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Isik D Ozel
  • Istanbul

Isik D Ozel

  • I am a visiting professor at the Department of Social Sciences and a member of the Juan March Institute at the Carlos... moreedit
The expansion of social welfare regimes in middle-income countries (MICs) has become a global trend that has involved the adaption of robust social assistance programs aiming to alleviate poverty and diminish inequalities. We analyze... more
The expansion of social welfare regimes in middle-income countries (MICs) has become a global trend that has involved the adaption of robust social assistance programs aiming to alleviate poverty and diminish inequalities. We analyze conditional cash transfers in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, identifying the types of regulatory regimes that exist in each, namely “loose decentralism” in Brazil, “strict centralism” in Mexico, and “subcontracted dirigisme” in Turkey. We argue that regulatory design is key to understanding how the newly flourishing welfare regimes can control political manipulation, and that where manipulation occurs, social assistance programs can deviate from their initial objectives and endanger the welfare of the poor and hazard trust in the government and political institutions. However, when social welfare regimes work in line with their objectives and eschew political discretion, regulatory welfare states can enhance trust in and legitimacy of political institution...
This working paper explores the processes in which accession to different regional blocs has affected the ways the state interacts with societal actors, along with the interest representation and mediation models in both member and... more
This working paper explores the processes in which accession to different regional blocs has affected the ways the state interacts with societal actors, along with the interest representation and mediation models in both member and accession countries. Focusing on Turkey and Mexico, two upper-middle-income countries situated on the fringes of major powers and integrated into the regional blocs led by those, the paper examines the differential impact of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the organization and mediation of business interests; the ways in which these interests are incorporated into policy-making; and the processes of social dialogue. Taking into consideration the fundamental differences between these two regionalisms, it looks into both direct and indirect mechanisms with respect to the influence of regional-level actors on domestic actors and institutions. Maintaining that the impact of regional blocs cannot be easily isolate...
The contents of this site is subject to the French law on intellectual property and is the exclusive property of the publisher. The works on this site can be accessed and reproduced on paper or digital media, provided that they are... more
The contents of this site is subject to the French law on intellectual property and is the exclusive property of the publisher. The works on this site can be accessed and reproduced on paper or digital media, provided that they are strictly used for personal, scientific or educational purposes excluding any commercial exploitation. Reproduction must necessarily mention the editor, the journal name, the author and the document reference. Any other reproduction is strictly forbidden without permission of the publisher, except in cases provided by legislation
Global Turkey in Europe's third volume sheds light on four key areas in EU-Turkey relations: foreign relations, democracy, the Kurdish question, and economic and trade issues. Building on its two preceding collective volumes, Global... more
Global Turkey in Europe's third volume sheds light on four key areas in EU-Turkey relations: foreign relations, democracy, the Kurdish question, and economic and trade issues. Building on its two preceding collective volumes, Global Turkey in Europe III intends to contribute to a comprehensive discussion on shaping a common Turkish-European future with an eye to key domestic, regional, and global challenges and opportunities facing both the EU and Turkey.
Transformation of interest politics in the context of globalization has been widely studied with respect to advanced countries. In a similar vein, this article examines the recent transformations and diverging national trajectories... more
Transformation of interest politics in the context of globalization has been widely studied with respect to advanced countries. In a similar vein, this article examines the recent transformations and diverging national trajectories against the backdrop of global market integration, focusing on business politics in upper-middle-income countries. Tackling the ways in which domestic political arrangements refract the impact of global forces, the article indicates that the market integration process engenders diverging effects in national settings contingent upon executive–legislative relations. Where power is concentrated in the executive, market integration upholds a form of corporatism; and where legislative power increases, it promotes a form of pluralism. Based on the empirics of Mexico and Turkey, this article shows the links between increasing legislative power and emerging legislative lobbying in Mexico in contrast to increasing executive power and centralization and concentrati...
The expansion of social welfare regimes in middle-income countries (MICs) has become a global trend that has involved the adaption of robust social assistance programs aiming to alleviate poverty and diminish inequalities. We analyze... more
The expansion of social welfare regimes in middle-income countries (MICs) has become a global trend that has involved the adaption of robust social assistance programs aiming to alleviate poverty and diminish inequalities. We analyze conditional cash transfers in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, identifying the types of regulatory regimes that exist in each, namely “loose decentralism” in Brazil, “strict centralism” in Mexico, and “subcontracted dirigisme” in Turkey. We argue that regulatory design is key to understanding how the newly flourishing welfare regimes can control political manipulation, and that where manipulation occurs, social assistance programs can deviate from their initial objectives and endanger the welfare of the poor and hazard trust in the government and political institutions. However, when social welfare regimes work in line with their objectives and eschew political discretion, regulatory welfare states can enhance trust in and legitimacy of political institutions. Our analysis indicates that a centrally regulated social assistance governance nurtured by local knowledge is key to avoiding political manipulation and to alleviating poverty, major issues in MICs.
Tackling redistributive expansion in developing countries, this paper explores broader political consequences of social assistance programmes. Drawing from the Turkish case, where social welfare expanded since the 2000s, it examines... more
Tackling redistributive expansion in developing countries, this paper explores broader political consequences of social assistance programmes. Drawing from the Turkish case, where social welfare expanded since the 2000s, it examines attitudes of social assistance beneficiaries towards transition to presidentialism, which was approved in a referendum in 2017, and took effect in 2018. Using the results of an original survey, it indicates that social assistance benefits played a significant role in increasing support for presidentialism, by garnering votes from opposition voters, especially those with high-risk perceptions, in return for benefits. Given the character of Turkish presidentialism, devoid of vital checks and balances, the findings reveal that incumbents can mobilise support by using redistributive instruments in the context of democratic backsliding.
Global diffusion of regulatory reforms in telecommunications has prevailed in many countries, engendering major institutionalchanges and entailing the establishment and/or reform of regulatory agencies. Although the triggers and timing of... more
Global diffusion of regulatory reforms in telecommunications has prevailed in many countries, engendering major institutionalchanges and entailing the establishment and/or reform of regulatory agencies. Although the triggers and timing of such agenti-fication processes have been more or less similar, agency independence displays significant cross-country variation. Seeking toexplain such variation based on a sample incorporating middle-income countries (MICs), this paper examines the impact ofpolitical-institutional settings in which the agencies operate, in addition to the impact of economic parameters. Regressionanalysis reveals that political rights appear as the central parameter, while their impact is more robust in MICs than inadvanced countries. The results underscore considerable cross-national variation in regulatory governance, along with a note-worthy decoupling between MICs and advanced countries. Concurring with the regulatory regionalism perspective, the paperdelineates distinct regional clusters, albeit remaining agnostic about the determinants of such clusters.
Transformation of interest politics in the context of globalization has been widely studied with respect to advanced countries. In a similar vein, this article examines the recent transformations and diverging national trajectories... more
Transformation of interest politics in the context of globalization has been widely studied with respect to advanced countries. In a similar vein, this article examines the recent transformations and diverging national trajectories against the backdrop of global market integration, focusing on business politics in upper-middle-income countries. Tackling the ways in which domestic political arrangements refract the impact of global forces, the article indicates that the market integration process engenders diverging effects in national settings contingent upon executive– legislative relations. Where power is concentrated in the executive, market integration upholds a form of corporatism; and where legislative power increases, it promotes a form of pluralism. Based on the empirics of Mexico and Turkey, this article shows the links between increasing legislative power and emerging legislative lobbying in Mexico in contrast to increasing executive power and centralization and concentration of interest politics in Turkey. It delineates a major variation in national trajectories in business politics in the age of globalization—the rise of 'elite-plural-ism' dominated by large firms in the former, and 'competitive corporatism' vastly controlled by the executive branch in the latter.
Research Interests:
Global Turkey in Europe's third volume sheds light on four key areas in EU-Turkey relations: foreign relations, democracy, the Kurdish question, and economic and trade issues. Building on its two preceding collective volumes, Global... more
Global Turkey in Europe's third volume sheds light on four key areas in EU-Turkey relations: foreign relations, democracy, the Kurdish question, and economic and trade issues. Building on its two preceding collective volumes, Global Turkey in Europe III intends to contribute to a comprehensive discussion on shaping a common Turkish-European future with an eye to key domestic, regional, and global challenges and opportunities facing both the EU and Turkey.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Transformation of interest politics in the context of globalization has been widely studied with respect to advanced countries. In a similar vein, this paper examines the recent transformations and diverging national trajectories against... more
Transformation of interest politics in the context of globalization has been widely studied with respect to advanced countries. In a similar vein, this paper examines the recent transformations and diverging national trajectories against the backdrop of global market integration, focusing on business politics in upper-middle-income countries. Tackling the ways in which domestic political arrangements refract the impact of global forces, the paper indicates that the market integration process engenders diverging effects in national settings contingent upon executive–legislative relations. Where power is concentrated in the executive, market integration upholds a form of corporatism; and where legislative power increases, it promotes a form of pluralism. Based on the empirics of Mexico and Turkey, the paper shows the links between increasing legislative power and emerging legislative lobbying in Mexico; in contrast to increasing executive power and centralization and concentration of interest politics in Turkey. It delineates a major variation in national trajectories in business politics in the age of globalization: the rise of ‘elite-pluralism’ dominated by large firms in the former, and ‘competitive corporatism’ vastly controlled by the executive branch in the latter.
Research Interests:
Examining the recent evolution of public skill institutions and the diverging trajectories of institutional change, this paper focuses on skill certification systems, empirically drawing from two middle-income countries (MICs), Mexico and... more
Examining the recent evolution of public skill institutions and the diverging trajectories of institutional change, this paper focuses on skill certification systems, empirically drawing from two middle-income countries (MICs), Mexico and Turkey. Building on the argument that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) prefer public skill systems to generate a technically skilled workforce more than large firms do, it puts forward that governments supporting and being supported by SMEs will be more willing to endorse skill certification systems for their distributional consequences. It argues that public skill institutions are embraced to varying degrees based on cost-benefit calculations of domestic elites; and only adopted effectively if they are in concord with key actors’ interests. Therefore, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on skill politics in the MICs by examining the dynamics of domestic political coalitions that support or prevent the development of skill institutions based on extensive empirical analysis, and it agrees with the arguments emphasizing the importance of SMEs’ presence in political coalitions for skill reforms. Furthermore, it provides important evidence against the arguments on institutional convergence in the age of globalization by showing the varying outcomes of similar external pressures in the MICs.

KEYWORDS: Skills, middle-income countries, globalization, institutional change, business, SMEs
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
... 15Democrat Party rule ended with a military takeover in May of 1960. The aftermath of the coup was characterized by the “rise of an ideological enthusiasm” to institute a sound growth strategy along “positivist-rationalist grounds”... more
... 15Democrat Party rule ended with a military takeover in May of 1960. The aftermath of the coup was characterized by the “rise of an ideological enthusiasm” to institute a sound growth strategy along “positivist-rationalist grounds” (Ünay 2006: 57). ...
Abstract will be provided by author.
This chapter examines the diffusion and actual operation of regulatory reforms since the 1990s in Turkey, focusing on national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in various sectors. It takes a step further from the mere initiation of regulatory... more
This chapter examines the diffusion and actual operation of regulatory reforms since the 1990s in Turkey, focusing on national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in various sectors. It takes a step further from the mere initiation of regulatory reforms along with de jure institutional ...
This article explains how the Turkish business' regime preferences have evolved from pro-authoritarian to pro-democratic in the context of dual transitions, in response to changes in incentive structures shaped by domestic,... more
This article explains how the Turkish business' regime preferences have evolved from pro-authoritarian to pro-democratic in the context of dual transitions, in response to changes in incentive structures shaped by domestic, regional and international parameters. It particularly focuses on big business and highlights the central role that greater exposure to international competition during the course of opening up and liberalization