Orhan Gafarli

This book presents a comprehensive overview of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict, the long-running dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Armenian-majority region of Azerbaijan. It outlines the historical development of the dispute, explores the political and social aspects of the confict, examines the wars over the territory including the war of 2020 which resulted in a signifcant Azerbaijani victory, and discusses the international dimensions.

Yakın bir geçmişte Hazar Denizi’nde beş ülkenin bir araya gelerek anlaşmaya varması önemli bir gelişmedir. Bu anlaşma, Hazar Denizi’nden Karadeniz’e bağlanacak doğal gaz ve petrol boru hatlarının geleceğinin belirlenmesi açısından da önemli olacaktır. Bu bağlamda Türkiye ve “Trans-Hazar” dediğimiz bölgeyi içine alan coğrafyanın en önemli enerji projeleri, Bakü-Tiflis-Ceyhan boru hattı ile “Trans-Anatolia” hattı olarak bilinen hattır. Bu projeler “güney gaz dehlizi” olarak da bilinmektedir. Uzmanların çoğu, bu gaz dehlizini Türk Akımı’nın bir rakibi olarak algılamaktadır. Bu nedenle bu iki proje, Türkiye’de adeta bir yarış içindedir. Güney gaz dehlizinin bir parçası olan TANAP projesi biraz daha Azerbaycan’a bağlı olan bir projedir. Çünkü yatırımın büyük bir kısmını Azerbaycan yapmaktadır. TANAP, Avrupa ülkeleri tarafından ısrarla desteklenen Nabucco Projesi’ne bir alternatif oluşturmaktaydı. Tabii TANAP Projesi’nin bir de TAP (Trans-Adriyatik) boyutu bulunuyor. Bu alanda ise Yunanistan ile Azerbaycan arasında ciddi sıkıntılar yaşanmaktadır

In the past two decades, the Turkish government has been seeking strategic autonomy in international relations by trying different foreign policy styles. Throughout that time, Turkey strongly prioritized its own interests in relations with other regional and global powers, and pursued a multilateral and balanced policy, seeing it as a window for more opportunities to maneuver in foreign policy. Part of Turkey’s approach to strategic autonomy relied on hedging, even if it resulted in the emergence of asymmetric relations with others. For example, Turkey developed not always economically and politically symmetric relations with Russia that had strong implications for the Middle East, South Caucasus, Black Sea region and Central Asia. On 24 February 2022, after Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, Turkey did not join in with Western sanctions against Russia, and instead attempted to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow. This decision was not spontaneous, as it was premised on years of...

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent republics faced a plethora of internal and external challenges related to democratization and integration into the capitalist system on their own, the problems that were not foreseen before the actual processes took place.  Former Soviet States have been facing serious tests in what concerns human rights, ensuring the right to vote and to be elected, and rotating political elites through elections. In the meantime, conflicts between former parts of the union over territorial claims against each other (over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria) and intrastate civil wars on ethnic grounds (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Russia/Chechnya) posed another set of challenges to stability in respective regions. In the process of modernization, the former Soviet states also had to maintain fine balance between security and freedom. Those balancing policies in turn strengthened power of the existing regimes and the authoritarian trend in them.

The integration process of the former Soviet states with the West had to be based on economic and political frameworks and the democratization of those states had to include internalizing the European norms and rules. However, the relationship established between the republics and the West revealed over time that the balance between security and freedom was observed in the domestic politics of the former Soviet states. The West's policies to meet its need for energy (oil and natural gas) supply from this region facilitated it turning a blind eye to violations of democratic rule and human rights. Therefore, the dilemmas that emerged as a result of observing this balance between security and freedom in domestic and foreign policy of the former Soviet states, not only hindered the democratization process, but also took the states in different directions. The reason for the emergence of these differences is the unique cultural, social and economic conditions of those states. For this, the search for a ‘third way’ by these states enabled the transformation of the current regimes' discourse on preserving their power and the emergence of a ‘controlled’ democratization process.

Over time, it became clear that the process of democratization of these newly established countries did not go the same way in all of them, diverging instead due to the different models of political development and concepts that accommodated it, like ‘color revolutions’ or ‘sovereign democracy’. The ‘color revolutions’ that took place in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, in turn, caused these countries problems with powerful neighbors, majorly with Russia. At the same time, the processes of political change in the ‘sovereign democracies’ or in countries that followed the ‘Nazarbayev Model’, ignited  competition between elites/clans and occurrence of civil wars. When we compare the two models, it becomes clear that each entails different risks for the states that followed them.

The purpose of this study is to look at the characteristics and nature of the risks that the post-Soviet states and their political elites encountered. The reasons to or origins of these risks are also discussed in this paper. For this purpose, in the first part of the article, the socio-economic and political causes of the ‘color revolutions’ on the post-Soviet space are examined; in the second part, the meaning, concept and manifestations of the ‘sovereign democracy" model proposed by Russian ideologues are examined. In the last part, internal and external risks, their basis and mechanisms of emergence within both models present in the post-Soviet republics are put in a comparative perspective.

Sovyetler Birliği dağıldıktan sonra bağımsızlıklarını elde eden cumhuriyetler, demokratikleşme ve kapitalist sisteme entegre olma sürecinde öngörülemeyen iç ve dış sorunlarla karşı karşıya kalmışlardır. Eski Sovyet devletlerinin, bağımsızlıklarından sonra demokratikleşme, insan haklarını içselleştirme ve iktidar değişimlerini seçimle gerçekleştirme konularında ciddi sınavlar vermeleri gerekmiştir. Bununla birlikte eski ittifak üyelerinin birbirlerinden toprak talepleri sonucunda ortaya çıkan savaşlar (Abhazya, Güney Osetya, Dağlık Karabağ, Transdinyester) ile etnik zeminde iç savaşların (Tacikistan, Kırgızistan ve Özbekistan) ve Çeçenistan bağımsızlık savaşlarının yaşanması, bu bölgenin istikrarı konusunda önemli sorunlara yol açmıştır. Böylece güvenlik ve özgürlük dengesini gözetmek zorunda kalan eski Sovyet devletlerinin politikaları, mevcut otoriter rejimlerin daha da güçlenmesine sebep olmuştur.

Eski Sovyet devletlerinin Batı ile entegrasyon sürecinin ekonomik ve siyasi meseleleri içermesi, bu bölgenin demokratikleşmesini ve bölgede Batılı norm ve kuralların içselleştirilmesini gerekli kılmaktaydı. Fakat iki bölge arasında kurulan ilişkide, eski Sovyet devletlerinin iç politikasında olduğu gibi, güvenlik ve özgürlük dengesinin gözetildiği zamanla ortaya çıkmıştır. Özellikle Batı’nın, söz konusu bölgeden enerji (petrol- doğalgaz) ihtiyacını sağlaması, buradaki demokrasi ve insan hakları konusunda yaşanan ihlâllere göz yummasına neden olmuştur. Eski Sovyet devletlerinin iç ve dış politikasında, güvenlik ve özgürlük dengesinin korunmaya çalışılması sonucunda ortaya çıkan ikilemler, demokratikleşme sürecini aksatmakla birlikte farklı patikaların ortaya çıkmasına da yol açmıştır. Bunun nedeni, bölgenin kendine özgü kültürel, sosyal ve ekonomik koşullarıyla bağlantılıdır. Söz konusu devletlerin üçüncü yol arayışı da, mevcut rejimlerin iktidarlarını sürdürme söyleminin dönüşmesine ve kontrollü ya da idare edilebilen demokratikleşme süreçlerinin ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmuştur.       

Eski Sovyet devletlerinin demokratikleşme süreci zamanla iki önemli patikada, “Renkli Devrimler” ve “Egemen Demokrasi” modellerin ortaya çıkmasıyla ayrışmaya başlamıştır. Gürcistan, Ukrayna, Moldova, Ermenistan ve Kırgızistan özelinde yaşanan Renkli Devrimler, bu ülkelerin Rusya gibi komşularıyla sorunlar yaşamasına yol açmıştır. Diğer taraftan Egemen Demokrasi ya da “Nazarbayev Modeli”ndeki değişim süreçleri, elitler/klanlar arası yaşanan rekabet savaşlarını ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu modellere karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde baktığımızda her iki modelin içerdiği riskler açısından farklı olduğunu görmek mümkündür.

Eski Sovyet coğrafyasında yaşanan rejim ya da iktidar değişimlerinin barındırdığı risklerin nitelikleri ile içeriklerine bakmak bu çalışmanın amacını oluşturmaktadır. Aynı zamanda bu risklerin ortaya çıkma sebepleri de çalışmada ele alınmıştır. Bu amaçla, makalenin ilk kısmında Eski Sovyet coğrafyasında ortaya çıkan Renkli Devrimlerin sosyoekonomik siyasal nedenleri incelenmiş; ikinci kısmında Rusya’da önerilen Egemen Demokrasi modelinin ne anlama geldiğine ve örneklerine bakılmıştır. Son kısımda ise her iki modelin taşıdığı iç ve dış risklerin neden ve nasıl ortaya çıktığı karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmiştir.

Chapter 15: The Russian Role in the Karabakh Conflict” argues that by constructing the South Caucasus region on the concept of the center-periphery, Russia tries to maintain its regional power through frozen conflicts to increase its influence on both sides. In addition, this chapter focuses on how and why Russian foreign policy changed according to (A) the First Karabakh War, 1991–1994, (B) the four-day war in 2016, and (C) the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The chapter also examines Russia's approaches for the solution of the Karabakh conflict by focusing on the “package plan,” “step by step plan,” “common state,” “land swap,” and Madrid and Kazan Principles and what they mean for Russia.

The past two and a half decades in the South Caucasus leave little hope to entertain for the eventual integration of the region. So far the fragmentation of the South Caucasus into different blocks is the only reality. The different integrational processes and transnational alliances that the South Caucasus countries have engaged in surely contribute to the creation of new spaces for cooperation, but also to the perpetuation of the conflicts in the region. In fact, often conflicts have been defining the design and implementation of these transnational alliances and integrational processes. With this reality, regional transnational integration as an avenue for conflict resolution seems to be part of a vicious circle since conflict resolution is often seen as a precondition for regional integration. This is not only due to the conflicts within and among the countries, but also to the complex and sometimes strained relations with the big neighbors – Turkey, Iran, and Russia. This paper aims to explore economic options for inserting a wedge in this vicious circle. Convinced that regional economic cooperation could be an important step towards conflict transformation in the South Caucasus, this paper suggests that the prospects of such integration be considered. Be it in the form of exploring opportunities in the different integrational paths that the countries of the South Caucasus have taken or challenging the isolationist economic policies that have outlived their goals and utility, this paper offers all stakeholders to look at economic cooperation with rather than against each other as the option that could lead to the resolution of conflicts in the region.

If Turkey is able to regain the influence she once enjoyed during the period of the Ottoman Empire, this would have negative consequences for Moscow and Tehran in the Middle East. Russia pursues a policy of balancing in the Middle East. In the course of the 2000s, Russia has been trying to weaken ties between Turkey and NATO, as well as Turkish-American cooperation. The revolutionary events in Syria since March 2011 have recently brought about divergence between Moscow and Ankara – however, the divergence may very well remain contained.

In the process of the end of the Syrian civil war, Russia's contact with some groups of Syrian Kurds necessitated the historical background of Russian-Kurdish relations. Kurds have been on the political agenda of the Russians not only in the present but also in the past. Both Tsarist Russia and the Soviets considered the ethnic groups living in the regions, where they expanded in military and political terms, as partners in order to
increase their domination in those regions. Some of the Kurds have also become actors with whom Russia has partnered in certain periods in the Middle East. In this context, this study will attempt to make a historical analysis of Russia's Kurdish policy. In this way, firstly, the academic and scientific dimension of Kurdish studies, which started in Russia in the middle of the 19th century, will be discussed. Then, the Kurdish policies
of Russia during these eras will be discussed through historical facts.

Rusya’da popülizm yeni bir olgu olduğunu iddia etmemiz yanlış olur. On dokuzuncu yüzyıla dayanan Rus popülizmi her zaman iktidar ve muhalif çevrelerin kullandığı en etkin politik enstrüman olmuştur. Bununla birlikte okuyucu da Rus popülizminin Narodniklerle başlayan ve günümüze kadar gelen “halktan olma” söylemi ile bağlantılı olduğu beklentisinin farkındayım. Öte yandan Rusya’da halktan olma söylemi karşısında her zaman güçlü devlet vurgusu üzerinden inşa edilen bir popülizmin olduğunu da görmemiz gerekir.

Some news about the hospitalization of Islam Karimov, the former President of Uzbekistan had been spread out in late August. There was no any clear information about his illness. His daughter Lola Karimova declared on the social networks that he has been hospitalized due to cerebral hemorrhage. At the same time, the “Fergananews” published that Karimov has already died.
The media agency announced the news based on unofficial sources. Russian and the western media shared the same news accurately. But Uzbekistan officials denied that news on August 30. According to official sources, opposition groups tried to spread the wrong news. Some analysts argued the death of Karimov was not important than the available conflict among clans in the country. But his death was announced shortly by the officials.
After a short time, Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev has been appointed the acting president by a decision of a joint meeting of the Senate and the Legislative Chamber of Uzbekistan’s Parliament on September 8.

The beginning of rebellion against the Mullah regime in Iran as evident in the #IranProtests that erupted early in January, in addition to Turkey's President Erdogan voicing support for Iranian President Rouhani in favor of the stability of Iran signals the possibility of a rapprochement between the two countries[1].  From the historical perspective, the state of relations between Turkey and Iran has witnessed ups and downs. Both countries adopt policies that overshadow their common stakes in their relations. It is possible to make such a statement if we look at the issues that affect Ankara and Tehran and influence their foreign policy and relations. These critical issues are mainly the Syrian crisis, Kurdish question, and the  Geneva, Astana and Sochi Talks.

A Belt and Road Forum was recently held in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, including the participation of thousands of people from some 50 countries involved with China's Belt and Road Initiative. The purpose of the Forum was to revitalize the historic Silk Road project between Georgia and China and to promote transport, economic investment and free trade zones, as well as the benefits of the Foreign Trade Agreement between the two countries negotiated in May.

Russian President Vladimir Putin made an unexpected visit to Ankara, on September 28 (Kremlin.ru, September 28). The reason for Putin’s trip was to discuss with Turkish authorities a host of regional and bilateral issues: the northern Iraqi Kurdistan referendum; the establishment of a safe zone in Syria’s İdlib region by Turkey, Russia and Iran; the removal of commercial customs bans stemming from the November 2015 aircraft shoot-down crisis; tourism and visa-free travel by Turkish citizens to Russia; as well as, notably, the Russian sale of the advanced S-400 air-defense missile system to Turkey.

On September 14, another round of the Astana talks will be held in Kazakhstan to resolve the Syrian crisis. On the sidelines of the conference, a series of meetings will be held between Iran, Russia and Turkey to discuss the anticipated military operation in Idlib. This trilateral negotiation and the formation of a new alliance will face various challenges that are not disclosed to Idlib operations. Thus, to better understand this alliance, one need to present an overview of the fluctuating relations between both countries over the last fifteen years.

Instead pursuing pursuing  policies on the Middle East  that are aligned with Iranian interests, Russia is pushing Tehran to adapt to its new regional policies. Russia believes that it will expand its economic and geopolitical influence through  building a multilateral foreign policy for the Middle East. It can be seen that, despite its alliance with Iran, Russia aims to establish such a policy develop bilateral relations taking into account the interests of the Arab world, as well as penetrate new markets for its exports.

The process to reestablish relations between Russia and Turkey, first launched on August 9, 2016, continues to this day. The two sides are increasingly pushing to improve bilateral relations as well as looking to find common ground when it comes to addressing regional issues. It is important to note a difference in approach between Moscow and Ankara, however. While Turkey wants to deal with bilateral and regional issues separately, Russia tends to view the full spectrum of its relations with Turkey as one interconnected whole. This divergence in expectations when it comes to their relationship has somewhat slowed progress on the Russian-Turkish rapprochement. Yet, for now, common interests continue to push the two countries closer together.

Rusya’nın Suriye’ye aktif müdahalesi sonrası Orta Doğu’da dengeleri değiştirmesiyle birlikte en çok tartışılan konu, Moskova’nın Kürt politikasıdır. Bu politikayı iyi anlamak ve bu ilişkinin geleceğiyle ilgili öngörüde bulunmak için tarihsel perspektiften bazı önemli olgulara değinmek gerekiyor.

Güney Kafkasya’da İran ve İsrail rekabeti
Ortadoğu’nun en etkili güçlerinden İran ve İsrail’in rekabet alanlarından biri de, Güney Kafkasya bölgesi. İsrail Azerbaycan ile, İran da Ermenistan ile iş birliğini geliştirmeye çalışarak bölgede güçlerini artırmaya çalışıyor.

Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları Komisyonu Başkanı Zeyd Raad Al Huseyin, Rusya’nın Halep’teki askeri operasyonlarının savaş suçu olduğunu ifade eden bir açıklama yaptı. Bu sırada 20-21 Ekim’deki Avrupa Birliği Liderler Zirvesi’nde, Rusya ile ilgili görüşmeler sırasında Halep’te yaşanan insanlık dramı yüzünden yeni yaptırımların uygulanmasına dair müzakerelerin yapıldığı ortaya çıktı. Bunun üzerine Rus basını Halep’te yaşanan insanlık dramdan dolayı Rusya’nın yeni yaptırımlar ile yüz yüze kalma ihtimali hususunda yazmaya başladı. Avrupa Konseyi Başkanı Donald Tusk, “AB liderlerinin görüşmelerde Rusya’nın AB’nin iç işlerine karışması, Ukrayna sorunu, Balkanlar, siber saldırı gibi konuları müzakere ettiklerini” söyledi. Aynı zamanda Ruslar tarafından düşürüldüğü iddia edilen Malezya sivil MH17 uçağı ve Halep konusunu da ele aldıklarını açıkladı. Bu görüşmeler sırasında ABD’nin de Halep konusu nedeniyle müttefik olduğu ülkelere, yeni yaptırımların ortak müzakere ile yapılması yönündeki çağrısı dikkat çekti.

26 yıl iktidarda olan Özbekistan Cumhurbaşkanı İslam Kerimov’un 78 yaşında hastaneye kaldırılmasıyla ilgili haberler 28 Ağustos’ta basına sızdı. İlk gün Kerimov’un hastalığıyla ilgili net bilgi verilmese de 29 Ağustos’ta, Kerimov’un kızı Lola Kerimov sosyal medya üzerinden babasının beyin kanaması geçirdiğini açıkladı. Farklı yöndeki açıklamalarla geçen birkaç günün ardından ise bugün geldiğimiz noktada Kerimov’un öldüğü haberi kesin olarak doğrulandı. Bazı bölge uzmanları Kerimov’un öldüğü hususunda net bilgilerin gelmediği günlerde dahi Kerimov’un artık yaşayıp yaşamadığının önemli olmadığını, ülkede klanlar arası bir iktidar savaşının hâlihazırda başladığıyla ilgili açıklamalar yaptılar.

Atatürk Havalimanı’ndaki terör eylemini gerçekleştirenlerin eski Sovyet coğrafyasından olduğu anlaşılıyor. Peki, orada IŞİD’e insan kaynağı sağlayan örgütler hangileri? Rusya onlarla nasıl mücadele ediyor? Avrasya uzmanı Orhan Gafarlı Al Jazeera'ye yazdı.

Rusya’nın PYD ile işbirliği konusunda taktiksel bir değişiklik söz konusu. Moskova, PYD/YPG’nin Afrin ve Kobani kantonlarını birleştirip bir koridor oluşturmasına karşı ama bu, Suriye’nin kuzeyinde bir Kürt entitesinin oluşmasına karşı olması anlamına gelmiyor.

Turkey’s Prime Minister Binali Yildirim paid a visit to Russia on December 6 and 7. Within the framework of the visit, Yildirim held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow. Then he paid a visit to Tatarstan’s capital Kazan and attended the Turkish–Tatar Business Forum and the unveiling of a monument dedicated to Sadri Maksudi Arsal (AA, December 6–7). - See more at:

arlier this month, Turkey hosted the 23rd World Energy Congress in Istanbul. The theme of the Congress, held on October 9–13, was “Embracing New Frontiers.” The participants—who included 3 presidents, 56 ministers, as well as academics and energy experts from 82 countries—came together to address global energy-related issues and innovation in the field (see EDM, October 19). One of the most important developments to come out of this event was the attendance of Russian President Vladimir Putin—his first visit to Turkey since the downing of a Russian jet on the Turkish-Syrian border on November 24, 2015. While in Istanbul, Putin met with his Turkish counterpart, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The two leaders signed a long-awaited intergovernmental agreements on the proposed Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline, which would stretch along the bottom of the Black Sea and across the European section of Turkey (Yeni Şafak, October 10). - See more at: https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-russia-work-normalizing-relations-sign-agreement-scaled-back-turkish-stream-pipeline/#sthash.NKOMp9t0.dpuf

War-torn Syria is days away from the start of a negotiated partial ceasefire, which is supposed to temporarily end fighting between rebel groups and government forces supported by Russian supplies and bombing sorties. The ceasefire, agreed to by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his United States counterpart, Secretary of State John Kerry, excludes any continued targeting of recognized terrorist groups, including the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. Serious questions remain about whether the partial ceasefire can last; but if effective and properly enforced, the halt in hostilities could provide much-needed respite for US- and Turkish-backed rebel groups fighting in northwestern Syria that were being pounded by Russian bombers for weeks (Albawaba News, February 24). - See more at:

On November 28, the Kremlin announced the implementation of a series of economic sanctions against Turkey in response to the latter’s shooting down of a Russian Su-24 military jet that had violated Turkish airspace (Kremlin.ru, November 29). In line with Ankara’s previously announced rules of engagement, the Su-24 was brought down, on November 24, by an air-to-air missile fired by a Turkish F-16, following the Russian aircraft’s incursion into Turkish airspace and its failure to heed repeated warnings (TRT, November 24). Both Russian pilots managed to eject from their burning plane; one was subsequently saved by his compatriots through a rescue operation that itself came under a deadly attack, but the other pilot was shot dead by a local Syrian rebel group during his parachute descent. Immediately after this incident, Russian President Vladimir Putin angrily declared, “Turkey has stabbed us in the back.” Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov canceled his scheduled meeting with his Turkish counterpart (NTV November 24), while Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated that this incident would have an adverse impact on Turkish-Russian relations at the economic, political and societal levels (Dmitry Medvedev’s Facebook page, November 25). Russia has demanded an apology from Turkey, but the latter has refused, promising to respond in a similar fashion in the event of another airspace violation in the future (CNN Turk, November 25). - See more at:

This past week (November 15–16), in the Mediterranean coastal city of Antalya, Turkey hosted the G20 summit for the first time. Though normally devoted to high-level political discussions of global economic issues, the recent string of terrorist attacks in Paris (November 13) and elsewhere induced this year’s gathering of G20 leaders to debate how to respond to the growing threat posed by the Islamic State group. (Hurriyet Daily News, November 14). - See more at:

On August 25, an explosion occurred on a Turkish natural gas pipeline that connects to the South Caucasus Pipeline, which transports gas from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, and into Turkey (Anadolu Agency, August 25). According to the Turkish press, the militant organization the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) was behind this explosion, which occurred along the section of the pipeline near Sarıkamış, a Turkish town around 30 miles southwest of Kars. - See more at:

After years of preparations, Azerbaijan is hosting the first ever European Games, which kicked off on June 12 and will end on June 28. Besides being a high-profile international sporting event, the Games also serve as an important symbol for Azerbaijan to prove its ties to the European community of states (Cbc.az, May 26). - See more at: https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-and-putin-meet-in-baku-will-the-balance-of-power-change-in-the-south-caucasus/#sthash.kbddK3D2.dpuf

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a formal visit to Iran on April 7, 2015. The trip was designed to try to repair bilateral relations after their severe breakdown linked to the crisis in Yemen. Indeed, the conservative wing of the ruling establishment in Tehran, including the head of Iran’s Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Huseyn Nakavi, demanded that Erdogan’s Iran visit should be delayed (BBC–Turkish service, April 7). Some even warned the government that if Erdogan did not cancel the visit, the issue would be brought before Iran’s Guardian Council. Despite this negative pressure, the Turkish president did end up traveling to Tehran to clarify Ankara’s position (Radikal, April 7). - See more at: https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-iranian-competition-in-the-middle-east/#sthash.ciIcjt9n.dpuf

The sixth meeting of the World Forum on Energy Regulation is scheduled to be held on May 25–28, in Istanbul, and is being organized by the office of the prime minister of the Turkish Republic. The competitive and dynamically expanding nature of the energy sector in Eurasia has been boosting Turkey’s regional importance as it prepares to take on the role of a strategically important transit and energy hub country (Hurriyet Daily News, January 28). - See more at: https://jamestown.org/program/will-turkey-choose-the-european-or-eurasian-energy-union/#sthash.sm0y1Gzx.dpuf

During his visit to Ankara in December 2014, Vladimir Putin announced that South Stream—a large pipeline that would have carried Europe-bound Russian gas under the Black Sea and across Southeastern Europe—had been terminated. A major reason for South Stream’s cancellation was attributed to the exit from the project of Bulgaria, one of the key countries through which this pipeline would pass. Instead, Russia and its regional partners, including Turkey, are now discussing a new pipeline project—Turkish Stream, sometimes referred to as Turk Stream (Anadolu Agency Energy Terminal, December 2, 2014). - See more at: https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-stream-a-bluff-or-not/#sthash.mH2ZpuEa.dpuf

After the withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan in 2014,
the issue of regional security became the primary debate for Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Central Asian countries have common cultural, political and historical ties and they are also neighbours with Afghanistan. Therefore, if there are any problems in the security issues in Afghanistan, it has a negative impact on the Central Asian region. The CA countries have their own approach towards resolving the political, economic and security issues in Afghanistan. They are developing cooperation with Afghanistan in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CENTO). In
addition, these countries also have bilateral relations in the economic and political sphere with Afghanistan. The
question this chapter seeks to answer is focused on security. The main purpose is to examine the role and approach of the Central Asian countries in Afghanistan‘s transformation into a stable country

We have seen an unexpected war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between April 2nd-6th. This unexpected conflict has gone down in history as the “Four Day War.” The Armenian and Azeri chiefs of General Staff signed a ceasefire in Moscow on April 6th and the gunfire stopped. Following the ceasefire, it is necessary to look at the behind-the- scenes secrets of this clash.

Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs held its Annual Ambassadors Conference on January 5–6, where the overall vision and various aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy were reviewed and discussed (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 6). The year 2015 will be highly significant and particularly challenging for Turkey’s foreign policy because of the fast-approaching centennial date of the mass slaughter of Ottoman Armenians, annually commemorated on April 24. The entire Armenian diaspora as well as the state of Armenia demand that Turkey recognize the tragic events of 1915 as a “genocide,” and will jointly be maintaining strong political pressure on Ankara throughout the symbolic year of 2015 (Radikal Newspaper, January 3)

XIX. yüzyılda Birleşik Krallık, Çarlık Rusyası, Almanya ve Fransa arasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, İran, Orta Asya ve Uzak Doğu ülkelerinin topraklarını elde etmek amacıyla başlamış ve uzun yıllar sürmüş jeopolitik bir mücadele yaşanmıştır. Çarlık Rusyası, 1907 tarihinde Orta Asya, Güney Kafkasya ve Doğu Avrupa'da hâkimiyet alanı oluşturmuştur. 1991'de Sovyetler Birliği dağıldıktan sonra, Coğrafyada yeniden oluşan siyasi ve ekonomik boşluk üzerinden, yeni ve büyük bir stratejik oyun ortaya çıkmıştır.
Avrasya bölgesindeki bu Yeni Büyük Oyun, Ukrayna'dan başlayarak Afganistan'a kadar ulaşan Coğrafya üzerinde yeniden oynanmaktadır. Prof. Dr. Erel Tellal, Oyunun önemini vurgulamak için kitabın önsözünde “ABD başta olmak üzere, Türkiye, Rusya Federasyonu, Çin, İran gibi devletler; AB gibi devletüstü yapılar; BM, NATO, KGAÖ gibi örgütler; Gazprom, BP, ExonMobil gibi enerji şirketleri… Yeni Büyük Oyunun önemli oyuncularıdır.” demektedir.
Kitapta, Rusya Federasyonu'nun iç ve dış politikasının önemli olguları, Ukrayna'da yaşanan 2013 krizi, Güney Kafkasya Bölgesinde Azerbaycan, Ermenistan ve Gürcistan gibi büyük devletlerin rekabeti anlatılmaktadır. Aynı zamanda Çin'in genişleyen ekonomisinin, Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ermenistan'la gerçekleştirdiği ilişkilerinin içeriğinden de bahsedilmektedir. Türkiye gündeminde çok iyi takip edilmediği için Çin ve Güney Kafkasya ilişkileri ve Pekin'in bölge ülkeleriyle gerçekleştirdiği ilişkilerin gelecek perspektifine de bakılmaktadır.
Çalışmada, Türkiye ve Güney Kafkasya ilişkileri son dönemde yaşanan gelişmeler dikkate alınarak incelenmektedir. Türkiye'nin, yeni dış politika vizyonu üzerinden takip ettiği Azerbaycan, Ermenistan ve Ermeni Sorunu, Gürcistan ile ilişkileri askeri, ekonomik, politik ve enerji açısından değerlendirilmekte, ayrıca Avrasya Jeopolitiğinin temel kriz noktası olan Afganistan'la ilgili daha ayrıntılı değerlendirmelere yer verilmektedir.

As 2014 draws to a close, energy developments in the Eurasian region have been gaining new prominence. Notably, on December 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to Turkey to attend the fifth meeting of the Turkish-Russian High-Level Cooperation Council (CNN Turk, December 1). During this meeting, the parties talked about speeding up construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Additionally, both sides agreed that Turkey’s energy imports from Russia via the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline would increase from 16 billion to 19 billion cubic meters per year.

Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesinin üzerinden yirmi yıldan fazla bir süre geçti fakat modern dünyanın çok kutuplu sistem ertesindeki güçleri yine Ortadoğu’da hegemonya ve müttefik kazanma yarışına girdiler. Bu rekabetin ardındaki en önemli sebep ise Arap Baharı’nın bölgedeki global güçler arasındaki dengeleri değiştirmesinde yatmaktadır. Çünkü bu Bahar sahneye yeni oyuncular ve yeni kurallar çıkarmıştır. Günümüzde, Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği döneminden mirası olan müttefiklerini yeniden kazanmak isteyen Rusya, Arap Baharı öncesinde kuramadığı ilişkileri şimdi geliştirmeyi düşünmektedir. Bugün Rusya’nın en önemli arzusu Sovyet yıllarının mirası olan bağları yeniden geliştirip korumak ve kendisine yeni ortaklar bulmaktır. Ortadoğu’daki siyasal süreçte olayları etkileyen bir kaldıraç ve global bir güç olarak yer almak isteyen Moskova,  pragmatik ve çok vektörlü dış politikasını daha etkin hale getirmek amacıyla çeşitli uluslararası organizasyonlarla müttefiklerini desteklemektedir.
Arab Baharına karşı Rusya’nın tepkisini daha kapsamlı bir şekilde değerlendirebilmek için devrimlerin Büyük Ortadoğu (BOP) projesi ve düşünce konseptini de incelemek gerekmektedir. Aslında 1990’lı yıllardan itibaren tasarlanmaya başlanan BOP eski Rus İmparatorluğu’nun sınırlarını da kapsamaktadır. Ancak halen günümüzde bile BOP’la ilgili geniş ve kapsamlı araştırmalar yapılmamıştır. Ancak konumuz kapsamında; BOP’nin neleri kapsadığından ziyade Arab Baharı ile olan ilişkisi ve bütün bunların Rusya ile bağlantılarına bakmak gerekmektedir.

This book presents a comprehensive overview of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict, the long-running dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Armenian-majority region of Azerbaijan. It outlines the historical development of the dispute, explores the political and social aspects of the confict, examines the wars over the territory including the war of 2020 which resulted in a signifcant Azerbaijani victory, and discusses the international dimensions.