Ghazali

The aim of this study is to discuss where the meaning of change and transformation experienced in daily life in Islamic thought is based on. In this regard, this study tries to emphasize the existential moral dimension of this change and transformation in the context of Ghazali’s thought.
The possibility of questioning change and transformation in Islamic thought is interpreted on the basis of "being". In other words, the metaphysical discourse that guides the questioning of the truth and certainty of the truth in the experienced change and transformation process is shaped on the ground of "being". The main problem in this metaphysical discussion is how to base the ground of "being". According to Avicenna, the idea of "being", which cannot be explained but is the first principle of every explanation, exists in human beings directly. Thus, Avicenna, who draws attention to the mental area that makes it possible to be aware of one’s own existence even if it is isolated from all senses, with the metaphor of " the floating man", points out the abstracting ability of the mind as the most reliable place in producing metaphysical discourse on the ground of "being". In this interpretation of Avicenna, the ground of "being", which is the source of understanding the change and transformation, is based on the abstracting character of the mind.
Ghazali objects to grounding the questioning of the truth experienced in the process of change and transformation, which is inevitably experienced in daily life, on such an abstract epistemological basis. In the thought of al-Ghazali, since the investigation of the accuracy and certainty of the truth due to the will and power of God resists being reduced to mental universal categories, that is, epistemologically abstract rational thought, the ground of "being", which is the source of understanding change and transformation, is based on the holy text (Qur'an). In this interpretation, al-Ghazali highlights the existential moral meaning of the ground of "being" as opposed to the overly abstracting (tanzih) theoretical attitude. This study claims that it is important to shed light on the foundations of Islamic thought in the example of Ghazali in order to make visible the increasingly abstract contextual framework of questioning change and transformation due to science and technology and to question alternative approaches.

The article aims to demonstrate that Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) centrality in Islamic intellectual history is not restricted to the branches of theoretical philosophy; rather, he also has had a deep and strong influence on the conception of practical philosophy until modern times. I will discuss the impact of Avicenna’s view of practical philosophy by analyzing his different classifications of practical philosophy throughout his career and the factors behind his disregard for practical philosophy in his philosophical summas on the basis of his view of the relationship between philosophy and šarī‘a. To demonstrate my argument regarding Avicenna’s influence on the conception of practical philosophy in Islamic tradition, I will refer to major works on the classification of sciences, and the commentaries (šurūḥ) and glosses (ḥāwāšī) on the two most important and widely circulated philosophical summas in the post-Avicennan philosophy, including al-Abharī’s (d. 663/1264) Hidāyat al-ḥikma and al-Kātibī’s (d. 675/1276) Ḥikmat al-‘ayn.

İslam düşünce tarihinin en etkili isimlerinden biri olan ve Hüccetü'l-İslam unvanıyla tanınan Gazzali, ehl-i sünnet kelamının önemli kaynaklarından olmakla birlikte geçmişte yeterince rağbet görmeyen İtikadda Orta Yol'da itikadî meseleleri aktarıp lehte ve aleyhte ortaya atılan fikirleri naklettikten sonra en doğru görüşün orta yola (iktisad) bağlı olan ehl-i sünnet tarafından temsil edildiğinin altını çizer ve konuları hem aklî hem de naklî esaslar çerçevesinde izah eder. Bu bakımdan eser, mantık kurallarının itikadî konulara uygulandığı ilk eserlerden biridir.

Gazzalî'nin -kendi ifadesiyle- bu eserde ortaya koyduğu deliller, itikadî/manevî hastalıkların tedavisinde kullanılan ilaçlar hükmündedir ve bunu uygulayan doktorun (kelamcı) yetenekli, sağlam görüşlü ve keskin zekalı olması gerekir. Bu sebeple, eserin girişinde geniş bir metodoloji kısmına yer verir.

Kısacası, İtikadda Orta Yol bir yandan yeterli miktarda kelam bilgisine sahip olmak isteyenler için sahih itikadın çerçevesini belirlemekte, diğer taraftan, bid'at ve dalaletlere karşı çıkarak şüpheleri gidermek ve avamın itikadını savunmak isteyenlere kılavuzluk etmektedir.

Al-Gazali, s arapskog preveo: Almir Fatić. Djelo " Opomene i savjeti " ustvari je zbirka kudsi-hadisa, pažljivo probranih od strane velikog islamskog autoriteta imama Ebu-Hamida el-Gazalija, koji govore o životu na ovome i onome svijetu i iznose niz savjeta i opomena kako postupati u raznim životnim situacijama, kako očistiti dušu i povećati svoju ljubav prema Uzvišenom Allahu. Knjiga podstiče na preispitivanje svojih postupaka, na pokajanje, predan ibadet i obraćanje Uzvišenom Allahu, kao i pripremanje za susret s Njim...

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (zm. 1111), Sprawiedliwa waga. Ratunek przed zabłądzeniem. Z języka arabskiego przełożyła, opracowała i wstępem opatrzyła Katarzyna Pachniak, WUW, Warszawa 2008. Nie boję się powiedzieć, że dokonania intelektualne Abu Hamida al-Ghazalego (zmarł w 1111 r.) są tytaniczne. Nie ma dziedziny wiedzy, w której nie pozostało by coś ważnego po tym uczonym. Pisał o prawie muzułmańskim, filozofii, polityce, etyce i sufiźmie. Pod koniec życia na kartach swej autobiografii intelektualnej chwalił się, że wszystko go interesowało. Twierdził , że zna poglądy i przekonania ludzi swej epoki i epok minionych. Zawsze znajdzie się ktoś, kto uzna te słowa za przechwałki. Jakby to nie było, celem praktycznym gromadzenia tak rozległej wiedzy była w końcu analiza i krytyka. I właśnie dlatego, jego myśl przekraczała, wydawało by się nieprzekraczalne, granice świata islamu. W średniowiecznym świecie chrześcijańskim jego prace o filozofii przełożone na łacinę czytał z wielkim zainteresowaniem Tomasz z Akwinu. Od 2008 roku polski czytelnik ma możliwość zapoznać się z fragmentem myśli Al-Ghazalego, lecz jest to fragment, w moim mniemaniu, bardzo autorytatywny, przynajmniej z dwóch powodów. Dwa, niedużej objętości, traktaty Abu Hamida al-Ghazalego przełożone na język polski przez profesor Katarzynę Pachniak z Katedry Arabistyki i Islamistyki UW, reprezentują, w rzeczy samej, krytyczne podejście Autora. Badania prof. Katarzyny Pachniak koncentrują się na historii myśli ismailickiej i naturalnym jest, iż z racji tych zainteresowań przygotowała dla polskiego czytelnika przekład pism, w których uczony w szerszym lub węższym zakresie prowadzi polemikę z ideologią ismailicką. Traktatem wymierzonym w ismailitów jest " Sprawiedliwa waga ". Natomiast " Ratunek przed zabłądzeniem " jest zapisem drogi intelektualnej jego autora zwieńczonej wyborem sufizmu. Autor postfactum wyjaśnia czytelnikowi powody swego przylgnięcia do mistyki, poprzez prezentację i zbicie poglądów, z którymi nie mógł się in toto utożsamiać. Oczywiście, jest wśród tych poglądów myśl ismailicka. Osobiście jestem pod wrażeniem przekładu, któremu niewiele można zarzucić. Dlatego skoncentruję się na uwagach dotyczących kilku drobnych błędów zauważonych w recenzowanym wydaniu, a ponadto ustosunkuję się do kilku zdań zawartych przez prof. Pachniak we wstępie do obu traktatów, co odniosę do treści " Sprawiedliwej wagi " ...

تتناول هذه الدراسة واحدة من أهم نظريات الفيلسوف اليهودي ليفي بن جرشوم(1288 – 1344) وهي خلق العالم. إن العالم عند بن جرشوم مخلوق، لكن لا من العدم بل من مادة أولى قديمة غير متعينة. وعلى الرغم من أنه مخلوق إلا أنه أبدي من جهة المستقبل، أي أنه لا يفنى. والواضح أن نظرية بن جرشوم في العالم تنتمي إلى الاتجاه الأفلاطوني وهي إعادة صياغة لنظرية أفلاطون في العالم والتي تنص على أن للعالم بداية لكن ليس له نهاية، وأن العالم ذاته مخلوق لكن من مادة أولى غير مخلوقة. وكان بن جرشوم على وعي بالأصل الأفلاطوني لهذه النظرية وأشار إلى ذلك بوضوح، لكنه أقام تعديلات جوهرية عليها.
ولأن ابن رشد (1126-1198) كان آخر الفلاسفة السابقين على بن جرشوم والذي كان صاحب نظرية شهيرة في قدم العالم، ولأن بن جرشوم قد أسس نظريته في الخلق على أساس نقده لأرسطو، فإننا نهدف في هذه الدراسة عقد مقارنة بين بن جرشوم وابن رشد في مسألة القدم والحدوث، محاولين تقديم رد رشدي على نظرية بن جرشوم في الخلق.

Author: Domenico Ingenito
Beholding Beauty: Saʿdi of Shiraz and the Aesthetics of Desire in Medieval Persian Poetry explores the relationship between sexuality, politics, and spirituality in the lyrics of Saʿdi Shirazi (d. 1292 CE), one of the most revered masters of classical Persian literature. Relying on a variety of sources, including unstudied manuscripts, Domenico Ingenito presents the so-called “inimitable smoothness” of Saʿdi’s lyric style as a serene yet multifaceted window into the uncanny beauty of the world, the human body, and the realm of the unseen.

The book constitutes the first attempt to study Sa‘di’s lyric meditations on beauty in the context of the major artistic, scientific and intellectual trends of his time. By charting unexplored connections between Islamic philosophy and mysticism, obscene verses and courtly ideals of love, Ingenito approaches Sa‘di’s literary genius from the perspective of sacred homoeroticism and the psychology of performative lyricism in their historical context.

https://brill.com/view/title/57745

Al-Radd al-jamīl – A Fitting Refutation of the Divinity of Jesus. Attributed to Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. Edited by Mark BEAUMONT and Maha EL-KAISY FRIEMUTH (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2016) [The History of Christian-Muslim Relations, 28]. Journal of the American Oriental Society 138.3 (2018) 645-648.

Among Islamic thinkers, al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) has been the one, who from his time until now has been mostly read and who mostly influenced the reader. He not only wrote in almost all fields of religious sciences, like kalam, fiqh, sufism, tafsir, but also in philosophy, logic and natural sciences. In this essay, we will survey al-Ghazālī’s understanding of logic, which is at least known about him.

Considering three philosophers – Ghazali , Hume, and Kant – we perceive that they were at grips with skepticism and each had a different attitude towards it. While Hume remains in a skeptical sphere, Ghazali and Kant offer solutions for skepticism, although their solutions differ largely. Criticizing Aristotle’s view on essential necessity, Ghazali expands Avicenna’s emphasis on experimentation and, in effect, negates the necessary relation between cause and effect. Ghazali preceded Hume in this regard for some 6 centuries and put forward Hume’s main idea. In order to overcome skepticism, Kant appealed to rationality and it’s a  priori backgrounds, while Ghazali put forward God’s will and put the emphasis on the inner direct experience. It will be argued that God’s deeds, rationality and faith should be compatible in principle.

GHAZALİ'S METHOD OF THE SUFİ İNTERPRETATİON OF QUR'AN
Sûfî Qur’ânic commentary is the interpretation of Qur’ân verses by sûfîs in the light of mystic experiences and knowledge that entitled by the sûfîs as the inner knowledge (gnosis). The beginning of the sûfî commentary of Qur’ân dates back to hijrî first and second centuries. Hasan-ı Basrî (d. 110/728) and Ca’fer es-Sâdık (d. 148/765) are the pioneers of this kind of interpretation.
Although great İslamic scholar Ebû Hâmid Muhammed al-Ghazâlî (d. 505/1111) wrote on a wide range of fields including jurisprudence, theology, mysticism and philosophy, he had not a separate book on Qur’ânic interpretation. But his voluminous corpus is full of sûfî Qur’anic commentaries. Accordingly, he is accepted one of the most important sûfî Qur’anic interpreter. The aim of this study is to specify the sufî commentaries in Ghazâlî’s corpus and so determine the main principles of his commentary method.
The study is divided into three sections: In the first section, Ghazâlî’s view of Qur’an will be clarified. In the second section, the central theme of the study will be treated: Ghazâlî’s sufî commentary method. In this section firstly the main principles of the method which Ghazâlî adopted will be handled and then the commentary examples made by Ghazâlî’s in his several books will be presented. The last section of the study will be on the Ghazali’s allegorical/esoteric interpretation of Qur’ân.

Keywords: Qur’ân, Sûfî Qur’ânic commentary, al-Ghazâlî, Allegorical Interpretation.

This article sheds new light on the sixth/twelfth-century anti-Avicennan current, which took its cue primarily from al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa). A key representative of this current, Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī (d. ca. 590/1194), veers away from the usual points of conflict in metaphysics and natural philosophy, directing his attention instead to descriptions of the properties of simple drugs in Avicenna's Canon of Medicine and Heart Remedies (al-Adwiya al-qalbiyya) and Ismāʿīl al-Jurjānī's (d. 531/1136) medical encyclopaedia The Khwārazmshāhī Treasure (Dhakhīra-yi Khwārazmshāhī). In a dedicated text, he highlights various inconsistencies in these sources, with a view to demonstrating that Avicenna's works are unreliable and exposing a culture of uncritical imitation among contemporary Avicennists. The article includes an edition and translation of the text.

“Gazzâlî ve David Hume’da Nedensellik” başlıklı bu çalışmamız her biri yaşadıkları kültür coğrafyası ve zaman dilimlerinin en önemli düşünürleri olmuş iki zirve şahsiyetin nedensellik görüşlerini içermektedir. Gerek Gazzâlî ve gerekse Hume zamanlarını aşan etkiye sahip bireylerdir. İncelemeye çalışacağımız nedensellik görüşlerinin ilk bakışta birbirlerine olan benzerliklerinin yanında, algılama ve anlamlandırma bakımından farklılık arzetmektedir. Konu olarak ‘nedensellik’ kavramını her iki düşünür bakımından ele almamızın temel nedeni, farklı kültür coğrafyalarından biri din adamı, diğeri filozof olan her iki şahsiyetin farklı amaçlar uğruna aynı argümanları kullanarak zaman zaman aynı, zaman zaman farklı sonuçlara ulaşmasında yatan zihinsel ve amaçsal arkaplanı açığa çıkarmaktır. Bu bağlamda tezimizin öncelikli amacı her iki düşünürün nedensellik kavramlarına yaklaşım ve ortaya koydukları reddiyelerin benzerlik ve farklılıklarına işaret ederek aradaki etkileşim imkanını sorgulamaktır. Konuya aşina olan herkeste Gazzâlî ve Hume’un nedensellik düşüncelerinin birbirine benzerlik hissi uyandırmasının yanında, aynı argümanların mûcize konusunda nasıl farklı algılandığı ve yargılandığını göstermek de çalışmamızın diğer bir amacıdır.

While the studies on al-Ghazālī’s thought are abundant, its unusual approach to the issue of khatm al-nubuwwa has not received the attention of researchers. Yet, in his Iqtiṣād, he seeks to answer this tricky issue: Is it possible to consider as an infidel a Muslim who does not believe in the sealing of prophethood? In this article, we will analyze al-Ghazālī’s response. Our aim will be to put his response into its historical context, taking into account the philosophical and religious attitude of the author. To this end, we will analyse, firstly, the context in which he tackles this issue in his Iqtiṣād. Secondly, we will examine how his opinion differs from the commonly accepted doctrine and then analyse how it provides a solid refutation of the idea that ijmā‘ and tawātur can be used as a conclusive proofs of a doctrine.

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Si les études sur la pensée d’al-Ghazālī sont abondantes, son approche singulière de la question du khatm al-nubuwwa n’a pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. Or dans son Iqtiṣād, il s’attache à répondre à cette question épineuse : peut-on qualifier d’infidèle un musulman qui ne croit pas en la clôture de la prophétie ? Dans le présent article, nous analyserons la réponse d’al-Ghazālī. Notre objectif sera de replacer celle-ci dans son contexte historique, en tenant compte de l’attitude philosophico-religieuse de l’auteur. Pour ce faire, nous analyserons, en premier lieu, le contexte dans lequel il traite cette question dans son Iqtiṣād. En second lieu, nous examinerons comment son opinion diffère de la doctrine communément admise et, ensuite, en quoi celle-ci constitue une réfutation solide de l’idée que l’ijmā‘ et le tawātur puissent servir de preuves décisives en matière de doctrine.

This is the Arabic translation of my 2009 book "Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology." Mariam M. Shehata did a marvelous job in translating the book from English into Arabic. That's not an easy task, given that the book itself contains many translations from Arabic into English that need to be replaced with the original Arabic texts and the translation needs to adapt to that. I am very grateful to Mariam.

Ce travail essaye, par une approche à la fois analytique et descriptive, de remonter aux origines du soufisme en Islam. A travers une documentation arabophone assez fournie, il essaye de dégager une analyse objective qui permet d’aboutir à des conclusions précises.
La dévotion et la recherche de l’agrément de Dieu qui émanaient de la foi sincère des premiers croyants de l’Islam, s’exprimant sous forme d’un certain nombre de pratiques et comportements, firent distinguer, le long des générations, parmi les musulmans, un groupe qui, malgré les facteurs bouleversants qui se succédaient, cherchaient à sauvegarder sa spiritualité à travers des méthodes d’éducation de l’âme. Ces dévots furent désignés sous le nom de « sûfî » (soufis) vers le IIe siècle après l’Hégire (VIIIe siècle) ; leurs pratiques furent progressivement conceptualisées et identifiées sous le terme « Tasawwuf » ou soufisme.
Par différentes approches, les soufis s’accordent dans la recherche continue de la perfection de leur soumission. Ils développent des relations entre le spirituel et la nature de l’âme. Afin de maîtriser celle-ci dans leur quête continue du bien faire dévotionnel, ils cherchent à mieux la connaître, ce qui les oblige à mener une vie de « combat contre eux-mêmes » durant laquelle, à travers des expériences personnelles, ils systématisent progressivement une voie intérieure qu’ils qualifient parfois de Réalité spirituelle ou Ḥaqîqa. Elle doit être l’esprit qui sous-tend l’expression visible régie par la Loi religieuse ou Sharî̔a.
L’analyse de toutes ces données quelque peu disparates et parfois peu élaborées a permis d’aboutir à un ensemble cohérent et systémique dans lequel l’âme et l’esprit, dans un cadre métaphysique, développent leurs relations avec le cœur et la raison et, de ce fait, se trouvent être très liés au fondement de tous les comportements physiques du croyant.

Le Taṣawwuf ou soufisme, réalité de la civilisation islamique, est connu de nos jours à travers deux manifestations.  Une manifestation pratique, plus ou moins populaire et plus actuelle, se forme et se développe à travers des confréries. Il se présente également sous forme d’un développement théorique issu de l’héritage islamique.
Cette pensée en question a connu son essor le plus important à l’époque comprise entre le troisième et le cinquième siècle de l’Hégire, ce qui correspond à la période médiévale de l’ère chrétienne. La doctrine systématisée à ce niveau se réclame absolument de l’Islam tel que vécu par son prophète et ses premiers compagnons. D’autres parts, l’autre forme d’expression plus actuelle du soufisme veut s’inscrire dans cette même continuité malgré les contestations du salafisme qui leur dispute cette authenticité.

Sur ce, cette thèse s’est interrogée sur la probable évolution sociale et historique d’une même réalité spirituelle. Autrement dit, est-il vérifiable théologiquement et historiquement que les théoriciens du Taṣawwuf n’ont fait que conceptualiser et systématiser les dimensions pratiques et spirituelles de l’Islam tel que vécu par les premiers croyants ? Y’a-t-il une constance sur le plan spirituel qui permet aux soufis des confréries de soutenir une authenticité par rapport aux prédécesseurs dont ils se réclament ? Si oui, comment s’est opérée cette évolution ?
Ce sont là un certain nombre de questions dont les réponses seront cherchées dans l’histoire des idées de la civilisation islamique.

Preserved in what seems to be a unique manuscript at the Bodleian Library, al-Nafs wa-l-rūḥ wa-sharḥ quwāhumā (The Soul and the Spirit together with an Explanation of Their Faculties) of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) is a curious book. At the beginning, the author decribes the text as part of the philosophical sciences (as opposed to the religious ones) and clarifies that it deals with ʿilm al-akhlāq, meaning Aristotelian virtue ethics. The text is divided into two parts, the first explaining subjects of philosophical psychology, such as the nature of the soul, its faculties, and its survival after the death of the body. The second part explains how one can “treat” or “heal” the soul from certain negative character traits or vices. In both parts, the book makes liberal use of quotations from the Qur’an, from prophetical ḥadīth, and from sayings by other prophets and sages. This is quite unlike any other “book on philosophy” that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī wrote.
      The article explains the distinction between philosophical and non-philosophical books in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and what it means for a book to belong to the former group. Al-Rāzī’s works in the theoretical fields of philosophy (logic, the natural sciences, metaphysics, and theology) do not use evidence derived from revelation and hardly ever refer to it. The relationship between revelation and the practical disciplines of philosophy (among them ethics), however, is different from the relation between revelation and theoretical philosophy. This difference leads in Avicenna to an almost complete abandonment of the practical disciplines. In authors who follow Avicenna in his Farabian approach to the relationship between philosophy and revelation it leads to hybrid works such as al-Nafs wa-l-rūḥ wa-sharḥ quwāhumā that follow a philosophical agenda but employ means and strategies that mimic and imitate revelation.

Bu makalede Gazâlî’ye göre çocuk eğitiminin pratik ve temel prensiplerini ortaya koymaya çalışacağız. Çalışmada kullanılan materyaller, Kimyâ-yı Saâdet ve İhyâ’û Ulûmiddin başta olmak üzere Gazâlî’nin temel orijinal eserleri olacaktır. Gazâlî sadece çocuklar için bir kitap yazmaya karar vermemiş, aynı zamanda bu kitabına da “Ey Çocuk!” (Eyyühel Veled) ismini vermiştir. Bu konuda yazılmış diğer eserler, Gazâlî’nin çocuk eğitiminde farklı bakışlarını basit bir tavır ile taklit etmektedir. Çok iyi bir sûfi olduğu kadar iyi bir ahlakçı da olan Gazâlî çocuk eğitimini içeren bazı güzel prensipleri bize önermektedir: Ona göre, çocuğun kalbi saf bir cevherdir ki, o her çeşit nakış ve resimden boş, fakat nakşedilecek her şeyi kabule müsait ve kendine yönelen her şeye meyleder durumdadır. Gördüğümüz gibi Gazâlî’ye göre, çocuk doğuştan ne iyi nede kötüdür. O, yaşadığı kültür ve toplumda belirgin özellikleri ve isimlendirmeleri alır. Çocuk eğitiminde, bir yandan benzerlik kurarak taklit etmek ve diğer yandan bireysel çabalarda bulunmak temeldir. Böylece, aile ve okul, çocuk eğitimi ve karakter gelişiminde iki önemli araç olmaktadır.

Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) is one of the most influential thinkers of Islam. There is hardly a genre of Islamic literature where he is not regarded as a major authority. Islamic Law, Sufism, ethics, philosophy, and theology are all deeply shaped by him. Yet in the past thirty years, the field of Ghazālī-studies has been shaken by the realization that Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 428/1037) and other philosophers had a strong influence on him. Now, after the 900th anniversary at his death, the field emerges stronger than ever. This second volume of Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazālī brings together twelve leading experts on al-Ghazālī who write about his thought and the impact it had on later Muslim thinkers.
Contributors are: Anna Ayşe Akasoy, Ahmed El Shamsy, Kenneth Garden, Frank Griffel, Jules Janssens, Damien Janos, Taneli Kukkonen, Stephen Ogden, M. Sait Özervarlı, Martin Riexinger, Ulrich Rudolph, and Ayman Shihadeh.

In his famous autobiography, The Deliverer from Error, al-Ghazālī reconstructs the way the science of ethics is supposed to have developed. Al-Ghazālī contends that the philosophical ethics taught by the Arabic Aristotelians necessarily depends upon prior revelations handed to religious aspirants of a vaguely Sufi stamp. Al-Ghazālī's argument is reminiscent of similar ones made in late antiquity; I maintain, however, that for al-Ghazālī the point bears added systematic significance. Given the central position held by the purification of the soul in al-Ghazālī's conception of true religion , he can hardly admit that the philosophers should have discovered independently any of the philosophical ethics al-Ghazālī himself espouses. It is the supernatural power of prescribed ritual acts that ultimately allows al-Ghazālī to maintain the superiority of religiously predicated ethics.

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The return of the Moroccan philosopher Muhammad-Aziz Lahbabi (d. 1993) to the history of philosophy seems to have been not to learn more about the problems that preoccupied the philosophers of the past, nor to solve philological or hermeneutical problems, as is usually the case in this discipline, but rather his return was for a more "substantial" cause that was the basis of his career throughout his intellectual life, namely, the future of the human.  Perhaps the characteristics of this future that Lahbabi wanted to attribute to this philosophy guided his reading of the history of philosophy in Muslim contexts. From this point of view, one should perhaps understand the nature of his approach to the Muslim philosophies that were the focus of his research and reflection. He has reconstructed the history of this philosophy in order to bring it in line with his objectives and challenges, which do not consist in the accumulation of new studies on this or these philosophies, but in their use in the challenges of his time.

This paper discusses the question of an Ismaʿili influence within the cosmology of al-Ghazālī and argues that al-Ghazālī appropriated certain features of the Ismaʿili cosmology from the Persian Ismaʿili thought of Nāṣir-i Khusraw (d. ca. 481/1088). After introducing Nāṣir-i Khusraw and his Ismaʿili Neoplatonic cosmology, the paper first examines some of the Ismaʿili doctrinal material presented in al-Ghazālī’s anti-Ismaʿili polemical work Faḍāʾiḥ al-bāṭiniyya—concerning cosmology, revelation, and taʾwīl—and traces this content back to Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s works, arguing that Nāṣir-i Khusraw was one of the sources for al-Ghazālī’s knowledge of Ismaʿili doctrines. Secondly, the paper highlights a number of commonalities and shared terminology between the cosmology, epistemology, and doctrine of prophecy in al-Ghazālī’s Mishkāt al-anwār (‘The Niche of Lights’) and the Ismaʿili doctrines of Nāṣir-i Khusraw, revealing how the two thinkers understand the cosmos as containing precisely ‘two worlds’, emphasize the correspondence (muwāzana) between the spiritual and physical realms, and conceive the faculty of prophecy as a higher supra-intellectual spirit (rūḥ) or ‘eye’ of perception. Thirdly, the paper revisits the scholarly debate concerning al-Ghazālī’s higher theology and cosmology in the Veils section of the Mishkāt. It demonstrates that al-Ghazālī’s worldview, which places the transcendent God above the First Mover of the Aristotelians and the Necessary Existent of the falāsifa using the Qurʾānic symbolism of Moon and Sun worship, has been appropriated from Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s Ismaʿili Neoplatonic cosmology.

KIMIĀ-YE SAʿĀDAT (Alchemy of happiness), a composition (taṣnif) of Abu Ḥāmed Moḥammad Ḡazāli (q.v.; 450-505/1058-1111), a scholar of the Sha ʿite school of law and a prominent Persian thinker of medieval Islam. The Kimiā-ye saʿādat was written during Ḡazāli's Khorasan period, after his return from his wanderings to his native Ṭus (see ḠAZĀLI i. BIOGRAPHY), and completed between 495-99/1102-6. The Kimiā-ye saʿādat was one of Ḡazāli's works composed in Persian during the period of the Saljuq sultanate, when Persian was the o cial language of its vast empire and was gradually becoming a lingua franca for Muslim scholars.

Knowledge and Method in Ghazali’s Philosophy
According to Ghazali, various methods can be used to acquire and use knowledge, as he professed in his numerous works. In doing this, he adopted the Aristotelian logic as the primary principle and sought to reconcile it with Islamic sciences. He is apparently the first in the Islamic thought to use Aristotle’s logic as a methodology of Islamic sciences. In his understanding, logic was independent of philosophy, while it wasn’t directly related to religion. He thought, logic was merely an “instrument” (organon) to receive correct knowledge and to discover the path to true sciences.
Ghazali claimed that logic had divine roots and is prerequisite to grasp the principles of religion. This assertion of Ghazali has been influential throughout the Islamic world; this in turn accelerated the spread and use of Aristotelian logic.
The main concern of Ghazali’s philosophy was the issue of “certitude” in knowledge, especially in the area of metaphysics. He perceives metaphysics an area where reason renders are insufficient while it has been perceived by most philosophers as sublime of all sciences. According to him, at this juncture knowledge can only be obtained through religious experiences such as inspiration, intuition and divination.
He perceived dialectics among the methods Ghazali used as the art of debate which did not generate precise knowledge. Meanwhile, see his hermeneutic method (tevil) as faith-based hermeneutics which seeks to base everything in God. The most authentic part of his philosophy is his sense of “methodological scepticism”. He concluded to have found the precise knowledge thorough this method, and then linked truth (yakin) with faith. His methodological scepticism is the forerunner of Ibn al-Haytham and Descartes.
The search for absolute inner integrity lies at the heart of Ghazali’s books and colourful world. He tried his utmost to absorb the totality of knowledge before him, analysed it critically, and sought to systematize this knowledge with the contribution of his own learning. This was an attempt to demonstrate the discord between Islam and the Greek metaphysics, which led him to lay the foundations of an Islamic method of philosophical inquiry. Therefore, his life, thought and method serve as a good model for us today.
Key words: Ghazali, Knowledge, Methodology, Logic, Methodological Scepticism.