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Neophytos Loizides
  • Canterbury, Kent, United Kingdom
Border arrangements are often critical to the successful negotiation of peace settlements and the broader politics of post-conflict societies. However, developing an understanding of popular preferences about these arrangements is... more
Border arrangements are often critical to the successful negotiation of peace settlements and the broader politics of post-conflict societies. However, developing an understanding of popular preferences about these arrangements is difficult using traditional surveys. To address this problem, we used a conjoint survey experiment to assess preferences about post-Brexit border arrangements in Northern Ireland. We mapped areas of convergence and divergence in the preferences about post-Brexit border arrangements of unionist and nationalist communities, simulated the degree of public support for politically plausible outcomes and identified the border arrangements that both communities could agree upon. In so doing, we outlined an empirical approach to understanding public preferences about border arrangements that could be used to understand the degree of support for similar institutional arrangements in other divided societies.
This chapter examines the Brussels’ consociational model, a sophisticated and original system of regional and urban governance. We focus on two critical features of broader interest to consociational theories: proportionality and minority... more
This chapter examines the Brussels’ consociational model, a sophisticated and original system of regional and urban governance. We focus on two critical features of broader interest to consociational theories: proportionality and minority protection. While most classic and contemporary studies of consociationalism associate the latter with proportional representation (Lijphart 1968; McEvoy 2006; McGarry and O’Leary, 2009), we demonstrate how in Brussels, mechanisms of minority protection have substantially modified proportional representation, resulting in what has been called a “protective dis-proportional representation model.” We discuss the potential benefits and limits of dis-proportionality in favor of Dutch speakers in Brussels emphasizing the broader context of Belgium’s multi-level consociationalism (favoring the French speakers in Belgium’s central government). Finally, we propose a legal analysis of the Brussels dis-proportional representation model and question the compliance of the latter with the fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination.
Supplemental material, Supplemental_material for Internally displaced persons and the Cyprus peace process by Charis Psaltis, Huseyin Cakal, Neophytos Loizides and Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant in International Political Science Review
This is a representative sample survey from both communities of Cyprus that was funded by A.G. Leventis Foundation of the University of Cyprus
For decades, the UN has failed to mediate a settlement in Cyprus because of a general and profound weakness: it is unable, outside of unity and resolve in the Security Council, to offer direct incentives to parties in conflict that would... more
For decades, the UN has failed to mediate a settlement in Cyprus because of a general and profound weakness: it is unable, outside of unity and resolve in the Security Council, to offer direct incentives to parties in conflict that would shape their calculus towards conflict resolution, or to control the actions of third parties in a way that would incentivize conflict resolution or prevent disincentives. In the resulting vacuum, the prospects for peace settlements come to rest largely on domestic politics within the contesting camps and, sometimes relatedly, on the balance of power between them. In the case of Cyprus, the article claims that these weaknesses on the part of the UN were clearly on display during the negotiation process surrounding the Annan Plan (2001–04) and the resumed process that began in 2008 and ended at Crans-Montana in 2017.
How do different degrees of displaced people’s hardship shape their expectations of peace and violence in post-conflict societies? We develop a novel explanation and empirically examine it using survey data collected in Bosnia Herzegovina... more
How do different degrees of displaced people’s hardship shape their expectations of peace and violence in post-conflict societies? We develop a novel explanation and empirically examine it using survey data collected in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2013. The displaced may suffer by being the target of the hostility of opposing groups and/or by receiving little support from, or being mistreated by, their own groups and international actors. As a result, they develop negative opinions about these actors, friend and foe alike, become pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation, and see post-conflict peace as unsustainable. We find those who have suffered greater hardship during displacement are more likely to foresee political violence. Hardship during displacement is also a stronger predictor than the experience of violence. Our analysis implies that, while violence does have an impact as suggested by the literature, other hardship during displacement, such as the lack of support, also ...
The article focuses on Greek Cypriot internally displaced persons and their attitudes towards the island’s reunification talks. We utilize quantitative data from two representative sample surveys, conducted in 2016–2017, which probed... more
The article focuses on Greek Cypriot internally displaced persons and their attitudes towards the island’s reunification talks. We utilize quantitative data from two representative sample surveys, conducted in 2016–2017, which probed respondents on their views on territorial readjustments, property provisions and power-sharing. Contrary to the current findings in the literature, internally displaced persons status is associated with higher levels of support for a negotiated peace settlement. The article examines the impact of anticipated threats and economic opportunities accompanying a settlement and suggests a set of institutionalized mechanisms to incorporate the views of internally displaced persons and other disadvantaged groups in future reunification talks.
This special issue examines the interplay between reconciliation in postconflict societies and alternative mechanisms of political accommodation. In our introductory article, we define and explore the central concepts used in... more
This special issue examines the interplay between reconciliation in postconflict societies and alternative mechanisms of political accommodation. In our introductory article, we define and explore the central concepts used in post-conflict studies while investigating the potential linkages between reconciliation and federal or power-sharing arrangements. We argue that addressing issues of justice, reconciliation and amnesty in the aftermath of conflict frequently facilitates cooperation in establishing successful institutional mechanisms at the political level. We also examine the degree to which reconciliation at the grassroots level should be seen as a prerequisite of consolidating power-sharing arrangements among elites particularly in the form of federal agreements. Finally, we discuss the individual contributions to the special issue and highlight the importance of incorporating insights from the literature of transitional justice and post-conflict reconciliation to the study a...
This article compares the processes of foreign policymaking in Greece and Turkey in order to examine why the incentives and pressures of the enlargement process have failed until now to initiate a settlement in the Cyprus bicommunal... more
This article compares the processes of foreign policymaking in Greece and Turkey in order to examine why the incentives and pressures of the enlargement process have failed until now to initiate a settlement in the Cyprus bicommunal negotiations. While most studies on the Cyprus problem have focused on the two communities of the island, little attention has been paid to the policies of the two `motherlands', namely Greece and Turkey. Yet their leverage on the two Cypriot communities and their conflicting expectations with regard to an enlarged Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute a complex security puzzle. The Republic of Cyprus stands as a champion candidate member for the next enlargement, amid fears of Turkish reprisals and hopes for a political settlement on the island. With the benefits of settlement overwhelming the benefits of any other alternative, it is paradoxical that the parties seem to be about to fail to reach a last-minute, mutually beneficial compromise...
ABSTRACT This article examines why center-right parties that have partly built their image around ethnic or religious identities reverse their positions to support peace arrangements. Political settlements in divided societies frequently... more
ABSTRACT This article examines why center-right parties that have partly built their image around ethnic or religious identities reverse their positions to support peace arrangements. Political settlements in divided societies frequently run counter to the values of these parties and are also potentially damaging to their internal party cohesion. We argue that political learning through sustained interaction with external pro-peace allies transforms the positions of center-right parties by socializing them when it comes to their international agenda, yet the same effect is not observed in party actions within the sphere of domestic intra-communal politics. Drawing from the Cypriot and Northern Irish peace processes, we show that once these parties embrace peace agreements, they do so by balancing international and local considerations, choosing to compensate domestic constituencies on symbolic issues of less importance for the peace process yet of major significance to conservative constituencies. The study of center-right and conservative peace actors has important implications for research on mediation and international conflict since it suggests mechanisms through which policy makers can better engage with ethnic or religious parties in fragile peace processes.
Negotiating the right of return is a central issue in post-conflict societies aiming to resolve tensions between human rights issues and security concerns. Peace proposals often fail to carefully balance these tensions or to identify... more
Negotiating the right of return is a central issue in post-conflict societies aiming to resolve tensions between human rights issues and security concerns. Peace proposals often fail to carefully balance these tensions or to identify incentives and linkages that enable refugee return. To address this gap, the article puts forward an alternative arrangement in negotiating refugee rights currently being considered in the bilateral negotiations in Cyprus. Previous peace plans for the reunification of the island emphasized primarily Turkish Cypriot security and stipulated a maximum number of Greek Cypriot refugees eligible to return under future Turkish Cypriot administration. The authors’ alternative suggests a minimum threshold of Greek Cypriots refugees plus self-adjustable incentives for the Turkish Cypriot community to accept the rest. The article reviews different options including linking actual numbers of returnees with naturalizations for Turkish settlers or immigrants, Turkey’...
What explains patterns of restraint vs. patterns of confrontation in the crisis behavior of majority groups? My thesis examines two dominant national majorities and their miscellaneous patterns of crisis behavior, manifested either in... more
What explains patterns of restraint vs. patterns of confrontation in the crisis behavior of majority groups? My thesis examines two dominant national majorities and their miscellaneous patterns of crisis behavior, manifested either in confrontational policies or in policies of restraint. I focus on the external security conditions and constraints that shape confrontational behavior, the domestic political dynamics that drive crisis behavior, and the framing of grievances and opportunities preceding ethnopolitical crises. In the course of the study, I use two types of methods, supplementing the semi-quantitative Boolean method with qualitative analysis. More specifically, I test alternative hypotheses on Greece and Turkey, two neighboring countries that feature a rich, highly explosive, but also diverse pool of ethnopolitical contention. I find that in the Boolean tests, the security dilemma explains fewer cases with more accuracy (i.e. 14 out of 15 cases, thus being an “almost” sufficient cause); the diversionary theory speaks for the majority of cases, albeit with less precision (20 out of 30). In sum, the findings suggest that the diversionary theory needs to be complemented by other variables, if we wish to explain a number of puzzling clusters of cases in Greece and Turkey.In the qualitative part of my thesis, I probe more deeply into these cases. Nation-wide protests and confrontational policies over the Macedonian issue in Greece in the turbulent first half of the 1990s were not replicated over arguably equally important issues involving either Turkey or Albania. Likewise, political instability in Turkey and discontent over the Kurdish issue translated into mass mobilizations and confrontational policies towards Syria and Italy in the fall of 1998; however, the same factors did not prevent a significant Greek-Turkish compromise at the 1999 European Council summit in Helsinki. I argue that pre-crisis framing (i.e. framing before the advent of each crisis) can explain these apparently dichotomous cases, and working through parliamentary debates, I demonstrate the causal links between a predominantly adversarial framing of opportunities and grievances, on the one hand, and confrontational action, on the other. Finally, I argue that pre-crisis frames are causal: they become entrenched in the social norms, definitions of national interest, domestic politics, and even international negotiations of the majority-group, preventing adaptation as well as reassessment of policy errors.
ABSTRACT Much of the recent political debate in both sides of the island has centered on a proposal by the Greek Cypriot negotiating team for weighted-voting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the island. Specifically, this proposal... more
ABSTRACT Much of the recent political debate in both sides of the island has centered on a proposal by the Greek Cypriot negotiating team for weighted-voting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the island. Specifically, this proposal will allow all Cypriots a double vote, one in their ethnic community and another (with a standardized weight of approximately 20%) in the other community. In the election of President, every person will have one vote therefore Turkish Cypriots will be an electoral minority of around 20%. In a second election, Turkish Cypriots will vote for the Vice-President. Greek Cypriots will participate but with a weighted vote of about 20% (same percentage as Turkish Cypriots in the electoral rolls). Thus, the Greek Cypriot vote will be weighted and the community will become an electoral minority of the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot President will be the Head of government for 2/3 of the time; the Turkish Cypriot will rotate as President for 1/3 of the time. In cases of constitutional deadlock, the acting President will have the winning vote. Following this proposal, it has been argued that weighted voting is a Cypriot innovation with no international precedents. The memo questions this view by demonstrating that weighted voting systems are neither new nor particularly exceptional. About 40 percent of the population of the planet currently lives in democratic or democratizing federations. By their own nature, federal systems try to balance individual rights with those of the governing federal units, drawing on weighted voting systems to do so. The memo summarizes examples of federations departing from the "one person one vote" principle by using some form of weighted voting comparable to the one recently proposed by the Greek Cypriot negotiating team.

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