorities to destroy the investment. At the same time, it is clear that, action in bad faith is not a prerequisite for finding that the FET standard has been breached.

The concept of human rights has developed during the last 60 years mainly through multilateral treaties as a positivist branch of public international law. However, key positivist doctrines such as pacta sunt servanda or state sovereignty pose significant obstacles to the effective realization of a modern human rights regime. The universal, inherent and inalienable nature of fundamental human rights, deriving from their natural law origins, are often set aside by such doctrines and annulled. Through close examination of reservations to human rights treaties, this study sheds new light on the deep interplay of naturalistic and legal positivist doctrines on the progress and implementation of human rights law (CEDAW, HR Committee, ILC). It is argued that the positions of apex human rights bodies regarding reservations reveal that establishing a human rights concept within a legal positivist environment, without a systematic methodological foundation, endangers its basic sustainability.

While treaties can be notoriously difficult to amend by formal means, they must nevertheless be adapted over time in order to remain useful. Herein lies the role of subsequent practice as a key tool for treaty change. Subsequent practice - a well-established means of treaty interpretation - sometimes diverges from the original treaty provision to such an extent that it can no longer be said to constitute an act of interpretation or application. Rather, it becomes, in effect, one of treaty modification.

The modification of treaties by subsequent practice extends to all fields of international law, from the law of the sea, environmental law, and investment law, to human rights and humanitarian law. Such modifications can have significant practical consequences, from revising or creating new rights and obligations, to establishing new institutional mechanisms. Determining when and how treaty modification by subsequent practice occurs poses difficulty to legal scholars and dispute settlement bodies alike, and impacts States' expectations as to their treaty obligations. This significant yet underexplored process is the focus of this book.

Modification of Treaties by Subsequent Practice proves that subsequent practice can - under carefully defined conditions that ensure strict accordance with the will of the treaty parties - alter, supplement, and terminate treaty provisions or even entire treaty frameworks. It can also generate customary law and fuel regime interaction. Ultimately, this book demonstrates the relevance and dynamism of the process of treaty modification by subsequent practice, emphasizing the need to deal with the issue head on, and explains - on a theoretical and practical level - how it can be identified and dealt with more consistently in the future. The book thus contributes to a deeper understanding of the process of treaty modification by subsequent practice and its continued role in striking the judicious balance between the stability of treaties on the one hand, and the organic evolution of the law on the other.

The adoption of the 2008 Rotterdam Rules in six equally authentic language versions has presented the maritime community with an issue that it has not (knowingly) previously encountered, namely the issue of the interpretation of plurilingual treaties.

This foreword to the book The Law of Treaties (by Valerio de Oliveira Mazzuoli) was written by Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Judge of the European Court of Human Rights, for the first Portuguese edition. The following text is written in Persian for the edition published in Iran.

The present work aimed at studying the model in which the 1988 Brazilian Constitution deals with the competence of constituted powers for the celebration of treaties. It was analyzed, this way, the Legislative and Executive relationship powers as to the proceedings for the celebration of international treaties.

Për arsye të mos funksionimit/përdorimit të kontrollit Kushtetutes, Protokolli 12 i KEDNJ është i papajtueshëm me  Nenin 18/3 të Kushtetutës së Shqipërisë. Nga ana tjetër, dispozita në fjalë është transformuar vetvetiu në anti-Kushtetuese, dhe sa herë që Shteti do të përdorë Nenin 18/3 të Kushtetutës, vetvetiu, do të kryejë kundravajtje Kushtetuese, e për pasojë, kjo dispozitë nuk duhet përdorur më. Ndoshta, ky është rasti i vetëm, i paprecedentë, në botë, ku një dispozitë kushtetuese hyn në konflikt me dispozitat e tjera, të vetë Kushtetutës, pas ratifikimit të një marrëveshjeje ndërkombëtare.

В Национальном реестре правовых актов 4 мая было официально опубликовано Решение Конституционного Суда Республики Беларусь от 26 апреля 2016 г. № Р-1030/2016 «О праве на обжалование решений налоговых органов, действий (бездействия) их должностных лиц», вынесенное в рамках производства по устранению пробелов. Решение можно охарактеризовать, как относительно безвредное и симптоматичное.

Сама проблема, ставшая основанием для обращения в Конституционный Суд, не стоила и «выеденного яйца». Решением налогового органа (о нарушении налогового законодательства частным предприятием, допущенного в результате действий (бездействия) А.М. Барташевича) были затронуты права и законные интересы данного гражданина, но положения Общей части Налогового Кодекса Республики Беларусь не позволяли обжаловать решения налогового органа лицам, не являющимся плательщиками (коим гражданин уже не являлся). Ситуация осложнялась еще и тем, что принятие решения о нарушении налогового законодательства открывало дорогу для привлечения данного гражданина к субсидиарной ответственности по обязательствам организации. Тем не менее, гражданин обратился в районный суд г. Минска с жалобой на решение ИМНС.

The paper offers an alternative narrative about the interplay between the ECtHR and the CJEU. It argues that Bosphorus cannot serve as a role-model for understanding the interrelationship between these two quasi-Constitutional Courts, the interaction of which is inherently marked by implicit competition. Although other motives may exist as well, the reason why the ECtHR in Bosphorus felt it necessary to self-restrain its judicial powers was not so much its esteem towards the CJEU, but the impact judicial review would have on the UNSC, the Resolutions of which the EU was in fact implementing. A second(ary) goal of the paper is to ‘zoom-out’ from the European-centric vision of the CJEU-ECtHR dipole and outline the broader environment within which their common tale is situated. In that respect, the paper discusses systemic integration and legal pluralism, (indirect) review of the acts of the UNSC from the perspective of the hierarchy of rules and responsibility of States in cases where their membership of an organisation is linked to a situation resulting in the circumvention of the ECHR.

On December 5, 2014, the Australian parliament passed the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth). Section 197C of the Act deems ‘Australia’s non-refoulement obligations irrelevant to removal of unlawful non-citizens under section 198‘. This amendment to the act overturns previous High Court decisions and opens up the possibility of refoulement for irregular maritime arrivals and asylum seekers intercepted in international waters.

The law of non-refoulement has extraterritorial application and can extend to persons whose refugee status has not yet been determined. It is a principle so universally accepted that it can be considered a part of international custom. The new provisions of the act raise questions regarding the concept established in the Vienna Convention of the ‘good faith’ implementation of this law. If Australia contradicts such a provision of the Refugee Convention, its commitment to other international obligations may be questioned. This raises a broader issue of the choice between monism and dualism in the application of international law, where ‘either or’ arguments may no longer suffice in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

This paper considers the changes to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in relation to the law of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention. In doing so, it explores the broader domestic laws that reinforce the international obligation of non-refoulement and contemplate points of consistency and divergence between Australian domestic law and international obligation. It further considers the question of whether Australia could be held responsible in cases where persons are not given their right to non-refoulement extraterritorially. In doing so it queries the dichotomy between monism and dualism in international law, exploring extraterritorial responsibility as a way to bridge the divide.

In April 2014, the Marshall Islands announced it was suing all nine nuclear armed states for a purported failure to meet their nuclear disarmament obligations under international law. Logically speaking, the veracity of that charge depends on precisely what those disarmament obligations are. This paper presents an interpretation of existing international obligations relating to nuclear disarmament, based on an almost universally-recognised legal methodology – articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In doing so, the paper offers a preliminary answer to the question, what is the international norm of nuclear disarmament? In other words, what are the collective expectations of international society regarding nuclear disarmament?

The International Health Regulations (IHR), of which the World Health Organization is custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, including prevention, detection, and response to global health emergencies such as the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Countries are permitted to exercise their sovereignty in taking additional health measures to respond to such emergencies if these measures adhere to Article 43 of this legally binding instrument. Overbroad measures taken during recent public health emergencies of international concern, however, reveal that the provision remains inadequately understood. A shared understanding of the measures legally permitted by Article 43 is a necessary step in ensuring the fulfillment of obligations, and fostering global solidarity and resilience in the face of future pandemics. In this consensus statement, public international law scholars specializing in global health consider the legal meaning of Article 43 using the inter...

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 50 TEU recognized and regulated the unilateral right of a Member State to withdraw from the EU. The contribution seeks to demonstrate that, in so doing, the exercise of this sovereign right has been framed in a composite procedure exclusively governed by EU law and subject to EU values, principles and objectives and to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU. The article investigates the scope of this jurisdiction, maintaining that it not only covers the withdrawal agreement as an international agreement but also extends to its negotiations and the sovereign decision to withdraw.

The Prespa Agreement (PA, the Agreement) is a bilateral international treaty between Greece and North Macedonia that entered into force on 12 February 2019. Its primary purpose is the settlement of a relatively longstanding dispute that arose in the aftermath of the former Yugoslavia’s dissolution, when North Macedonia declared its independence under the constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia. Greece, whose northern region is also called Macedonia, was opposed to the use of this name by its neighbour for a number of reasons, involving historical concerns and fears of irredentism. Article 1(3)(a) of the PA provides as follows: ‘The official name of the Second Party [i.e. the state nowadays named North Macedonia] shall be the “Republic of North Macedonia”, which shall be the constitutional name of the Second Party and shall be used erga omnes, as provided for in this Agreement. The short name of the Second Party shall be “North Macedonia”.’ Other provisions of the PA define the new terminologies to be used regarding North Macedonia’s nationals and language. 

This note presents the architecture and key features of the Agreement and sets the scene for the two papers hosted in the QIL issue on the PA that it (i.e. this note) introduces. These papers treat the PA as a case study offering the opportunity to define the meaning and the effects of the term ‘erga omnes’ within this particular context, discuss who is bound by the Agreement, and explore the obligations and rights this treaty potentially establishes for non-parties. In that respect, the note identifies three key scenarios. First, the term ‘erga omnes’ might be read as referring to the instances when and the persons vis-à-vis whom the agreed terminologies must be used; not vis-à-vis whom the obligation to employ these terminologies is owed. Thus, according to this scenario, the obligation to use the agreed terminologies for all usages and all purposes, erga omnes, both domestically and internationally is a bilateral obligation that one party to the PA owes to the other party. Thus, the PA is a bilateral treaty establishing reciprocal, synallagmatic obligations pertaining to interests that, prima facie, are exclusive to the two parties to the Agreement. The PA establishes no rights or obligations for third parties according to this scenario. The second scenario consists in reading the PA as a bilateral treaty, a part of which is aimed at establishing obligations (and rights) for non-parties consenting to adopt and use the new terminologies. This scenario raises questions such as whether consenting third parties assume a duty to employ these terminologies, as well as vis-à-vis whom such an obligation is owed. Finally, the third scenario considers that the settlement of the naming dispute is a means of prevention of territorial claims, tension and conflict, and serves purposes that are not solely “private”, and which do not exclusively concern the interests of the parties to it. Peace, conflict prevention and the preservation of the existing borders are also a matter of general interest. Therefore, the PA could fall within the category of treaties establishing an objective regime, i.e. a regime binding everyone and which ought to be respected by everyone, including non-parties to the Agreement. Qualifying part of the PA as an objective regime would imply the establishment of an obligation owed by all actors vis-à-vis all other actors, that is to say, an obligation erga omnes.

The International Health Regulations (ihr), of which the World Health Organization is custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, including prevention, detection, and response to potential global health emergencies such as the ongoing covid-19 pandemic. While Article 44 of this binding legal instrument requires countries to collaborate and assist each other in meeting their respective obligations, recent events demonstrate that the precise nature and scope of these legal obligations are ill-understood. A shared understanding of the level and type of collaboration legally required by the ihr is a necessary step in ensuring these obligations can be acted upon and fully realized, and in fostering global solidarity and resilience in the face of future pandemics. In this consensus statement, public international law scholars specializing in global health consider the legal meaning of Article 44 using the interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on ...

The law of unilateral acts and the law of treaties are generally considered to be two distinct areas of international law. While the former governs the effect of unilateral undertakings by States, the latter governs, inter alia, the formation, interpretation, termination, and suspension of treaties. In 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) concluded a two-decade study on reservations. One of its most remarkable insights is the argument that reservations ought to be considered ‘unilateral acts’. Thus, certain rules pertaining the law of unilateral acts ought to apply to reservations. This article critically examines the ILC's novel proposal as well as its attempt to provide answers to contemporary questions on reservations through conceptualizing reservations as unilateral acts.

O artigo visa compreender o tema dos vícios do consentimento e da nulidade dos tratados internacionais, à luz da Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados de 1969, separando os casos de vícios do consentimento (os casos anuláveis e o único caso nulo) das hipóteses de nulidade dos tratados propriamente ditos. A doutrina (nacional e internacional) confunde-se sobre o tema, não esclarecendo o que afinal vicia “o consentimento” do Estado em obrigar-se pelo tratado e o que vicia “o tratado” propriamente dito. Neste estudo, dividiremos bem as coisas, colocando cada tema no seu devido lugar.

While the topic of this chapter may appear out of place in an edited volume on 'evolutionary interpretation', intertemporal linguistics in fact drills down directly into the epicentre of the evolutionary interpretation debate. In this chapter, I will explain why we need to move beyond what has become a fragmented and confused discussion of evolutionary interpretation to the more refined problem of intertemporal linguistics (section I). I will then demonstrate that teachings from fields outside international law, principally linguistics, are required to resolve the
entirely legal problem of how international adjudicators should interpret treaties through time (section II).

International lawyers and courts consider the principle of systemic integration to be a potential answer to difficulties arising from the fragmentation of public international law. This article questions the application of this approach in the context of human rights treaties. It is argued, first, that in many instances, systemic integration raises serious interpretational and jurisdictional concerns and, second, that systemic integration may give rise to a less diverse international law.

International lawyers and courts consider the principle of systemic integration to be a potential answer to difficulties arising from the fragmentation of public international law. This article questions the application of this approach in the context of human rights treaties. It is argued, first, that in many instances, systemic integration raises serious interpretational and jurisdictional concerns and, second, that systemic integration may give rise to a less diverse international law.

The International Health Regulations (ihr), of which the World Health Organization is custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, including prevention, detection, and response to potential global health emergencies such as the ongoing covid-19 pandemic. While Article 44 of this binding legal instrument requires countries to collaborate and assist each other in meeting their respective obligations, recent events demonstrate that the precise nature and scope of these legal obligations are ill-understood. A shared understanding of the level and type of collaboration legally required by the ihr is a necessary step in ensuring these obligations can be acted upon and fully realized, and in fostering global solidarity and resilience in the face of future pandemics. In this consensus statement, public international law scholars specializing in global health consider the legal meaning of Article 44 using the interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on ...

Over the past few years, states have been entering into international agreements that increasingly displace their non-refoulement obligations. Non-refoulement is a legal norm that protects vulnerable people from being expelled and returned to a state where they might face serious mistreatement. This rule has been a cornerstone of the law on international migration and forced movement for a considerable period, even being viewed as a human right by some. However, recently states have begun entering into international agreements and treaties that overcome the non-refoulement obligation through a number of arrangements. This study will proceed by looking at three forms of contracting out of non-refoulement: agreements that establish facts, agreements that establish jurisdiction or agreements creating competing norms. This article seeks to draw attention to these effects, criticize them and emphasize that we should not lose sight of the need to protect vulnerable people from expulsion to situations of serious mistreatment.

The International Health Regulations (ihr), of which the World Health Organization is custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, including prevention, detection, and response to global health emergencies such as the ongoing covid-19 pandemic. Countries are permitted to exercise their sovereignty in taking additional health measures to respond to such emergencies if these measures adhere to Article 43 of this legally binding instrument. Overbroad measures taken during recent public health emergencies of international concern, however, reveal that the provision remains inadequately understood. A shared understanding of the measures legally permitted by Article 43 is a necessary step in ensuring the fulfillment of obligations, and fostering global solidarity and resilience in the face of future pandemics. In this consensus statement, public international law scholars specializing in global health consider the legal meaning of Article 43 using the inter...