Manohar Kumar

Certain strands of liberal political theory treats dissent as an aberration to the procedures of consent formation. Dissent is understood as necessary in so far as the procedures of consent formation are unjust or inimical to competing conceptions of the good. Dissent, in such reasoning, forces the state and the majority to take note of the just grievances of the minority. This requires dissent to be conducted in public, in a non-violent and civil manner. The reasons should be available for public scrutiny and deliberation and dissenting voices need to convince the majority regarding the justness of their claims. Thus proper procedures and norms of civility and publicity need to be followed. Any practice that deviates from these norms is not only considered suspect but also illegal. But such a proceduralist conception, derived from an ideal theory of justice, fails to accommodate new and emergent varieties of dissent and relegates them to the margins. Against the proceduralist conception, in this paper, I develop a non-ideal approach to understand everyday practices of dissent. This approach treats dissent as an ever evolving and a creative mode of engagement that not only fashions and defines new methods but also leads to revision in procedures. To explore a non-ideal theory of dissent this paper is divided into three parts. The first part provides a survey of existing literature on dissent. The second part develops two criteria to evaluate dissent. The final part develops the theory further by testing it against covert forms of dissent. I argue that a non-ideal theory of dissent should have the following two criteria to evaluate it: (i) An impartial criteria, (ii) an epistemic criteria. The impartial criteria ascertains whether a particular dissenting action is democracy enhancing or limiting in character. By democracy enhancing I mean those practices that uphold and respect the general system of rights. Such impartial criteria neither demands of political actors publicness of actions nor public reasons. It rather ascertains whether public reasons, independent of the motivation of actors, can be provided, to judge dissenting actions. Such reasons can be publicly provided either by the civil society or independent actors, including, the dissenters (whenever possible). The epistemic criteria evaluates the epistemic role of dissent: whether such forms reveal previously unknown sources and acts of injustice. This approach thus does not take principles of publicity and civility as a binding norm for dissent to be legitimate. Rather it suggests that some apparent uncivil or covert forms of dissent are permissible if they have a commendable moral, political, epistemic, and public function. Thus the binary civil/uncivil, public/ non-public is not a helpful category to evaluate or understand dissent. Finally, I argue that certain covert forms of dissent qualify the criteria developed in part two. By covert forms of dissent I mean secretive political action, unidentified digital dissent, anonymous whistleblowing, hacking, and leaking. Covert dissent is not only democracy enhancing but, in some instances, introduces new vocabulary and important information into the public discourse, absent which democracy is not only poor but fails in its self-corrective disposition.

This paper argues for the centrality of dissent to the democratic process. Contemporary political theory treats dissent as an aberration to the procedures of consent formation. Dissent is understood as necessary in so far as the procedures of consent formation are unjust or inimical to competing conceptions of justice. Dissent, in such a conception, forces the state and the majority to take note of the just grievances of the minority. When procedures of grievance redressal accommodate the competing conceptions of the good in a just and fair manner dissent is not merely suspect but illegal. Such procedures not only lay down criteria and qualification to judge dissent but also categorise it as being civil or uncivil. Dissent lying outside the defined set of procedures is considered as an act of a maverick, the outsider, who cannot accommodate itself within the given procedural framework. This particular categorisation has its dangers. Dissent is not only crucial to understand democracy as a work in progress but also qualifies the stability of democracy. By stability I mean that dissent is not merely tolerated or recognised (politically and constitutionally) as having a testimonial value but that substantive disagreement is a qualifying feature of democracy, which if not addressed would result in breakdown of the democratic process. Democracy thus requires sustained and substantive engagement with its dissenters. This requires constant upgradation in its vocabulary: awareness of not only varieties but new and emerging forms of dissent. A proceduralist conception, derived from an ideal theory of justice, often fails to accommodate new varieties and treats them as uncivil and illegal thus requiring non-engagement. This causes disaffection among the dissenting population thus posing threat to democracy. In order to avoid such disaffection democratic theory needs to formulate a theory of dissent that does not derive from an ideal theory of justice or fits within its framework. This requires a sustained engagement with new and emerging forms of dissent and understand the claims they make on the democratic process. At times emergency requirements necessitates democracies to undertake un-democratic measures to preserve itself. It is in such instances that threat of exclusion and marginalisation is more. Dissenting voices might be treated as suspect or worst un-patriotic. It is here at the margins and excesses of democracy that the test of democracy lies. In such a context, forms of dissent, which at the outset seem to be undemocratic or unpatriotic, but enhance the cause of democracy in the long run demand a proper consideration. It is only through a thorough understanding of the dissenting claims and the procedures they use that a proper qualification between civil and uncivil, legal and illegal forms of dissent can be made. It needs to be understood whether such emerging forms of dissent have a commendable moral, political, and epistemic function. To accommodate new and emerging varieties we need a new theory that steers away from the current approach. This will not only accommodate considerations which are in danger of being excluded but also clear the often held confusion between civil and uncivil forms of dissent. In the absence of such accommodation there is a threat of losing out on important epistemic considerations that revise democracy for its own good. Thus, the main claim of the paper is that there is much good that dissent brings about to democracy. Examples abound for this claim. But existing political theories of dissent treat many such conceptions as suspect because they do not conform to the procedural and the ideal conception of democracy. Such an approach risks exclusions of varied forms that enhances democracy in the long run. This paper thus steers away from the current conception to understand the existing everyday forms of dissent and develop a theory that not only accommodates it but also provides opening to new forms, if and when they emerge.

Veils of secrecy break down the reason sharing function of democracy. Evidence of wrongs is sole proprietorship of those having access to classified information. Individuals are denied access to information that would allow them to assess the circumstances that lead to their right limitations (if the information concerns certain wrongs). They are injured in their capacity as right holders. In these conditions the system of rights and public accountability can only be ensured through acts of whistleblowing. This paper argues that whistleblowing is a form of civil disobedience and not conscientious objection. To this end the paper is divided in two parts. The first part outlays the distinction between conscientious objection and civil disobedience pertaining to acts of whistleblowing. It then argues that whistleblowing can be read as an aspect of the latter rather than the former. The second part provides a theory of civil disobedience that is sensitive to acts of whistleblowing. In doing so the paper argues against certain tendencies to accommodate and explain whistleblowing under existing theories. Rather the paper highlights that the civil disobedience theory needs to be broadened to explain new and emerging forms of dissent. I Whistleblowing is a form of civil disobedience, and not conscientious objection, since it demands a pro-active engagement in the critique of existing legislation. On the contrary, the minimal requirement for conscientious objection to be successful is a withdrawal of services or consent, refusal to participate in harms of the organization. It is a moral act to the extent that the perceived harm does not comply with the moral universe of the person, and any engagement with the act militates against deeply held convictions. These convictions need not be public in character or need not be elucidated in democratic terms; on the contrary some of these convictions might be un-democratic. A conscientious refusal merely demands a respect of deeply held beliefs of the agent and requires an exemption from the services they are supposed to offer. Contrary to this, whistleblowing seeks to uphold democratic norms of transparency and publicity, and affirms the right of the citizens to be aware of wrongness of institutional practices and policies. Thus, whistleblowing represents a critique of institutional practices and ensures democratic accountability. Whistleblowing is an act of civil disobedience since it is a public act done with keeping public interest in mind and intended to address, and if possible correct, wrongs perpetrated against it. The justification of the act is public as it affirms the need for public assessment of the nature of wrongs. II In this part I argue that whistleblowing represents a special kind of civil disobedience because of its epistemic character. Secrecy creates an

National security and strategic interests of the modern state require a certain amount of secrecy. However, state secrecy poses a dilemma for constitutional democracies, whose legitimacy depends on the transparency of democratic decision-making. In this chapter, we defend the argument that citizens’ right to know limits the prerogatives of state secrecy. We start from the debate on the balance between liberty and security and provide some criticisms of the idea that striking a balance is always justified in a democracy. We pay particular attention to the role secrecy plays in matters of national security and the effects of unrestrained secrecy on the enjoyment of rights. We then introduce the notion of epistemic entitlement of rights and argue that secrecy is legitimate within a constitutional democracy only when citizens enjoy a specific right to know in which circumstances their rights can be legitimately limited or restricted. We call this the right of assessment.

In this chapter we provide a justification of political whistleblowing and articulate some criteria for the permissibility of disclosures. In the first part we discuss the main criticisms against political whistleblowing. In particular, we address the objections from the breach of obligation and trust, lack of patriotism, harm to national security, vigilantism, lack of accountability, and imperfect information. In the second part we define the epistemic circumstances of disclosure, and we specify three conditions for the permissibility of political whistleblowing: the communicative constraints, intent, and public interest.

Political corruption is a fraudulent exchange for the mutual advantage between parties entrusted with public power, and whose costs bear on third parties who do not enjoy the benefit of that transaction. A defining feature of political corruption is that it affects the public interest of constituencies by diverting public funds for personal advantages, dumping the costs of diversion on the polity at large. In this chapter, we argue that the role of civic whistleblowing in the fight against corruption should be properly understood within a conception of public interest. In this chapter, we argue that whistleblowing contributes to the public interest when it exposes crimes that cause an unfair allocation of the burdens of cooperation.

How should one qualify political whistleblowing within a democratic system, governed by the rule of law? Whistleblowing is often considered a form of principled, sometimes even democratic dissent. In this last chapter, we discuss what kind of dissent whistleblowing is. We discuss various forms of dissent and argue that whistleblowing is neither a case of conscientious objection nor a case of civil disobedience. However—we conclude—it is a distinctive form of civil dissent against the threat of unruled government secrecy.

The practice of fearless speech occupies a distinctive yet neglected role within the history of political thought. In this chapter we contextualize whistleblowing within such a tradition and define its proper scope. In the first part we offer an introduction on the origin of the term and a discussion of some early cases. We pay particular attention to the ancient Greek practice of parrhesia, and then situate whistleblowing within the debate on publicity. In the second part of the chapter we turn to the current debate on the morality of whistleblowing and review some conceptions proposed in the literature: the standard theory, complicity, the moral choice view, integrity, civic duty, and the question of loyalty. In the final part we lay down the features of a comprehensive definition. We introduce an important distinction between political and civic whistleblowing, provide a detailed account of both forms, and clear some confusions that have emerged in the recent literature.

The political institutions under which we live today evolved from a revolutionary idea that shook the world in the second part of the eighteenth century: that a people should govern itself. Yet if we judge contemporary democracies by the ideals of self-government, equality and liberty, we find that democracy is not what it was dreamt to be. This book addresses central issues in democratic theory by analyzing the sources of widespread dissatisfaction with democracies around the world. With attention throughout to historical and cross-national variations, the focus is on the generic limits of democracy in promoting equality, effective participation, control of governments by citizens, and liberty. The conclusion is that although some of this dissatisfaction has good reasons, some is based on an erroneous understanding of how democracy functions. Hence, although the analysis identifies the limits of democracy, it also points to directions for feasible reforms.

Inequality is not exclusively a matter of unequal distribution of resources or opportunities. It also affects people's awareness of their social standing with regard to their fellow citizens. Should a theory of justice be concerned with these aspects of people's standing in society? In this paper we answer this question in the affirmative, focussing on the role epistemic injustice plays in shaping the attitudes towards educational opportunities, especially in those cases when “bound to fail” attitudes affects educational outcomes for the worst-off.

The recent Democratic National Committee (DNC) email leaks raises a plethora of questions that need careful consideration. If the leaks are to be believed the committee sought to favour Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders to the point of undermining his candidacy. The leaks demonstrate a fundamental prejudice against Sanders. Some committee members wanted Sanders to be questioned over his religious beliefs; this would make him unpopular with the religious population. In addition they mocked his campaign, were annoyed at his supporters. As if this was not enough, Clinton lawyers also provided strategic advice to the DNC when it was questioned over its neutrality. Allegation have also been made that debates were scheduled in a manner to limit Sanders' access to the public. The leaks also raise concerns regarding preferences of certain donors in terms of access to POTUS or important platforms. In my opinion we should judge the leaks within the fundamental conflict between the right to privacy and the quest for transparency. Privacy advocates would vouch for the secrecy of exchanges and the right of individuals to share and discuss their opinions freely. The disclosure of identity of individual donors would also be a matter of concern. It can be argued, in their defence, that the leaks jeopardise future attempts to raise funds by keeping in mind the interests of donors. Contrary to these contentions, I think that the leaks raise weightier concerns of transparency and publicity. These concerns trump over privacy rights of individual donors and the claim of the committee to hold negotiation among its members in a secretive manner. The leaks also raise important questions from the point of democratic theory: should members holding public office disregard their preferences over commands of duty? Should strategic and pragmatic considerations trump role obligations? Are offices such as DNC bound by transparency regulations? To answer these questions the functioning of the DNC needs to be understood along with the role that publicity and secrecy plays in such institutions. Since the DNC is the formal governing body of the Democratic Party, it is supposed to be impartial towards its candidates and accountable to its members. All departures from such a norm requires due public justification to its members. With this contention in mind let us turn to what philosophy has to offer about secrecy of negotiations. Political philosophers have often argued that secrecy in deliberation is permitted if it enhances the quality of deliberation. Publicity often forces individuals to play to the gallery and advance partisan interests rather than deliberate in a calm, reasonable manner. It also allows individuals to accept and appreciate reasons provided by others and counter them with equal reasonable arguments. Participants can equally revise their opinion in an uncoerced environment. This argument has been contested by those who claim that allowing for secret negotiations can in turn allow the very partisan interests to hold sway which one is seeking to avoid. Publicity, on the contrary, acts as a necessary check against private appropriation of a public platform.