Daniel O'Shiel
Brunel University, Department of Life Sciences, Graduate Student
- Hello! My expertise is in phenomenology, although more broadly speaking I'm interested in many themes from philosophi... moreHello! My expertise is in phenomenology, although more broadly speaking I'm interested in many themes from philosophical anthropology, including the nature of many basic modes of experience (not least perception, imagination, emotion and value), philosophy of technology, philosophy and literature, environmental philosophy and ethics, and feminism.edit
This paper argues that digital games are best understood as a type of image-consciousness (Bildbewusstein). First, I argue how our experiences of digital games are not perceptions. Second, I provide a summary of the phenomenological... more
This paper argues that digital games are best understood as a type of image-consciousness (Bildbewusstein). First, I argue how our experiences of digital games are not perceptions. Second, I provide a summary of the phenomenological natures of three basic modes of consciousness in Husserl, Fink and Sartre-perception, phantasy and image-consciousness-in order to demonstrate that the latter ultimately finds its place between the other two. Lastly, I spell out the implications and contributions these insights can have for our understanding of digital games, including their quite unique character and force. Indeed, once one understands digital games as a quintessential instantiation of this intermediate kind of consciousness, one can also better understand the immense pull digital games can have on us, not least their 'superreality'.
Research Interests:
This article provides the existential and phenomenological conditions for addiction by applying the concepts of lack, escape and ‘hypervirtuality’ in new ways to the subject matter. There are five sections. The first is a brief review of... more
This article provides the existential and phenomenological conditions for addiction by applying the concepts of lack, escape and ‘hypervirtuality’ in new ways to the subject matter. There are five sections. The first is a brief review of some of the most relevant literature. The second lists the main general characteristics of addiction, gleaned from the literature, as well as discussing a possible general definition, namely wants that have become (damaging) needs. The third provides the existential conditions required for addiction to be understood as a human phenomenon to which we are all susceptible, albeit to greatly differing degrees and objects. Here I stress the ideas of transcendence, desire, lack and escape one finds in the early writings of Sartre and Levinas. The fourth fills this idea out with a key phenomenological notion of hypervirtuality, inspired by Husserl. This latter, fifthly and finally, explains the rising power of new technologies and how many are increasing and providing new opportunities for addictive behaviour.
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This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of... more
This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of (self-)censorship and morality as internalised aggression. I then show how this conception expands and can be detailed through a defence of a hydraulic model of the psyche that has specific “safety valves” of disgust, shame, and pity constantly counteracting specific sets of Freudian drives. This model is important for explicating Freud’s crucial concept of sublimation, which continues to have key therapeutic and normative relevance today, which I show through the case of jokes. I finish with the argument that largely happy, productive lives can be seen as in a dynamic between the release of too much (perversion) and too little (neurosis) psychical pressure through these mechanisms.
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This article argues that reality and virtuality are still very much phenomenologically distinguishable, although this might not be the case forever. I argue for two main types of virtuality – one inherently involved in the dynamic... more
This article argues that reality and virtuality are still very much phenomenologically distinguishable, although this might not be the case forever. I argue for two main types of virtuality – one inherently involved in the dynamic horizons of perceptual experiences, while the other is all of our experiences of digital images – in order to show that a particular possible instantiation of the latter type, namely “pure” mixed reality (MR), might come to blur and collapse various experiential categories in the future, not least real and irreal, like never before. To show this, there are three main sections. First, I outline my understanding of the two basic types of virtuality, as understood from a classical phenomenological analysis. Second, I give an account of the most important family of “virtual technologies” relevant to the question at hand, namely virtual, augmented and mixed reality (VR, AR and MR respectively) technologies. After homing in on MR, I explain what “pure” MR is and how, through tactile holograms, this might change even basic experiential distinctions going forward, and not necessarily for the better.
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This paper argues that a proper understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical issue of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on... more
This paper argues that a proper understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical issue of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on dualism, whether they were apparent proponents (Descartes), opponents (Spinoza), or had a somewhat ambiguous status (Sartre), were also heavily involved in understanding emotion. Ultimately, a proper comprehension of emotion shows the issue of dualism to be moot when it comes to our pre-reflective, everyday lives; dualism is a theoretical interest that shows how we must necessarily posit two essential realms-one of nature and one of consciousness-that are nevertheless always already entwined in pre-reflective and immediately lived experiences like emotion. In this manner, a proper understanding of emotion shows that dualism is not an issue on the everyday lived level, but certainly is on epistemological and metaphysical ones. On these levels, dualism is an essential tool that must be understood and used properly if one is to give a thoroughgoing account of human nature from a theoretical standpoint, where avoiding conflations between immediate and reflective experiences, as well as first-person and third-person standpoints, is crucial. Here, one needs to be aware not only of our dual nature of matter and mind, but also of our dual-which is to say scientific and phenomenological ways-of tackling theoretical problems. In short, one may give a proper, dynamic account of human emotion and simultaneously recognize the advantage of thinking in dual-but not "dualistic"-registers.
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This paper contrasts Sartre's account of emotion with Heidegger's account of Befindlichkeit and 'mood' (Stimmung). Sartre's account of emotion is a strong one: emotions occur only when a more neutral and colourless 'pragmatic attitude' is... more
This paper contrasts Sartre's account of emotion with Heidegger's account of Befindlichkeit and 'mood' (Stimmung). Sartre's account of emotion is a strong one: emotions occur only when a more neutral and colourless 'pragmatic attitude' is frustrated or breaks down. In this manner, emotion has to be acutely felt in and through the body, which also means that there are many circumstances and states in which we do not undergo any emotion at all. In fact, Sartre's 'pragmatic attitude' is precisely the mode in which we simply go about our business in an emotionless manner. This raises the question as to whether Sartre's stark opposition between emotional and non-emotional experiences actually holds. I believe Heidegger's account of Befindlichkeit and its moods are key in this regard, in that it can be used to nuance the Sartrean account. Indeed, Heidegger famously states that Dasein is never unattuned. In fact, precisely because of the ontological structure of Befindlichkeit, the world always already matters to us in one way or another, with moods being one of our primary ways of experiencing what matters and why. This discussion therefore aims to yield an account whereby faint moods (Heidegger) and strong emotions (Sartre) form two poles of the same dynamic. To use a metaphor, moods are the tectonic plates that make the various emotional shakes and quakes possible in any given situation. Finally, I finish with some possible remaining tensions between the two thinkers, as well as a way to look for a possible solution.
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Sartre’s conception of ‘‘the look’’ creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) one will be able to begin... more
Sartre’s conception of ‘‘the look’’ creates an ontological conflict with no
real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as believing too much in some deep ‘‘I’’ or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of
the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets ‘‘magically’’ reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable ‘‘I’’; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of (inter)personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better (through the look), with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core.
real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as believing too much in some deep ‘‘I’’ or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of
the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets ‘‘magically’’ reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable ‘‘I’’; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of (inter)personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better (through the look), with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core.
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By introducing ‘drives’ into a Sartrean framework, ‘being-in-itself’ is interpreted as ‘Nature as such’, wherein instincts dominate. Being-for-itself, on the contrary, has an ontological nature diametrically opposed to this former –... more
By introducing ‘drives’ into a Sartrean framework,
‘being-in-itself’ is interpreted as ‘Nature as such’, wherein instincts
dominate. Being-for-itself, on the contrary, has an ontological nature
diametrically opposed to this former – indeed, in the latter realm,
through a fundamental process of ‘nihilation’ (Sartre’s ‘freedom’)
consciousness perpetually fl ees itself by transcending towards the
world. However, a kernel of (our) nihilated Nature is left at the heart
of this process, in the form of ‘original facticity’ that we here name
drives. Drives are the original feelings and urges of a freed Nature that
simply are there; they are the fundamental forces that consciousness
qua freedom always has to deal with. Drives, in addition, can be
nihilated in their own turn, onto a refl ective, irreal plane, whereby
they take the form of value. This means Sartre’s notion of ontological
desire is always made up of two necessary components: drives and
value.
‘being-in-itself’ is interpreted as ‘Nature as such’, wherein instincts
dominate. Being-for-itself, on the contrary, has an ontological nature
diametrically opposed to this former – indeed, in the latter realm,
through a fundamental process of ‘nihilation’ (Sartre’s ‘freedom’)
consciousness perpetually fl ees itself by transcending towards the
world. However, a kernel of (our) nihilated Nature is left at the heart
of this process, in the form of ‘original facticity’ that we here name
drives. Drives are the original feelings and urges of a freed Nature that
simply are there; they are the fundamental forces that consciousness
qua freedom always has to deal with. Drives, in addition, can be
nihilated in their own turn, onto a refl ective, irreal plane, whereby
they take the form of value. This means Sartre’s notion of ontological
desire is always made up of two necessary components: drives and
value.
Research Interests:
Sartrean conceptions of the Ego, emotions, language, and the imaginary provide a comprehensive account of "magic" that could ultimately give rise to a new philosophical psychology. By focusing upon only one of these here-the imaginary-we... more
Sartrean conceptions of the Ego, emotions, language, and the imaginary provide a comprehensive account of "magic" that could ultimately give rise to a new philosophical psychology. By focusing upon only one of these here-the imaginary-we see that through its irrealizing capabilities consciousness contaminates the world and bewitches itself in a manner that defies simple determinis-tic explication. We highlight this with an explication of what Sartre means by "nihilation" and the "analogon," and introduce a concrete example of nostalgia, hoping to lay the scene for a detailed study into the dynamic between our ontological freedom and its constitution and experience of phenomena as enchanting and bewitching. "Magical being" must therefore involve a deep, Sartrean analysis that explicates ontological freedom as becoming concretely engaged in both the real and irreal alike, whereby the imaginary as magic can lead to the most insane, as well as the most artistic, incantations.
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Research Interests: Phenomenology and Sports
This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully... more
This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully included in its philosophical foundations. The respective chapters share new insights on art, media, psychic systems and technology, while also presenting new ways of articulating the concept of the virtual with regard to the main premises of Western thought.
Given its thematic scope, this book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions.
Given its thematic scope, this book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions.
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This is a special issue edited by Laura Candiotto and Léo Peruzzo Jr. for the Journal Aurora. Among the contributors: Dina Mendonça, Valeria Bizzarri, Adrian Spremberg, Carlos Vara Sanchéz, Daniel O'Shiel, Alejandro Murillo-Lara, Carlos... more
This is a special issue edited by Laura Candiotto and Léo Peruzzo Jr. for the Journal Aurora. Among the contributors: Dina Mendonça, Valeria Bizzarri, Adrian Spremberg, Carlos Vara Sanchéz, Daniel O'Shiel, Alejandro Murillo-Lara, Carlos Andrés Muñoz-Serna, Daniel Calbino, Moysés Pinto Neto, Charles Borges, Godwin Darmanin, Daniel De Luca-Noronha, Léo Peruzzo Júnior, Laura Candiotto, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, José Araya
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This paper argues that digital games are best understood as a type of image-consciousness (Bildbewusstein). First, I argue how our experiences of digital games are not perceptions. Second, I provide a summary of the phenomenological... more
This paper argues that digital games are best understood as a type of image-consciousness (Bildbewusstein). First, I argue how our experiences of digital games are not perceptions. Second, I provide a summary of the phenomenological natures of three basic modes of consciousness in Hus-serl, Fink and Sartre—perception, phantasy and image-consciousness—in order to demonstrate that the latter ultimately finds its place between the other two. Lastly, I spell out the implications and contributions these insights can have for our understanding of digital games, including their quite unique character and force. Indeed, once one understands digital games as a quintessential instantia-tion of this intermediate kind of consciousness, one can also better understand the immense pull digital games can have on us, not least their ‘superreality’.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
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The contemporary discourse on disgust takes place in a “nature-culture” debate where it is considered as a basic instinct that is nonetheless uniquely human. Herein, disgust is usually defined as an aversive, real emotion that always has... more
The contemporary discourse on disgust takes place in a “nature-culture” debate where it is considered as a basic instinct that is nonetheless uniquely human. Herein, disgust is usually defined as an aversive, real emotion that always has a “core”, automatic physical element, which can then also be taken up onto a more abstract, moral plane. Disgust, thus considered, is often unavoidable on the “physical” level, but (largely) avoidable and damaging on the “symbolic” level. This project aims to critique some key presuppositions in the contemporary discourse by invoking some psychoanalytic and phenomenological insights. With Freud one will see that disgust is not just an emotion – it is also, in fact, a basic psychical mechanism that constitutes human character as such, but also often runs the risk of leading to many psychopathologies, both individual and social. With Kolnai, disgust is not simply “aversive” but on the contrary has a complex nature wherein human consciousness is both repelled and attracted by the revolting object. And with Sartre, for disgust to be “real”, the role of the imaginary must always already be at work. Ultimately such analyses, by using disgust as a case study, will inform us with regard to the general nature of the emotions and the role of the imaginary therein, meaning a rather novel theory of the latter two may be developed and then practically applied to various individual (e.g. phobias) and social (e.g. racism) psychical phenomena.status: publishe
Research Interests: Psychology and Disgust
This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of... more
This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of (self-)censorship and morality as internalised aggression. I then show how this conception expands and can be detailed through a defence of a hydraulic model of the psyche that has specific “safety valves” of disgust, shame, and pity constantly counteracting specific sets of Freudian drives. This model is important for explicating Freud’s crucial concept of sublimation, which continues to have key therapeutic and normative relevance today, which I show through the case of jokes. I finish with the argument that largely happy, productive lives can be seen as in a dynamic between the release of too much (perversion) and too little (neurosis) psychical pressure through these mechanisms.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Psychology, Emotion, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphor, and 5 moreHeidegger, Mood, Sartre, Philosophia, and Befindlichkeit
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I argue for three different concepts of God in Being and Nothingness. First I review the relevant scholarship with regard to Sartre, religion, and God. Second I show how Sartre uses three Gods in his ontological system: God as Nature, God... more
I argue for three different concepts of God in Being and Nothingness. First I review the relevant scholarship with regard to Sartre, religion, and God. Second I show how Sartre uses three Gods in his ontological system: God as Nature, God as radical Otherness, and God as absolute Value. Third I show that Sartre’s conception of the imaginary explains how a purer, more theoretical conception of God can be perverted into more anthropocentrised and anthropomorphised versions. Fourth I consider the consequences of sticking to more Sartrean notions which ultimately can emphasise humility, respect, and responsibility before Nature, the Other, and Value, thereby calling for a reduction of both anthropomorphism and -centrism in religious faith and our conceptions of God.
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This paper argues that a proper understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical issue of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on... more
This paper argues that a proper understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical issue of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on dualism, whether they were apparent proponents (Descartes), opponents (Spinoza), or had a somewhat ambiguous status (Sartre), were also heavily involved in understanding emotion. Ultimately, a proper comprehension of emotion shows the issue of dualism to be moot when it comes to our pre-reflective, everyday lives; dualism is a theoretical interest that shows how we must necessarily posit two essential realms – one of nature and one of consciousness – that are nevertheless always already entwined in pre-reflective and immediately lived experiences like emotion. In this manner, a proper understanding of emotion shows that dualism is not an issue on the everyday lived level, but certainly is on epistemological and metaphysical ones. On these levels, dualism ...