- University of Aberdeen, Politics and International Relations, Department Memberadd
- International Studies, International Relations, Modern Egypt, Area Studies, Middle East Studies, Middle Eastern History, and 15 moreNationalism And State Building, Egypt, Democratization, Political Theory, Bio-Politics, Discourse Theory, European/EU Politics, External Relations of the EU, Identity Politics (Political Science), Islam (Political Science), Middle East Politics, Continental Philosophy, Michel Foucault, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), and Arab Uprisingsedit
- Andrea Teti is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, 2018-19 Visiting Professor at th... moreAndrea Teti is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, 2018-19 Visiting Professor at the GramsciLab (University of Cagliari), and Visiting Professor at the University of Ghent's Middle East & North Africa Research Group (2017-18), as well as co-founder and Co-Chair of the Critical Middle East Studies (CMES) group, and Trustee of the British Society for Middle East Studies (BRISMES). He was previously Principal Investigator for the ArabTransformations Project (2015-16, EU FP7, €2.49m) and held the 2015-16 ACES Europe Visiting Fellow at the University of Amsterdam (2015-16). In 2016, he joined the Editorial Board of Middle East Critique, and in January 2019 he was appointed Associate Editor, and then Senior Associate Editor in 2021. From 2019 to 2022 he was Trustee for the British Society of Middle East Studies (BRISMES), and still sits on its Committee for Academic Freedom. He is co-founder and co-chair of the Critical Middle East Studies network, and formerly Scientific Lead of the Arab Trasformations Project (grant id: 320214).
His research focuses on the politics of democracy promotion in the Euro-Mediterranean area, and several related areas spanning the history and theory of social science. Andrea has published widely in English, Italian and French on democratization, Egyptian politics, knowledge production in Social Science, and political theory (e.g. Constructivism, Orientalism). His analyses are considered leading exemplars of Constructivism and of Poststructuralism in these areas, as well as innovative uses of Critical Discourse Analysis in unpacking EU foreign policy towards the Middle East (2012, 2013, 2015) and influential critiques of orthodox models of Democratization in the region. His account of the so-called 'Area Studies Controversy' is widely cited and features on syllabi worldwide. He is also editor of Hidden Geographies: Informal Power in the Greater Middle East (2014) with Gennaro Gervasio and Luca Anceschi.
As Consortium Leader for the Arab Transformations Project, he was responsible overseeing the production of 21 Working Papers, 11 Policy Briefs, singly or jointly authoring a majority of these, and co-authoring an additional two Briefs on behalf of the EU (Perceptions of Democracy, Development and the EU, 2014; Social Cohesion, 2016). The Project also produced a data set of public opinion surveys carried out in late 2014, and a longitudinal database including other major surveys and quantitative indicators.
His recent publications focus on analysing the results of the Arab Transformations Project and their implications for various subfields: these publications include a book on The Arab Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan (2017), and articles on corruption (2017), on the role of youth in the Uprisings (2018), and on conceptions of democracy in four Arab countries (2019). Forthcoming work for 2019 includes a co-authored book on EU-MENA relations, as well as an article on Foucault in materiali foucaultiani.
Andrea appears regulalry on national and international media, including the BBC, Al-Jazeera English, France24, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Australia's SBS, Deutsche Welle, Voice of America, and Italy's RAI state broadcaster. He is also a regular contributor to OpenDemocracy and The Conversation, and has been featured on various newspapers and magazines including Newsweek, Common Dreams, Middle East Report (US), The Scotsman, Berfrois, Aberdeen Press & Journal, The Big Issue (UK), To Vima (Greece), L’Unità, Il Manifesto, La Repubblica, Il Fatto Quotidiano, VICE News Italia, Minima et Moralia, Affari Italiani (Italy), Mada Masr, Aswat Masriya/Reuters Egypt, Egypt Independent, The Cairo Post (Egypt), Islamopedia, Qantara, and has been interviewed or cited in several more.edit
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Public Opinion, Middle East & North Africa, Democratization, European Union, Public Opinion Research, and 12 moreEgypt, Morocco, Survey Research, Democracy, Middle East Politics, Survey Research (Research Methodology), Middle East, Tunisia, International Relations and European Studies, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), Tunisian Revolution-Arab Spring, and Arab Uprisings
Research Interests: Middle East Studies, Middle East & North Africa, Religion and Politics, Politics, Identity politics, and 9 moreIdentity Politics (Political Science), Islam, Informal Economy, Middle East Politics, Imperialism, Informal Sector, Politics and International relations, Ethnicity and National Identity, and Greater Middle East
EN: Explanations of the authoritarian retrenchment after Egypt’s 2011 Revolution invoke either the regime’s repressive advantage over ‘leaderless’ mobilisation and civic activists, or insufficient preparations and radicalism on the part... more
EN: Explanations of the authoritarian retrenchment after Egypt’s 2011 Revolution invoke either the regime’s repressive advantage over ‘leaderless’ mobilisation and civic activists, or insufficient preparations and radicalism on the part of opposition groups. Both explanations are unsatisfactory. First, because despite being ‘reformist’, opposition groups’ demands were perceived as radical challenges to regimes before, during and after the uprisings. Second, because appeals to regimes’ coercive capacity contradict explanations of opponents’ rise to prominence before the uprisings: if activists eroded Egypt’s authoritarian regime before 2011, what made them unable to continue doing so afterwards? Conversely, if activists’ agency was effective before 2011 despite gross imbalances in coercive capacity, then those imbalances alone cannot explain activists’ post-revolutionary decline. In short, if activists’ agency cannot be denied before Egypt’s ‘eighteen days’, it must be accounted for in their aftermath. To do this, the authors draw on Gramsci’s original texts and Italian-language scholarship to develop his neglected notion of disgregazione.
FR:
Les explications du repli autoritaire après la révolution égyptienne de 2011 invoquent soit l’avantage répressif du régime, soit une faute de radicalisme de la part des groupes d’opposition. Les deux explications sont insatisfaisantes. D’abord parce qu’en dépit d'être « réformistes », les revendications des groupes d’opposition étaient perçues comme des défis radicaux aux régimes avant, pendant et après les soulèvements. Deuxièmement, parce que les appels à la capacité coercitive des régimes contredisent les explications de la montée des groupes d’opposition avant les soulèvements : si les militants ont contesté le régime autoritaire égyptien avant 2011, qu’est-ce qui les a empêchés de continuer après ? Inversement, si l’action des militants était efficace avant 2011 malgré les déséquilibres flagrants de la capacité coercitive, ces déséquilibres ne peuvent à eux seuls expliquer le déclin des militants après la révolution. En bref, si l’agentivité des militants ne peut être niée avant les « dix-huit jours » égyptiens, elle doit être prise en compte après. Pour ce faire, nous nous appuyons sur les textes originaux de Gramsci et sur la recherche en langue italienne pour développer sa notion de disgregazione.
FR:
Les explications du repli autoritaire après la révolution égyptienne de 2011 invoquent soit l’avantage répressif du régime, soit une faute de radicalisme de la part des groupes d’opposition. Les deux explications sont insatisfaisantes. D’abord parce qu’en dépit d'être « réformistes », les revendications des groupes d’opposition étaient perçues comme des défis radicaux aux régimes avant, pendant et après les soulèvements. Deuxièmement, parce que les appels à la capacité coercitive des régimes contredisent les explications de la montée des groupes d’opposition avant les soulèvements : si les militants ont contesté le régime autoritaire égyptien avant 2011, qu’est-ce qui les a empêchés de continuer après ? Inversement, si l’action des militants était efficace avant 2011 malgré les déséquilibres flagrants de la capacité coercitive, ces déséquilibres ne peuvent à eux seuls expliquer le déclin des militants après la révolution. En bref, si l’agentivité des militants ne peut être niée avant les « dix-huit jours » égyptiens, elle doit être prise en compte après. Pour ce faire, nous nous appuyons sur les textes originaux de Gramsci et sur la recherche en langue italienne pour développer sa notion de disgregazione.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This article draws on public opinion survey data from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan to investigate first, whether a “demand for democracy” in the region exists; second, how to measure it; and third, how respondents understand it.... more
This article draws on public opinion survey data from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan to investigate first, whether a “demand for democracy” in the region exists; second, how to measure it; and third, how respondents understand it. The picture emerging from this analysis is complex, eluding the simple dichotomy between prima facie support and second order incongruence with democracy, which characterises current debates. Respondents have a more holistic understanding of democracy than is found in current scholarship or indeed pursued by Western or regional policymakers, valuing civil-political rights but prioritizing socio-economic rights. There is broad consensus behind principles of gender equality, but indirect questions reveal the continuing influence of conservative and patriarchal attitudes. Respondents value religion, but do not trust religious leaders or want them to meddle in elections or government. Moreover, while there is broad support for conventionally-understood pillars of liberal democracy (free elections, a parliamentary system), there is also a significant gap between those who support democracy as the best political system in principle and those who also believe it is actually suitable for their country.
Research Interests:
Although EU democracy assistance (DA) policy has been criticized both before and after the Arab Uprisings for reflecting a one-size-fits-all (neo) liberal script, there is little detailed exploration of how exactly EU policy is ‘liberal’.... more
Although EU democracy assistance (DA) policy has been criticized both before and after the Arab Uprisings for reflecting a one-size-fits-all (neo) liberal script, there is little detailed exploration of how exactly EU policy is ‘liberal’. With this objective, this article examines the conceptual structure of ‘democracy’ in key policy documents. It finds that the ideas of democracy and its promotion remain virtually unchanged after the uprisings. Specifically, the analysis shows that, first, democracy is understood as involving a balance between state and civil society. Second, that while the indivisibility of human rights—particularly civil, political, social, and economic—is proclaimed, civil and political rights far outweigh social and economic rights in their importance vis-a`-vis democracy in EU policy. Third, that the role of socio-economic rights progressively is being marginalized as individual policy documents develop. Fourth, that conceptions of civil society in these documents marginalize trade unions and other actors focusing on socio-economic rights. Finally, that socio-economic issues gradually are being redefined as matters not of rights but of trade and aid. This fundamentally reverses the moral economy of obligations attached to socio-economic issues: from a focus on would-be democratizing populations as right-bearers to their reconceptualization as morally and financially indebted recipients of charity.
Research Interests:
Le soulèvement au royaume du Bahreïn et la répression sanglante qui a suivi ont constitué un vrai cas d'école pour les révoltes arabes. Que ce soit au Bahreïn ou en Tunisie, en Syrie ou en Égypte, un régime qui exerce une... more
Le soulèvement au royaume du Bahreïn et la répression sanglante qui a suivi ont constitué un vrai cas d'école pour les révoltes arabes. Que ce soit au Bahreïn ou en Tunisie, en Syrie ou en Égypte, un régime qui exerce une discrimination systématique entre de minces ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This paper explores the hypothesis of a convergence between ‘backsliding’ European liberal democracies and the ‘pseudo-liberalization’ of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems (Cavatorta, 2010) by considering the similarities, beyond the... more
This paper explores the hypothesis of a convergence between ‘backsliding’ European liberal democracies and the ‘pseudo-liberalization’ of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems (Cavatorta, 2010) by considering the similarities, beyond the well-known differences, between Italy and Egypt. We suggest that standard indicators of regime type (e.g. Polity IV Authority Index) fail to capture important trends both in the evolution of both the forms of political power and the forms of resistance. Reflecting on such trends may help re-think the current limitations of Democratization theory (Teti, 2012).
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This paper explores the hypothesis of a convergence between ‘backsliding’ European liberal democracies and the ‘pseudo-liberalization’ of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems (Cavatorta, 2010) by considering the similarities, beyond the... more
This paper explores the hypothesis of a convergence between ‘backsliding’ European liberal democracies and the ‘pseudo-liberalization’ of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems (Cavatorta, 2010) by considering the similarities, beyond the well-known differences, between Italy and Egypt. We suggest that standard indicators of regime type (e.g. Polity IV Authority Index) fail to capture important trends both in the evolution of both the forms of political power and the forms of resistance. Reflecting on such trends may help re-think the current limitations of Democratization theory (Teti, 2012).
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Public Opinion, Political Science, Democratization, Social Justice, European Neighbourhood Policy, and 15 moreEuropean Union, Egypt, Morocco, Survey Research, Democracy, Democratisation, Multidisciplinary, External Relations of the EU, Political Islam, Social Democracy, Algeria, Egyptian Politics, Democratic Transitions, Libyan Studies, and North African studies
In addition to being characterised as a 'regime of truth', Orientalist discourses also display the general properties of confessional discourses outlined in Foucault's Will to Knowledge. The article argues that there is a similarity... more
In addition to being characterised as a 'regime of truth', Orientalist discourses also display the general properties of confessional discourses outlined in Foucault's Will to Knowledge. The article argues that there is a similarity in the 'effects of power'; made possible within these frameworks, particular regarding the legitimisation and application of discipline. Finally, the paper draws out a few implications for the analysis of power and resistance in confessional economies of power. The perspective this paper provides an insight into the internal structure of Orientalist discourse; connects this structure with Orientalism's 'effects of power'; affords purchase on both Orientalism's organisational and ontogenetic properties; helps explain the persistence of Orientalism-both overt and covert-despite three decades of post-Orientalist scholarship. In this sense, a confessional perspective on Orientalism affords a broad view of the contemporary p...
We draw innovatively on new and existing public opinion survey data carried out across North African countries since 2011 to provide a ‘view from below’ of the type of democracy that citizens of North African countries want, and compare... more
We draw innovatively on new and existing public opinion survey data carried out across North African countries since 2011 to provide a ‘view from below’ of the type of democracy that citizens of North African countries want, and compare this conception with the type of democracy the European Union (EU) ‘offers’ its counterparts in the ‘Southern Neighbourhood’. This comparison shows there is a mismatch between what citizens want and what the EU is offering. While citizens want a ‘thicker’, socially just democracy, the EU ‘offers’ a market democracy that prioritises a limited number of civil and political rights. Social and economic rights are discursively constructed as macroeconomic issues relevant to the stability and consolidation of democracy rather than human rights as integral to democracy as their civil-political counterparts.
Research Interests: Public Opinion, Democratization, Social Justice, European Neighbourhood Policy, European Union, and 15 moreEgypt, Morocco, Survey Research, Democracy, Democratisation, Democracy and Islam in muslim-majority countries, External Relations of the EU, Political Islam, Social Democracy, Algeria, Tunisia, Egyptian Politics, Tunisian Revolution-Arab Spring, Democratic Transitions, and Libyan Studies
This article explores whether, in the decade preceding the 2011 uprising, Egypt’s Independent Civic Activists (ICAs) can be considered organic intellectuals in terms of Antonio Gramsci’s well-known definition. To do so, three aspects of... more
This article explores whether, in the decade preceding the 2011 uprising, Egypt’s Independent Civic Activists (ICAs) can be considered organic intellectuals in terms of Antonio Gramsci’s well-known definition. To do so, three aspects of ‘organicity’ with respect to subaltern groups are identified: a ‘demographic’ dimension, namely their embeddedness within subaltern groups; an ‘ideological’ dimension pertaining to their ability to correctly identify the problems affecting subaltern classes; and a ‘cognitive’ dimension, i.e. whether ICAs had managed to gain at least partial recognition from subaltern groups as providing political leadership. During the pre-2011 period, ICAs can be shown to be partly – but not fully – ‘organic’ intellectuals with respect to Egypt’s subaltern groups. Examining ICAs’ evolving mobilisation, it is also possible to both discern the embryonic emergence of a counter-hegemonic project well before 2011, and by contrast the substantial continuity between the regime and the Ikhwan. Finally, the article notes that the Egyptian regime under Husni Mubarak appeared unable or unwilling to address the root causes of dissatisfaction through anything other than palliative measures, leaving it not so much stable as fierce and brittle, vulnerable in precisely the same ways ICAs capitalised on in the run-up to the ‘January 25th Revolution’.
Research Interests:
This article draws on public opinion survey data from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan to investigate first, whether a “demand for democracy” in the region exists; second, how to measure it; and third, how respondents understand it.... more
This article draws on public opinion survey data from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan to investigate first, whether a “demand for democracy” in the region exists; second, how to measure it; and third, how respondents understand it. The picture emerging from this analysis is complex, eluding the simple dichotomy between prima facie support and second order incongruence with democracy, which characterises current debates. Respondents have a more holistic understanding of democracy than is found in current scholarship or indeed pursued by Western or regional policymakers, valuing civil-political rights but prioritizing socio-economic rights. There is broad consensus behind principles of gender equality, but indirect questions reveal the continuing influence of conservative and patriarchal attitudes. Respondents value religion, but do not trust religious leaders or want them to meddle in elections or government. Moreover, while there is broad support for conventionally-understood pillars of liberal democracy (free elections, a parliamentary system), there is also a significant gap between those who support democracy as the best political system in principle and those who also believe it is actually suitable for their country.
Research Interests: Social Justice, Public Opinion (Political Science), Survey Research, Jordan, Democracy, and 15 moreMiddle East Politics, Political Islam, Authoritarianism, Social Democracy, Middle East, Libya, Democracy and democratization, Tunisia, Egyptian Politics, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), Arab Region, Comparative Democratization, Economic and Social Rights, Tunisian Revolution, and Values and Attitudes
One of Foucault’s most famous claims is that “Western man has become a confessing animal (bête d'aveu)” (Foucault, 1978, page 59). It is also one of his most misunderstood. This paper traces the evolution in Foucault’s use of confession... more
One of Foucault’s most famous claims is that “Western man has become a confessing animal (bête d'aveu)” (Foucault, 1978, page 59). It is also one of his most misunderstood. This paper traces the evolution in Foucault’s use of confession (confession) and avowal (aveu) in his early work with two general objectives in mind: first, to obtain a better picture of the evolution of Foucault’s own thinking, particularly the roots of his better- known late work on these issues; and second, contribute towards the analytical development of these two concepts in and beyond Foucault’s own work.
Research Interests:
Corruption provokes much anger in the Middle East and North African (MENA) and was important in the Arab Uprisings; it was government corruption that sparked the greatest anger among the population. The argument of this Report is (a) that... more
Corruption provokes much anger in the Middle East and North African (MENA) and was important in the Arab Uprisings; it was government corruption that sparked the greatest anger among the population. The argument of this Report is (a) that corruption is a major and obvious breach of trust, (b) that the same is true for ‘civil’ corruption – ‘wasta’ in employment, business corruption – (c) that as well as not trusting their government and its institutions, MENA residents do not trust each other either, to the detriment of maintaining functional nation states without coercion, and (d) that corruption is a special case of breach of the Rule of Law which is essential for a decent society. The initial focus on corruption leads to consideration of what people think they can reason- ably expect from government and from each other. Ultimately, corruption divides the society into those who extort bribes or dispense favours and those who are required to pay bribes and are excluded from favour – in other words, there is a breakdown of social inclusion. Further, it destroys trust between people and trust in social institutions, which breaks the cords that hold modern societies together - it is an attack on social cohesion. The article is based mainly on the Arab Transformations Survey, carried out in six developing MENA countries in 2014, three years after the ‘Arab Spring’.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: International Relations, Middle East Studies, Democratization, Mediterranean Studies, International Politics, and 35 moreEuropean Union, Neoliberalism, Egypt, Middle Eastern Studies, European Union (International Studies), Democracy, Middle East Politics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarian regimes, Domestic Politics and International Relations, European Union external relations, Middle East, Concept analysis, Democracy and Good Governance, Arab, Corruption, Measurement, Political Economy of Authoritarianism, Regime change, Egypt, Arab Spring, middle east, Arab studies, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), Middle East and North Africa, Politics and International relations, Tunisian Revolution-Arab Spring, Arab studies, Arab Uprisings, International Relations and Politics, International Studies and Politics, SPRING, Arab Spring, The Arab Spring, European Union Policies, Politics and International Relations of the Middle East, Governance and Democracy, and Democracy, Governance and Development
Research Interests:
On 17 December 2010, Mohamad Bouazizi set himself on fire in desperation in the small Tunisia town of Sidi Bouzid, sparking what became a revolution which toppled one of the most notorious autocrats in the Middle East and North Africa in... more
On 17 December 2010, Mohamad Bouazizi set himself on fire in desperation in the small Tunisia town of Sidi Bouzid, sparking what became a revolution which toppled one of the most notorious autocrats in the Middle East and North Africa in barely twenty-eight days. To the region’s observers this was significant, particularly as Algerians too were protesting about much the same issues. The upheaval that followed, however, surprised even keen observers, not only successfully removing Zine el-Abidine Ben ‘Ali from what seemed like a seat of unchallengeable power, but sparking revolts against other autocrats across the region, most famously in Egypt, but also in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and latterly Syria, with significant protests also in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Today, as protesters in Tunisia and Egypt struggle to consolidate their gains and others hope to emulate their successes, it is far from clear what enduring results these uprisings will yield. Some have called the last few months an ‘Arab 1989’, others have drawn analogies with Europe’s doomed revolutions of 1848. Although the outcome of these unprecedented uprisings and the precise nature of the changes currently taking place in Egypt and across the region will only become apparent in the fullness of time, some important lessons on their roots and significance can already be drawn.
Research Interests:
Although EU democracy assistance (DA) policy has been criticized both before and after the Arab Uprisings for reflecting a one-size-fits-all (neo) liberal script, there is little detailed exploration of how exactly EU policy is ‘liberal’.... more
Although EU democracy assistance (DA) policy has been criticized both before and after the Arab Uprisings for reflecting a one-size-fits-all (neo) liberal script, there is little detailed exploration of how exactly EU policy is ‘liberal’. With this objective, this article examines the conceptual structure of ‘democracy’ in key policy documents. It finds that the ideas of democracy and its promotion remain virtually unchanged after the uprisings. Specifically, the analysis shows that, first, democracy is understood as involving a balance between state and civil society. Second, that while the indivisibility of human rights—particularly civil, political, social, and economic—is proclaimed, civil and political rights far outweigh social and economic rights in their importance vis-a`-vis democracy in EU policy. Third, that the role of socio-economic rights progressively is being marginalized as individual policy documents develop. Fourth, that conceptions of civil society in these documents marginalize trade unions and other actors focusing on socio-economic rights. Finally, that socio-economic issues gradually are being redefined as matters not of rights but of trade and aid. This fundamentally reverses the moral economy of obligations attached to socio-economic issues: from a focus on would-be democratizing populations as right-bearers to their reconceptualization as morally and financially indebted recipients of charity.
Research Interests:
This article examines current proposals for ‘post-democratization’ scholarship, providing support for the need of an epistemic shift in democratization studies both in a regional Middle Eastern setting and more generally. In doing so, it... more
This article examines current proposals for ‘post-democratization’ scholarship, providing support for the need of an epistemic shift in democratization studies both in a regional Middle Eastern setting and more generally. In doing so, it raises several questions about existing proposals, arguing that the failure thus far to challenge the currently hegemonic liberal, positivist democratization framework not just at a conceptual level but also at an ontological and epistemological level risks surreptitiously reproducing key analytical drawbacks built into democratization studies’ epistemic framework. The article then sketches a different approach to analyzing the democratization framework’s limitations, approaching it as a discourse in its own right, and based on this examination formulates an expanded and deepened research agenda for post-democratization scholarship that allows for reflexive scrutiny not just of the building blocks of post-democratization itself but also for an analysis of the deployment of ‘democratization’ as a category of action, both in the process of knowledge production about democratization and in concrete political struggles.
Research Interests:
Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis, this article compares the structure of key policy documents on European Union (EU) democracy promotion in the Southern Neighborhood before and after the “Arab Uprisings.” With reference to the key... more
Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis, this article compares the structure of key policy documents on European Union (EU) democracy promotion in the Southern Neighborhood before and after the “Arab Uprisings.” With reference to the key document presenting the EU's revised conception of democracy and strategic vision in the Southern Neighborhood, this article argues that, despite assertions of a paradigmatic shift in the EU's approach to democracy, the conceptual structure of these documents maintains unaltered the substantively liberal model for both development and democratization. This is likely to leave the EU's pre-Uprisings reputational deficit concerning democracy promotion unaltered.
Research Interests: Egyptology, Middle East Studies, Democratization, Middle East Anthropology, European Politics, and 38 moreInternational Politics, European Union, Middle Eastern Politics, Critical Discourse Analysis, Egypt, Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East (Political Science), European Union (International Studies), Democracy, Critical Political Discourse Analysis, Political Discourse Analysis, Middle East Politics, European Union Politics, International Relations of Middle East, Authoritarian regimes, European Union external relations, Middle East, EU, Comparative Politics, Democratization, Authoritarian Regimes, Regime Change, Concept Analysis, Measurement, Concept analysis, Democracy and Good Governance, Measurement, Regime change, Egypt, Arab Spring, middle east, Arab studies, Democracy in the European Union, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Democracy and Governance, Middle East and North Africa, Politics and International relations, Arab studies, Arab Uprisings, International Studies and Politics, political theory, democracy,democratization, social theory, political theory, Middel Eastern study, Political Clientelism,Comparative Politics, and Corruption (Political Science),clientelism, European Union Policies, Governance and Democracy, Democracy, Governance and Development, and European Union, Globalization, Politics
This paper uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse the EU’s first policy re-assessment in light of the ‘Arab Uprisings’. COM(2011)200 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) claims to outline a new framework... more
This paper uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse the EU’s first policy re-assessment in light of the ‘Arab Uprisings’. COM(2011)200 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) claims to outline a new framework for EU Democracy Assistance (DA) based on a new conception of democracy, and a new position for democracy in the EU’s external relations. The paper analyses PfDSP and one of its key antecedents, COM(2001)252, to assess this claim, focusing on the way two pillars of the debate on democracy – civil-political and socio-economic rights – are defined and how they are organised into a narrative about democracy and its promotion. Contrary to most commentary so far, which accepts the EU's claim to policy novelty whether they are sceptical of whether it will be implemented or not, this analysis suggests that the conceptual structure and policy implications of PfDSP maintain unaltered the substantive vision of a 'liberal' model for both development and democratization in the region. This continuity sets the EU up to repeat earlier mistakes, which resulted in the poor reputation on democracy promotion in the eyes of pro-democracy opposition groups – many of which were central to the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings – well before before the Arab uprisings.
Research Interests: International Relations, Middle East Studies, Mediterranean Studies, European Politics, International Politics, and 23 moreEuropean Union, Mediterranean, Critical Discourse Analysis, Egypt, Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East (Political Science), Democracy, Critical Political Discourse Analysis, Middle East Politics, European Union Politics, International Relations of Middle East, European Union external relations, Middle East, EU, Egypt, Arab Spring, middle east, Arab studies, Democracy in the European Union, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Middle East and North Africa, Arab Uprisings, International Relations of the Middle East, European Union Policies, and EU European Union (International Studies)
Research Interests:
Although International Relations and Middle East Studies share an interest in several aspects of Middle East politics, interdisciplinary research remains surprisingly scarce. This article asks why, despite repeated calls since the... more
Although International Relations and Middle East Studies share an interest in several aspects of Middle East politics, interdisciplinary research remains surprisingly scarce. This article asks why, despite repeated calls since the inception of these fields, this interdisciplinary gap has never been bridged. It supplements conventional approaches which emphasize a simple intellectual history, with elements of a political economy of the organization and production of knowledge, arguing that while intellectual convergence may be a necessary condition for interdisciplinarity, only a shift in epistemic grounds within which fields understand their scholarship can bring this about, and that this in turn requires a shift in the way knowledge is organized and produced. First, the article provides a genealogy of calls for interdisciplinary scholarship. Second, it locates interdisciplinary relations in the universalist organization of knowledge within which they emerged and which still (re)produce inter- and intra-disciplinary divides today. Finally, it considers the potential for Constructivism to provide an interdisciplinary bridge.
Research Interests:
Unlike Tunisia’s more orderly and quicker transition, over a year after the removal of ex-President, Hosni Mubarak, the situation in Egypt remains confused. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military junta which took... more
Unlike Tunisia’s more orderly and quicker transition, over a year after the removal of ex-President, Hosni Mubarak, the situation in Egypt remains confused. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military junta which took over from the former President, has undertaken certain steps towards transition, but opinion on their intentions remains deeply divided. Increasingly, it is clear that they constitute the hard core of Mubarak’s regime, that they are fighting for their survival, and that in this struggle, they are more than prepared to sacrifice the demands for freedom and social justice which were at the core of the uprising which began on January 25th, 2011.
Research Interests:
IR’s intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas (Waever 1998) in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider (political) context. This article contributes... more
IR’s intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas (Waever 1998) in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider (political) context. This article contributes to this wider analysis by focusing on the impact of the field’s discursive economy. Specifically, using Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogical strategy of problematisation to analyse the emergence and disciplinary trajectories of Constructivism in IR, this article argues that Constructivism has been brought gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpart through a process of normalisation, and investigates how it was possible for Constructivism to be purged of its early critical potential, both theoretical and practical. The first part of the paper shows how the intellectual configuration of Constructivism and its disciplinary fortunes are inseparable from far-from-unproblematic readings of the Philosophy of Social Science (PoSS): the choices made at this level are neither as intellectually neutral nor as disciplinarily inconsequential as they are presented. The second and third parts chart the genealogies of Constructivism, showing how its overall normalisation occurred in two stages, each revolving around particular practices and events. The second part concentrates on older genealogies, analysing the politics of early classificatory practices regarding Constructivism, and showing how these permitted the distillation and immunisation of Constructivism –and thus of the rest of the mainstream scholarship which it was depicted as compatible with– against more radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the third part focuses attention on recent genealogies, revealing new attempts to reconstruct and reformulate Constructivism: here, indirect neutralisation practices such as the elaboration of ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism, as well as the direct neutralisation such as the formulation of ‘Realist’ Constructivism, are key events in Constructivism’s normalisation. These apparently ‘critical’ alternatives which aim to ‘provide the identity variable’ in fact remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, but their successful representation as ‘critical’ help neutralise calls for greater openness in mainstream IR. Rather than a simple intellectual history, it is this complex process of (re)reading and (re)producing what counts as ‘Constructivism’ which explains both the normalisation of Constructivism and the continued marginalisation of Postmodernist/Post-structuralist approaches in mainstream IR’s infra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power.
Research Interests:
International Relations’s (IR’s) intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider (political) context. This paper... more
International Relations’s (IR’s) intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider (political) context. This paper contributes to this wider analysis by focusing on the impact of the field’s discursive economy. Specifically, using Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogical strategy of problematization to analyse the emergence and disciplinary trajectories of Constructivism in IR, this paper argues that Constructivism has been brought gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpart through a process of normalization, and investigates how it was possible for Constructivism to be purged of its early critical potential, both theoretical and practical. The first part of the paper shows how the intellectual configuration of Constructivism and its disciplinary fortunes are inseparable from far-from- unproblematic readings of the Philosophy of Social Science: the choices made at this level are neither as intellectually neutral nor as disciplinarily inconsequen- tial as they are presented. The second and third parts chart the genealogies of Constructivism, showing how its overall normalization occurred in two stages, each revolving around particular practices and events. The second part concentrates on older genealogies, analysing the politics of early classificatory practices regarding Constructivism, and showing how these permitted the distillation and immunization of Constructivism – and thus of the rest of the mainstream scholarship which it was depicted as compatible with – against more radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the third part focuses attention on recent genealogies, revealing new attempts to reconstruct and reformulate Constructivism: here, indirect neutralization practices such as the elaboration of ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism, as well as the direct neutraliza- tion such as the formulation of ‘Realist’ Constructivism, are key events in Constructivism’s normalization. These apparently ‘critical’ alternatives that aim to ‘provide the identity variable’ in fact remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, but their successful representation as ‘critical’ help neutralize calls for greater openness in mainstream IR. Rather than a simple intellectual history, it is this complex process of (re)reading and (re)producing that counts as ‘Constructivism’, which explains both the normalization of Constructivism and the continued marginalization of Postmodernist/Post-structuralist approaches in mainstream IR’s infra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power.
Research Interests:
In addition to being characterised as a ‘regime of truth’, Orientalist discourses also display the general properties of confessional discourses outlined in Foucault’s Will to Knowledge. The article argues that there is a similarity in... more
In addition to being characterised as a ‘regime of truth’, Orientalist discourses also display the general properties of confessional discourses outlined in Foucault’s Will to Knowledge. The article argues that there is a similarity in the ‘effects of power’ made possible within these frameworks, particular regarding the legitimisation and application of discipline. Finally, the paper draws out a few implications for the analysis of power and resistance in confessional economies of power. The perspective this paper provides an insight into the internal structure of Orientalist discourse; connects this structure with Orientalism’s ‘effects of power’; affords purchase on both Orientalism’s organisational and ontogenetic properties; helps explain the persistence of Orientalism – both overt and covert – despite three decades of post‐Orientalist scholarship. In this sense, a confessional perspective on Orientalism affords a broad view of the contemporary politics of truth in which Orientalism plays such as an important part. Finally, a confessional perspective affords purchase on the nature of power, the formation of subjectivities, and the possibilities of resistance within Orientalist discursive contexts, which Said’s own analysis is often said to lack.
Research Interests: Social Theory, Political Philosophy, Education, Political Theory, Postcolonial Studies, and 15 moreEducational Research, Critical Social Theory, Resistance (Social), Michel Foucault, Social and Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Edward Said, Poststructuralist Theory, Confessionalization, International Political Theory, Orientalism, The Rhetoric of Confession, Autobiography, Self-Portraiture and the Construction of the Self, Edward Said; orientalism; Anti-Westernism, Michel Foucault and the theory of Power, and International Political Theory (Post structuralism
In addition to being characterised as a ‘regime of truth’, Orientalist discourses also display the general properties of confessional discourses outlined in Foucault’s Will to Knowledge. The article argues that there is a similarity in... more
In addition to being characterised as a ‘regime of truth’, Orientalist discourses also display the general properties of confessional discourses outlined in Foucault’s Will to Knowledge. The article argues that there is a similarity in the ‘effects of power’ made possible within these frameworks, particular regarding the legitimisation and application of discipline. Finally, the paper draws out a few implications for the analysis of power and resistance in confessional economies of power. The perspective this paper provides an insight into the in‐ ternal structure of Orientalist discourse; connects this structure with Orientalism’s ‘effects of power’; affords purchase on both Orientalism’s organisational and ontogenetic properties; helps explain the persistence of Orientalism – both overt and covert – despite three decades of post‐Orientalist scholarship. In this sense, a confessional perspective on Orientalism affords a broad view of the contemporary politics of truth in which Orientalism plays such as an im‐ portant part. Finally, a confessional perspective affords purchase on the nature of power, the formation of subjectivities, and the possibilities of resistance within Orientalist discursive con‐ texts, which Said’s own analysis is often said to lack.
Research Interests:
In un mumero speciale di 'Meirione' dedicato alle elezioni in Medio Oriente durante il 2005/06, questo pezzo considera alcune caratteristiche dei parametri analitici usati dalla letteratura scientifica per carpire il significato delle... more
In un mumero speciale di 'Meirione' dedicato alle elezioni in Medio Oriente durante il 2005/06, questo pezzo considera alcune caratteristiche dei parametri analitici usati dalla letteratura scientifica per carpire il significato delle elezioni in termini di possibili transizioni democratiche in Medio Oriente. La principale conclusione a cui si arriva e' che, nonostante le dichiarate intenzioni anti-culturaliste ed oggettiviste dei cosidetti 'democratization studies', vi si possono riscontrare molti elementi propri dell'Orientalismo classico criticato da Edward Said.
Research Interests:
This article considers the potential contributions Constructivism could bring to both International Relations (IR) and Middle East Studies (MES) thanks to a framework which emphasises the transformative potential of political identity, as... more
This article considers the potential contributions Constructivism could bring to both International Relations (IR) and Middle East Studies (MES) thanks to a framework which emphasises the transformative potential of political identity, as well as the importance of its location within specific historical, social, political and cultural pathways. Constructivism presents perhaps the best and most realistic opportunity to build bridges between traditionally isolationist fields like IR and MES, and the analytical and empirical sections of this paper intend to offer a brief example of how that cross-fertilisation might take place. However, as a post-positivist framework, Constructivism also offers the possibility of reflecting on the development and interaction (or lack thereof) of IR and MES themselves. Unfortunately, Constructivism still has to make any significant impact upon MES, and despite the potentially radical impact this deployment of it might have on IR, on this aspect Constructivist literature is puzzlingly silent.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Le soulèvement au royaume du Bahreïn et la répression sanglante qui a suivi ont constitué un vrai cas d’école pour les révoltes arabes. Que ce soit au Bahreïn ou en Tunisie, en Syrie ou en Égypte, un régime qui exerce une discrimination... more
Le soulèvement au royaume du Bahreïn et la répression sanglante qui a suivi ont constitué un vrai cas d’école pour les révoltes arabes. Que ce soit au Bahreïn ou en Tunisie, en Syrie ou en Égypte, un régime qui exerce une discrimination systématique entre de minces élites aisées et une majorité de la population ne peut que s’appuyer sur des mécanismes parallèles de marginalisation politique. Ce qui a conduit le Bahreïn, comme certains de ses homologues arabes, à une impasse : d’une part, la libéralisation politique ne peut servir à alléger les pressions de l’inégalité économique ; mais les promesses touchant au développement et à la rente, d’autre part, ne dissuadent plus les gens de réclamer leurs droits. Pire : les stratégies mises en œuvre par les élites pour se maintenir au pouvoir – combinaison de mesures coercitives et attribution de privilèges à des groupes spécifiques – contribuent la plupart du temps sur le long terme à ébranler la cohérence et la légitimité des États.
La seconde impasse au Bahreïn comme ailleurs dans les pays arabes, s’illustre dans la politique extérieure. Le royaume, au lieu de lancer un nouveau « contrat » social et économique susceptible de remédier aux causes de déstabilisation à venir, perpétue l’exacerbation des problèmes existants et renforce vraisemblablement l’instabilité intérieure comme régionale.
La seconde impasse au Bahreïn comme ailleurs dans les pays arabes, s’illustre dans la politique extérieure. Le royaume, au lieu de lancer un nouveau « contrat » social et économique susceptible de remédier aux causes de déstabilisation à venir, perpétue l’exacerbation des problèmes existants et renforce vraisemblablement l’instabilité intérieure comme régionale.
Reading recent accounts of the ‘state of the art’ in the study of Middle East politics, one might believe there was a politically and intellectually unprecedented state of crisis, particularly in Middle East Studies (MES). Such narratives... more
Reading recent accounts of the ‘state of the art’ in the study of Middle East politics, one might believe there was a politically and intellectually unprecedented state of crisis, particularly in Middle East Studies (MES). Such narratives are dominated by the theme that the supposedly new — if not necessarily brave — world since ‘9/11’ can ill-afford an antiquated intellectual sectarianism and political partisanship of which MES is apparently doubly culpable. To strike a blow in defense of freedom, scholars are asked to abandon such academic parochialism and converge upon a common ground which, through the adoption of Social Science’s objective methodologies, would not only produce policy-relevant scholarship in the ‘War on Terror’,1 but also end the narrow factionalism of traditional academia. By virtually universal agreement, interdisciplinarity — understood as enquiry across fields under the epistemic umbrella of Social Science — is the key to such a common ground. Academics are asked to commit to this cause, their silence or reluctance construed as tantamount to complicity with the ‘enemy’. These claims, however, do not hold up to scrutiny: on closer inspection, these political and intellectual debates appear to be embedded into the very way in which Social Science is articulated as an intellectual enterprise. This chapter sketches some ways in which this articulation takes place.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Despite repeated calls for interdisciplinary bridges since the inception of International Relations (IR) and Middle East Studies (MES), the 'gap' between them has never been bridged because the necessity of that 'gap'... more
Despite repeated calls for interdisciplinary bridges since the inception of International Relations (IR) and Middle East Studies (MES), the 'gap' between them has never been bridged because the necessity of that 'gap' is embedded into the very nature of the division between Social Sciences and Area Studies. Emerging as complementary counterparts within a Positivist organization of knowledge, while the latter's original purpose was to gather 'data', the former's was to arrive at 'law-like generalizations'. Since then, partly owing to the convergence of 'Area Studies' with 'Humanities' and its historicist-interpretive methodologies MES has come to understand itself largely in opposition to social science. These largely incompatible epistemic commitments lie at the heart of their inability to find a shared ground upon which 'interdisciplinary' research can be carried out. This paper supplements conventional...
Research Interests:
This paper uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyse the EU's first policy reassessment in light of the Arab uprisings. COM(2011)200 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) claims to outline a new framework... more
This paper uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyse the EU's first policy reassessment in light of the Arab uprisings. COM(2011)200 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) claims to outline a new framework for EU Democracy Assistance (DA) based on a new conception of democracy, and a new position for democracy in the EU's external relations. The paper analyses PfDSP and one of its key antecedents, COM(2001)252, to assess this claim, focusing on the way two pillars of the debate on democracy – civil–political and socio-economic rights – are defined and how they are organized into a narrative about democracy and its promotion. This analysis suggests that the conceptual structure – and therefore policy implications – of PfDSP maintain unaltered the substantive vision of a liberal model for both development and democratization in the region. This continuity sets the EU up to repeat earlier mistakes, which resulted before 2011 in the poor reputation of the EU on democracy promotion among pro-democracy opposition groups – many of which were central to the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings.
Research Interests: Demography, International Relations, Mediterranean Studies, European Politics, International Politics, and 15 moreEuropean Union, Mediterranean, Critical Discourse Analysis, Egypt, Democracy, Critical Political Discourse Analysis, European Union Politics, International Relations of Middle East, European Union external relations, EU, Democracy in the European Union, Arab Uprisings, International Relations of the Middle East, European Union Policies, and Mediterranean Politics
During the Arab Uprisings (or ‘Arab Spring’), the EU recognized that the populations in its ‘Southern Neighborhood’ had been marginalized politically and economically; that this produced instability in politics, economics, and security;... more
During the Arab Uprisings (or ‘Arab Spring’), the EU recognized that the populations in its ‘Southern Neighborhood’ had been marginalized politically and economically; that this produced instability in politics, economics, and security; and that EU policy needed to correct its previous mistake of equating authoritarian repression with stability. Unfortunately, the wrong lessons have been learned from the Uprisings: Europe’s Union and its most powerful states have returned to focusing ‘stability’ understood as a mere lack of change, and to believing that supporting violently authoritarian regimes is an acceptable ‘cost of doing business’ to keep migration in check and to counter terrorism in Europe’s ‘heartland’. After a brief review of the historical context within which Egypt’s current regime emerged, this contribution criticizes the orthodox analytical and policy narratives which represent Egypt as a ‘beacon of stability’ in a turbulent MENA Region, outlining an alternative view which highlights the structural causes of instability in regimes like Egypt’s. It then outlines this instability by noting Egypt’s own post-2013 track record on key domestic and regional issues. The chapter concludes by criticizing the way Western governments invoke the concept of ‘national interest’ to supporting al-Sisi’s (al-Sīsī) regime and those like it, noting that this approach reflects an inability to accept the evidence of the failure of authoritarian regimes to stabilize either internally or externally.
Research Interests: Resilience, International Security, Political Science, Democratization, Security Studies, and 9 moreEuropean Neighbourhood Policy, European Union (International Studies), Democratisation, Stability, Authoritarianism, Authoritarian regimes, European Union external relations, Egyptian Politics, and Egyptian Foreign Relations
This chapter summarises the results of an analysis of empirical data conducted throughout the volume, focusing on key issues: corruption, gender, youth, trust, religion and democracy. This analysis epitomises the integrated approach to... more
This chapter summarises the results of an analysis of empirical data conducted throughout the volume, focusing on key issues: corruption, gender, youth, trust, religion and democracy. This analysis epitomises the integrated approach to quantitative and qualitative data the volume calls for. The chapter concludes with reflections on the implications for policy and scholarship of the volume’s findings, arguing for re-thinking the conception of democracy in particular, challenging existing approaches to ‘authoritarian resilience’ and the excessive emphasis on a narrow approach to security and stability focused on coercive capabilities, and arguing that Arab autocracies in the wake of the Uprisings should be seen as brittle and precarious rather than strong and stable.
Conventional scholarly and policy approaches to democratization in the Middle East either assume or explicitly posit a hierarchy among human rights in the definition and pursuit of democracy, specifically the priority of some... more
Conventional scholarly and policy approaches to democratization in the Middle East either assume or explicitly posit a hierarchy among human rights in the definition and pursuit of democracy, specifically the priority of some civil-political rights (e.g. voting, free expression) over others (e.g. right of association or protest, socio-economic rights). These constructs’ discursive structure has become the terrain for the promotion of democracy by the EU and its Member States in the region (Teti et al. 2020) and for a discursive reframing and resistance by regional governments against that effort (Malmvig 2012). But there is a broader dynamic being played out around the definition of democracy which has thus far been missed. Drawing on discourse analysis of documents, survey data, and interviews, analyzing the Egyptian case shows that alongside governments’ attempts to ‘conduct’ their counterparts is a common discursive ground between them, and that this common ground delegitimizes regional populations’ own conceptions of human rights and democracy and the political and socio-economic demands of those populations, which are considerably more radical than their governments are willing to concede. Governments, in short, are attempting to ‘counter-conduct’ their own populations. The competition between governments highlighted by existing research is real, but it is also a dance around democracy which seeks to avoid populations’ more radical, egalitarian demands.
Research Interests:
Conventional approaches to democratization in the Middle East take for granted the priority of some civil–political rights (e.g., voting) over others (e.g., rights of association or protest, socioeconomic rights). The discursive structure... more
Conventional approaches to democratization in the Middle East take for granted the priority of some civil–political rights (e.g., voting) over others (e.g., rights of association or protest, socioeconomic rights). The discursive structure of these approaches has framed both the promotion of democracy by the European Union and regional governments’ counter-conductive reframing against that effort. But this pas de deux is part of a broader dynamic in which the common ground shared by these two efforts frames democracy so as to deny and delegitimize both the conception of democracy held by Middle Eastern and North African populations themselves and the political and socioeconomic demands of those same populations. Governments, in short, are engaged in “counter-conducting” their own populations. Drawing on critical discourse analysis of key documents, public opinion survey data, and activist interviews, an analysis of the Egyptian case shows that the discursive competition between gover...
Research Interests:
The EU suffers from a poor reputation amongst both the general populations and activists in particular across the Levant and North Africa. This reputation is rooted in a mismatch between how the EU perceives itself and how people and... more
The EU suffers from a poor reputation amongst both the general populations and activists in particular across the Levant and North Africa. This reputation is rooted in a mismatch between how the EU perceives itself and how people and activists perceive its actions and their consequences: the EU believes its policies are rooted in and promote stability, security, and democracy, but on the ground its actions appear to have exactly the opposite effect. To show how and why this is so, this chapter builds on existing analysis of the EU’s self-conception by ‘triangulating’ it with evidence from interviews with activists on the one hand, and with public opinion polls on the other. This triangulation maps a perception mismatch between EU, regional activists, and MENA populations. In particular, the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy has at its heart an understanding of democracy which focuses on certain civil-political rights and which continues to assume – despite decades of failure – that ‘market liberalisation’ will support both political democratization and social justice. Activists and populations, on the other hand, display a holistic and substantive conception of democracy, in which both civil-political and socio-economic rights are integral: there can be no democracy without social justice.
Research Interests:
Conventional scholarly and policy approaches to democratization in the Middle East either assume or explicitly posit a hierarchy among human rights in the definition and pursuit of democracy, specifically the priority of some... more
Conventional scholarly and policy approaches to democratization in the Middle East either assume or explicitly posit a hierarchy among human rights in the definition and pursuit of democracy, specifically the priority of some civil-political rights (e.g. voting, free expression) over others (e.g. right of association or protest, socio-economic rights). These constructs’ discursive structure has become the terrain for the promotion of democracy by the EU and its Member States in the region (Teti et al. 2020) and for a discursive reframing and resistance by regional governments against that effort (Malmvig 2012).
But there is a broader dynamic being played out around the definition of democracy which has thus far been missed. Drawing on discourse analysis of documents, survey data, and interviews, analyzing the Egyptian case shows that alongside governments’ attempts to ‘conduct’ their counterparts is a common discursive ground between them, and that this common ground delegitimizes regional populations’ own conceptions of human rights and democracy and the political and socio-economic demands of those populations, which are considerably more radical than their governments are willing to concede. Governments, in short, are attempting to ‘counter-conduct’ their own populations. The competition between governments highlighted by existing research is real, but it is also a dance around democracy which seeks to avoid populations’ more radical, egalitarian demands.
But there is a broader dynamic being played out around the definition of democracy which has thus far been missed. Drawing on discourse analysis of documents, survey data, and interviews, analyzing the Egyptian case shows that alongside governments’ attempts to ‘conduct’ their counterparts is a common discursive ground between them, and that this common ground delegitimizes regional populations’ own conceptions of human rights and democracy and the political and socio-economic demands of those populations, which are considerably more radical than their governments are willing to concede. Governments, in short, are attempting to ‘counter-conduct’ their own populations. The competition between governments highlighted by existing research is real, but it is also a dance around democracy which seeks to avoid populations’ more radical, egalitarian demands.
Research Interests:
During the Arab Uprisings (or ‘Arab Spring’) the EU recognised that the populations in its ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ had been marginalised politically and economically; that this produced instability in politics, economics, and security;... more
During the Arab Uprisings (or ‘Arab Spring’) the EU recognised that the populations in its ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ had been marginalised politically and economically; that this produced instability in politics, economics, and security; and that EU policy needed to correct its previous mistake of equating authoritarian repression with stability. Unfortunately, the wrong lessons have been learned from the Uprisings: Europe’s Union and its most powerful states have returned to focusing ‘stability’ understood as a mere lack of change, and to believing that supporting violently authoritarian regimes is an acceptable ‘cost of doing business’ to keep migration in check and to counter terrorism in Europe’s ‘heartland’. After a brief review of the historical context within which Egypt’s current regime emerged, this contribution criticises the orthodox analytical and policy narratives which represent Egypt as a ‘beacon of stability’ in a turbulent MENA Region, outlining an alternative view which highlights the structural causes of instability in regimes like Egypt’s. It then outlines this instability by noting Egypt’s own post-2013 track record on key domestic and regional issues. The chapter concludes by criticising the way Western governments invoke the concept of ‘national interest’ to supporting al-Sisi’s (al-Sīsī) regime and those like it, noting that this approach reflects an inability to accept the evidence of the failure of authoritarian regimes to stabilise either internally or externally.
Research Interests: Resilience, International Security, Democratization, Security Studies, European Neighbourhood Policy, and 10 moreEuropean Union (International Studies), Democratisation, Stability, Authoritarianism, Authoritarian regimes, European Union external relations, Egyptian Politics, European Union, European Foreign Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean, Eastern Partnership, Foreign Policy Analysis, Principal-Agent, European Neighbourhood Policy (Euro Mediterranean Partnership), and Egyptian Foreign Relations
ISBN 978-88-98014-83-5
© 2015
Edizioni Epoké
First edition: 2015
© 2015
Edizioni Epoké
First edition: 2015
Research Interests:
This chapter provides an introduction to the history, themes and debates concerning the relationship between Islam and politics. The authors trace a short history of Islam and Islamism's relation to politics from the early days of... more
This chapter provides an introduction to the history, themes and debates concerning the relationship between Islam and politics. The authors trace a short history of Islam and Islamism's relation to politics from the early days of Muahmmad, to the recent rise of DAIISH (ISIS), and phenomena as Islamism online, Islamism in music (hip hop, punk), and popular culture, arguing that the point about 'Political Islam' is not so much that it is Islamic, but that it is political.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
A third of a century after the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism and after Michel Foucault’s death, it is difficult to think of two intellectuals who have been more influential not just within their respective fields, but whose... more
A third of a century after the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism and after Michel Foucault’s death, it is difficult to think of two intellectuals who have been more influential not just within their respective fields, but whose influence has travelled beyond the confines of their disciplines. The intellectual and personal relationship between Edward Said and Michel Foucault - particularly the former’s assessment of the latter - has been the subject of a considerable amount of controversy, generated not least by Said himself. Said’s very public disenchantment with Foucault’s theoretical project and its political implications - in particular, Foucault’s supposed unwillingness to translate ‘insurrectionary scholarship’ into political activism - has been the subject of much debate, not least because it resonates with much (mostly positivist) criticism of post-structuralism generally, and because it came from such a prominent figure, noted for both his contribution to post-positivist theory and for his activism on the Palestinian question. One would not be alone in finding this reading of Foucault’s analysis and of his political practice questionable, but the aim of this contribution will not be to offer yet another attempt to ‘rule’ over the dispute by arriving at a ‘correct’ interpretation of these two intellectuals’ thought, not least because it attempts to take seriously warnings by both scholars concerning the political implications of ruling on ‘truth.’
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This paper analyses the epistemic frameworks which define the fields of Political Science and Middle East Area Studies (MES) and articulate their relation. Drawing on Foucault's analysis of confession, it argues that within Social Science... more
This paper analyses the epistemic frameworks which define the fields of Political Science and Middle East Area Studies (MES) and articulate their relation. Drawing on Foucault's analysis of confession, it argues that within Social Science as a mode of knowledge production, a double confessional relation exists between the Area Studies and Political Science in which MES silences and speaks for the Arab-Islamic Oriental Other, and is then in turn silenced by the Disciplines in the attempt to produce 'law-like generalisations'.
Research Interests:
This chapter provides an introduction to the history, themes and debates concerning the relationship between Islam and politics. The authors trace a short history of Islam and Islamism's relation to politics from the early days of... more
This chapter provides an introduction to the history, themes and debates concerning the relationship between Islam and politics. The authors trace a short history of Islam and Islamism's relation to politics from the early days of Muahmmad, to Islamism online, in music (hip hop, punk), and popular culture, arguing that the point about 'Political Islam' is not so much that it is Islamic, but that it is political.
Code Book for the Arab Transformations Survey 2014
Research Interests:
This Working Paper reviews the social, economic, and political context within which Egypt's 'January Revolution' took place. It describes the historical trajectories which set the scene for the popular uprising, and the principal state... more
This Working Paper reviews the social, economic, and political context within which Egypt's 'January Revolution' took place. It describes the historical trajectories which set the scene for the popular uprising, and the principal state and non-state actors, internal and external drivers, regional and international relations, and economic context within which the protests which removed Hosni Mubarak from office took place.
Arab Transformations Working Paper n. 5
ISSN 2398-9106
Arab Transformations Working Paper n. 5
ISSN 2398-9106
Research Interests:
Survey data from the ArabTrans 2014 survey contains a unique battery of questions pertaining to the perception of the European Union. This report builds on those questions to analyse perceptions of the EU, its development cooperation... more
Survey data from the ArabTrans 2014 survey contains a unique battery of questions pertaining to the perception of the European Union. This report builds on those questions to analyse perceptions of the EU, its development cooperation programmes, its promotion of democracy, the appropriateness of its response to the Arab Uprisings, and the perception of the EU as an international actor. Overall, the data suggests low levels of awareness and relatively negative opinions of the EU’s actions both in general and in the specific context of its response to the Arab Uprisings. However, respondents’ preferences also suggest avenues for policy development for the Union such that it might simultaneously achieve its interests and meet the demands of MENA populations. Throughout, the paper also takes note of specific patterns and conditions found in individual countries which present particular challenges for the EU.
Research Interests:
The story of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a revolt of young people against autocratic rule and to bring democracy to their countries is not a good fit to the available data. Younger people were indeed over-represented in comparison to the age... more
The story of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a revolt of young people against autocratic rule and to bring democracy to their countries is not a good fit to the available data. Younger people were indeed over-represented in comparison to the age distribution of the population as a whole, but some of those ‘identified’ as young were in fact well into middle age, in no country were a majority of the protestors younger than 35, and the introduction of procedural democracy was not the only or even the main aim of the Uprisings. There is little evidence for the ‘rising tide’ in MENA which has been expected to sweep away autocratic rule in favour of democratisation as successive younger generations became individualised, liberalised and secularised. There is partial evidence for secularisation but little for the radical change in liberal values and the growth of rights-based politics. (For the latter we take attitudes to gender equality and gendered norms as our case study.) The neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’ which MENA countries have been urged to adopt has failed to provide a basis for such a normative change, failing either to generate the jobs which would have turned the ‘youth bulge’ into an economic ‘youth dividend’ or to establish an independent middle class within which liberalisation of norms and values leads to the demand for democracy.
Research Interests:
In 2010-11 an unprecedented wave of protests and demands for regime change spread across the MENA region following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouaziz in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, on December 17th, 2010. In the wake of this ‘Arab Spring,’... more
In 2010-11 an unprecedented wave of protests and demands for regime change spread across the MENA region following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouaziz in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, on December 17th, 2010. In the wake of this ‘Arab Spring,’ many called for a ‘paradigm shift’ in the EU’s approach, including the then Enlargement and ENP Commissioner, Štefan Füle, who stated: “The peoples of this region have taken a courageous stand to defend their rights and to introduce democracy and social reforms. The EU must rise to the challenge […] it has often focused too much on stability […] Now is the time to bring our interests in line with our values. Recent events in the South have proved that there can be no real stability without real democracy” (SPEECH/11/436; p. 1). However, the EU’s substantive vision for both development and democratization remained unchanged, paying too little attention to socio-economic rights and inclusive economic development on the one hand and to politically sensitive civil and political rights (e.g. freedom to protest and freedom of association) on the other. This lack of responsiveness transpires from public opinion surveys conducted by the Arab Transitions project in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, and Morocco in 2014, which provided an insight into the attitudes and behaviours of ordinary citizens. Specifically, it sheds light on what people’s political demands are, what they understand by democracy, what they want governments to deliver, their attitudes to the EU, how they evaluate EU policies and, how they think the Union can best support them. This research suggests populations are using ‘thicker’ conceptions of democracy, including social justice and economic rights as well as civil/political rights. In short, what they want is a ‘decent society’ in which there is economic security, in which they are recognised as full citizens, in which different groups work together and, in which they are empowered to take control over their own lives. Failure to engage with the populations’ demand for a better life risks undermining EU credibility as a normative actor and as a stabilising force in the region. Commensurately, by not responding fully to people’s hopes the EU risks missing an opportunity to exert a stabilising influence in the region.
Research Interests:
Based on the Arab Transformations survey of Iraq in 2014, this paper examines the relative weight of religious identification and region of residence in several key areas, including main challenges perceived by the population, perceptions... more
Based on the Arab Transformations survey of Iraq in 2014, this paper examines the relative weight of religious identification and region of residence in several key areas, including main challenges perceived by the population, perceptions of security, of economic conditions, of governance, political mobilisation, corruption, and migration. Contrary to the perception that sectarian identity is the most important factor in understanding contemporary Iraqi politics, this analysis shows that religious identification is often a confounding variable, and that regional location better captures variations in respondents’ perceptions, including in key areas such as security, the economy, and migration.
Research Interests:
In the decade before the Arab Uprisings, people became increasingly disaffected with corrupt regimes which maintained power by rewarding a political and economic elite while excluding increasing swathes of the population from economic... more
In the decade before the Arab Uprisings, people became increasingly disaffected with corrupt regimes which maintained power by rewarding a political and economic elite while excluding increasing swathes of the population from economic gains and political voice. As structural reforms failed to 'trickle down' and only increased crony elites' strength, the middle classes joined working classes in becoming disaffected and politically mobilised. Survey data shows that with the unprecedented wave of protests across the MENA region in 2010-11 came a renewed optimism that post-Uprisings governments would bring desired change, but also awareness that socioeconomic problems remained as acute as political ones, if not more so. Survey data also suggests that what drove protesters was a demand for both social and economic rights (e.g. decent jobs, social protection, universal education and health services) as well as political change. Protesters displayed this sense of betrayal in the slogans they used, such as the immensely popular 'Bread, Freedom, Social Justice' ('Aysh! Horreya! 'Adala al-igtima'eyya!). Since then, people's expectations have gone largely unattended on a range of issues from social security to jobs, trust in governments has dropped drastically, the economy remains the single largest challenge (and cause of migration), corruption remains pervasive, unemployment endemic, political reforms have been either cosmetic or reversed or in Tunisia's case remain shaky, and people have little faith that things will change. This potentially toxic mix of factors has not been addressed either by regional governments or their international counterparts. Indeed, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Western governments quickly recast the Uprisings as a struggle merely for formal democracy and the overthrow of autocracy. This made it possible to stress the need for an orderly transition to democracy while continuing the very economic policies ordinary citizens blamed for the increasingly precarious lives they were leading.
Research Interests:
Data from the Arab Transformations public opinion survey provides strong indications about the nature of population movements from Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. As such they are crucial in designing responsive,... more
Data from the Arab Transformations public opinion survey provides strong indications about the nature of population movements from Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. As such they are crucial in designing responsive, evidence-based policy. ArabTrans data shows those who have considered migrating tend to be young, male, and with higher levels of education (the notable exception being Libya). In all countries surveyed, young people are more likely to have considered migrating; in nearly all countries the economy is the main driver of migration; and although a substantial portion of those considering migration think of a permanent move, large proportions are considering only temporary migration. This underscores the importance of economic policies which actually deliver inclusive growth and social cohesion. Two major conclusions can be drawn from this data: first, that the economic causes and strong temporary dimension of migration provide EU Member states with opportunities to reap the benefits of migration, both to the economy as a whole and to welfare systems in particular; second, that MENA countries of origin present significant internal differentiation suggesting policy should reflect specific national circumstances.
Research Interests:
This paper examines whether the expectations of the post-2011 Arab uprisings have been met, by evaluating how citizens felt, three years later, who had supported the 2011 events actively or passively. The 2011 protests that shook the Arab... more
This paper examines whether the expectations of the post-2011 Arab uprisings have been met, by evaluating how citizens felt, three years later, who had supported the 2011 events actively or passively. The 2011 protests that shook the Arab world could be seen as a form of popular protest demanding democratic government - albeit on a massive, cross-national scale - but a political economy approach would suggest differently: the drivers of the uprisings were not discontent with authoritarianism but the outcome of a complex process of interaction between political, economic and social development (or lack thereof). In particular, a variety of factors can lead to this ‘paradox of unhappy development’ - from the incomplete liberalisation of state economies since the 1970s and the subsequent rise of crony capitalism to the poor or worsening living conditions and poor labour market conditions, combined with a lack of freedom despite economic growth and improvements in human development. Importantly, the implicit social contract of redistribution in return for limited “voice” is no longer seen as adequate. The legitimacy of Arab governments has been questioned by their citizens, particularly the middle classes. Specifically, the Uprisings can be located in the crisis of neo-liberalism and the growth of the precariat (Standing 2011), a breakdown of the (implicit) social contract between the state and citizens and a perception of growing inequalities and a decline in in satisfaction with life . This was in the face of sluggish real economic growth at least partly due to the demographic transition, with a decline in decent jobs for the increasing number of educated young people coming onto the labour market. Ordinary people had become dissatisfied with their standard of living, with high inflation and large increases in food prices. Protestors were demanding social justice in the face of a more aggressive implementation of a new modality of capital accumulation in a regime where there had been a persistence of authoritarianism that offered highly restricted economic and political opportunities. The middle class in particular had become frustrated by a lack of reward for qualifications and experience and the persistence of a system in which connections and patronage determined progress. Thus one could argue that the Uprisings should be located within a distinct socio-economic, cultural and political context, which will allow a more accurate analysis of the interaction between structure and agency. One way through which this can be done is to examine how citizens’ opinions on the Arab Uprisings evolved as the years passed. Indeed, as one delves deeper into the motivation of different classes with regard to the levels of support of the 2011 events three years later, it could be argued that the popular slogan accompanying the Arab Uprisings, “change the regime,” should be more broadly interpreted as “change the system.” A related survey, the 2011 Arab Barometer, asked participants to nominate two main demands of the Arab uprisings: 80 per cent of both Egyptians and Tunisians identified the improvement of the economic situation as their main demand, followed by the fight against corruption (72.7% and 62.8%, respectively). The demand for civil and political freedoms and the fight against authoritarianism were identified by only16.5 per cent of Egyptians and 43.6 per cent of Tunisians. With the benefit of hindsight, how can we evaluate whether protesting citizens’ expectations have been met? As a background note in order to contextualize the survey results, the situation in each country in 2014 was as follows: - In Egypt, protesters had achieved the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, and a March 2011 constitutional referendum led the way for Egypt’s first parliamentary elections in November 2011. The subsequent election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi to the Presidency in June 2012 was followed by a wave of protests against the new government. The military removed Morsi in July 2013, regained formal power in Egypt, and paved the way for Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to become President in June 2014. The intense polarization around Egyptian politics, the continuing deterioration of the country’s economic indicators, as well as a prevailing question regarding the effects of the 2011 Uprisings can be witnessed in the polling results below. - In Morocco, the 20 February movement led a series of protests in early 2011, to which the Moroccan monarch replied swiftly: in March, Mohammed VI agreed to adopt deep, comprehensive reform of the country’s politics in order to improve accountability and rule of law in the country. These reforms, formally announced in June, were agreed by referendum in July 2011. Although it has largely subsided, instances of protest continued (most notably in May 2012), accusing the monarch of not delivering results and also driven by continuing unemployment and a number of structural economic problems. Moroccans’ responses below shed light to the extent to which their 2011 demands were met three years later. - Tunisia, much like Egypt, has been characterized by intense polarization following the ousting of Ben Ali in 2011. The Islamist Ennahda Movement won the October 2011 Constitute Assembly elections but argued for maintaining the state’s secular orientation. As the transition away from authoritarianism continues – amidst protests, backtracking, and a number of obstacles – Tunisia has also been hit by terrorist attacks on foreign tourists as well as a number of political assassinations. Given a struggling economic performance in the post-2011 era, Tunisians continue to debate the extent to which the 2011 protests against corruption and unemployment and for freedom of speech etc. were successful, as can be seen from this study’s results. - In Jordan, the Arab Uprisings elsewhere produced distinct diffusion effects that led citizens to protest on a large scale following 2011. However, in a similar way to the Moroccan monarchy’s reactions to these events, King Abdullah II performed a quick shifting of his cabinet, replacing the prime minister, and promising a number of political reforms. The extent to which these actions placated Jordanians – who are also faced with a struggling national economy and instances of corruption and mismanagement, as well as an influx of Syrian refugees – is debatable. The study highlights the extent to which Jordanians have rethought their support of the 2011 events, and their perceptions of the country’s present and future. - In Libya, the 2011 Arab Uprisings quickly escalated to a civil war that led to the overthrow and killing of Muammar Qaddafi, in the midst of an international operation by NATO. The post-Gaddafi era has seen the country divided between different military groups that hindered economic or political progress. This has been highlighted by the creation of two separate governments, one in Tobruk and one in Tripoli, as well as several instances of the rekindling of hostilities. Citizens’ polling reflects to a large extent their positive reaction to the overthrow of Gaddafi, but also their apprehension and confusion about the future. - In Iraq, the Arab Uprisings contributed to heightened conflicts within the state, already suffering from the post-2003 US-led occupation. Normality – in terms of economic development or socio-political stability – is yet to be evident in the country, which is struggling to reconcile the interests and demands of different groups within its borders. Increasing amounts of violence, as well as the inability of the central government to maintain control of security across the state (coupled with the spread of ISIS) is evident in citizens’ responses to this poll.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Sisi may have won Egypt's presidential election, but the socio-economic and political system he and the Armed Forces preside over cannot be fixed by the continuation of old policies which the Army's rule heralds.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
"This paper explores the hypothesis of a convergence between ‘backsliding’ European liberal democracies and the ‘pseudo-liberalization’ of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems (Cavatorta, 2010) by considering the similarities, beyond... more
"This paper explores the hypothesis of a convergence between ‘backsliding’ European liberal democracies and the
‘pseudo-liberalization’ of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems (Cavatorta, 2010) by considering the similarities, beyond
the well-known differences, between Italy and Egypt. We suggest that standard indicators of regime type (e.g. Polity IV
Authority Index) fail to capture important trends both in the evolution of both the forms of political power and the forms
of resistance. Reflecting on such trends may help re-think the current limitations of Democratization theory (Teti, 2012)."
‘pseudo-liberalization’ of Middle Eastern authoritarian systems (Cavatorta, 2010) by considering the similarities, beyond
the well-known differences, between Italy and Egypt. We suggest that standard indicators of regime type (e.g. Polity IV
Authority Index) fail to capture important trends both in the evolution of both the forms of political power and the forms
of resistance. Reflecting on such trends may help re-think the current limitations of Democratization theory (Teti, 2012)."
Research Interests: Political Science, Democratization, Civil Society and the Public Sphere, Egypt, Democracy, and 4 moreItaly, Comparative Politics, Democratization, Authoritarian Regimes, Regime Change, Concept Analysis, Measurement, Corruption, and political theory, democracy,democratization, social theory, political theory, Middel Eastern study, Political Clientelism,Comparative Politics, and Corruption (Political Science),clientelism
"Partners in Democracy, Partners in Security" offers recommendations for how NATO ought to respond to the Arab Uprisings. Although some of the ideas presented sound good in principle, they present several difficulties which make their... more
"Partners in Democracy, Partners in Security" offers recommendations for how NATO ought to respond to the Arab Uprisings. Although some of the ideas presented sound good in principle, they present several difficulties which make their success highly unlikely. More fundamentally, they do not challenge the basic way in which NATO specifically and Europe generally approach relations with their South Mediterranean counterparts.
Research Interests:
The shock results in Italy’s local elections have been variously dismissed by all major political parties – which is understandable, since the results for all of them ranged from bad to terrible. The main leftist Democratic Party (PD)... more
The shock results in Italy’s local elections have been variously dismissed by all major political parties – which is understandable, since the results for all of them ranged from bad to terrible. The main leftist Democratic Party (PD) more or less held, albeit wobbling amidst a crisis of legitimacy which has seen its recent ratings plummet as much as its centre-right counterparts’. The centrist coalition lead by former Christian Democrats has all but disappeared. And Berlusconi’s Freedom Party (PDL) has been virtually wiped off the electoral map. As if this weren’t enough of a political earthquake already, the greatest surprise of all has been the performance of the MoVimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement, or M5S) lead by figurehead Beppe Grillo, a political satirist and stand-up comedian. Polling at just above 5% a month before the elections, voters propelled it to a 14% national average, electing its first mayors, and even overtaking Berlusconi’s PDL in important heartland cities like Verona. Even more significant is the fact that these elections suggest more than a passing resemblance with the results of Europe’s ‘Super Sunday’, which also saw presidential elections in France, parliamentary polls in Greece, and Land elections in Germany, hard on the heels of the May 3rd local elections in the UK. The message that seems to come from all these polls is a resounding diffidence in ruling politicians, their methods, and their policies – austerity first and foremost.
Research Interests:
One year after Mubarak’s ouster, it is difficult to conclude that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military junta which took over from the former President, are anything but the hard core of Mubarak’s regime, fighting... more
One year after Mubarak’s ouster, it is difficult to conclude that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military junta which took over from the former President, are anything but the hard core of Mubarak’s regime, fighting for its survival.
Research Interests:
A year after the uprising, the struggle for power between Egypt’s military and the Muslim Brotherhood, unexpected electoral gains of radical Salafis, and increasing support for the status quo from some GCC countries make a smooth... more
A year after the uprising, the struggle for power between Egypt’s military and the Muslim Brotherhood, unexpected electoral gains of radical Salafis, and increasing support for the status quo from some GCC countries make a smooth transition to democracy unlikely. European governments find themselves caught between outdated democracy assistance strategies and the increasing influence of Gulf funding. The current re-evaluation of democratization assistance must focus on key issues and groups if they hope to be successful.
Research Interests:
The post-revolutionary period Egyptian political scene is still extremely volatile, but some trends appear increasingly clear. First, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) appears increasingly reluctant to cede power to a... more
The post-revolutionary period Egyptian political scene is still extremely volatile, but some trends appear increasingly clear. First, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) appears increasingly reluctant to cede power to a democratic process. Secondly, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) confirms its willingness to compromise with the regime by guaranteeing the latter’s privileges. Thirdly, the broad coalition of Left-Liberal forces which called for and drove the revolution during its early stages have been badly wrong-footed and marked by internal divisions. Overall, the picture presents a gradual re-emergence and even reinforcement of executive power despite the uprising.
As ballots are being counted in Egypt’s first post-Mubarak elections, the political landscape is becoming clearer. The turnout has been very strong compared to the Mubarak era, with lines outside polling stations ↑ often stretching for... more
As ballots are being counted in Egypt’s first post-Mubarak elections, the political landscape is becoming clearer. The turnout has been very strong compared to the Mubarak era, with lines outside polling stations ↑ often stretching for hundreds of metres. This determined will to participate in elections is the best indictment of those who until a few months ago argued that countries like Egypt were not ‘ready for democracy’. But beyond this, there is little to take cheer from.
Research Interests:
There has never been such rejoicing at the resignation of a post-war Prime Minster as was on display yesterday in the streets of Rome: music, popped champagne and dancing in the streets, and much talk of a page being turned in Italian... more
There has never been such rejoicing at the resignation of a post-war Prime Minster as was on display yesterday in the streets of Rome: music, popped champagne and dancing in the streets, and much talk of a page being turned in Italian history. This, however, remains to be seen. Berlusconi has already vowed to fight back, lashing out at those who ‘betrayed’ him, attempting to extract crucial concessions on media and electoral legislation, and even stating bluntly “we can pull the plug on this government whenever we want.” Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation is not the end, but the beginning of Italy’s daunting economic and political struggle.
In chess, a gambit is a risky strategy in which a player offers a short-term advantage to his opponent in exchange for some other longer-term gain. The demonstrations which took place outside the Israeli embassy in Cairo go to the heart... more
In chess, a gambit is a risky strategy in which a player offers a short-term advantage to his opponent in exchange for some other longer-term gain. The demonstrations which took place outside the Israeli embassy in Cairo go to the heart of the ‘Egyptian gambit’ which has been played out on the Middle Eastern chess board for decades: political elites allow a frustrated Egyptian population to vent their anger against a recognizable ‘enemy’, and bear ensuing political heat because it allows them to exert leverage abroad and protects their legitimacy at home.
Research Interests:
The post-revolutionary period Egyptian political scene is still extremely volatile, but some trends appear increasingly clear. First, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) appears reluctant to cede power to a democratic process.... more
The post-revolutionary period Egyptian political scene is still extremely volatile, but some trends appear increasingly clear. First, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) appears reluctant to cede power to a democratic process. Secondly, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) confirms its willingness to compromise with the regime by guaranteeing the latter's privileges. Thirdly, the broad coalition of Left-Liberal forces which called for and drove the revolution during its early stages have been badly wrong-footed and marked by internal divisions. Overall, the picture presents a gradual re-emergence and even reinforcement of executive power despite the uprising.
Research Interests: Revolutions, Democratization, Egypt, Democracy, Middle East Politics, and 11 moreElections, Civil Society, Middle East, Islam and Democracy, Egypt, Arab Spring, middle east, Arab studies, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), Arab Uprisings, Arab Spring, Islamist Political Parties, Political Parties and Party Politics, and Mubarak era
Youth, employment and Civil Society (CS) have long been crucial to both political and economic inclusion. Longstanding debates over how best to design and implement related policies were given renewed vigour in the wake of the Arab... more
Youth, employment and Civil Society (CS) have long been crucial to both political and economic inclusion. Longstanding debates over how best to design and implement related policies were given renewed vigour in the wake of the Arab Uprisings: the risks involved in failing to achieve such inclusion and cohesion are clear. In line with Hiwar II’s aim to provide a forum to consult in order to set priorities for policy development, this workshop combined research’ expertise with policymaker and civil society stakeholders’ experience to better diagnose key challenges, identify possible ideas for work, and inform policy design and practice in these areas.
Research broadly concurs that the three primary causes of the Arab Uprisings in people’s views are Economic marginalisation (e.g. unemployment, inequality) Political marginalisation, and corruption, which was nearly always the most frequently mentioned reason to support the Uprisings. By 2014, hope that new governments were tackling these problems had faded. Researchers and CS stakeholders agreed there are systemic problems with MENA social, economic and political systems: their causes will need to be addressed, otherwise other measures dealing with specific issues – e.g. youth, labour – are to be effective. The consequent lack of resilience turns MENA countries into sinkholes of insecurity, an ongoing source of instability within – and migration from – the region .
From the discussion, the following key themes emerged:
• Addressing Exclusion: The challenge MENA states face is addressing demands for social, economic, and political inclusion. The Arab Uprisings and ongoing mobilisation illustrate a benign consequence of failing to address the causes of exclusion. Increased exclusion in the EU has also mobilised protest (both right-wing xenophobic nationalism and of progressive demands for democracy and social justice). The interconnected and multidimensional nature of that exclusion requires equally holistic policy solutions, from technical problem-solving measures to systemic change;
• Similarities in Difference, Shared Challenges: From job quality to youth marginalisation, EU and MENA countries present problems of different intensity, but often similar in kind: the difference is a matter of degree rather than nature. Obstacles to effective action on these issues are significant and require radically rethinking economic and political strategies. But for precisely this reason, they are also an opportunity for mutual learning and trust-building in addressing root causes of exclusion and instability.
• Civil Society, Entrepreneurship, and Education: While necessary, participants argued that these three factors are not by themselves sufficient to achieve the transformative political and economic inclusion policymakers seek.
Research broadly concurs that the three primary causes of the Arab Uprisings in people’s views are Economic marginalisation (e.g. unemployment, inequality) Political marginalisation, and corruption, which was nearly always the most frequently mentioned reason to support the Uprisings. By 2014, hope that new governments were tackling these problems had faded. Researchers and CS stakeholders agreed there are systemic problems with MENA social, economic and political systems: their causes will need to be addressed, otherwise other measures dealing with specific issues – e.g. youth, labour – are to be effective. The consequent lack of resilience turns MENA countries into sinkholes of insecurity, an ongoing source of instability within – and migration from – the region .
From the discussion, the following key themes emerged:
• Addressing Exclusion: The challenge MENA states face is addressing demands for social, economic, and political inclusion. The Arab Uprisings and ongoing mobilisation illustrate a benign consequence of failing to address the causes of exclusion. Increased exclusion in the EU has also mobilised protest (both right-wing xenophobic nationalism and of progressive demands for democracy and social justice). The interconnected and multidimensional nature of that exclusion requires equally holistic policy solutions, from technical problem-solving measures to systemic change;
• Similarities in Difference, Shared Challenges: From job quality to youth marginalisation, EU and MENA countries present problems of different intensity, but often similar in kind: the difference is a matter of degree rather than nature. Obstacles to effective action on these issues are significant and require radically rethinking economic and political strategies. But for precisely this reason, they are also an opportunity for mutual learning and trust-building in addressing root causes of exclusion and instability.
• Civil Society, Entrepreneurship, and Education: While necessary, participants argued that these three factors are not by themselves sufficient to achieve the transformative political and economic inclusion policymakers seek.
Research Interests:
What are nature and origins/causes of the major political, economic, and social challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean region today (e.g. security, migration, democracy, development)? What role can the EU play in the Southern Neighbourhood... more
What are nature and origins/causes of the major political, economic, and social challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean region today (e.g. security, migration, democracy, development)? What role can the EU play in the Southern Neighbourhood to meet those challenges? This report addresses these two central questions. Because there can be no stability, democracy or shared prosperity so long as people’s priorities and expectations are left frustrated, the report begins by identifying the challenges for EU policy: survey research shows protesters demanded both political and economic inclusion, and that the Arab Uprisings were driven by governments’ failures to meet people’s needs and expectations across the board.
While experts’ opinions tend to portray the EU’s efforts – if not results – generously, survey research shows people distrust the EU and that contrary to its own self-image, they do not perceive it as pursuing fundamental values of democracy and human rights. The report also shows that an increasingly complex geopolitical environment paired with reduced EU capacity makes local tensions and conflicts more globally entangled and thus harder to address. EU policy should therefore manage expectations and focus on areas in which the EU, due to experience, leverage, and means at hand, is best placed to make a difference. However, the report also shows there is space for external leverage providing the EU ad- dresses people’s needs: to do this, the EU must revise its promotion of policies which incre- ase inequality in the MENA, and which acquiesce to supporting autocrats in the name of the short-term pursuit of security.
This does not mean sacrificing European interests, but rather acknowledging that in the long term current policies contribute to destabilising both the economies and political systems in the MENA. Planning economic and security strategy for the long term also af- fords opportunities: addressing social justice, environmental degradation, territorial ine- qualities, youth and women’s empowerment, economic diversification and inclusiveness. Reconstruction and reconciliation is not easy, but these can also be the ingredients of a forward-lo Euro-Mediterranean agenda. The EU must finally catch up and implement the lessons from the ongoing Arab Uprisings, returning to focusing on human rights and democracy, providing practical solutions for migration (e.g. circular labour migration sc- hemes), and living up to its fundamental values by routinely speaking out about human rights abuses. It should heavily invest in ties with civil society and democratic forces and ensure economic policies fit the socio-economic needs of Arab populations.
While experts’ opinions tend to portray the EU’s efforts – if not results – generously, survey research shows people distrust the EU and that contrary to its own self-image, they do not perceive it as pursuing fundamental values of democracy and human rights. The report also shows that an increasingly complex geopolitical environment paired with reduced EU capacity makes local tensions and conflicts more globally entangled and thus harder to address. EU policy should therefore manage expectations and focus on areas in which the EU, due to experience, leverage, and means at hand, is best placed to make a difference. However, the report also shows there is space for external leverage providing the EU ad- dresses people’s needs: to do this, the EU must revise its promotion of policies which incre- ase inequality in the MENA, and which acquiesce to supporting autocrats in the name of the short-term pursuit of security.
This does not mean sacrificing European interests, but rather acknowledging that in the long term current policies contribute to destabilising both the economies and political systems in the MENA. Planning economic and security strategy for the long term also af- fords opportunities: addressing social justice, environmental degradation, territorial ine- qualities, youth and women’s empowerment, economic diversification and inclusiveness. Reconstruction and reconciliation is not easy, but these can also be the ingredients of a forward-lo Euro-Mediterranean agenda. The EU must finally catch up and implement the lessons from the ongoing Arab Uprisings, returning to focusing on human rights and democracy, providing practical solutions for migration (e.g. circular labour migration sc- hemes), and living up to its fundamental values by routinely speaking out about human rights abuses. It should heavily invest in ties with civil society and democratic forces and ensure economic policies fit the socio-economic needs of Arab populations.
Research Interests: Middle East & North Africa, Mediterranean Studies, European Union, European Union (International Studies), Democracy, and 8 moreMiddle East Politics, Mediterranean and North Africa, European Union external relations, Islam and Democracy, Tunisia, International Relations and European Studies, Arab Spring (Arab Revolts), and Arab Spring
Research Interests:
This article examines current proposals for ‘post-democratization’ scholarship, providing support for the need of an epistemic shift in democratization studies both in a regional Middle Eastern setting and more generally. In doing so, it... more
This article examines current proposals for ‘post-democratization’ scholarship, providing support for the need of an epistemic shift in democratization studies both in a regional Middle Eastern setting and more generally. In doing so, it raises several questions about existing proposals, arguing that the failure thus far to challenge the currently hegemonic liberal, positivist democratization framework not just at a conceptual level, but also at an ontological and at an epistemological level, risks surreptitiously reproducing key analytical drawbacks built into democratization studies’ epistemic framework. The article then sketches a different approach to analyzing the democratization framework’s limitations, approaching it as a discourse in its own right, and based on this examination formulates an expanded and deepened research agenda for post-democratization scholarship that allows for reflexive scrutiny not just of the building blocks of post-democratization itself, but also for an analysis of the deployment of ‘democratization’ as a category of action, both in the process of knowledge production about democratization and in concrete political struggles. Critique’s special issue on post-democratization represents a potentially significant undertaking in moving beyond the current limitations of the demcoratization studies subfield, but its most important challenge—tackling the epistemic roots of the current impasse—have yet to be addressed satisfactorily. Like the precarious fate of transitions in Tunisia and Egypt, the future of democracy (scholarship) depends on not falling into
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
... Mención aparte merecen otros gru-pos como el Centro de Servicios de Sindicatos y Trabajadores, el Centro Legal Hisham Mubarak y la Or ... sustituyó al primer ministro, Ahmad Sha-fiq, por el más popular Essam Sharaf, y al ministro del... more
... Mención aparte merecen otros gru-pos como el Centro de Servicios de Sindicatos y Trabajadores, el Centro Legal Hisham Mubarak y la Or ... sustituyó al primer ministro, Ahmad Sha-fiq, por el más popular Essam Sharaf, y al ministro del Interior, Mohamed Wagdi, por Mansour el ...
EN: Explanations of the authoritarian retrenchment after Egypt’s 2011 Revolution invoke either the regime’s repressive advantage over ‘leaderless’ mobilisation and civic activists, or insufficient preparations and radicalism on the part... more
EN: Explanations of the authoritarian retrenchment after Egypt’s 2011 Revolution invoke either the regime’s repressive advantage over ‘leaderless’ mobilisation and civic activists, or insufficient preparations and radicalism on the part of opposition groups. Both explanations are unsatisfactory. First, because despite being ‘reformist’, opposition groups’ demands were perceived as radical challenges to regimes before, during and after the uprisings. Second, because appeals to regimes’ coercive capacity contradict explanations of opponents’ rise to prominence before the uprisings: if activists eroded Egypt’s authoritarian regime before 2011, what made them unable to continue doing so afterwards? Conversely, if activists’ agency was effective before 2011 despite gross imbalances in coercive capacity, then those imbalances alone cannot explain activists’ post-revolutionary decline. In short, if activists’ agency cannot be denied before Egypt’s ‘eighteen days’, it must be accounted for in their aftermath. To do this, the authors draw on Gramsci’s original texts and Italian-language scholarship to develop his neglected notion of disgregazione. FR: Les explications du repli autoritaire après la révolution égyptienne de 2011 invoquent soit l’avantage répressif du régime, soit une faute de radicalisme de la part des groupes d’opposition. Les deux explications sont insatisfaisantes. D’abord parce qu’en dépit d'être « réformistes », les revendications des groupes d’opposition étaient perçues comme des défis radicaux aux régimes avant, pendant et après les soulèvements. Deuxièmement, parce que les appels à la capacité coercitive des régimes contredisent les explications de la montée des groupes d’opposition avant les soulèvements : si les militants ont contesté le régime autoritaire égyptien avant 2011, qu’est-ce qui les a empêchés de continuer après ? Inversement, si l’action des militants était efficace avant 2011 malgré les déséquilibres flagrants de la capacité coercitive, ces déséquilibres ne peuvent à eux seuls expliquer le déclin des militants après la révolution. En bref, si l’agentivité des militants ne peut être niée avant les « dix-huit jours » égyptiens, elle doit être prise en compte après. Pour ce faire, nous nous appuyons sur les textes originaux de Gramsci et sur la recherche en langue italienne pour développer sa notion de disgregazione.
Research Interests: Economics, Political Economy, Philosophy of Agency, Resilience, Political Science, and 15 moreRevolutions, Democratization, Egypt, Sociology of Intellectuals, Hegemony, Antonio Gramsci, Authoritarianism, Gramsci and Cultural Hegemony, Retrenchment, Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony, Scholarship, Organic Intellectuals, Opposition Politics, African political economy, and Counter revolutions
ABSTRACTA recently published dataset of Middle East and North Africa (MENA)–focused scholarship in journals selected to represent the disciplinary “core” of political science sheds empirical light on key publishing trends, from the... more
ABSTRACTA recently published dataset of Middle East and North Africa (MENA)–focused scholarship in journals selected to represent the disciplinary “core” of political science sheds empirical light on key publishing trends, from the balance between quantitative and qualitative studies to the growth in experimental and “large-N” statistical methods. Cammett and Kendall’s (2021) analysis shows that between 2001 and 2019, MENA-focused studies declined as a share of publications but that slightly less than half of that work is qualitative. However, the definition of qualitative research that the study uses significantly overstates the number of such articles in the Cammett and Kendall dataset. Our analysis rectifies this, distinguishing among research studies that use qualitative evidence, qualitative methods, theoretical traditions, and paradigms (i.e., positivist/post-positivist). This yields a more accurate and significantly starker picture of the marginality of MENA qualitative resea...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
"Partners in Democracy, Partners in Security" offers recommendations for how NATO ought to respond to the Arab Uprisings. Although some of the ideas presented sound good in principle, they present several difficulties which make... more
"Partners in Democracy, Partners in Security" offers recommendations for how NATO ought to respond to the Arab Uprisings. Although some of the ideas presented sound good in principle, they present several difficulties which make their success highly unlikely. More fundamentally, they do not challenge the basic way in which NATO specifically and Europe generally approach relations with their South Mediterranean counterparts.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Humanities and Art
Research Interests:
The EU suffers from a poor reputation amongst both the general populations and activists in particular across the Levant and North Africa. This reputation is rooted in a mismatch between how the EU perceives itself and how people and... more
The EU suffers from a poor reputation amongst both the general populations and activists in particular across the Levant and North Africa. This reputation is rooted in a mismatch between how the EU perceives itself and how people and activists perceive its actions and their consequences: the EU believes its policies are rooted in and promote stability, security, and democracy, but on the ground its actions appear to have exactly the opposite effect. To show how and why this is so, this chapter builds on existing analysis of the EU’s self-conception by ‘triangulating’ it with evidence from interviews with activists on the one hand, and with public opinion polls on the other. This triangulation maps a perception mismatch between EU, regional activists, and MENA populations. In particular, the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy has at its heart an understanding of democracy which focuses on certain civil-political rights and which continues to assume – despite decades of failure – that ‘market liberalisation’ will support both political democratization and social justice. Activists and populations, on the other hand, display a holistic and substantive conception of democracy, in which both civil-political and socio-economic rights are integral: there can be no democracy without social justice.
Research Interests: Social Movements, Perception, Public Opinion, Middle East Studies, Political Science, and 12 moreDemocratization, European Neighbourhood Policy, Social Movements (Political Science), European Union, Social movements and revolution, Democracy, Middle East Politics, European Union external relations, Social Democracy, Middle East, Egyptian Politics, and Routledge
New Crossings, New Heroes One image more than perhaps any other struck me as I watched transfixed the first days of the Egypt’s Second January Uprising: the struggle of protesters to cross bridges into Tahrir Square. What is already being... more
New Crossings, New Heroes One image more than perhaps any other struck me as I watched transfixed the first days of the Egypt’s Second January Uprising: the struggle of protesters to cross bridges into Tahrir Square. What is already being called the ‘Battle of Kasr el-Nil’ was an epic effort on January 28th by virtually unarmed protesters to drive back the feared Egyptian security forces in their riot gear and armed with clubs, sticks, tear gas and water cannons. The protesters took beating upon beating, but they just kept coming. The security forces kept being driven back, slowly but surely. By the end of the afternoon, they just broke and ran, as the protesters symbolically entered Tahrir Liberation) Square in triumph.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This chapter shows that, as with the economy, by 2014 people’s hopes that their lives would improve and that governments would address their grievances had been dashed. Early optimism was replaced by concern that things were not getting... more
This chapter shows that, as with the economy, by 2014 people’s hopes that their lives would improve and that governments would address their grievances had been dashed. Early optimism was replaced by concern that things were not getting better. Trust in government was low—albeit higher in the judiciary and the police and very high in the army—and corruption in both government and society generally was seen as pervasive. People did not think their government was effective on corruption, job creation or service delivery. Gender inequality is crucial—not least to achieve inclusive development—but conservative values continue to be widespread, especially in Egypt and Jordan, and while attitudes are more liberal in Tunisia they have become more conservative following the Uprisings.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This chapter sets the scene for analyses in Chaps. 4 and 5 by tracing the roots, rationales and evolution of the EU’s pre-Uprisings external relations in its Southern Neighbourhood. The chapter then examines the discursive structure of EU... more
This chapter sets the scene for analyses in Chaps. 4 and 5 by tracing the roots, rationales and evolution of the EU’s pre-Uprisings external relations in its Southern Neighbourhood. The chapter then examines the discursive structure of EU policies in the run-up to 2010–11 in three key areas: democracy, development and delivery. Key pre-Uprisings EU documents describe democracy in ‘procedural’ terms (elections, civil-political rights) and as defending the rights of women and minorities but pay scant attention to ‘difficult’ civil-political rights (association, protest) or to socioeconomic rights. Pre-Uprisings policy also aims for ‘sustainable and inclusive growth’ through economic liberalisation. Finally, conditionality is the EU’s main instrument for leveraging progress on human rights and democracy, making access to the Common Market conditional on delivery of progress in these areas. While pre-Uprisings delivery was framed in terms of both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ conditionality...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The military may wish to maintain its economic and political stranglehold, the Brotherhood may feel its time has come, and progressive groups may want to push for real change. But for the time…
Research Interests:
The chapter does three things: first, it examines the discursive structure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as it was revised between 2011 and 2017, critically assessing its claim to discursive novelty in the post-Uprisings... more
The chapter does three things: first, it examines the discursive structure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as it was revised between 2011 and 2017, critically assessing its claim to discursive novelty in the post-Uprisings principles and frameworks of the ENP; secondly, it examines the policies and practices associated with post-Uprisings principles, again scrutinising the EU’s claim to novelty; and thirdly, it considers the extent to which citizens in Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) have benefited from the implementation of these policies. The chapter conducts an in-depth comparative examination of the conceptual properties and discursive structure of the EU’s democracy and development policies after the Arab Uprisings, designed to make the thematic comparison with pre-Uprisings policies conducted in the previous chapter straightforward, facilitating an assessment of the EU’s own claims to having learned from past mistakes and of having substantively innovated th...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The Arab Uprisings moved the EU to learn lessons from past mistakes and re-define its approach to development, democracy, and security. Reality, however, has fallen short of this aim. Analysis of the revised Neighbourhood Policy suggests... more
The Arab Uprisings moved the EU to learn lessons from past mistakes and re-define its approach to development, democracy, and security. Reality, however, has fallen short of this aim. Analysis of the revised Neighbourhood Policy suggests it changed little, falling back on pre-Uprisings conceptions and discarding approaches which were more inclusive, organic, and better suited to long-term EU interests. Conversely, ArabTrans survey data shows MENA populations display precisely the more substantive and holistic approaches to democracy which EU policy discarded. It also shows supporters of the Uprisings were driven by dissatisfaction with the provision of satisfactory socioeconomic conditions and tackling corruption, and that their expectations of improvements remain largely frustrated. This mis-match between policy and popular expectations leaves existing difficulties unaddressed.
Research Interests:
Page 1. 1 Cercando un altro Egitto: tra democrazia e contro-rivoluzione Gennaro Gervasio* e Andrea Teti Afriche e Orienti vol. 11, n. 1, 2011 Seguendo l'entusiasmo derivante dalla rivoluzione tunisina, dove il... more
Page 1. 1 Cercando un altro Egitto: tra democrazia e contro-rivoluzione Gennaro Gervasio* e Andrea Teti Afriche e Orienti vol. 11, n. 1, 2011 Seguendo l'entusiasmo derivante dalla rivoluzione tunisina, dove il movimento popolare aveva ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This chapter looks in detail at citizens’ views on the extent to which their governments are meeting their demands for inclusive economic development, decent employment and fighting corruptions. It concludes that they are generally... more
This chapter looks in detail at citizens’ views on the extent to which their governments are meeting their demands for inclusive economic development, decent employment and fighting corruptions. It concludes that they are generally dissatisfied with the way governments are managing the economy and providing basic services, although there are some differences between countries. In particular, they are concerned about a lack of employment opportunities and they do not think that their governments are fighting corruption. Migration is mainly motivated by economic factors, with those considering migration being educated young to middle-aged men.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
One of Foucault’s most famous claims is that “Western man has become a confessing animal (bête d'aveu)” (Foucault, 1978, page 59). It is also one of his most misunderstood. This paper traces the evolution in Foucault’s use of... more
One of Foucault’s most famous claims is that “Western man has become a confessing animal (bête d'aveu)” (Foucault, 1978, page 59). It is also one of his most misunderstood. This paper traces the evolution in Foucault’s use of confession (confession) and avowal (aveu) in his early work with two general objectives in mind: first, to obtain a better picture of the evolution of Foucault’s own thinking, particularly the roots of his betterknown late work on these issues; and second, contribute towards the analytical development of these two concepts in and beyond Foucault’s own work. The established approach to confession and aveu in Foucault’s work suggests these are conceptually and analytically interchangeable inasmuch as both terms are interpreted as indexing forms of power through which the self is enjoined upon to continuously monitor and speak truth about itself. Emblematic of this approach is the account by Dreyfus and Rabinow (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, pages 119, 141, 145–1...
Research Interests:
Youth, employment and Civil Society (CS) have long been crucial to both political and economic inclusion. Longstanding debates over how best to design and implement related policies were given renewed vigour in the wake of the Arab... more
Youth, employment and Civil Society (CS) have long been crucial to both political and economic inclusion. Longstanding debates over how best to design and implement related policies were given renewed vigour in the wake of the Arab Uprisings: the risks involved in failing to achieve such inclusion and cohesion are clear. In line with Hiwar II’s aim to provide a forum to consult in order to set priorities for policy development, this workshop combined research’ expertise with policymaker and civil society stakeholders’ experience to better diagnose key challenges, identify possible ideas for work, and inform policy design and practice in these areas. Research broadly concurs that the three primary causes of the Arab Uprisings in people’s views are Economic marginalisation (e.g. unemployment, inequality) Political marginalisation, and corruption, which was nearly always the most frequently mentioned reason to support the Uprisings. By 2014, hope that new governments were tackling these problems had faded. Researchers and CS stakeholders agreed there are systemic problems with MENA social, economic and political systems: their causes will need to be addressed, otherwise other measures dealing with specific issues – e.g. youth, labour – are to be effective. The consequent lack of resilience turns MENA countries into sinkholes of insecurity, an ongoing source of instability within – and migration from – the region . From the discussion, the following key themes emerged: • Addressing Exclusion: The challenge MENA states face is addressing demands for social, economic, and political inclusion. The Arab Uprisings and ongoing mobilisation illustrate a benign consequence of failing to address the causes of exclusion. Increased exclusion in the EU has also mobilised protest (both right-wing xenophobic nationalism and of progressive demands for democracy and social justice). The interconnected and multidimensional nature of that exclusion requires equally holistic policy solutions, from technical problem-solving measures to systemic change; • Similarities in Difference, Shared Challenges: From job quality to youth marginalisation, EU and MENA countries present problems of different intensity, but often similar in kind: the difference is a matter of degree rather than nature. Obstacles to effective action on these issues are significant and require radically rethinking economic and political strategies. But for precisely this reason, they are also an opportunity for mutual learning and trust-building in addressing root causes of exclusion and instability. • Civil Society, Entrepreneurship, and Education: While necessary, participants argued that these three factors are not by themselves sufficient to achieve the transformative political and economic inclusion policymakers seek.
Research Interests:
The Arab Transformations Project is an international research project operating within the European Commission's FP7 framework. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviours in the context of the social, political and... more
The Arab Transformations Project is an international research project operating within the European Commission's FP7 framework. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviours in the context of the social, political and economic transformations taking place across Middle East and North Africa since February 2011. The countries covered are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.
Research Interests:
This Working Paper reviews the social, economic, and political context within which Egypt's 'January Revolution' took place. It describes the historical trajectories which set the scene for the popular uprising,... more
This Working Paper reviews the social, economic, and political context within which Egypt's 'January Revolution' took place. It describes the historical trajectories which set the scene for the popular uprising, and the principal state and non-state actors, internal and external drivers, regional and international relations, and economic context within which the protests which removed Hosni Mubarak from office took place. Arab Transformations Working Paper n. 5 ISSN 2398-9106
Research Interests:
In the decade before the Arab Uprisings, people became increasingly disaffected with corrupt regimes which maintained power by rewarding a political and economic elite while excluding increasing swathes of the population from economic... more
In the decade before the Arab Uprisings, people became increasingly disaffected with corrupt regimes which maintained power by rewarding a political and economic elite while excluding increasing swathes of the population from economic gains and political voice. As structural reforms failed to 'trickle down' and only increased crony elites' strength, the middle classes joined working classes in becoming disaffected and politically mobilised. Survey data shows that with the unprecedented wave of protests across the MENA region in 2010-11 came a renewed optimism that post-Uprisings governments would bring desired change, but also awareness that socioeconomic problems remained as acute as political ones, if not more so. Survey data also suggests that what drove protesters was a demand for both social and economic rights (e.g. decent jobs, social protection, universal education and health services) as well as political change. Protesters displayed this sense of betrayal in the slogans they used, such as the immensely popular 'Bread, Freedom, Social Justice' ('Aysh! Horreya! 'Adala al-igtima'eyya!). Since then, people's expectations have gone largely unattended on a range of issues from social security to jobs, trust in governments has dropped drastically, the economy remains the single largest challenge (and cause of migration), corruption remains pervasive, unemployment endemic, political reforms have been either cosmetic or reversed or in Tunisia's case remain shaky, and people have little faith that things will change. This potentially toxic mix of factors has not been addressed either by regional governments or their international counterparts. Indeed, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Western governments quickly recast the Uprisings as a struggle merely for formal democracy and the overthrow of autocracy. This made it possible to stress the need for an orderly transition to democracy while continuing the very economic policies ordinary citizens blamed for the increasingly precarious lives they were leading.