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As the primary means of political organisation, political parties remain vital to contemporary democracies, making it important to investigate their understanding of democracy. This study explores the themes with which five largest... more
As the primary means of political organisation, political parties remain vital to contemporary democracies, making it important to investigate their understanding of democracy. This study explores the themes with which five largest political parties in Turkey associate democracy. We studied tweets posted by official accounts of these parties’ headquarters and branches, as well as by other Twitter accounts that are institutionally linked to these parties. We found significant differences between the government bloc and the opposition bloc as well as between People Alliance and Nation Alliance in terms of the themes with which they associate democracy. The government bloc and People Alliance use themes such as national will and military coups while referring to democracy. The opposition bloc and Nation Alliance emphasise themes such as equality, freedom of the press, and justice. We conclude that parties’ and blocs’ different attitudes towards democracy are indicators of political polarisation in Turkey.
Populist politicians and political parties often prefer social media, especially Facebook, for their communication with the public. Populists, as well as radical left and right leaders and parties, especially those on the margins of the... more
Populist politicians and political parties often prefer social media, especially Facebook, for their communication with the public. Populists, as well as radical left and right leaders and parties, especially those on the margins of the mainstream political system and with less access to traditional media, have seen in platforms like Facebook a gateway to direct communication with their audiences, in the wake of elections as well as in non-electoral periods. Despite this, comparative or in some cases, country-specific populist communication on social media remains rather under-studied. To fill this empirical gap, the study explores contemporary populist politicians’ use of various media sources in their Facebook communication strategy, as well as the legacy and alternative media networks that disseminate and amplify their messages. The analysis is carried out at two levels: a) a classification of the media sources that are shared by 17 official Facebook pages of main populist leader...
This article explores how UKIP and Nigel Farage used social media to amplify their message. Mainly digital sources, such as websites and social media, were the preferred source type of both profiles, but more for UKIP than for N. Farage.... more
This article explores how UKIP and Nigel Farage used social media to amplify their message. Mainly digital sources, such as websites and social media, were the preferred source type of both profiles, but more for UKIP than for N. Farage. The most shared digital content of both profiles was websites and social media accounts of their political parties. The second most used source type was print media – mainly national newspapers. Radio stations were the least used source by UKIP, while TV channels the least used source by N. Farage. The higher use of radio sources concerns links to LBC Radio, where he presented a show between 2019 and 2020. TV channels and radio were largely ignored by both profiles as sources. In terms of ownership, sources used by either profile were in their vast majority private due to prevailing type of ownership in the UK. Both profiles relied more on quality newspapers and magazines rather than tabloids but this was often accompanied by a critical approach to ...
This working paper examined citizens’ reactions to populism. It also verified whether anti-elite populist narratives have an impact on citizens’ trust in politics and institutions. Additionally, the research investigated the success of... more
This working paper examined citizens’ reactions to populism. It also verified whether anti-elite populist narratives have an impact on citizens’ trust in politics and institutions. Additionally, the research investigated the success of populist content on Facebook by means of reactions. Given the different purposes, this study relied on both quantitative and qualitative methods such as focus groups, quantitative text analysis (i.e., digital dashboard) and a survey experiment.
Focus groups research with over 80 participants in Turkey, Spain, France, Poland and the UK revealed that citizens who support both populist and mainstream parties distrust politicians in general and share a feeling of poor political representation even in countries led by populist parties such as Poland and Turkey.

The digital dashboard analysis in France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and the UK found that social media users are more likely to imitate populist language when populist politicians use populist rhetoric in their posts. Conversely, when populist themes are used by mainstream politicians in their Facebook communication, their followers are less likely to use populist language. For this quantitative text analysis, we considered 31,541 posts (and their related 11 million user comments), published between March and July 2021 on 122 Facebook pages of political parties – populist and mainstream.

The experimental survey studied the links between zero-sum thinking (e.g., “a gain for them is a loss for us”) and populist attitudes and support for populist parties. Five online studies were carried out in the UK, France, Spain, Italy, and Poland with over 2,100 participants selected through the platform Prolific Academic. Results were successful only in the Italian and French samples. Still, where the experimental manipulation of four randomly assigned conditions did not elicit a significant change in zero-sum beliefs (ZSB) ratings, it significantly affected ratings for one item on the ZSB scale.
Gender emerged as a powerful predictor of ZSB, with males scoring higher than both females and participants identifying with other genders. And ZSB emerged as central predictors of populist attitudes, agreement with populist politicians, and intention to vote for a populist party. Given that anti-immigrant rhetoric in the guise of zero-sum beliefs is common in right-wing populist discourse, this is no surprise. But it does suggest that a bad environment or the presence of perceived ‘out-groups’ can trigger resource-protection attitudes.
Procedural justice, which is about the fairness of procedures that the legal authorities use in their interactions with the public, is an important determinant of people’s general evaluations of these authorities. Based on a nationally... more
Procedural justice, which is about the fairness of procedures that the legal authorities use in their interactions with the public, is an important determinant of people’s general evaluations of these authorities. Based on a nationally representative survey with 1,804 people, this article investigates how socio-political identities such as ethnicity and one’s status as a political winner or loser affect people’s perceptions of procedural justice in the courts in Turkey. Multivariate regression analysis revealed that Kurds and political losers are more likely than Turks and political winners, respectively, to think that the courts in Turkey are not procedurally just. Furthermore, we found that voting for the incumbent party or being an Alevi does not have an effect on Kurds’ perceptions of procedural justice in the courts. We, therefore, argue that ethnicity and being a political winner are two important identity factors that determine people’s perceptions of procedural justice in th...
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Erdoğan represent the culturally heterogeneous periphery against the old ruling elite in Turkey. After almost two decades in power, Erdoğan and the AKP subdued the mainstream media... more
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Erdoğan represent the culturally heterogeneous periphery against the old ruling elite in Turkey. After almost two decades in power, Erdoğan and the AKP subdued the mainstream media while they aim to realize the same scenario with respect to the social media. Social media are spaces for governmental or pro-governmental propaganda, but also for the expression of political dissent. Politicians in Turkey have been using various social media platforms more effectively since the 2010s. This research reveals that the great majority of the content shared by Erdoğan and the AKP Facebook (FB) accounts belong to their own media production teams. The shared sources are disseminating pro-government propaganda.  The Erdoğan FB account has a more intensive network than the AKP FB account. We also found that the main promoters of these two FB accounts were using pseudo names, which might indicate that the main promoters were political trolls.
Previous literature demonstrated that gender inequality is a major challenge for democratic consolidation. However, research that studies the effect of gender inequality on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy is limited. This study... more
Previous literature demonstrated that gender inequality is a major challenge for
democratic consolidation. However, research that studies the effect of gender
inequality on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy is limited. This study contributes
to this literature by exploring the relationship between citizens’ perceptions of
gender impartiality of public institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Turkey,
where gender inequality is an acute problem. Analysis of a nationally representative
survey showed that the perception of gender impartiality of public institutions is a
major factor explaining citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Results also revealed
that perceptions of gender impartiality of public institutions affect citizens’
evaluations of the long-term performance of democracy. Another finding is that
religiosity moderates the effect of perceptions of gender impartiality of public
institutions on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. We conclude that gender
inequality is not a peripheral issue to democratic consolidation in Turkey but a
social problem that remains at the heart of it.
Few consumers, when they snack on hazelnuts or hazelnut chocolate bars, think of the steps that go into producing these treats, including who is involved or what share of the price they pay at the supermarket reaches the workers who toil... more
Few consumers, when they snack on hazelnuts or hazelnut chocolate bars, think of the steps that go into producing these treats, including who is involved or what share of the price they pay at the supermarket reaches the workers who toil under the summer sun to harvest the hazelnuts. As part of the project “Piloting the USDA Guidelines for Eliminating Child Labor and Forced Labor in the Hazelnut Supply Chain in Turkey,” the Fair Labor Association commissioned this study to find out how value is spread across the hazelnut supply chain, and the impact of the value distribution on workers’ wages in the hazelnut sector. This research—the first of its kind—examines the procurement price of Turkish hazelnuts, analyzing the components that make up its value, and explores the relationship between the procurement price and working conditions in hazelnut production, with a special focus on child labor and the working conditions of seasonal migrant workers. The study also traces the share of wages in a kilogram of hazelnut chocolate and a kilogram of chocolate hazelnut spread.
In this working paper, we explore the reactions of target groups to populist discourse through focus groups in five European countries and perform a quantitative analysis of Facebook data in eight European countries. We demonstrate the... more
In this working paper, we explore the reactions of target groups to populist discourse through focus groups in five European countries and perform a quantitative analysis of Facebook data in eight European countries. We demonstrate the ways in which populist discourse and policies affect target groups including migrants, ethnic or religious minorities, academics, and LGBTIQ+ groups. Focus groups revealed that organized religion is an agent of populist movements. The Catholic Church in Poland and the Greek Orthodox Church legitimize and disseminate populist discourses. We also find that vulnerable groups complain about mainstreaming of hate language in their countries. The rise of populist movements and these movements’ eagerness to express controversial opinion on issues including immigration, homosexuality and political liberalism caused certain groups examined in this paper to appropriate these opinions and voice them in everyday life. Vulnerable groups, in an attempt to counterpoise the populist challenge in their countries, have developed four main strategies: i) creating echo chambers, ii) self-censorship, iii) migration, and iv) active resistance. Echo chambers enable members of vulnerable groups to avoid what they deem unnecessary and potentially unpleasant encounters with supporters of populist movements. It provides them with a comfort zone where they can express opinion more freely. Self-censorship, similar to echo chambers, helps target groups to stay under the radar of populist movements and their supporters. Those defending migration state that the process in their countries is irreversible and migrating to another country is the only way out. Finally, some participants argued that rather than conceding defeat, they actively resist through civil society organizations, street protests, and openly display their identity to fight off populism. Analysis of Facebook data revealed information about the ways in which populist parties and leaders communicate on social media and how the public perceives their communication. Populists use an anti-elitist language more frequently than mainstream political actors. Turkey and Hungary are exception to the rule, because in both countries populist governments have been in office for a long time. Second, populist actors in all countries but Poland and Turkey talk about immigration more. In Germany, France and the UK, populist actors frequently discuss EU-related issues. We also found that populists in Germany, France, Italy and the UK talk more about ‘democracy and legitimacy’ than mainstream parties do whilst populists talk about these issues less than mainstream parties do in Greece, Hungary and Turkey. Analysis also suggests that populist actors’ Facebook posts obtain more reactions, shares, and comments than mainstream political actors’. Anti-elitist language in social media posts produces more reactions, shares, and comments. Posts with references to religious minorities trigger fewer reactions from the users while posts making references to ethnic minorities, including immigrants or asylum seekers, as well as country-specific minorities like Roma in Hungary or Kurds in Turkey, trigger more reactions, and these posts are shared more. Finally, we find that posts referring to ‘immigration’ trigger more reactions and shares and produce more discussion than other issues. In the final section of this working paper, we conclude with a short discussion on policy options.
This working paper investigates public policies that precede the rise of populism. A mixedmethod research design is applied: on the one hand, we use data from international surveys and databanks to explore the policy–populism nexus from a... more
This working paper investigates public policies that precede the rise of populism. A mixedmethod research design is applied: on the one hand, we use data from international surveys and databanks to explore the policy–populism nexus from a comparative European perspective. On the other hand, country case studies have been prepared to understand the country-specific historical and socio-economic features of populism and its potential policy roots. Four countries were selected as national case studies: two EU member states (Greece and Hungary) because of a strong, long-term support of populist parties; one EU member state (Lithuania), where support of populist parties remain moderate, although historical and socio-economic features suggest a likely rise of populism; and one country (Turkey) that exhibits the potential hybridization tendencies of populism and the role of policies in the shift from democratic towards authoritarian regimes. We found that the content of policies were weak ...
This working paper presents the findings of quantitave and qualititave research into populist communication on Facebook. Specifically, we look at how populist politicians from all across Europe used Facebook in their campaigns for the... more
This working paper presents the findings of quantitave and qualititave research into populist communication on Facebook. Specifically, we look at how populist politicians from all across Europe used Facebook in their campaigns for the European Parliamentary elections in May 2019 and compared this with a posts from July 2019. We start the paper with sections on research design and then outline the importance of social media for populist political communication. From here, we present the findings of our comparative research. We found that the use of Facebook varied widely around the bloc. Some countries – Spain, Italy, the UK, France, and Poland – display a more widespread use of social media and with more complex usage, whilst others, such as Lithuania, have a low usage level. As a result, we maintain that there is no, one online populist strategy currently in use. Instead, the frequency, tone and topic of social media usage by populist actors differs from country to country, actor t...
Populism is the “40 is the new 30” of political research, buzzing for the last two decades with what seems as an unfading energy. A lot of attention has been paid to defining the phenomena and outlining its general features. Significantly... more
Populism is the “40 is the new 30” of political research, buzzing for the last two decades with what seems as an unfading energy. A lot of attention has been paid to defining the phenomena and outlining its general features. Significantly less notice has been paid to political parties. Even less work has been done on comparative party populism in contemporary Europe, one that would take into consideration social, political and historical aspects. This paper fills this void. Examining sixteen European populist parties and movements across the continent, we argue that while all adhere to the standard populist framework, there is not one but four populisms in contemporary Europe. We demonstrate our argument by positioning the case selection against the following dichotomies: exclusionary v. inclusionary populism, authoritarian v. non-authoritarian populism, strong nativist v. weak nativist populism, and radical democratic v. conspiratorial populism. Based on these variables, we introdu...
This study presents a new theoretical framework for understanding one of the ways in which populists generate support in elections. It argues that populist movements securitize elections by triggering perceptions of ontological insecurity... more
This study presents a new theoretical framework for understanding one of the ways in which populists generate support in elections. It argues that populist movements securitize elections by triggering perceptions of ontological insecurity among voters. Through this strategy, populist movements amplify voters’ negative image of the country they live in and the challenges they face, which contributes to populist movements’ electoral success. Building upon this theoretical framework, this study offers an explanation for the 2015 double general elections in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) experienced disappointment after losing its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 elections. However, the AKP increased its votes by 8.6 percent in the November 2015 elections. Between these two elections, the AKP had used the Kurdish question to trigger perceptions of ontological insecurity, which enabled it to securitize the elections in November. This st...
A variety of factors affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Based on Turkey’s political and economic context, as well as the existing literature, this study investigates the effect of four factors on people’s satisfaction with... more
A variety of factors affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Based on Turkey’s political and economic context, as well as the existing literature, this study investigates the effect of four factors on people’s satisfaction with democracy in Turkey: citizens’ conceptualizations of democracy, being a political winner, citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity, and ethnic identity. Regression analysis of a nationally representative survey reveals that political losers and those with negative perceptions of electoral integrity are less satisfied with democracy in Turkey, while people’s conceptualizations of democracy and ethnic identity do not have an effect on satisfaction with democracy. We conclude that, in Turkey, political polarization and negative perceptions of electoral integrity trigger a decline in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, which requires the attention of policymakers.
ABSTRACT Drawing on the literature on minorities’ and ethnic groups’ perceptions of the police, this article investigates the differences between Kurds and Turks in terms of their perceptions of the police in Turkey. We conducted survey... more
ABSTRACT Drawing on the literature on minorities’ and ethnic groups’ perceptions of the police, this article investigates the differences between Kurds and Turks in terms of their perceptions of the police in Turkey. We conducted survey research using a nationally representative sample of 1804 people. Multivariate regression analysis revealed that Kurds in Turkey have a more negative perception of the police than Turks, regardless of their gender, education, income, party affiliation, and sectarian identity. It is concluded that the historical relationship between Kurds and the Turkish state has had a decisive effect on how Kurds perceive the police.
Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. Ordinary people do not understand the same thing from democracy. Nevertheless, intellectuals and the political elite alike promote democracy as an ideal to be emulated. In addition, democracy... more
Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. Ordinary people do not understand the same thing from democracy. Nevertheless, intellectuals and the political elite alike promote democracy as an ideal to be emulated. In addition, democracy literature does not extensively study the factors, which affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term. A major goal of this research is to investigate how the context people occupy affects the ways in which they understand democracy. To do this, I use World Values Survey 6th wave, which was conducted between 2010 and 2014 and covers 60 countries. Analysis demonstrates that GDP per capita (PPP) is an important factor affecting the ways in which people define democracy. People in richer countries are more likely to consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy while people in poorer countries tend to consider economic characteristics as essential to democracy. This finding indicates the possibility of the presence of specific...
A variety of factors affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Based on Turkey’s political and economic context, as well as the existing literature, this study investigates the effect of four factors on people’s satisfaction with... more
A variety of factors affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Based on Turkey’s political and economic context, as well as the existing literature, this study investigates the effect of four factors on people’s satisfaction with democracy in Turkey: citizens’ conceptualizations of democracy, being a political winner, citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity, and ethnic identity. Regression analysis of a nationally representative survey reveals that political losers and those with negative perceptions of electoral integrity are less satisfied with democracy in Turkey, while people’s conceptualizations of democracy and ethnic identity do not have an effect on satisfaction with democracy. We conclude that, in Turkey, political polarization and negative perceptions of electoral integrity trigger a decline in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, which requires the attention of policymakers.
Previous research demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between democracy and membership in civil society organizations. Turkey is considered to be a country where membership in civil society organizations is low. Relying on... more
Previous research demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between democracy and
membership in civil society organizations. Turkey is considered to be a country where membership in civil society organizations is low. Relying on the literature on the factors effecting the participation in civil society organizations and the history of the relationship between civil society organizations and the Turkish state, this article aims to investigate the factors behind low civil society organization membership in Turkey. To this end, this article benefited from a nation-wide survey conducted in 2015. Analysis showed that people in Turkey do not consider strong civil society as an important dimension of democracy. In addition, analysis revealed that a large number of people in Turkey think that: civil society organizations in Turkey are not independent from the state; the state does not see civil society as a partner in policy-making; and people are afraid of being a member of civil society organizations. This article concluded that the problematic history between civil society organizations and the Turkish state is a major reason why people in Turkey hold negative views about civil society organizations, and therefore avoid membership in these organizations.

Yapılan araştırmalar, sivil toplum kuruluşlarına katılımın demokrasi üstünde olumlu bir etkisi
olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak Türkiye’de sivil toplum kuruluşlarına üyelik düşüktür. Bu çalışma,
Türkiye’de devlet ile sivil toplum kuruluşları arasındaki ilişkinin tarihine ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarına katılımı etkileyen faktörleri inceleyen literatüre dayanarak Türkiye’de sivil toplum kuruluşlarına üyeliğin düşük olmasının nedenlerini araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu doğrultuda bu çalışmada, 2015 senesinde Türkiye nüfusunu temsil eden bir örneklem ile gerçekleştirilmiş ulusal bir anket çalışması kullanılmıştır. Yapılan analizler, Türkiye’de kişilerin sivil toplum kuruluşlarını demokrasinin önemli öğesi olarak görmediğine işaret etmiştir. Ayrıca, devletin sivil toplum kuruluşlarını dikkate alması, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının devletten bağımsız hareket etmesi ve vatandaşların çekinmeden sivil kuruluşlarına üye olması gibi konularda katılımcıların büyük bir kısmının olumsuz düşüncelere sahip olduğu bulunmuştur. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de sivil toplum ve devlet ilişkilerinin problemli tarihinin kişilerin sivil toplum kuruluşlarına karşı bu olumsuz yargılara sahip olmalarına ve dolayısıyla sivil toplum kuruluşlarına üyelikten kaçınmalarına neden olduğu sonuca varmıştır
Drawing on the literature on minorities’ and ethnic groups’ perceptions of the police, this article investigates the differences between Kurds and Turks in terms of their perceptions of the police in Turkey. We conducted survey research... more
Drawing on the literature on minorities’ and ethnic groups’ perceptions of the police, this article investigates the differences between Kurds and Turks in terms of their perceptions of the police in Turkey. We conducted survey research using a nationally representative sample of 1804 people. Multivariate regression analysis revealed that Kurds in Turkey have a more negative perception of the police than Turks, regardless of their gender, education, income, party affiliation, and sectarian identity. It is concluded that the historical relationship between Kurds and the Turkish state has had a decisive effect on how Kurds perceive the police.
Utilizing 60 interviews, we examine how people belonging to different gender, ethnic, and sectarian groups in Turkey define democracy and the democratic state. An analysis of the interviews reveals that women emphasize gender equality,... more
Utilizing 60 interviews, we examine how people belonging to different gender, ethnic, and sectarian groups in Turkey define democracy and the democratic state. An analysis of the interviews reveals that women emphasize gender equality, while Kurds and Alevis focus on rights and freedoms in their definitions of democracy. Male Sunni Turks, on the other hand, focus on economic welfare. On the basis of these results, we argue that identity groups that have a problematic relationship with the state are more likely to define democracy in terms of rights and freedoms, whereas those who do not have a problematic relationship with the state are more likely to consider economic issues as central to democracy. This research also examined people’s expectations of a democratic state. When male Sunni Turks indicated that equality is among their expectations of a democratic state, they formulated it in terms of the state realizing economic equality. Female Sunni Turks, Kurds, and Alevis, on the other hand, emphasized the provision of equality among different ethnic and religious groups in their expectations of a democratic state. These important differences among identity groups in Turkey in terms of their attitudes toward democracy and the democratic state illustrate the problems involved in consolidating democracy as well as significant challenges in lessening social differentiation regarding this issue.

Bu araştırmada, Türkiye’de farklı cinsiyet, etnik ve mezhep gruplarına mensup kişilerin, demokrasi ve demokratik devlet tanımları 60 adet yarı-yapılandırılmış yüz yüze görüşmeye dayanarak çalışılmıştır. Bu görüşmelerde, çeşitli etnik ve dini kimliklere ve sosyo-ekonomik gruplara ait bireylerle konuşulmuştur. Görüşmelerin analizi sonucunda, demokrasiyi tanımlarken, kadınların cinsiyet eşitliği üzerinde durduğu, Kürtlerin ve Alevilerin hak ve özgürlüklere, Sünni Türk erkeklerin ise ekonomik refaha odaklandıkları görülmüştür. Bu bulgulara dayanarak, devletle tartışmalı bir ilişki içerisinde olan kimlik gruplarının demokrasiyi hak ve özgürlükler açısından tanımlamaya, devletle bu şekilde bir ilişki içerisinde olmayan grupların ise demokrasiyi tanımlarken ekonomik
konuları merkeze almaya daha eğilimli olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Çalışmada ayrıca katılımcıların demokratik devletten beklentileri de incelenmiştir. Görüşmelerin bu bölümünde de benzer sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. Sünni Türk erkeklerin demokratik devletten beklentileri arasında eşitlik bulunduğu durumlarda bile, bu görüşmecilerin daha çok ekonomik eşitliğin belirli bir
ölçüde sağlanmasını kastettikleri anlaşılmıştır. Bunun aksine, Sünni Türk kadınlar, Kürtler ve Aleviler, demokratik devletten beklentilerinin arasında farklı etnik ve dini gruplar arasında eşitliğin sağlanması olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir. Türkiye toplumunu oluşturan bu kimlik gruplarının demokrasiye ve demokratik devlete ilişkin tutumlarındaki bu önemli farklılıklar, Türkiye’de hem
demokrasinin konsolide edilmesi hem de bu konudaki toplumsal ayrışmanın azaltılması yönündeki sorunlara işaret etmektedir.
Previous literature demonstrated that gender inequality is a major challenge for democratic consolidation. However, research that studies the effect of gender inequality on citizens' satisfaction with democracy is limited. This study... more
Previous literature demonstrated that gender inequality is a major challenge for democratic consolidation. However, research that studies the effect of gender inequality on citizens' satisfaction with democracy is limited. This study contributes to this literature by exploring the relationship between citizens' perceptions of gender impartiality of public institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Turkey, where gender inequality is an acute problem. Analysis of a nationally representative survey showed that the perception of gender impartiality of public institutions is a major factor explaining citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Results also revealed that perceptions of gender impartiality of public institutions affect citizens' evaluations of the long-term performance of democracy. Another finding is that religiosity moderates the effect of perceptions of gender impartiality of public institutions on citizens' satisfaction with democracy. We conclude t...
Authors: Samuel Bennett, Artur Lipiński, Agnieszka Stępińska, David Abadi, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Nicolas Hubé, Martin Baloge, Giuliano Bobba, Eglė Butkevičienė, Charlotte Brands, Agneta H Fischer, Bogdan Ianosev, Lena Karamanidou,... more
Authors: Samuel Bennett, Artur Lipiński, Agnieszka Stępińska, David Abadi, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Nicolas Hubé, Martin Baloge, Giuliano Bobba, Eglė Butkevičienė, Charlotte Brands, Agneta H Fischer, Bogdan Ianosev, Lena Karamanidou, Sune Klinge, Jiří Kocián, Umut Korkut, Jaume Magre, Moreno Mancosu, Adina Marincea, Dejan Matić, Luis Medir, Vaidas Morkevičius, Esther Pano, Franca Roncarolo, Osman Sahin, Antonella Seddone, Andrej Školkay, Gabriella Szabó, Emmanouil Tsatsanis, Giedrius Žvaliauskas This working paper presents the findings of quantitave and qualititave research into populist communication on Facebook. Specifically, we look at how populist politicians from all across Europe used Facebook in their campaigns for the European Parliamentary elections in May 2019 and compared this with a posts from July 2019. We start the paper with sections on research design and then outline the importance of social media for populist political communication. From here, we present the find...
Procedural justice, which is about the fairness of procedures that the legal authorities use in their interactions with the public, is an important determinant of people's general evaluations of these authorities. Based on a nationally... more
Procedural justice, which is about the fairness of procedures that the legal authorities use in their interactions with the public, is an important determinant of people's general evaluations of these authorities. Based on a nationally representative survey with 1,804 people, this article investigates how socio-political identities such as ethnicity and one's status as a political winner or loser affect people's perceptions of procedural justice in the courts in Turkey. Multivariate regression analysis revealed that Kurds and political losers are more likely than Turks and political winners, respectively, to think that the courts in Turkey are not procedurally just. Furthermore, we found that voting for the incumbent party or being an Alevi does not have an effect on Kurds' perceptions of procedural justice in the courts. We, therefore, argue that ethnicity and being a political winner are two important identity factors that determine people's perceptions of procedural justice in the courts in Turkey. We concluded that because Kurds and political losers are less likely to identify with the state, they have more negative perceptions of procedural justice in the courts in Turkey.
Previous literature demonstrated that gender inequality is a major challenge for democratic consolidation. However, research that studies the effect of gender inequality on citizens' satisfaction with democracy is limited. This study... more
Previous literature demonstrated that gender inequality is a major challenge for democratic consolidation. However, research that studies the effect of gender inequality on citizens' satisfaction with democracy is limited. This study contributes to this literature by exploring the relationship between citizens' perceptions of gender impartiality of public institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Turkey, where gender inequality is an acute problem. Analysis of a nationally representative survey showed that the perception of gender impartiality of public institutions is a major factor explaining citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Results also revealed that perceptions of gender impartiality of public institutions affect citizens' evaluations of the long-term performance of democracy. Another finding is that religiosity moderates the effect of perceptions of gender impartiality of public institutions on citizens' satisfaction with democracy. We conclude that gender inequality is not a peripheral issue to democratic consolidation in Turkey but a social problem that remains at the heart of it.
Experience in various countries demonstrated that populist leaders enfeeble democracy. Once elected, populist leaders concentrate power in their hands while undermining horizontal checks on their power. By drawing upon the Trump... more
Experience in various countries demonstrated that populist leaders enfeeble democracy. Once elected, populist leaders concentrate power in their hands while undermining horizontal checks on their power. By drawing upon the Trump presidency in the U.S., this article reveals one of the dynamics in which populist leaders bypass institutions of horizontal checks in policy-making. It argues that populist leaders use social media platforms to disseminate discourse to convince people that a certain course of action is necessary and thereafter bypass formal institutions in policy-making. Trump used discourse first to discipline the federal bureaucracy, second to roll back Obama-era social and environmental regulations, and third to reorient the US migration policy. His discourse became pervasive thanks to his efficient use of Twitter, which allowed him to achieve political change without going through formal institutional channels.
This study presents a new theoretical framework for understanding one of the ways in which populists generate support in elections. It argues that populist movements securitize elections by triggering perceptions of ontological insecurity... more
This study presents a new theoretical framework for understanding one of the ways in which populists generate support in elections. It argues that populist movements securitize elections by triggering perceptions of ontological insecurity among voters. Through this strategy, populist movements amplify voters’ negative image of the country they live in and the challenges they face, which contributes to populist movements’ electoral success. Building upon this theoretical framework, this study offers an explanation for the 2015 double general elections in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) experienced disappointment after losing its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 elections. However, the AKP increased its votes by 8.6 percent in the November 2015 elections. Between these two elections, the AKP had used the Kurdish question to trigger perceptions of ontological insecurity, which enabled it to securitize the elections in November. This strategy helped the AKP win the November elections.
Drawing on the literature on minorities’ and ethnic groups’ perceptions of the police, this article investigates the differences between Kurds and Turks in terms of their perceptions of the police in Turkey. We conducted survey research... more
Drawing on the literature on minorities’ and ethnic groups’ perceptions of
the police, this article investigates the differences between Kurds and Turks in terms of their perceptions of the police in Turkey. We conducted survey research using a nationally representative sample of 1804 people. Multivariate regression analysis revealed that Kurds in Turkey have a more negative perception of the police than Turks, regardless of their gender, education, income, party affiliation, and sectarian identity. It is concluded that the historical relationship between Kurds and the Turkish state has had a decisive effect on how Kurds perceive the police.
A variety of factors affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Based on Turkey’s political and economic context, as well as the existing literature, this study investigates the effect of four factors on people’s satisfaction with... more
A variety of factors affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Based on Turkey’s political and economic context, as well as the existing literature, this study investigates the effect of four factors on people’s satisfaction with democracy in Turkey: citizens’ conceptualizations of democracy, being a political winner, citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity, and ethnic identity. Regression analysis of a nationally representative survey reveals that political losers and those with negative perceptions of electoral integrity are less satisfied with democracy in Turkey, while people’s conceptualizations of democracy and ethnic identity do not have an effect on satisfaction with democracy. We conclude that, in Turkey, political polarization and negative perceptions of electoral integrity trigger a decline in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, which requires the
the attention of policymakers.
Türkiye dünyanın en büyük fındık üreticisi ve ihracatçısı konumunda. Ancak fındık üreticileri, bazı yıllar bol mahsul veya mahsullerine iyi fiyat alsalar bile, giderek daha zorlu koşullarda üretim yapıyorlar. Bu yazıda, Türkiye'de fındık... more
Türkiye dünyanın en büyük fındık üreticisi ve ihracatçısı konumunda. Ancak fındık üreticileri, bazı yıllar bol mahsul veya mahsullerine iyi fiyat alsalar bile, giderek daha zorlu koşullarda üretim yapıyorlar. Bu yazıda, Türkiye'de fındık üretiminin barındırdığı çelişkileri ele alacağız. Sorunların kaynağında fındık işletmelerinin küçük olmasının yattığı yönündeki genel kabulün aksine, sorunun aslen fındık piyasasındaki eşitsiz güç ilişkilerinden kaynaklandığını göstermeye çalışacağız. 2017'de Doğu ve Batı Karadeniz Bölgeleri'nde yaptığımız alan araştırmasının verilerinin bir bölümünün bulgularına dayanan makalede şu savları ortaya koyuyoruz. Türkiye'de küçük işletmelerde yapılan fındık tarımının verimlilik ve kârlılık konusunda sorunları vardır. Fındık üreticilerinin çoğu verim artırımı için gerekli harcamaları ve yatırımı yapamamaktadırlar. Bu sorunlar, üretim birimlerinin küçük olmasından çok, fındık üreticilerinin demografik profili, borçlanma ve fındık piyasasındaki eşitsiz yapıdan kaynaklanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, fındık üretimindeki sorunların çözülmesi için üretim ölçeğini büyütmekten çok, eşitsiz güç ilişkilerinin hâkim olduğu küresel piyasada üretici lehine değişiklikler yapmak daha uygun olabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fındık üretimi • Karadeniz Bölgesi • Küçük meta üretimi • Küresel tedarik zinciri
Few consumers, when they snack on hazelnuts or hazelnut chocolate bars, think of the steps that go into producing these treats, including who is involved or what share of the price they pay at the supermarket reaches the workers who toil... more
Few consumers, when they snack on hazelnuts or hazelnut chocolate bars, think of the steps that go into producing these treats, including who is involved or what share of the price they pay at the supermarket reaches the workers who toil under the summer sun to harvest the hazelnuts. As part of the project “Piloting the USDA Guidelines for Eliminating Child Labor and Forced Labor in the Hazelnut Supply Chain in Turkey,” the Fair Labor Association commissioned this study to find out how value is spread across the hazelnut supply chain, and the impact of the value distribution on workers’ wages in the hazelnut sector. This research—the first of its kind—examines the procurement price of Turkish hazelnuts, analyzing the
components that make up its value, and explores the relationship between the procurement price and working conditions in hazelnut production, with a special focus on child labor and the working conditions of seasonal migrant workers. The study also traces the share of wages in a kilogram of
hazelnut chocolate and a kilogram of chocolate hazelnut spread.
Bu araştırmada, Türkiye’de farklı cinsiyet, etnik ve mezhep gruplarına mensup kişilerin, demokrasi ve demokratik devlet tanımları 60 adet yarı-yapılandırılmış yüz yüze görüşmeye dayanarak çalışılmıştır. Bu görüşmelerde, çeşitli etnik... more
Bu araştırmada, Türkiye’de farklı cinsiyet, etnik ve mezhep gruplarına mensup kişilerin, demokrasi ve demokratik devlet tanımları 60 adet yarı-yapılandırılmış yüz yüze görüşmeye dayanarak çalışılmıştır. Bu görüşmelerde, çeşitli etnik ve dini kimliklere ve sosyo-ekonomik gruplara ait bireylerle konuşulmuştur. Görüşmelerin analizi sonucunda, demokrasiyi tanımlarken, kadınların cinsiyet eşitliği üzerinde durduğu, Kürtlerin ve Alevilerin hak ve özgürlüklere, Sünni Türk erkeklerin ise ekonomik refaha odaklandıkları görülmüştür. Bu bulgulara dayanarak, devletle tartışmalı bir ilişki içerisinde olan kimlik gruplarının demokrasiyi hak ve özgürlükler açısından tanımlamaya, devletle bu şekilde bir ilişki içerisinde olmayan grupların ise demokrasiyi tanımlarken ekonomik konuları merkeze almaya daha eğilimli olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Çalışmada ayrıca katılımcıların demokratik devletten beklentileri de incelenmiştir. Görüşmelerin bu bölümünde de benzer sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. Sünni Türk erkeklerin demokratik devletten beklentileri arasında eşitlik bulunduğu durumlarda bile, bu görüşmecilerin daha çok ekonomik eşitliğin belirli bir ölçüde sağlanmasını kastettikleri anlaşılmıştır. Bunun aksine, Sünni Türk kadınlar, Kürtler ve Aleviler, demokratik devletten beklentilerinin arasında farklı etnik ve dini gruplar arasında eşitliğin sağlanması olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir. Türkiye toplumunu oluşturan bu kimlik gruplarının demokrasiye ve demokratik devlete ilişkin tutumlarındaki bu önemli farklılıklar, Türkiye’de hem demokrasinin konsolide edilmesi hem de bu konudaki toplumsal ayrışmanın azaltılması yönündeki sorunlara işaret etmektedir.
Yapılan araştırmalar, sivil toplum kuruluşlarına katılımın demokrasi üstünde olumlu bir etkisi olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak Türkiye’de sivil toplum kuruluşlarına üyelik düşüktür. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de devlet ile sivil toplum... more
Yapılan araştırmalar, sivil toplum kuruluşlarına katılımın demokrasi üstünde olumlu bir etkisi olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak Türkiye’de sivil toplum kuruluşlarına üyelik düşüktür. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de devlet ile sivil toplum kuruluşları arasındaki ilişkinin tarihine ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarına
katılımı etkileyen faktörleri inceleyen literatüre dayanarak Türkiye’de sivil toplum kuruluşlarına üyeliğin düşük olmasının nedenlerini araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu doğrultuda bu çalışmada, 2015 senesinde Türkiye nüfusunu temsil eden bir örneklem ile gerçekleştirilmiş ulusal bir anket çalışması kullanılmıştır. Yapılan analizler, Türkiye’de kişilerin sivil toplum kuruluşlarını demokrasinin önemli öğesi olarak görmediğine işaret etmiştir. Ayrıca, devletin sivil toplum kuruluşlarını dikkate alması, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının devletten bağımsız hareket etmesi ve vatandaşların çekinmeden sivil kuruluşlarına üye olması gibi konularda katılımcıların büyük bir kısmının olumsuz düşüncelere sahip olduğu bulunmuştur. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de sivil toplum ve devlet ilişkilerinin problemli tarihinin
kişilerin sivil toplum kuruluşlarına karşı bu olumsuz yargılara sahip olmalarına ve dolayısıyla sivil toplum kuruluşlarına üyelikten kaçınmalarına neden olduğu sonuca varmıştır.
Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. Ordinary people do not understand the same thing from democracy. Nevertheless, intellectuals and the political elite alike promote democracy as an ideal to be emulated. In addition, democracy... more
Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. Ordinary people do not understand the same thing from democracy. Nevertheless, intellectuals and the political elite alike promote democracy as an ideal to be emulated. In addition, democracy literature does not extensively study the factors, which affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term. A major goal of this research is to investigate how the context people occupy affects the ways in which they understand democracy. To do this, I use World Values Survey 6th wave, which was conducted between 2010 and 2014 and covers 60 countries. Analysis demonstrates that GDP per capita (PPP) is an important factor affecting the ways in which people define democracy. People in richer countries are more likely to consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy while people in poorer countries tend to consider economic characteristics as essential to democracy. This finding indicates the possibility of the presence of specific support to the regime in poorer countries and the presence of diffuse support to the regime in richer countries, making consolidation of democracy harder in poorer countries. The analysis also shows that in poorer countries authoritarian tendencies are higher among people than among people in richer countries. The analysis does not provide any evidence that the ways in which people define democracy shape the political regime. Comparative study of Egypt and Tunisia shows that two factors affect the outcome of transitions: elite coherence and electoral system preference.
In this working paper, we explore the reactions of target groups to populist discourse through focus groups in five European countries and perform a quantitative analysis of Facebook data in eight European countries. We demonstrate the... more
In this working paper, we explore the reactions of target groups to populist discourse through focus groups in five European countries and perform a quantitative analysis of Facebook data in eight European countries. We demonstrate the ways in which populist discourse and policies affect target groups including migrants, ethnic or religious minorities, academics, and LGBTIQ+ groups. Focus groups revealed that organized religion is an agent of populist movements. The Catholic Church in Poland and the Greek Orthodox Church legitimize and disseminate populist discourses. We also find that vulnerable groups complain about mainstreaming of hate language in their countries. The rise of populist movements and these movements’ eagerness to express controversial opinion on issues including immigration, homosexuality and political liberalism caused certain groups examined in this paper to appropriate these opinions and voice them in everyday life. Vulnerable groups, in an attempt to counterpoise the populist challenge in their countries, have developed four main strategies: i) creating echo chambers, ii) self-censorship, iii) migration, and iv) active resistance. Echo chambers enable members of vulnerable groups to avoid what they deem unnecessary and potentially unpleasant encounters with supporters of populist movements. It provides them with a comfort zone where they can express opinion more freely. Self-censorship, similar to echo chambers, helps target groups to stay under the radar of populist movements and their supporters. Those defending migration state that the process in their countries is irreversible and migrating to another country is the only way out. Finally, some participants argued that rather than conceding defeat, they actively resist through civil society organizations, street protests, and openly display their identity to fight off populism. Analysis of Facebook data revealed information about the ways in which populist parties and leaders communicate on social media and how the public perceives their communication. Populists use an anti-elitist language more frequently than mainstream political actors. Turkey and Hungary are exception to the rule, because in both countries populist governments have been in office for a long time. Second, populist actors in all countries but Poland and Turkey talk about immigration more. In Germany, France and the UK, populist actors frequently discuss EU-related issues. We also found that populists in Germany, France, Italy and the UK talk more about ‘democracy and legitimacy’ than mainstream parties do whilst populists talk about these issues less than mainstream parties do in Greece, Hungary and Turkey. Analysis also suggests that populist actors’ Facebook posts obtain more reactions, shares, and comments than mainstream political actors’. Anti-elitist language in social media posts produces more reactions, shares, and comments. Posts with references to religious minorities trigger fewer reactions from the users while posts making references to ethnic minorities, including immigrants or asylum seekers, as well as country-specific minorities like Roma in Hungary or Kurds in Turkey, trigger more reactions, and these posts are shared more. Finally, we find that posts referring to ‘immigration’ trigger more reactions and shares and produce more discussion than other issues. In the final section of this working paper, we conclude with a short discussion on policy options.