Mariana Teixeira

A hipertrofia da racionalidade instrumental na modernidade capitalista é uma das características marcantes da teoria crítica em termos de diagnóstico de tempo. Esse leitmotiv parece ser contradito ou, no melhor dos cenários, ofuscado na teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth, representante da chamada terceira geração dessa tradição teórica. Neste artigo, traço um panorama dos posicionamentos de Honneth a esse respeito ao longo de sua obra, de Crítica do poder a Direito da liberdade, no intuito de mostrar que seu modelo teórico não só é compatível com, como fornece as bases para, uma crítica da razão instrumental como crítica da liberdade negativa – ainda que o próprio autor não tenha levado essa conexão até suas últimas consequências.The hypertrophy of instrumental rationality in capitalist modernity is one of the outstanding characteristics of critical theory in terms of time diagnosis. This leitmotiv seems to be contradicted or, at best, overshadowed in Axel Honneth’s recognitio...

A hipertrofia da racionalidade instrumental na modernidade capitalista e uma das caracteristicas marcantes da teoria critica em termos de diagnostico de tempo. Esse leitmotiv parece ser contradito ou, no melhor dos cenarios, ofuscado na teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth, representante da chamada terceira geracao dessa tradicao teorica. Neste artigo, traco um panorama dos posicionamentos de Honneth a esse respeito ao longo de sua obra, de Critica do poder a Direito da liberdade, no intuito de mostrar que seu modelo teorico nao so e compativel com, como fornece as bases para, uma critica da razao instrumental como critica da liberdade negativa – ainda que o proprio autor nao tenha levado essa conexao ate suas ultimas consequencias.

A proposta do dossiê Diálogos na Teoria Crítica reside em explorar, com rigor teórico-conceitual, alguns dos principais debates que tiveram impacto sobre a consolidação da teoria crítica da sociedade ou sobre a trajetória intelectual de seus representantes, mostrando como a fi losofi a e a teoria social não se fazem de modo solitário e estático, mas envolvem, no mais das vezes, um processo dinâmico de interação com outros pensadores, outras tradições teóricas, e outros modos de fazer filosofi a e teoria social.

O que faz de uma teoria social uma teoria crítica da sociedade? O que a distingue de outras maneiras (“tradicionais”) de descrever, compreender e avaliar a realidade social? E como se dá a relação entre ambas? Questões como essas aparecem, ao longo do desenvolvimento da chamada teoria crítica, como centrais para a sua própria constituição e para a definição de sua peculiaridade enquanto teoria da sociedade. A despeito da diversidade das respostas dadas a esse campo de problemas pelos diferentes autores dessa corrente teórica, é possível concebêlas de modo unitário na medida em que sejam consideradas como formulações diversas de uma mesma ideia básica acerca das rupturas e continuidades entre pensamento crítico e ciência tradicional: o caráter eminentemente histórico que o primeiro assume de modo consciente em relação a si mesmo, bem como em relação a todo pensamento teórico, conduz a que a segunda seja, no interior do pensamento crítico, ao mesmo tempo afirmada (em sua parcialidade)...

A hipertrofia da racionalidade instrumental na modernidade capitalista é uma das características marcantes da teoria crítica em termos de diagnóstico de tempo. Esse leitmotiv parece ser contradito ou, no melhor dos cenários, ofuscado na teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth, representante da chamada terceira geração dessa tradição teórica. Neste artigo, traço um panorama dos posicionamentos de Honneth a esse respeito ao longo de sua obra, de Crítica do poder a Direito da liberdade, no intuito de mostrar que seu modelo teórico não só é compatível com, como fornece as bases para, uma crítica da razão instrumental como crítica da liberdade negativa-ainda que o próprio autor não tenha levado essa conexão até suas últimas consequências.

Trata-se do texto de apresentação da Parte II do dossiê "Diálogos na Teoria Crítica" (Revista Idéias, vol. 8, n. 1), no qual os organizadores do dossiê indicam que a proposta deste reside em explorar, com rigor teórico-conceitual, alguns dos principais debates que tiveram impacto sobre a consolidação da teoria crítica da sociedade ou sobre a trajetória intelectual de seus representantes. É apresentada, também uma breve visão dos artigos, da resenha e da entrevista que compõem o volume.

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O que faz de uma teoria social uma teoria crítica da sociedade? O que a distingue de outras maneiras (“tradicionais”) de descrever, compreender e avaliar a realidade social? E como se dá a relação entre ambas? Questões como essas aparecem, ao longo do desenvolvimento da chamada teoria crítica, como centrais para a sua própria constituição e para a definição de sua peculiaridade enquanto teoria da sociedade. A despeito da diversidade das respostas dadas a esse campo de problemas pelos diferentes autores dessa corrente teórica, é possível concebê-las de modo unitário na medida em que sejam consideradas como formulações diversas de uma mesma ideia básica acerca das rupturas e continuidades entre pensamento crítico e ciência tradicional: o caráter eminentemente histórico que o primeiro assume de modo consciente em relação a si mesmo, bem como em relação a todo pensamento teórico, conduz a que a segunda seja, no interior do pensamento crítico, ao mesmo tempo afirmada (em sua parcialidade) e negada (em sua pretensão irrefletida de abarcar o todo social). Este trabalho procura apresentar os contornos gerais dessa ideia e sua aplicação prática na obra de dois autores decisivos para a consolidação inicial da teoria crítica, Georg Lukács e Max Horkheimer, com especial atenção ao problema da apropriação das ciências empíricas especializadas. A partir dessa análise e de um breve exame crítico da posição de Jürgen Habermas sobre o assunto, procura-se avaliar os limites e as possibilidades de atualização dos modelos lukácsiano e horkheimeriano na direção de uma teoria crítica que tenha como referência fundamental a dialética, desenvolvida inicialmente por Marx, entre pesquisa e apresentação.
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Abstract:
What is it that makes a social theory a critical theory of society? What distinguishes it from other (“traditional”) attempts to theoretically depict, understand and evaluate social reality? And how do they relate to each other? Such issues appear as central, in the development of critical theory, to the definition of its peculiarity as a theory of society. Despite the diversity of responses presented by different authors in the critical field to these questions, it is possible to conceive them in a unified way to the extent that they are considered as various formulations of the same basic idea concerning the ruptures and continuities between critical thought and traditional science: the historical character the first recognizes in relation to itself, as well as in relation to every form of theoretical thinking, leads to the fact that the second is, within critical thought, at the same time affirmed (in its partiality) and denied (in its unreflected claim to have grasped the social whole). This paper aims to present the general outlines of this idea and its practical application in the work of two authors that are decisive for the early establishment of critical theory, Georg Lukács and Max Horkheimer, with particular regard to the problem of the appropriation of specialized empirical sciences. From this analysis and from a brief critical review of Jürgen Habermas’s position on the matter, this article seeks to assess the limits and possibilities of actualizing the lukácsian and horkheimian models towards a critical theory that has the dialectics between research and presentation, initially developed by Marx, as a fundamental reference.

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Apesar de G. Lukács ser conhecido como um dos mais importantes representantes da teoria marxista, sua formação intelectual não se restringiu à obra de Marx, mas abrangeu um amplo leque de correntes teóricas (muitas das quais com sentido diverso das análises marxianas). Um momento decisivo nessa formação foi sua participação no círculo intelectual em torno de M. Weber, na cidade de Heidelberg, na década de 10 do século passado. Por meio da análise de alguns aspectos do debate intelectual entre Lukács e Weber, das aproximações e dos distanciamentos entre eles, buscamos explicitar o fato de que a influência que um pensador exerceu sobre o outro assumiu uma forma viva e dialógica.
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Abstract:
Although G. Lukacs is known as one of the most important representatives of Marxist theory, his intellectual development was not confined to the work of Marx, but covered a wide range of theoretical perspectives (many of which have a different standpoint from the Marxian analysis). A turning point in this development was his participation in the intellectual circle around M. Weber, in the city of Heidelberg, at the beginning of the last century. Through the analysis of some aspects of the intellectual debate between Lukacs and Weber, of the approaches and distances between them, we intended to draw attention to the fact that the influence that one thinker had on the other took the active character of a vivid dialogue.

The critique of the pervasiveness of instrumental reason in modern capitalist societies is a hallmark of the Frankfurt School critical theory. In this regard, Axel Honneth's recognition theory seems to depart considerably from his predecessors in the critical tradition. He considers the representation of the economic system as a normatively neutralized social sphere a fictional and misleading one, an instantiation of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. It can be argued, however, that Honneth's focus on morally motivated social struggles does not rule out the diagnosis of social pathologies systemically inflicted upon individuals by the impersonal, calculation-driven logic of the capitalist market. This is clear in the author's early Marxist essays, but can also be seen in his recent works on social freedom, where a renewed theoretical opening to a critique of instrumental reason can be identified in the form of a critique of negative freedom. The challenge faced by Honneth's theory now lies in articulating both approaches: the critique of instrumental reason as a critique of negative freedom can benefit a great deal from the sensitivity recognition theory has for the moral grammar of social conflicts, i.e., the experiences of injustice that function as the motivational force behind resistance to commodification and reification.

Having written uninterruptedly on several topics concerning political and social philosophy from the late 1970s to the present, Axel Honneth offers his readers a wide range of possibilities to engage with his work. The theoretical path traced in his almost 40 years of intellectual life, however, has not always followed a univocal line, advancing through conceptual shifts of varying scope, always in a committed debate with his peers, commentators and students. This chapter proposes an interpretation that allows understanding the theoretical shifts undertaken along this path, showing that Honneth moves between two critical models: one centered on the social actors’ experience of disrespect and injustice, and another focused on institutions and the functional imperatives of the social order. As a result, the second model runs the risk of falling prey to Honneth’s own objection of critical theory’s sociological deficit. A conceptual tool for avoiding such risk can be found, the author argues, in a dialogically interpreted notion of normative reconstruction, which could restore the latent, dialectical role of negativity, once crucial to Honneth’s theory.

Georg Lukács’ theory of reification, with its original combination of Weberian and Simmelian themes within a Hegelian-Marxist framework, has had an incredibly fertile influence on 20th century social philosophy, – including numerous renowned philosophers, literature scholars, and social theorists, as well as collective theoretical enterprises such as the Praxis and Budapest Schools, the Situationist International, and Critical Theory. Yet, Fredric Jameson provocatively suggests that the most authentic descendency of Lukács’ thinking is to be found, not among the Marxists, but within feminist standpoint theory. The affinity of this ongoing project to Lukács’ Marxism is remarkable: the idea that the proletariat might achieve a distinctive, and potentially privileged, standpoint that allows (and even compels) it to grasp capitalist society in its totality has a parallel in the affirmation made by feminist standpoint theorists that women might also attain a privileged perspective on the dynamics of patriarchal societies. The current relevance of feminist standpoint theories is attested by the role played by its central concern – i.e., the material conditioning of knowledge and the cognitive potentiality of socially subjugated standpoints – in contemporary scholarly discussions on epistemic injustice and ignorance as well as in the articulation of collective action against oppression. Although the Lukácsian and Marxian lineage of feminist standpoint theory is usually alluded to, this relationship is often taken for granted and not further problematized. In this chapter, I address two prominent early versions of feminist standpoint theory, namely, those of Nancy Hartsock and Dorothy Smith, with the aim of exploring both the connections and the contrasts to Lukács’ theory regarding their accounts of the experiences of “the revolutionary subject” – the proletariat, women. What could Lukács’ contribution to such debates be? It is noteworthy that feminist standpoint theory (especially in the academic setting) has gradually been focusing less on women’s subjugation and struggles and more on the discussion about the validity of truth claims, which is often connected to embracing a postmodern view to the detriment of the dialectical tradition that has its origins in Hegel, Marx, and Lukács. By discussing the works of Hartsock and Smith and their connection to Lukács’ theory of reification, this paper aims at countering the tendency to reduce standpoint theory to a purely epistemological debate centered on discourse. Finally, a further reason to discuss these founding texts of feminist standpoint theory is an effort to shift the discussion back to the (politically and epistemologically) enabling features of subjugated standpoints, in contrast to contemporary studies in epistemic injustice that see only the disabling consequences of oppression. I begin (1) by presenting Nancy Hartsock’s conception of standpoint theory and discussing some problematic features of her proposal, especially the idealization of women’s standpoint as free from dichotomies. Next (2), I argue that looking back at Lukács’ theory of reification and his phenomenology of the dilacerated subject might contribute to addressing such difficulties. I turn then (3) to Dorothy Smith and argue that her seminal essay on women’s experience of disjunction and bifurcated consciousness as the starting point of a critical sociology shares with Lukács the key feature that enables her to avoid the complications identified in Hartsock’s work: the connection between dilaceration and emancipatory interest.

Esta tese reconstrói a obra de Axel Honneth desde os estudos preparatórios para a teoria da luta por reconhecimento até os desenvolvimentos mais recentes, vinculados à ideia de liberdade social. A partir da análise das insuficiências teóricas do modelo crítico do reconhecimento, examina-se a possibilidade de encontrar, na própria lógica interna da teoria honnethiana, elementos que contribuam para superá-las. Tendo como referência sua perspectiva acerca dos potenciais de resistência frente a experiências de injustiça vivenciadas pelos atores sociais como sofrimento, são identificadas e discutidas três fases no pensamento do autor. 1) Modelo crítico do reconhecimento: nas décadas de 1980 e 1990, Honneth recorre à ideia de interesse emancipatório, segundo a qual o bloqueio da autorrealização causa nos atores sociais concernidos algum tipo de mal-estar que, por sua vez, guarda potenciais motivacionais para a resistência à dominação e a luta pela libertação do sofrimento. A experiência de injustiça representa, assim, uma oportunidade para os atores sociais articularem de modo reflexivo as expectativas normativas que conformam o seu repertório moral. 2) Fase de transição: durante os anos 2000, apresenta-se nos escritos de Honneth um bloqueio sistemático na conexão motivacional entre sofrimento e resistência. Nesse contexto, apesar de a ideia de sofrimento permanecer central, seu potencial de impulsionar uma resistência ativa nos atores concernidos sai de cena como consequência de um diagnóstico de época mais sofisticado, que identifica patologias sociais justamente na erosão do aspecto motivacional da experiência de sofrimento. 3) Modelo crítico da liberdade social: a partir da década de 2010, a ausência na obra do autor de análises sobre a possibilidade de resistência à dominação social pode ser atribuída à adoção de um modelo teórico de tendência sistêmica. Com o foco não mais nas experiências de desrespeito nem nas patologias sociais, mas nas chamadas anomalias sociais – entendidas como desequilíbrios funcionais na reprodução social –, Honneth deixa em segundo plano precisamente seu impulso teórico inicial: a busca por superar, no pensamento crítico, as abordagens funcionalistas que impediam que se revelasse, no âmbito da própria vida social, um potencial latente de resistência. Honneth abandona o vínculo fundamental, anteriormente defendido, entre desrespeito, sofrimento e disposição para a resistência. Tal ruptura não é fruto de um diagnóstico de tempo, como no caso das patologias sociais, mas de uma reorientação teórica em direção à perspectiva do observador, em detrimento da do participante, minando com isso o poder explicativo e normativo da ideia de interesse emancipatório. Todavia, uma noção ampliada de reconstrução normativa com foco na negatividade latente da realidade social (desenvolvida a partir da própria obra de Honneth, mas indo além de suas formulações mais recentes) pode assumir um caráter emancipatório – não porque de algum modo desfaz o dano causado pelo sofrimento, mas antes porque contribui para o trabalho reflexivo, distorcido por fenômenos patológicos, de articulação social do sofrimento individualmente experienciado. É, assim, na interação concreta entre as perspectivas do observador e do participante, mediada pela colaboração entre filosofia, teoria social e pesquisas empíricas, que uma teoria crítica reconstrutiva pode fazer justiça às suas intenções práticas.

O livro História e Consciência de Classe, publicado por Georg Lukács em 1923, foi objeto de intensos debates ao longo do século XX por conta da originalidade com que o filósofo húngaro abordou um tema candente na produção teórica marxista: a questão em torno da consciência. Um dos pontos polêmicos da abordagem lukácsiana desse problema é a combinação da teoria de Marx com elementos de outras matrizes metodológicas. Este estudo pretende apresentar a análise de um caso desse tipo de combinação: a apropriação feita por Lukács de elementos presentes na obra de Max Weber. Nos centramos, mais precisamente, no modo pelo qual Lukács articula a temática weberiana da racionalização do mundo na elaboração do conceito de reificação, que é o conceito central de História e Consciência de Classe. Procuramos esclarecer o caráter dessa articulação, de forma a responder às seguintes perguntas: a obra de Lukács constitui um quadro teórico “eclético”, em que tradições conceituais distintas (a de Marx e a Weber) se justapõem de maneira fortuita ou contingente? A partir de que ponto de vista Lukács combina essas orientações teóricas? Para tanto, analisamos as aproximações e os distanciamentos entre os conceitos em tela, identificando quais aspectos da obra de Weber sobre a racionalização estão presentes no conceito lukácsiano de reificação, e quais aspectos foram por Lukács descartados. Nossa conclusão é a de que Lukács realiza uma apropriação da temática weberiana da racionalização a partir de um ponto de vista específico – a sua leitura da teoria de Marx como uma teoria que parte da perspectiva da totalidade. Lukács confere, assim, um novo estatuto a essa temática weberiana e cria a sua própria e original estrutura teórica, em que a racionalização permite a generalização do fetichismo e da alienação para as diferentes áreas da vida cultural.

CALL FOR PAPERS
Special Issue of Dissonancia: Critical Theory Journal (ISSN: 2594-5025)

The centennial of History and Class Consciousness:
Lukács and critical theory today
(https://ojs.ifch.unicamp.br/index.php/teoriacritica/hcc100)

SUBMISSION DEADLINES
- Paper proposals: 31/10/2022 (abstracts of 300-500 words)
- Complete papers: 15/02/2023 (please follow the journal guidelines: https://ojs.ifch.unicamp.br/index.php/teoriacritica/info_gerais_sub)

Please send abstracts, papers and books reviews to: dissonancia@unicamp.br

Editors:
Mariana Teixeira (Freie Universität Berlin), m.teixeira@fu-berlin.de
Victor Strazzeri (Universität Bern/Berliner Institut für kritische Theorie, e.V.), victor.strazzeri@unibe.ch

This paper is part of a broader investigation into how different authors in the Hegelian philosophical tradition conceived the political and epistemological dimensions of the experience of subjects situated in marginal social positions. Within contemporary debates, Axel Honneth has gained prominence with a theory of the struggle for recognition that seeks to overcome the problems he identifies in earlier, more Marxist attempts to actualize Hegel. Most notably, Honneth intends to avoid what he considers a monological stance, too focused on labor, which would have its source in the lordship-bondage dialectics in The Phenomenology of Spirit. For this reason, Honneth bases his own account of recognition on Hegel's previous writings of Jena. My main thesis is that certain readings of the Hegelian lord-bondsman figure-those which have marginal perspectives as a philosophical starting point-unveil a theoretical potential that can take an important step beyond Honneth's theory of recognition, especially with regard to further exploring the motivational dimension characterizing the conflictual dynamics of the intersubjective formation of human subjectivity under social conditions marked by asymmetric power relations. I begin by sketching out Honneth's position, in The Struggle for Recognition, towards Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1). I discuss, then, Kojève's peculiar and influential rendering of the lordship and bondage passage (2) before indicating how Fanon's reading might escape Honneth's concern about an overemphasis on labor and its monological consequences (3).

Together with Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth is among the most important proponents of a theoretical paradigm for the social sciences centered on the idea of “recognition.” This notion has, of course, entirely different meanings in the various contexts in which it is called upon. In Honneth’s specific case, it is of decisive importance the fact that his theorizations around the centrality of recognition relations for human self-realization are rooted precisely in the negative experiences of denial of recognition: disrespect or misrecognition. Despite the more than twenty years that separate us from the publication of Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition, however, it seems that the theoretical genesis of this important book has not yet been grasped in its full potential for understanding today’s modern societies and for a revitalization of the social sciences in general, and of Critical Theory in particular.
In this presentation, I intend to cast light on other motives that animated the formulation of this recognition-theoretical critical model, aside from the Hegelian works from the period of Jena: namely, the sociological and historiographical studies that convinced Honneth of the undeniable moral character of social struggles, that is, the American and especially British Sociology of the Working Classes that flourished in the 1980’s. This influence reveal a closer relation between Honneth’s work and empirical social research than is made visible in his books. I argue, finally, that this connection is a most fruitful one and that Honneth, however, partially abandons it in his recent works – despite its precise meta-theoretical formulation under the name of “normative reconstruction” in his latest book, Das Recht der Freiheit (2011).

In this paper, I would like to address the relevance for current debates not only of Georg Lukács’ characterization and critique of reification, but also of his account of the possibility of resisting it. Lukács’ 1923 book, History and Class Consciousness, is arguably one of the most important Marxist works of the 20th century and the concept of reification outlined in its main essay, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat”, has proved to be extremely fruitful for understanding (and criticizing) the forms of subjectivity that come along with capitalist forms of objectivity. In his masterful reworking of Weberian and Simmelian themes within a Marxist framework broadly influenced by Hegel, Lukács offers his readers a vivid account of the processes that, under capitalist social relations, rob subjects of that which makes them subjects, and not objects or things, that is: their capacity for agency, for acting upon the world and transforming it, instead of only following “natural laws” that are external to and dominate them.
Although reification affects everyone in modern capitalist societies, regardless of their position in the social process of production, those that are part of the proletariat experience it in a different, much more acute way. This happens, so goes Lukács’ argument, because workers experience themselves as objects in spite of the fact that they are actually the ones who are transforming the world through their work, and as a consequence, workers are torn apart (zerrissen) in the innermost layers of their physical and psychic being, which has the potentiality to fuel resistance and revolt. Members of the bourgeoisie, on the other hand, do not experience this fracture (Zerrissenheit): their position as “objects” is unproblematic (and materially comfortable), which makes it extremely difficult for them to view the established social conditions as questionable in any way. In short: for Lukács, while everybody is reified under capitalism, only the proletariat suffers like it is a matter of life and death – and here lie the limits of reification.
This idea was extensively discussed in the first half of the 20th century and is, for example, at the core of the first generation critical theorists’ disagreements with Lukács’ diagnoses (and prognoses). Today, however, it is not unusual for social critical theorists to draw on Lukács “phenomenology of reification” – laid out especially in the famous first part of his essay – while leaving aside the necessary counterpart of his description: namely, the analysis of the limits of reification and of the possibility of overcoming it, dealt with in the third part of the reification essay (“The Standpoint of the Proletariat”). The aim of this paper is to recover the contribution of Lukács’ account of the limits of reification for a contemporary social diagnosis that denounces oppression in capitalist societies without neglecting an analysis of how it is experienced by the oppressed nor the potentialities for resistance that are immanent – even when blocked or suppressed – to such experience.

The idea that critical social theorists must diagnose the social pathologies that affect contemporary societies has come to the spotlight in the last decades and the work of Axel Honneth has remarkably contributed to this tendency. As I interpret them, Honneth’s early writings (in the 1980s and 1990s) imply a notion of social pathology that amounts basically to obstacles to individual self-realization, which cause social actors to suffer and to struggle against it. Suffering, then, is taken as a symptom of an underlying social pathology (offering at the same time a motivational potential for resistance to it). From the 2000s on, however, a systematic blockage in the motivational connection between social suffering and resistance appears in Honneth’s writings. This is a consequence, I argue, of an elaborate time diagnosis that identifies social pathologies no longer with the sources of suffering itself, but rather with the erosion of the motivational aspect of experienced suffering. From this viewpoint, a social situation is pathological not because it entails suffering, but rather because social actors cannot articulate their experienced suffering and, thus, cannot collectively struggle against its causes. This specific notion of social pathology suggests, then, that the complete suppression of suffering should not be the aim of social theories orientated towards emancipation. Although this more sophisticated view of social pathologies overcomes most of the difficulties posed by Honneth’s earlier formulation, it nonetheless retains a problematic feature: the downplaying of structural relations of domination that produce very different kinds of suffering among different social groups. I will indicate, finally, that peripheral social and critical theorists have developed insights and frameworks that provocatively and productively address this issue.

In this paper, I intend to analyze and problematize some aspects of Simone de Beauvoir’s appropriation of Hegelian dialectics, in order to shed some light on the possibilities of productively actualizing her feminism and articulating it with other emancipatory struggles of the present.
The Hegelian dialectical approach human subjectivity formation, as outlined in his famous metaphor of lordship/bondage (or master/slave) present in the chapter 4 of the Phenomenology of Spirit, has been appropriated by a number of different authors who have sought to rework or actualize it, and to thereby make it more concrete, plural, or radical. It may seem surprising that a philosopher whose oeuvre has frequently been associated with authoritarianism and conservatism could also be quite often relied upon by subversive thinkers aiming at changing or revolutionizing the existing social order. The most obvious example here is the left Hegelianism inaugurated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as early as the first half of the 19th century and that reaches through to authors like Georg Lukács and the ones associated with the Frankfurt School. But the reworking of the Hegelian dialectical approach to subjectivity formation is no prerogative of the advocates of a proletarian revolution. Thinkers broadly located in the fields of feminism (Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler, and Jessica Benjamin) and post-colonial studies (such as Frantz Fanon, W. E. B. du Bois, and Paul Gilroy) have also relied upon a reshaped dialectic between master and slave to formulate their own approaches to social domination (sexism, colonialism/racism) and resistance to domination (feminist and anti-colonial/anti-racist struggles).
Within feminism, Beauvoir’s appropriation and re-interpretation of the master/slave dialectic is pioneer – albeit not free from criticism. Although the presence of this theme can be found in many of her writings – as Debbie Evans has remarked, it appears as early as the publication of Beauvoir’s novel She Came to Stay, and as Nancy Bauer has showed, it runs through Pyrrhus et Cinéas and The Ethics of Ambiguity –, The Second Sex represents Beauvoir’s most extensive and significant critical dialogue with Hegel.
Beauvoir’s reading of the master/slave dialectic in this book is very complex, since she both appropriates it and transforms it in some key aspects. Like Hegel, she conceives of subjectivity formation as an agonistic process, where consciousness and its other oppose one another so that they can each pose himself as consciousness, as a for-itself. In this combat, one consciousness sees itself as essential and the other as inessential. In Beauvoir’s words: “Things become clear, on the contrary, if, following Hegel, we find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness; the subject can be posed only in being opposed – he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object” (The Second Sex, 17). Nevertheless, against and beyond Hegel, Beauvoir contends that the relation between man and woman does not follow the dialectical path that leads to a struggle to the death (and subsequent reconciliation). For Hegel, master and slave are subjects that share an original, fundamental equality that is disrupted when the outcome of the struggle posits one as the master and the other as the slave. Beauvoir stresses, however, that man and woman do not share this primeval equality. Woman is, in Beauvoir’s words, “the absolute other, without reciprocity” (The Second Sex, 260, my emphasis), while the Hegelian slave is a relative other. The relation of man and woman, therefore, is not dialectical. There is not, in this relationship, the promise of a struggle that leads to woman’s liberation from her inessential position in the world; she cannot, like the slave, risk her life and, in so doing, achieve a superior state of being. Liberation must be sought after elsewhere: “This liberation must be collective, and it requires first of all that the economic evolution of woman’s condition be accomplished” (The Second Sex, 595).
Beauvoir’s reading (and subsequent destabilization and critical appropriation) of the master/slave dialectic was certainly influenced by the French reception of Hegel prompted by Alexandre Kojève’s distinctive interpretation, and this impacts on the way she views the different moments of the dialectical process of subjectivity formation. This is true especially for the moment of the death struggle: is this the moment in which the slave frees himself/herself, or in which one of the struggling subjects becomes a slave in the first place? And, more importantly, what political-philosophical consequences does each of the alternatives have? Beauvoir’s interpretation of this struggle, although influenced by Kojève, is nonetheless very peculiar and original, which decisively distances her from these authors – and from Hegel himself. My intention in pursuing this investigation is not, however, to deliberate over the “correctness” or “faithfulness” of Beauvoir’s appropriation of Hegel, but to extract the most fruitful consequences that her reading has for conceiving of feminist (and other emancipatory) struggles.

The Hegelian dialectic of lordship and bondage as a metaphor for human subjectivity formation has been appropriated by several critical thinkers who sought to rework or actualize it, and to thereby make it more concrete, plural, or radical. It may seem surprising that a philosopher whose oeuvre has frequently been associated with authoritarianism could also be quite often relied upon by subversive thinkers aiming at changing or revolutionizing the existing social order – the most obvious example is the left Hegelianism inaugurated by Marx in the 19th century and that reaches through to authors like Lukács and the ones associated with the Frankfurt School. But the reworking of the Hegelian dialectical approach to subjectivity formation is no prerogative of the advocates of a proletarian revolution. Thinkers located in the broad field of post-colonialism, like Frantz Fanon, W.E.B. du Bois, and Paul Gilroy, have also relied upon a reshaped dialectic between the master and the slave to formulate their own approaches to social domination (colonialism/racism) and resistance to domination (anti-colonial/anti-racist struggles). In this paper, I address Fanon’s Hegelian post-colonialism with regard to the issue of “travelling theories” and “misplaced ideas” referred to by Edward Said and Roberto Schwartz, respectively. Under which historical and philosophical circumstances could the master/slave dialectic travel in time and space and be translated into the language of post-colonial theory? And, more importantly: How can such a “misplaced” reformulation of this powerful philosophical metaphor shed new light on the contradictions that underlie its original formulation, when the idea was “in its proper place”?