Nihat Celik

The Russian annexation of the Crimean Khanate was a severe blow to the
Ottomans, since the empire was forced to accept the annexation of an independent polity populated by Muslims without a shot being fired, and against the stipulations of past treaties. While the Crimean population sent delegations to the imperial capital and asked for help, the Ottomans also feared the harm the annexation would inflict on their legitimacy; however, they were aware of their military and financial weakness in the face of the Austro-Russian alliance and could not risk a multi-front war. To handle this difficult situation, the Ottoman government resorted to two strategies: first, it sought an intra-bureaucratic consensus by employing the consultation principle of Islamic governance to allow bureaucratic participation in the decision-making process with unanimous decisions to avoid any criticisms that would trigger a popular backlash and, secondly, legitimizing the government policy by benefiting from the principles of Islamic law and portraying the current situation as a temporary one which would be corrected once the empire gained enough military strength. This article will use primary and secondary sources to show how the Ottoman government navigated this diplomatic crisis while aiming to legitimize its decisions by creatively adapting the principles of Islamic international law (siyar). It will emphasize the interaction between political authority, legitimacy, and Islamic law by discussing how the Ottomans interpreted Islamic law with respect to the termination of treaties and power asymmetry in war decisions when the empire faced a multi-front war with Russia and Austria.

The 2019 local elections in Turkey brought Istanbul and Ankara, the country’s two largest cities, under the opposition bloc’s rule, which led to conflicts between the mayors and the central government led by the AKP. While the obstruction efforts of the incumbent continue to occupy the political scene, this paper will test the claims of central-local government conflict and partisanship by focusing on the two metropolitan municipalities’ access to financial resources.

Keywords: local governments, intergovernmental relations, congruity, financial resources, competitive authoritarianism, Turkey.

ABSTRACT With the emergence of Medina as the capital of the first Muslim state following the Hijra at the time of Prophet Mohammad, Muslims started to develop a sense and tradition of diplomacy which was later improved when the Muslim state became an empire and its borders stretched from Basra to Andalusia. The emergence of Muslim states in the Near East in the following centuries and the increasing levels of confrontation and diplomatic relations with non-Muslims especially, necessitated a more comprehensive and flexible approach to foreign relations. In Anatolia, the Seljuk Empire had intense relations with the Byzantines. The nature of those relations was mostly hostile, a fact that did not pose an obstacle for cooperation against the Latin invaders of the Fourth Crusade. Following the demise of the Seljuk Empire, the Ottomans became the main power centre in Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire, as the only Muslim Empire that had penetrated well into Europe, had to develop intense relations with non-Muslims. The nature of these relations was not always hostile. There was enough room for manoeuvring, even for an alliance with Christian powers. The concerns for interests and material benefits forced all actors to behave in a more accommodative way. Thus the concept of "Holy War", which is always employed to explain the nature of Ottoman diplomacy vis-à-vis Christian actors, does not always provide a satisfactory explanation because the Ottomans also faced hostilities from and waged war against its Muslim neighbours. The aim of this article is firstly to summarize Islamic principles and implementations regarding foreign relations. The second purpose is to analyze the Ottoman view of foreign relations and diplomacy with both Muslim and non-Muslim actors in the light of Islamic Law and Ottoman historiography. Contrary to the generally-held and biased views about the nature and structure of Ottoman diplomacy, I will try to show the rationality, flexibility and the capability of manoeuvring it had. Thirdly it will highlight the transition from ad hoc to permanent diplomacy and the reasons which necessitated it, and also compare the Classical Era (1299-1789) to the Modern Era (1789-1856) in which Ottoman diplomacy reached its apogee by becoming a part of the The Concert of Europe with the Treaty of Paris.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in addition to the political and economic orders, the structure of civil-military relations also began to change. The paper will provide an insight into the patterns of civil-military relations from a historical perspective. The main argument of the paper is that even though serious and mostly successful first generation reforms are made in the field of democratic civil-military relations, there are still some problems regarding the second generation reforms. In order to address these problems, the evolution of civil-military relations in the post-Communist era will be analyzed with a focus on successes and failures. After sorting out current problems, it will secondly try to answer the question what should be done in order to establish a more democratic structure of civil-military relations.

The increasing number of interventions at Turkish universities by the ruling AKP party (Justice and Development; Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in the last decade culminated in a wave of student protests in January 2021 following Melih Bulu’s appointment as the new president of the prestigious Boğaziçi University. Bulu, who is a professor of business administration and has served as president at other relatively newly established and small private
universities (İstinye University and Haliç University), was appointed by a presidential decree of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after the government abolished the university-wide elections for university presidents at Turkish universities. He was regarded as an “implant” at the university by the faculty and students, who organized mass protests against the “trustee rector” (kayyum rektör) a nickname given to him due to his appointment by the government without
elections. This resistance brought the Turkish university system and government intrusions under focus at home and abroad.
The current resistance results from accumulated frustration with the increasing levels of political interventions that aim to shape the university and the whole education system in general. This short piece will first highlight the importance of universities as sites of knowledge production, tools of hegemony, and social transformation, and then will explain the factors that have led to increasing political interventions in the Turkish academic system.

Turkey's foreign policy activism in the Middle East under the JDP started with great hopes of fostering peace, stability, democracy, and economic integration in the region. Turkey's increasing popularity and efforts to lead democratization efforts in the Middle East, alongside its more assertive foreign policy approach in the last decade, encouraged Turkey to establish its regional hegemony. The Arab Spring provided another stimulus to these initiatives. However, the post-Arab Spring developments showed that Turkey failed this task. This paper will analyze the global and regional developments that led to Turkey's failure and isolation in the Middle East by using the middle power concept. It will show that in addition to the policies and penetration level of a region, the regional distribution of material capabilities and acts of counterbalancing by other regional players may hinder the efforts of a middle power to become either the regional hegemon or regional dominant power.

Keywords: middle powers, Middle East, Turkey, hegemony, Arab Spring.

Many optimists believed that the “Arab Spring” was a ripe moment for regional radiant Turkey with its pro-active stance that could trigger “demonstrative effect” and transform the conflict-ridden Middle Eastern (in) security complex into a pluralistic security community. However, those expectations on Turkey’s capabilities to transform the region have fallen short as Middle East re-entered into turmoil. In this light, the article aims to conduct an academic inquiry into the reasons that curtailed Turkey of priming the pump for a regional security community in the region. It argues that international system (structural), sub-systemic (regional), and finally that of agential factors (Turkey’s own domestic embodiment) hindered Turkey’s efforts to transform the Middle East into security community. It concludes that three main hindrances (that of systemic, sub-systemic and domestic) which altogether, but particularly the latter, render Turkey to fall short in restoring peace and stabilit...

ABSTRACT This paper aims to contribute to the growing Foreign Policy Analysis literature by focusing on the role of non-state actors in foreign policy implementation. Special attention is paid to the case of Turkey, which has emerged as a ‘humanitarian state’ in the last decade. In Turkey, relatively new Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs (HNGOs) have been providing ever-increasing amounts of humanitarian aid throughout the former Ottoman lands including the Middle East and Africa. Employing a constructivist-realist perspective, this paper asserts that a ‘parallelism,’ if not a complementarity, exists between Turkey’s Islamically oriented HNGO discourse and practice and AKP foreign policy implementation process. Based on primary qualitative data acquired from interviews, this study has identified various degrees of parallelism between the two, calling into question the status of these HNGOs as purportedly non-governmental entities.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in addition to the political and economic orders, the structure of civil-military relations also began to change. The paper will provide an insight into the patterns of civil-military relations from a historical perspective. The main argument of the paper is that even though serious and mostly successful first generation reforms are made in the field of democratic civil-military relations, there are still some problems regarding the second generation reforms. In order to address these problems, the evolution of civil-military relations in the post-Communist era will be analyzed with a focus on successes and failures. After sorting out current problems, it will secondly try to answer the question what should be done in order to establish a more democratic structure of civil-military relations.

ABSTRACT Turkey’s new foreign policy activism heightened expectations regarding Turkish- Armenian reconciliation -- expectations that remain unmet. Beginning at the nexus of national identity and foreign policy, this article addresses the way in which the Turkish nation-state identity’s constitutive discourse on Sèvres Syndrome and ‘brotherly’ Azerbaijan still play a critical role in Turkey’s foreign policy on Armenia

https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/43291
Turkey has become an emerging humanitarian actor in the last decade, with increasing activities of its government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) abroad. The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), which was established in 1992, became an influential actor in providing development and humanitarian aid and gained enormous capabilities in the 2000s. Turkish humanitarian NGOs are relatively new, having been established largely in the 1990s and 2000s, yet the scope of their activities and growth deserve some attention. The rise of Turkish humanitarian NGOs can be seen as a direct result of Turkey’s growing conservative capitalist class, a more favorable political environment, a new legal framework, and tax incentives for NGOs. In this contribution, I argue that in the humanitarian domain, Turkish civil society is increasingly dominated by an Islamist sector that has flourished due in part to government regulation deliberately tilted in its favor, with notable consequences at home and abroad.

With the post-Cold War developments Turkey found a suitable environment to assert itself as a regional leader in the Balkans and Middle East. In this vein mediation became a tool for advancing Turkey’s regional role with the Justice and Development Party rule that started in 2002. The aim of this study is to show Turkey’s motivations in acting as a mediator while highlighting its capabilities and limits in the aforementioned regions based on case-studies of Turkey’s mediation initiatives. It will be argued that Turkey as an emerging middle-power faces important limitations with regards to material capabilities and also resistance from regional and global actors against its regional leadership role.
Keywords: Regional Power, Mediation, Balkans, Middle East, Conflict Resolution, Middle Powers

With the emergence of Medina as the capital of the first Muslim state following the Hijra at the time of Prophet Mohammad, Muslims started to develop a sense and tradition of diplomacy which was later improved when the Muslim state became an empire and its borders stretched from Basra to Andalusia. The emergence of Muslim states in the Near East in the following centuries and the increasing levels of confrontation and diplomatic relations with non-Muslims especially, necessitated a more comprehensive and flexible approach to foreign relations. In Anatolia, the Seljuk Empire had intense relations with the Byzantines. The nature of those relations was mostly hostile, a fact that did not pose an obstacle for cooperation against the Latin invaders of the Fourth Crusade.  Following the demise of the Seljuk Empire, the Ottomans became the main power centre in Anatolia.  The Ottoman Empire, as the only Muslim Empire that had penetrated well into Europe, had to develop intense relations with non-Muslims. The nature of these relations was not always hostile. There was enough room for manoeuvring, even for an alliance with Christian powers. The concerns for interests and material benefits forced all actors to behave in a more accommodative way. Thus the concept of “Holy War”, which is always employed to explain the nature of Ottoman diplomacy vis-à-vis Christian actors, does not always provide a satisfactory explanation because the Ottomans also faced hostilities from and waged war against its Muslim neighbours. The aim of this article is firstly to summarize Islamic principles and implementations regarding foreign relations. The second purpose is to analyze the Ottoman view of foreign relations and diplomacy with both Muslim and non-Muslim actors in the light of Islamic Law and Ottoman historiography. Contrary to the generally-held and biased views about the nature and structure of Ottoman diplomacy, I will try to show the rationality, flexibility and the capability of manoeuvring it had. Thirdly it will highlight the transition from ad hoc to permanent diplomacy and the reasons which necessitated it, and also compare the Classical Era (1299-1789) to the Modern Era (1789-1856) in which Ottoman diplomacy reached its apogee by becoming a part of the The Concert of Europe with the Treaty of Paris.

Keywords: Diplomacy, Ottoman Empire, Islamic Law, Islam, Foreign Relations, Ottoman History

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in addition to the
political and economic orders, the structure of civil-military relations also began to change.
The paper will provide an insight into the patterns of civil-military relations from a historical
perspective. The main argument of the paper is that even though serious and mostly successful
first generation reforms are made in the field of democratic civil-military relations, there are still
some problems regarding the second generation reforms. In order to address these problems,
the evolution of civil-military relations in the post-Communist era will be analyzed with a focus
on successes and failures. After sorting out current problems, it will secondly try to answer the
question what should be done in order to establish a more democratic structure of civil-military
relations.

Decisions related to foreign policy are complex due to the dire consequences such as war in various periods of history and in various regimes. Generally considered as an absolute monarchy where the monarch enjoys absolute authority to rule, the Ottoman Empire throughout its existence were involved in many diplomatic crises. However, a closer look on the decision-making process in the Ottoman Empire reveals that the monarch was far from being the sole decision-making authority. At this point, it would be appropriate to ask what structures were employed in the decision-making process in the Ottoman Empire. This study aims to identify these structures and processes with a focus on the functions of ad hoc consultation councils. For this purpose, among many other examples, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 will be employed as a case-study to highlight the role of consultation councils. With the goal of identifying the roles of different actors in the state bureaucracy and their varying attitudes in the face of the crisis, the theoretical framework of bureaucratic politics model developed by Graham Allison will be employed. The paper will show the instances of groupthink in the decision-making process and sources of conflict between the different branches of Ottoman bureaucracy. For this purpose, I will employ published and unpublished sources from the Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives and published archival sources from the British and French state archives. To complete the broader picture, I will use secondary sources such as contemporary Ottoman official historiographies and memoires of the statesmen involved in the process. My main aim is to show that contrary to the generally held assumptions, decision-making process in the Ottoman Empire was much more complex and various actors, with their own beliefs and approaches, were involved. Secondly, the paper will prove that rational and material factors had played a much more important role than spiritual and religious factors in decision-making. Finally, the paper will showcase a conflict with Islamic law and realities of foreign policy and how this conflict was solved through political flexibility.

The aim of this study is to show how “emerging middle-power” Turkey’s “structural power” capabilities (security, production, finance, and knowledge), transforming into leverage over conflicting parties in the negotiation table, determines its prospects as a mediator. Based on two case-studies of its mediation initiatives in the Balkans and Middle East, the paper argues that due to its limited leverage abilities, prospects for Turkey's own mediation initiatives to promote regional peace are gloomy. The paper concludes that without backing of great power(s) the best bet for Turkey is to play the role of facilitator in regional conflicts.

Key-words: power, mediation, Balkans, Middle East, Turkey.

(1st Kadir Has University Conference on International Relations, 22-24 October 2015)