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Meital Pinto
Zefat Academic College, School of Law, Faculty Member
- Discrimination, Arbitrariness, Language rights, Language Policy, Group Rights, Religion, and 12 moreComperative Law, Politics of Recognition, Constitutional Law, Multiculturalism, Equality and Non Discrimination, Constitutional Theory, Social Epistemology, Martin Loughlin, Mattias Kumm, Arabic, Rationality, and Gender Equalityedit
- Dr. Meital Pinto is a senior lecturer at the Zefat Academic College School of Law, and the Ono Academic College Schoo... moreDr. Meital Pinto is a senior lecturer at the Zefat Academic College School of Law, and the Ono Academic College School of Law, Israel. She is also a teaching fellow at the Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University in Jerusalem (teaching a seminar on Law and Feminism).
Dr. Pinto was an Israel Institute visiting scholar (2022) at the
Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality and Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago.. Dr. Pinto served as a teaching fellow at Tel-Aviv University (teaching constitutional law for first year LL.B students) from 2017-2020.
Meital has an S.J.D. (2009) and an LL.M. (2005) from University of Toronto, and LL.B degree (2003) in Law and Government from Reichman University (IDC) Herzliya, Israel (Magna cum Laude). Prior to her graduate studies Meital served as a law clerk to Justice Asher Grunis of the Israeli Supreme Court, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel.
Meital teaches in the fields of Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Law and Gender, and Multiculturalism.
Meital’s research focuses on the issues of shaming, discrimination, and minority rights within multicultural societies (especially language rights and religious freedom), including rights of minorities within minorities.
Among her recent publications are: “Arbitrariness as Discrimination” 34(2) The Canadian Journal Of Law And Jurisprudence 391-415 (2021)"; “The Impact of the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People on the Status of the Arabic Language in Israel” 30 (1) Minnesota Journal of International Law 1( 2020); “Gender Quotas and the Parity Paradigm in Israel” in Women And Legal Pluralism: Extending Parity Governance? (Oxford University Press, 2018); "The Right to Culture, the Right to Dispute, and the Right to Exclude: A New Perspective on Minorities within Minorities" 28 RATIO JURIS 521-539 (2015); "Taking Language Rights Seriously" 25 KING'S LAW JOURNAL (Hart Publishing) 231-254 (2014); "Philosophy of Language Policy" in Bernard Spolsky ed., The Cambridge Handbook of Language Policy 37-58 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) (With Denise Réaume); "What Are Offences to Feelings Really about? A New Regulative Principle for the Multicultural Era, 30(4) OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 695 (2010); “On the Intrinsic Value of Arabic in Israel - Challenging Kymlicka on Language Rights” 20(1) THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW & JURISPRUDENCE 143-172 (2007).edit
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The dominant attitude perceives group rights in a space shared by Jews and Arab-Palestinians as controversial because they disrupt Jewish ownership of the public space in Israel. The article presents two main arguments. First, to explain... more
The dominant attitude perceives group rights in a space shared by Jews and Arab-Palestinians as controversial because they disrupt Jewish ownership of the public space in Israel.
The article presents two main arguments. First, to explain their perceived threat, it divides group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority into two categories: (1) group rights manifested in a space shared by Jews and Arab-Palestinians, and (2) group rights manifested in a space in which almost exclusively Arab-Palestinians reside. Employing this distinction, the article argues that when group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority are exercised in a space shared by Jews and Arab-Palestinians, Jews are more likely to resist the rights because they are usually perceived as threatening Israel’s Jewish character. However, when group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority are manifested in a space shared almost exclusively by Arab-Palestinians, group rights are much less controversial among the Jewish majority.
The article’s second argument draws a connection between Israeli Jews’ common fear of group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority when the groups share common spaces, and the geographic separation between Arab-Palestinians and Jews in the issue of housing and settlement. The fact that most Jews in Israel are reluctant to live in a common geographic space with Arab-Palestinians supports the article’s first argument, which suggests that Israeli Jews perceive group rights as controversial by the Jewish public only when they threaten Jewish dominance over Israel’s symbolic and geographic space. When Arab-Palestinians disrupt the traditional order by moving to mixed cities or communities mostly inhabited by Jews, they are considered threats to the Jewish character of the public space. The same is true for group rights. When group rights extend beyond the specific geographic realm designated for Arab-Palestinian citizens and penetrate the symbolic and geographic domains common to Israeli citizens, they are perceived as a threat to Jewish dominance in Israel and to Israel’s Jewish character.
The Israeli case study suggests that space matters. Discussions of group rights should consider where the rights are manifested, since their proximity to the majority population adds a significant dimension to the analysis.
The article presents two main arguments. First, to explain their perceived threat, it divides group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority into two categories: (1) group rights manifested in a space shared by Jews and Arab-Palestinians, and (2) group rights manifested in a space in which almost exclusively Arab-Palestinians reside. Employing this distinction, the article argues that when group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority are exercised in a space shared by Jews and Arab-Palestinians, Jews are more likely to resist the rights because they are usually perceived as threatening Israel’s Jewish character. However, when group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority are manifested in a space shared almost exclusively by Arab-Palestinians, group rights are much less controversial among the Jewish majority.
The article’s second argument draws a connection between Israeli Jews’ common fear of group rights for the Arab-Palestinian minority when the groups share common spaces, and the geographic separation between Arab-Palestinians and Jews in the issue of housing and settlement. The fact that most Jews in Israel are reluctant to live in a common geographic space with Arab-Palestinians supports the article’s first argument, which suggests that Israeli Jews perceive group rights as controversial by the Jewish public only when they threaten Jewish dominance over Israel’s symbolic and geographic space. When Arab-Palestinians disrupt the traditional order by moving to mixed cities or communities mostly inhabited by Jews, they are considered threats to the Jewish character of the public space. The same is true for group rights. When group rights extend beyond the specific geographic realm designated for Arab-Palestinian citizens and penetrate the symbolic and geographic domains common to Israeli citizens, they are perceived as a threat to Jewish dominance in Israel and to Israel’s Jewish character.
The Israeli case study suggests that space matters. Discussions of group rights should consider where the rights are manifested, since their proximity to the majority population adds a significant dimension to the analysis.
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In the Israeli public sphere we often hear claims about offences to religious feelings. For example, representatives of the three major religions have argued that having a gay pride parade in the holy city of Jerusalem offends their... more
In the Israeli public sphere we often hear claims about offences to religious feelings. For example, representatives of the three major religions have argued that having a gay pride parade in the holy city of Jerusalem offends their religious feelings. The debate about allowing motor traffic during the Sabbath on Bar-Ilan road, which is located in a Jewish ultra orthodox neighbourhood in Jerusalem, is another example in which claims about offences to religious feelings were raised. According to the orthodox view in current liberal thought, there should be no legal protection from mere insult to feelings and sensibilities, as related to sacred religious and cultural values as they may be. The Israeli legal doctrine is a unique exception. It acknowledges claims about offences to religious feelings. It is not based, however, on a comprehensive theoretical framework in political and moral philosophy. In this article, I draw on the Israeli example and argue – against the prevailing liberal orthodoxy – that some claims of offence to feelings deserve legal protection. I argue that such claims boil down to a struggle for equality in the public sphere between competing cultural identities. I conceptualize such claims from offences to feelings as claims that purport to protect one’s right in the integrity of one’s cultural identity. I argue that from this conceptualization a principle for justly regulating claims from cultural identity emerges. This is the vulnerable cultural identity principle, according to which the more vulnerable the social and civic status of one’s cultural identity is, the stronger one’s claim is to integrity of cultural identity. The vulnerable identity principle recognizes the asymmetrical social power relations between minority and majority members. It is entailed by the notion of toleration, which requires the state, according to certain conceptions of toleration, to take active steps to ensure equal recognition of different cultural identities.
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ABSTRACT It is commonly argued that language rights bear unique features that distinguish them from fundamental human rights, and justify interpreting them with judicial restraint. I identify three such alleged features, and show that... more
ABSTRACT It is commonly argued that language rights bear unique features that distinguish them from fundamental human rights, and justify interpreting them with judicial restraint. I identify three such alleged features, and show that they also subsist in other rights, particularly religious freedom. I argue that since these other rights are justifiably deemed fundamental human rights that should be generously interpreted, so should language rights. I identify a novel claim for the restrained approach, according to which only language rights impose a cultural burden on majority members, but I argue that this burden is not sufficiently heavy to justify treating them differently.
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This article delves into the possible implications of the controversial Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People (here and after: the INS) on the legal status of Arabic in Israel. It challenges the dominant view that the... more
This article delves into the possible implications of the controversial Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People (here and after: the INS) on the legal status of Arabic in Israel. It challenges the dominant view that the INS as causes only symbolic harm to the status of the Arabic language in Israel. The article argues that the harm to Arabic caused by the INS is significant and not only symbolic. The article explains why the INS is likely to demote Arabic and reduce its presence in Israeli public sphere. In addition, the paper argues that the special status of Arabic in the INS should be purposively interpreted by courts not only in light of the legislators' intent to create a sharp hierarchy between Hebrew and Arabic, but also in light of the positive potential of strong protection of Arabic to create a basis for civic solidarity between Jews and Palestinian-Arabs in Israel.
Research Interests: Law, Constitutional Law, Hebrew Language, Arabic, Political Science, and 14 moreComparative Constitutional Law, Judaism, Minority Rights, Israel, Hebrew, Solidarity, Language rights, Minority language rights, Social Science Research Network, Hierarchy, Harm, Comperative Law, Israeli Constitutional Law, and Jewish State
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Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing... more
Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality. We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to be justly distributed among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality.
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This chapter explores recent struggles for gender parity in Israel. At the level of national politics, efforts to secure gender quotas in the parliament have largely failed. Some struggles for gender parity in the religious sphere have... more
This chapter explores recent struggles for gender parity in Israel. At the level of national politics, efforts to secure gender quotas in the parliament have largely failed. Some struggles for gender parity in the religious sphere have been more successful, however. Religious Jewish and Muslim women reject the idea that they need to choose between ‘your religion or your rights’, and have increasingly established their right to shape the norms of their religious community. For example, Muslim women have secured the right to have women appointed as arbitrators within Shari’a family courts; and Jewish women have secured the right to elect judges to rabbinical courts. These efforts are, to date at least, limited in scope, leaving significant forms of gender discrimination in place. However, the chapter nonetheless argues that these bottom-up struggles for gender parity within the religious sphere are significant movements towards reconciling gender equality and multiculturalism.
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A young man makes available online a file showing him having sex with a woman. The taping was consensual – the distribution, was not, it was an act of "revenge porn", after the woman ended their relationship. A person saw his neighbor... more
A young man makes available online a file showing him having sex with a woman. The taping was consensual – the distribution, was not, it was an act of "revenge porn", after the woman ended their relationship. A person saw his neighbor littering the corridor of their apartments building. He recorded the act on his cell phone, then distributed the file in a tenants' WhatsApp group, under the caption 'stop littering our building!'. A group of political activists tried to convince a supermarket chain to directly employ all of its workers, including cleaners and guards, currently working for a contractor. The employer refuses citing the additional costs. The activists react by putting up, in public large posters saying 'this supermarket chain [name and logo included] exploits its workers.'
All three scenarios share a fact pattern: someone intentionally makes public what he considers to be true information about another, without that other's consent or even against her will, causing, as clearly expected, serious discomfort, and reputational harm. All three scenarios also share, in public discourse, the same label: 'shaming'. Is this an accurate caption for all three cases? This introduction chapter analyzes the concept of 'shaming.' It explores different levels, forms and shapes, in which the term 'shaming' operates in law, and points out the common features that unite them.
The chapter unfolds as follows: Part B explores old and modern practices described as shaming with an emphasis on the recent rise of public interest in the issue. It also points out that although shaming has major implications to the legal world, it remains virtually undefined in legal literature; Part C addresses arguments that may explain why a legal definition of shaming has not yet emerged; Part D puts forward a nuanced legal definition of shaming, which allow us to explore the elements we find common to all practices referred to as 'shaming' in public debates, as well as elements that differ between contexts, layers, and purposes of shaming; Part E explores different interests that may justify the regulation of shaming.
All three scenarios share a fact pattern: someone intentionally makes public what he considers to be true information about another, without that other's consent or even against her will, causing, as clearly expected, serious discomfort, and reputational harm. All three scenarios also share, in public discourse, the same label: 'shaming'. Is this an accurate caption for all three cases? This introduction chapter analyzes the concept of 'shaming.' It explores different levels, forms and shapes, in which the term 'shaming' operates in law, and points out the common features that unite them.
The chapter unfolds as follows: Part B explores old and modern practices described as shaming with an emphasis on the recent rise of public interest in the issue. It also points out that although shaming has major implications to the legal world, it remains virtually undefined in legal literature; Part C addresses arguments that may explain why a legal definition of shaming has not yet emerged; Part D puts forward a nuanced legal definition of shaming, which allow us to explore the elements we find common to all practices referred to as 'shaming' in public debates, as well as elements that differ between contexts, layers, and purposes of shaming; Part E explores different interests that may justify the regulation of shaming.
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על ההבדל בין הזכות לתרבות לבין הזכות להתאגדות: בעקבות ספרו של גרשון גונטובניק ‘הפליה בדיור וקבוצות תרבותיות: בין חומות משפטיות לגדרות חברתיות’ (On the Difference between the Right to Culture and the Right to Freedom of Association: A Critical Assessment of Gershon Gontovnik's Book on 'Housing Dis...more
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Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of... more
Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as
the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that
suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means
of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of
equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality.
We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse
in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to be justly distributed
among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to
operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic
equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three
groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant
uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills
the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality.
the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that
suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means
of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of
equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality.
We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse
in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to be justly distributed
among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to
operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic
equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three
groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant
uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills
the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Critical Review of Ruth Gabizon’s Perspective on Jewish Settlement The Supreme Court’s decision in the Ka’adan case represents a central milestone in the legal framework for settlement of Jews and Arabs in Israel. In view of the recent... more
Critical Review of Ruth Gabizon’s Perspective on Jewish Settlement
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Ka’adan case represents a central milestone in the legal framework for settlement of Jews and Arabs in Israel. In view of the recent unrest in mixed and multiethnic cities, as well as the recent legal developments regarding the Israeli settlement (reflected in the basic law of nationality and in subsequent judgments regarding its constitutional legality), we found it fitting to reexamine the Ka’adan decision.
One of the more interesting analyses of the decision was originally presented by the late Professor Ruth Gavison. Although Gavison supported the Court’s decision in Ka’adan, she believed that the State of Israel should encourage and allow for the creation of settlements whose separate nationalist or religious characteristics are pre-determined and not subject to change.
On the one hand, we praise Gavison for her accurate prediction of the outcomes of the Ka’adan decision, which include a flurry of judicial and legislative activity in response to and following the opinion of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, we offer some critiques of Gavison’s approach. First, we disagree that maintenance of separate cultural communities requires the founding and preservation of settlements with pre-determined identities. Second, we criticize Gavison’s fundamental assumption that there exists a symmetry between the protection of cultural minorities and the protection of the cultural majority. Third, we argue that Gavison’s approach ignores the negative consequences that exclusion has on the minority when the exclusion relates to weaker groups within the majority, especially with respect to the acceptance procedures for communal settlements. Finally, we point out that approaches similar to Gavison’s, which do not regard the separation of settlements for Jews and Arabs as presumptively invalid, do not contribute to the creation of common denominators between Jewish and Arab citizens.
הלכת קעדאן מהווה נקודה מרכזית בכל הקשור למציאות המשפטית בנושא התיישבות של יהודים וערבים בישראל. על רקע המהומות האחרונות ביישובים המעורבים, כמו גם ההתפתחות המשפטית האחרונה בנושא ההתיישבות (כפי שהיא באה לידי ביטוי בחקיקת חוק יסוד הלאום ובפסיקה בנוגע לחוקתיותו), מצאנו לנכון לחזור ולבחון את הלכת קעדאן. אנו סבורות כי אחד הניתוחים המעניינים יותר של פסק הדין הוצג בשעתו על ידי פרופ' רות גביזון, זכרה לברכה.
מטרתו של מאמרנו הוא להציג את עמדתה של גביזון ביחס לתחום ההתיישבות ולהתמודד עימה באופן ביקורתי. גביזון צידדה במסקנות בית המשפט בעניין קעדאן הואיל ואופייה היהודי של ישראל אינו מצדיק הפליה של אזרחים לא יהודים. אולם, גביזון סברה כי אינטגרציה כפויה בין יהודים וערבים עלולה להיות כלי לא נכון להשגת שוויון בין חברות המקפידות על שימור זהותן הייחודית. לכן, לדעתה, ישראל צריכה לעודד ולאפשר צורות התיישבות שאופיין הלאומי או הדתי מוגדר מראש ואינו בר שינוי.
מחד גיסא, אנו משבחות את גביזון על כך שחזתה באופן מדויק את ההשלכות של הלכת קעדאן, שכללו פעילות חקיקתית ושיפוטית מואצת בתחום ההתיישבות בעיקר בעקבות אמירותיו הכלליות של בית המשפט. מאידך גיסא, המאמר מציג מספר טענות ביקורתיות על גישתה של גביזון. ראשית, בניגוד לגביזון, איננו סבורות כי שימור זהות תרבותית נפרדת לקהילות תרבותיות מחייב הקמה ושימור של יישובים שאופיים קבוע מראש. שנית, אנו מבקרות את נקודת המוצא של גביזון המניחה סימטריה בין הגנה על קבוצות מיעוט תרבותיות לבין הגנה על קבוצות רוב תרבותיות. שלישית, עמדתה של גביזון התעלמה מההשלכות השליליות שיש להדרה של קבוצות מיעוט בכל הנוגע להדרה של קבוצות חלשות בתוך קבוצת הרוב, בייחוד בהליכי קבלה ביישובים קהילתיים. רביעית, נצביע על כך כי עמדה כמו של גביזון, שאינה רואה פסול ביישובים נפרדים לערבים וליהודים, אינה תורמת ליצירת מכנה אזרחי משותף בין יהודים וערבים.
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Ka’adan case represents a central milestone in the legal framework for settlement of Jews and Arabs in Israel. In view of the recent unrest in mixed and multiethnic cities, as well as the recent legal developments regarding the Israeli settlement (reflected in the basic law of nationality and in subsequent judgments regarding its constitutional legality), we found it fitting to reexamine the Ka’adan decision.
One of the more interesting analyses of the decision was originally presented by the late Professor Ruth Gavison. Although Gavison supported the Court’s decision in Ka’adan, she believed that the State of Israel should encourage and allow for the creation of settlements whose separate nationalist or religious characteristics are pre-determined and not subject to change.
On the one hand, we praise Gavison for her accurate prediction of the outcomes of the Ka’adan decision, which include a flurry of judicial and legislative activity in response to and following the opinion of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, we offer some critiques of Gavison’s approach. First, we disagree that maintenance of separate cultural communities requires the founding and preservation of settlements with pre-determined identities. Second, we criticize Gavison’s fundamental assumption that there exists a symmetry between the protection of cultural minorities and the protection of the cultural majority. Third, we argue that Gavison’s approach ignores the negative consequences that exclusion has on the minority when the exclusion relates to weaker groups within the majority, especially with respect to the acceptance procedures for communal settlements. Finally, we point out that approaches similar to Gavison’s, which do not regard the separation of settlements for Jews and Arabs as presumptively invalid, do not contribute to the creation of common denominators between Jewish and Arab citizens.
הלכת קעדאן מהווה נקודה מרכזית בכל הקשור למציאות המשפטית בנושא התיישבות של יהודים וערבים בישראל. על רקע המהומות האחרונות ביישובים המעורבים, כמו גם ההתפתחות המשפטית האחרונה בנושא ההתיישבות (כפי שהיא באה לידי ביטוי בחקיקת חוק יסוד הלאום ובפסיקה בנוגע לחוקתיותו), מצאנו לנכון לחזור ולבחון את הלכת קעדאן. אנו סבורות כי אחד הניתוחים המעניינים יותר של פסק הדין הוצג בשעתו על ידי פרופ' רות גביזון, זכרה לברכה.
מטרתו של מאמרנו הוא להציג את עמדתה של גביזון ביחס לתחום ההתיישבות ולהתמודד עימה באופן ביקורתי. גביזון צידדה במסקנות בית המשפט בעניין קעדאן הואיל ואופייה היהודי של ישראל אינו מצדיק הפליה של אזרחים לא יהודים. אולם, גביזון סברה כי אינטגרציה כפויה בין יהודים וערבים עלולה להיות כלי לא נכון להשגת שוויון בין חברות המקפידות על שימור זהותן הייחודית. לכן, לדעתה, ישראל צריכה לעודד ולאפשר צורות התיישבות שאופיין הלאומי או הדתי מוגדר מראש ואינו בר שינוי.
מחד גיסא, אנו משבחות את גביזון על כך שחזתה באופן מדויק את ההשלכות של הלכת קעדאן, שכללו פעילות חקיקתית ושיפוטית מואצת בתחום ההתיישבות בעיקר בעקבות אמירותיו הכלליות של בית המשפט. מאידך גיסא, המאמר מציג מספר טענות ביקורתיות על גישתה של גביזון. ראשית, בניגוד לגביזון, איננו סבורות כי שימור זהות תרבותית נפרדת לקהילות תרבותיות מחייב הקמה ושימור של יישובים שאופיים קבוע מראש. שנית, אנו מבקרות את נקודת המוצא של גביזון המניחה סימטריה בין הגנה על קבוצות מיעוט תרבותיות לבין הגנה על קבוצות רוב תרבותיות. שלישית, עמדתה של גביזון התעלמה מההשלכות השליליות שיש להדרה של קבוצות מיעוט בכל הנוגע להדרה של קבוצות חלשות בתוך קבוצת הרוב, בייחוד בהליכי קבלה ביישובים קהילתיים. רביעית, נצביע על כך כי עמדה כמו של גביזון, שאינה רואה פסול ביישובים נפרדים לערבים וליהודים, אינה תורמת ליצירת מכנה אזרחי משותף בין יהודים וערבים.
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במסגרת בחינת חוקתיותו של חוק טל, אשר אפשר את המשך קיומו של הסדר דחיית הגיוס של בחורי הישיבות, סבר השופט גרוניס, בדעת יחיד, כי על בית המשפט לנהוג בריסון בהפעלת ביקורת שיפוטית על חוקים שנתמכו על ידי רוב ברשות המחוקקת, ומיטיבים עם קבוצת... more
במסגרת בחינת חוקתיותו של חוק טל, אשר אפשר את המשך קיומו של הסדר דחיית הגיוס של בחורי הישיבות, סבר השופט גרוניס, בדעת יחיד, כי על בית המשפט לנהוג בריסון בהפעלת ביקורת שיפוטית על חוקים שנתמכו על ידי רוב ברשות המחוקקת, ומיטיבים עם קבוצת מיעוט מובהקת. במאמר זה נטען כי גישתו של השופט גרוניס, הממליצה על התערבות שיפוטית חזקה יותר לטובת קבוצות מיעוט כאשר זכויותיהן מתנגשות באופן ברור עם זכויותיה של קבוצת הרוב, עולה בקנה אחד עם פסיקות אחרות של בית המשפט העליון בנושא שוויון, ייצוג הולם, והגבלה של חופש הביטוי. בנוסף, נשפוך אור על צידוקים נורמטיביים נוספים לגישתו של השופט גרוניס השאובים מהספרות האקדמית בנושא רב תרבותיות. עוד נטען, כי פסיקתו של השופט גרוניס בעניין חוק טל אינה עולה בקנה אחד עם פסיקתו בעניין הפטור מלימודי הליבה. לדעתנו, עניין הפטור מלימודי ליבה הוא מקרה מובהק של פגיעה במיעוט בתוך מיעוט. מעקב צמוד אחרי ההיגיון של גישתו הייחודית של גרוניס בעניין התנועה לאיכות השלטון, מוביל אותנו למסקנה כי ביקורת שיפוטית הנוגעת לפגיעה במיעוטים בתוך מיעוטים צריכה להיות עוצמתית יותר מזו שגרוניס מציע לקבוצות מיעוט.
על ההבדל בין הזכות לתרבות לבין הזכות להתאגדות: בעקבות ספרו של גרשון גונטובניק ‘הפליה בדיור וקבוצות תרבותיות: בין חומות משפטיות לגדרות חברתיות’ (On the Difference between the Right to Culture and the Right to Freedom of Association: A Critical Assessment of Gershon Gontovnik's Book on 'Housing Dis...more
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Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing... more
Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality. We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to be justly distributed among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality.
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The law uses ‘discrimination’ to denote practices of exclusion and distinction that are wrongful from a legal point of view. Anti-discrimination doctrines around the world use the concept of ‘wrongful distinctions’ to enumerate the ways... more
The law uses ‘discrimination’ to denote practices of exclusion and distinction that are wrongful from a legal point of view. Anti-discrimination doctrines around the world use the concept of ‘wrongful distinctions’ to enumerate the ways in which irrelevant distinctions between individuals or groups are made and to explain their illegality. But how should the term ‘irrelevant’ be understood in this context? Most legal systems around the world use the term ‘irrelevant’ only in denunciation of distinctions based on ‘common,’ ‘classic,’ or ‘suspicious’ grounds, such as race-based or sex-based distinctions.
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This article delves into the possible implications of the controversial Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People (here and after: the INS) on the legal status of Arabic in Israel. It challenges the dominant view that the... more
This article delves into the possible implications of the controversial Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People (here and after: the INS) on the legal status of Arabic in Israel. It challenges the dominant view that the INS as causes only symbolic harm to the status of the Arabic language in Israel. The article argues that the harm to Arabic caused by the INS is significant and not only symbolic. The article explains why the INS is likely to demote Arabic and reduce its presence in Israeli public sphere. In addition, the paper argues that the special status of Arabic in the INS should be purposively interpreted by courts not only in light of the legislators' intent to create a sharp hierarchy between Hebrew and Arabic, but also in light of the positive potential of strong protection of Arabic to create a basis for civic solidarity between Jews and Palestinian-Arabs in Israel.
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בניגוד למערכות משפט אחרות בעולם המערבי מערכת המשפט הישראלית מכירה בפגיעה ברגשות כעילה עצמאית המצדיקה הגבלה של התנהגות או ביטוי. במאמר זה אצדד בדוקטרינה זו, אך אטען כי הבסיס המושגי-נורמטיבי שלה שגוי. במקרים רבים הפגיעה ברגשות מתווכת על ידי... more
בניגוד למערכות משפט אחרות בעולם המערבי מערכת המשפט הישראלית מכירה בפגיעה ברגשות כעילה עצמאית המצדיקה הגבלה של התנהגות או ביטוי. במאמר זה אצדד בדוקטרינה זו, אך אטען כי הבסיס המושגי-נורמטיבי שלה שגוי. במקרים רבים הפגיעה ברגשות מתווכת על ידי ערכים תרבותיים או דתיים המרכזיים לזהותו של הנפגע. במקרים אלו טענות על פגיעה ברגשות אינן מבקשות הגנה נגד גרימת רגשות כואבים ככאלה, אלא מבקשות להגן על שלמות זהותו התרבותית של אדם. כאשר בית המשפט שוקל טענות על פגיעה ברגשות, עליו לבחון את עוצמת הפגיעה בזהות התרבותית או הדתית של האדם הנפגע ולא את עוצמת הפגיעה ברגשותיו. אציע את עקרון פגיעות הזהות התרבותית לפיו ככל שהמעמד החברתי של זהות תרבותית נתונה הוא נמוך יותר, כך הטענה על פגיעה בשלמותה חזקה יותר. עקרון פגיעות הזהות התרבותית הוא עיקרון חשוב, אולם אינו מכריע. יש לאזן אותו אל מול שיקולים אחרים.
Research Interests: Multiculturalism, Women, Feminism, Israel, Muslim, and 3 moreGroup Rights, Jewish, and Religious Freedom
In this short article, I argue that while most of the incentives Israel uses to encourage vaccination may infringe the right to autonomy, they are nevertheless legally valid. Most of them are proportionate and violate the right to... more
In this short article, I argue that while most of the incentives Israel uses
to encourage vaccination may infringe the right to autonomy, they are
nevertheless legally valid. Most of them are proportionate and violate the
right to autonomy as little as possible. More importantly, the debate that
conceptualizes the dilemma around these incentives as a conflict between the right to autonomy for individuals who resist vaccination, on the one hand, and the interest in public health, on the other, is misleading. Until widespread immunization is achieved, a number of human rights, such as the right to education, the right to earn a livelihood, and the right to enter and exit Israel, are likely to continue to be infringed. Therefore, the means used to encourage vaccination are also the means to prevent and eliminate the infringement of other rights.
to encourage vaccination may infringe the right to autonomy, they are
nevertheless legally valid. Most of them are proportionate and violate the
right to autonomy as little as possible. More importantly, the debate that
conceptualizes the dilemma around these incentives as a conflict between the right to autonomy for individuals who resist vaccination, on the one hand, and the interest in public health, on the other, is misleading. Until widespread immunization is achieved, a number of human rights, such as the right to education, the right to earn a livelihood, and the right to enter and exit Israel, are likely to continue to be infringed. Therefore, the means used to encourage vaccination are also the means to prevent and eliminate the infringement of other rights.
Research Interests:
I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from cultural identity’. I develop a conception of... more
I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the influence of other spher...
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תקציר בעברית: הערבית היא שפה רשמית בישראל, אולם בשל מגוון שיקולים ותהליכים מעמדה זה אינו מקבל ביטוי רחב במרחב הציבורי בישראל. המאמר, המתייחס לשיקולים ולתהליכים אלה, מדגיש את המטען של הערבית בישראל, לרבות הקשרים פוליטיים ולאומיים, וסוקר... more
תקציר בעברית: הערבית היא שפה רשמית בישראל, אולם בשל מגוון שיקולים ותהליכים מעמדה זה אינו מקבל ביטוי רחב במרחב הציבורי בישראל. המאמר, המתייחס לשיקולים ולתהליכים אלה, מדגיש את המטען של הערבית בישראל, לרבות הקשרים פוליטיים ולאומיים, וסוקר תהליכים החושפים את השפעת ההתייחסות לערבית )ולערבים( על ערעור מעמדה של השפה ועל חולשתה המתמדת בנוף הציבורי, במערכת החינוך, בשירות הציבורי ובמקומות נוספים. כותבי המאמר טוענים, כי מניתוח המצב הקיים עולה, שההחלשה במעמד השפה הערבית, ואף קיבועה כנחותה, הם אינדיקציות לתהליכים מסוכנים שהשפעתם על החברה בישראל רחבה ועמוקה וחורגת מהתחום הלשוני גרידא. לנוכח זאת, חיזוק מעמדה ומקומה של השפה הערבית בישראל הוא לא רק הכרח מוסרי בעל תוקף משפטי, כפי שמדגימים כותבי המאמר, אלא מהלך חיוני לקידומה של החברה בישראל בכלל, ולתחום של יחסי יהודים־ערבים בפרט. מהלך זה עשוי להשפיע לטובה על מגוון נושאים אזרחיים, חברתיים ואזוריים, לרבות קידום שוויון בישראל, מניעת אפליה של המיעוט הערבי־פלסטיני, קידום יחס חיובי לתרבות הערבית, ואף יצירת פתח חיובי לשינוי היחס של ישראל כלפי האזור ולשיפור מ...
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This chapter explores recent struggles for gender parity in Israel. At the level of national politics, efforts to secure gender quotas in the parliament have largely failed. Some struggles for gender parity in the religious sphere have... more
This chapter explores recent struggles for gender parity in Israel. At the level of national politics, efforts to secure gender quotas in the parliament have largely failed. Some struggles for gender parity in the religious sphere have been more successful, however. Religious Jewish and Muslim women reject the idea that they need to choose between ‘your religion or your rights’, and have increasingly established their right to shape the norms of their religious community. For example, Muslim women have secured the right to have women appointed as arbitrators within Shari’a family courts; and Jewish women have secured the right to elect judges to rabbinical courts. These efforts are, to date at least, limited in scope, leaving significant forms of gender discrimination in place. However, the chapter nonetheless argues that these bottom-up struggles for gender parity within the religious sphere are significant movements towards reconciling gender equality and multiculturalism.
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מטרתו של מאמר ביקורת זה היא להציע נקודת מבט נוספת על פולמוס הכותל לצורך יישום חוקתי של הדוקטרינה בדבר מיעוט בתוך מיעוט. נקודת המבט של מיעוט בתוך מיעוט שרוצה לשנות מבפנים נורמה דתית הנהוגה בקרב קבוצת המיעוט קריטית לפולמוס הכותל בגלל שלוש... more
מטרתו של מאמר ביקורת זה היא להציע נקודת מבט נוספת על פולמוס הכותל לצורך יישום חוקתי של הדוקטרינה בדבר מיעוט בתוך מיעוט. נקודת המבט של מיעוט בתוך מיעוט שרוצה לשנות מבפנים נורמה דתית הנהוגה בקרב קבוצת המיעוט קריטית לפולמוס הכותל בגלל שלוש סיבות עיקריות: ראשית, היא משקפת טוב יותר את טענותיהן של נשות הכותל; שנית, היא מדגישה את כוחן היחסי החלש יותר של נשות הכותל בשיח כוחני בין קבוצות ופרטים שונים בפולמוס הכותל. חולשתן היחסית של נשות הכותל מחזקת את טענותיהן במישור הזכויות והאינטרסים החוקתיים; שלישית, כשאנו מתמקדים בנשות הכותל כקבוצת מיעוט בתוך קבוצת מיעוט דתית, אנו יוצרים שיח של זהות על הנורמות השנויות במחלוקת עצמן.
Research Interests:
Group rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority are commonly considered in Israeli Jewish society as undermining Israel’s Jewish character. In light of this hostility, an important question arises: why is there de facto recognition of... more
Group rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority are commonly considered in Israeli Jewish society as undermining Israel’s Jewish character. In light of this hostility, an important question arises: why is there de facto recognition of several group rights which protect and enhance Palestinian-Arab culture in Israel?
I will argue that in order to answer this question, a distinction should be drawn between the non-territorial group rights and the semi-territorial group rights that protect Palestinian-Arab minority culture. When group rights that protect the Palestinian-Arab minority’s culture are exercised in a non-territorial sphere, in a space which is shared by both Jews and Palestinian-Arabs, Jews are more likely to resist them. However, when group rights that protect the Palestinian-Arab minority’s culture are limited to a specific semi-territory, such as schools in which the teaching language is Arabic, or Sharia courts that bind only Muslims, they tend to be much less controversial.
The best example of non-territorial group rights relates to comprehensive language rights. That is, language rights that make Arabic visible in public spaces common to both Jews and Arabs, such as streets, roads, bus stops, municipal symbols, government websites and trains.
In contrast to the prevailing opinion among Israeli Jews, I will stress that not only do non-territorial group rights not represent a risk to Israel’s Jewish character, but that they also strengthen Israel’s democratic character. Comprehensive language rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority, for example, have never risked the dominant status of Hebrew. They therefore do not pose any risk to Israel’s Jewish character. On the positive side, comprehensive language rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority have the potential to reinforce Israel’s democratic character. This is because comprehensive language rights enhance the civic status of Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, which is currently vulnerable. They thus have the potential to mitigate Arabs’ exclusion from the Israeli public sphere.
I will argue that in order to answer this question, a distinction should be drawn between the non-territorial group rights and the semi-territorial group rights that protect Palestinian-Arab minority culture. When group rights that protect the Palestinian-Arab minority’s culture are exercised in a non-territorial sphere, in a space which is shared by both Jews and Palestinian-Arabs, Jews are more likely to resist them. However, when group rights that protect the Palestinian-Arab minority’s culture are limited to a specific semi-territory, such as schools in which the teaching language is Arabic, or Sharia courts that bind only Muslims, they tend to be much less controversial.
The best example of non-territorial group rights relates to comprehensive language rights. That is, language rights that make Arabic visible in public spaces common to both Jews and Arabs, such as streets, roads, bus stops, municipal symbols, government websites and trains.
In contrast to the prevailing opinion among Israeli Jews, I will stress that not only do non-territorial group rights not represent a risk to Israel’s Jewish character, but that they also strengthen Israel’s democratic character. Comprehensive language rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority, for example, have never risked the dominant status of Hebrew. They therefore do not pose any risk to Israel’s Jewish character. On the positive side, comprehensive language rights for the Palestinian-Arab minority have the potential to reinforce Israel’s democratic character. This is because comprehensive language rights enhance the civic status of Palestinian-Arabs in Israel, which is currently vulnerable. They thus have the potential to mitigate Arabs’ exclusion from the Israeli public sphere.
Research Interests:
The chapter explores old and modern practices described as shaming with an emphasis on the recent rise of public interest in the issue. It also points out that although shaming has major implications to the legal world, it remains... more
The chapter explores old and modern practices described as shaming with an emphasis on the recent rise of public interest in the issue. It also points out that although shaming has major implications to the legal world, it remains virtually undefined in legal literature.
The chapter addresses arguments that may explain why a legal definition of shaming has not yet emerged, and puts forward a nuanced legal definition of shaming: shaming takes place when a shamer deliberately disseminates information, which even if true, is likely to harm the reputation of the shamee whom this information concerns before a public relevant to her, and/or embarrass or discomfort her. Shamer may expose the information by using different means or platforms. Shamer may expose the information for various reasons and purposes. The means and purposes of shaming differ from one case to another. They also influence its effects and consequences.
The definition the chapter proposes allows the legal audience to explore the elements the authors find common to all practices referred to as 'shaming' in public debates, as well as elements that differ between contexts, layers, and purposes of shaming.
Keywords: Shaming, Legal Definition of Shaming, History of Shaming.
The chapter addresses arguments that may explain why a legal definition of shaming has not yet emerged, and puts forward a nuanced legal definition of shaming: shaming takes place when a shamer deliberately disseminates information, which even if true, is likely to harm the reputation of the shamee whom this information concerns before a public relevant to her, and/or embarrass or discomfort her. Shamer may expose the information by using different means or platforms. Shamer may expose the information for various reasons and purposes. The means and purposes of shaming differ from one case to another. They also influence its effects and consequences.
The definition the chapter proposes allows the legal audience to explore the elements the authors find common to all practices referred to as 'shaming' in public debates, as well as elements that differ between contexts, layers, and purposes of shaming.
Keywords: Shaming, Legal Definition of Shaming, History of Shaming.
Research Interests:
למרות שהמבחן המקובל בפסיקה הישראלית הוא שהבחנה שנעשית על בסיס קריטריון לא רלוונטי מהווה הפליה אסורה, הדוקטרינה מעניקה את הגנתה של הזכות לשוויון מפני הפליה לא רלוונטית, או לא עניינית, רק כשהיא נעשית על בסיס עילות שמכונות בספרות "עילות... more
למרות שהמבחן המקובל בפסיקה הישראלית הוא שהבחנה שנעשית על בסיס קריטריון לא רלוונטי מהווה הפליה אסורה, הדוקטרינה מעניקה את הגנתה של הזכות לשוויון מפני הפליה לא רלוונטית, או לא עניינית, רק כשהיא נעשית על בסיס עילות שמכונות בספרות "עילות חשודות" או "חתכים חוקתיים קלאסיים", כגון השתייכות לקבוצות מיעוט גזעיות, לאומיות, דתיות, מיניות או מגדריות. גם חוקי איסור ההפליה – חוק שוויון הזדמנויות בעבודה וחוק איסור הפליה במוצרים ושירותים – אינם אוסרים הפליה בגין כל עילה לא רלוונטית, אלא רק בגין עילות חשודות ספציפיות המנויות בהם. בניגוד לדוקטרינה הקיימת, מאמר זה מציע להכיר בהבחנות לא רלוונטיות או שרירותיות כהבחנות מפלות גם אם הקריטריון השרירותי שעל בסיסן הן נעשו אינו קשור במישרין או בעקיפין לעילות חשודות או לעילות המנויות בחוקי איסור ההפליה. בניגוד להבחנות שפוגעות באידיאל האוטונומיה של פרטים, שאנחנו מוכנים להשלים איתן ואינם מכירים בהן כהפליות, כגון הבחנות המבוססות על מנבאים אמינים, הבחנות שרירותיות גרידא מהוות הפליות מכיוון שהן מתעלמות מאספקט מרכזי באוטונומיה של פרטים, מצרכיהם ומתכונות ייחודיות להם הרלוונטיות להבחנות הנדונות. הטענה המרכזית במאמר היא שיש להכיר בהבחנות שרירותיות גרידא כהפליות ועם זאת להכיר בכך שמדובר בהפליות בדרגת חומרה פחותה יותר מהפליות על בסיס עילות חשודות או עילות המנויות בחוקי איסור ההפליה. זאת מאחר שהפליות המתמצות בשרירותיות גרידא אינן כרוכות בהשפלה של פרטים.