Alexandre Kojève

Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of desire stands at the heart of their criticisms of psychoanalysis and the political program they develop in Anti-Oedipus. Although this notion is clearly divorced from a commonsense understanding in terms of wish, want, demand, etc., without these as touchstones not only is it difficult to conceive what they mean by desire but also desire’s political import. Despite the fact Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of desire is frequently referred to in secondary literature, it remains a stubbornly opaque notion.

Secondary works to date either largely dodge the issue, explaining “how the concept gets constructed and how it works” rather than “what desire means” (Holland 2005, 53), or explain Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of desire in polymorphous, early (Freudian) psychoanalytic terms, where the objects and aims of desire are variable. Although a conception of this type is by no means foreign to Deleuze and Guattari’s view, alone it fails to capture sufficiently what they mean by desire.

To better understand this notion my paper focuses on two claims Deleuze and Guattari make regarding the nature of desire in Anti-Oedipus. First, there is nothing specifically psychical about desire. Second, desire and labor are the same in nature while occupying different regimes. I argue these claims open onto two conceptions of desire, implying different understandings of the relationship between mind and body and supporting different understandings of the relationship between individuals and community. I show not only that these two conceptions of desire imply fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical anthropology – i.e., accounts of human nature – but also that each supports a different understanding of the nature of political activity.

George Grant began his philosophical career as a believer in Hegelian progress.  However,  an exposure to the thought of Leo Strauss contributed to making him less optimistic about the progress of history and its fulfillment in the present.  In particular, Strauss’s focus on the ancients and their superiority to the moderns appealed to him.  But Grant’s doubts about the progress of history, while stimulated in part by Strauss, took on a different and more radical form.  This was due to his exposure to Heidegger and his teaching about global technology, a variation of which was Kojeve’s notion of the Universal Homogenous State (UHS).  It was also due to the guiding concern of Grant’s life, Christian revelation.  Moreover, while Strauss always maintained a sharp divergence between classical philosophy and revelation, Grant was a Christian Platonist who believed the two were not irreconcilable.

History begins in a struggle producing two figures, Master and Slave. It
ends in a ‘‘universal and homogeneous state’’, an Empire. Revolution with its inevitable terror is the central point in this history. Kojeve himself had experienced the Russian revolution and Civil War; in 1920 he left Russia for Germany, where till the end of 1923 he had witnessed the same strife between the ‘‘left’’ and the ‘‘right’’. This experience is the basis of his view of history, his interpretation of the path from Mastery and Slavery to the figure of the Citizen, to universal recognition. The French revolution with the Jacobins’ terror and Napoleon’s Empire represent for him the model by which to understand not only the revolutions of the twentieth century, but of the entire course of history.

It is curious that Hegel's Phenomenology, a text that explicitly embraces philosophy as a system and aims to “sublate” the thinking of representation, ends with a literary image borrowed from Schiller's poetry. Many authors have tried to come to terms with this issue. This chapter contextualizes Hegel's editing work on what he quoted—for he both paraphrased and misquoted Schiller's text—and contrasts several interpretations of these interventions. While Robert Pippin uses this editing work to argue that Hegel's citation practices follow the speculative logic of/as accommodation and transformation, John McCumber, Rebecca Comay, and Katrin Pahl show in various ways how a series of shifts made by Hegel in misquoting Schiller imply both the resistance of literary imagery to dialectical appropriation and the possibility that his optimistic speculative project would fall apart. Together, these readings demonstrate how differently Hegel's phenomenological project can be judged and interpreted today in its relation to literature and history, as a totalizing system or a precarious enterprise. It also shows how a more detailed reading, which builds on these interpretive efforts, could reveal closer—and broad sweeping—affinities between Hegel and Schiller, both in their speculation and punctuation.

A summary of Kojeve's "anthropological" reading of Hegel that analyzes the influential sections of Kojeve's "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel," particularly those that establish the subject as a desiring negativity or void that positively instantiates itself through its division or lack. The essay outlines the dialectic of lordship and bondage and demonstrates that it is decisive in constituting knowledge as historical-discursive. It concludes by identifying the Kojevian-Hegelian themes and structural homologies with Lacan's notion of the "divided subject," identifying certain Kantian infiltrations into Kojeve's conception of Das Logische and Begriff, and foreshadowing Jean Hyppolite's critique of Kojeve's anthropological reading.

Translation of an unpublished manuscript from the BNF Bataille archives containing the table of contents and one completed part of an introduction to a never published (or completed) book on Hegel by Alexandre Kojève, circa 1950-54. Followed by the table of contents drafted by Kojève.

First, unedited version, 8/17/2021.

Made available freely for any purpose, and may even be distributed elsewhere provided proper credit is given. Violators will be found and sacrificed.

Source: [Fonds Georges Bataille, NAF 28086 (boîte 15) – Sous-boîte 4 « Hegel dans le monde présent. Introduction de G. Bataille au livre de Kojève sur  Hegel » : dactylographie corrigée: 52 ffos] &  (boîte 1) Enveloppes 1-18. Enveloppe 18 « Introduction à Kojève » (manuscrit, 152 ffos) Table des matières – ffos 140-152. in N. Apicella - Georges Bataille et Alexandre Kojève : la blessure de l’Histoire (2018). Annexe 1.

Since the nineteenth-sixties the concept of desire has played a significant role in investigating politics and the nature of political subjects. Through the readings of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza, to Nineteenth century political philosophy, this contribution highlights the main current development of this debate. The aim is to shed light on how, in contemporary political philosophy, the concept of desire is discussed to question the uniqueness of modern political subjectivity and to further political change, innovation and social transformation.

My aim is to lay out the main tenets of the philosophical dialogue engaged in by Alexandre Kojève and Trần Đức Thảo concerning the importance to be attributed to Hegel’s dialectic. After the publication of Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Trần Đức Thảo responded in an article published in Temps Modernes, in which he recognizes the « profound originality » of this enterprise, but points out the insufficiencies it contains both from an exegetical and a systematic point of view. From a « materialist » standpoint, inspired by Marx, Trần Đức Thảo rejects the restriction of negativity to the anthropological level, which, as Kojève frequently admits, is attributable more  to himself than to Hegel, since in Hegel’s « monist » system negativity truly extends universally. While for Kojève this « correction » to Hegel’s system makes it possible to preserve the irreducible character of human freedom – the genuine « seat » of negativity – this restriction involves a double danger for Trần Đức Thảo. Exegetically it endangers the overall coherence of Hegel’s system by introducing into it a breach and even an irrational moment. Furthermore, this restriction prevents the deployment of the « materialism » latent in Hegel and contributes willy-nilly to a « return to religious humanism ».

This essay from 2003 began as a reading of one work, Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Mask, which became an investigation into the tension between two separate themes: one from an early chapter entitled "The Fact of Blackness" and the second from a section of the last chapter on "The Negro and Recognition" entitled "the negro and Hegel." But as I began exploring the tension in earnest I realized I was dealing not with one figure but two: Frantz Fanon and Alexandre Kojève.

Indagar cómo Lacan lee permite avanzar en la pregunta por cómo leerlo. Esta es la intuición que guía este ensayo: en el modo en que Lacan comenta a Freud, a Sófocles o a Platón; en su abierta preferencia por una cierta filosofía; y en los paralelos que más de una vez propone entre la práctica del psicoanálisis y el comentario de textos, se esconden algunas pistas para abordar sus propios escritos y seminarios de un modo propiamente lacaniano.

'The explanatory power of the concept of the Other has led to its broad adoption in cultural and social criticism. Like all concepts the concept of the Other can illuminate, but it can also obscure meaning. Routine application of a received idea can become a barrier to thinking. Specifically in the case of the concept of the Other, as a consequence perhaps of its promiscuous reproduction in the social sciences, the unspoken presuppositions in the theory of the Other are rarely made explicit.

If we trace the intellectual development of the theory of the Other we can see that it always contained an absolute opposition that could not be overcome. The theory of the Other is in essence a revision of Hegel's 'Master-Slave dialectic'. It was from Hegel's account of the clash between Master and Slave that Simone De Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre took the categorical opposition of Self and Other and made it into an absolute.

Translation of Lettre de Kojève à Bataille du 28 juillet 1943, in Correspondance Bataille, NAF 15853 – Ambrosino-Kojève, n° 579, reproduced in A. Kojève, « Lettres à Georges Bataille, » in Textures, n° 6, 1970, pp. 61-65. Translation follows the original text, without the interpretations and interpolations in the text as published in Textures.

Translated 8/21/2021.

El presente trabajo analiza la concepción del capitalismo de Gilles Deleuze, en el marco de la discusión suscitada por autores que reducen la dimensión política de su obra a una indagación ética. Sostenemos que el pensamiento político deleuziano tiene como punto de partida su abordaje del capitalismo, al cual atribuye dos notas particulares: poner fin a la historia universal y organizar un campo económico de pura inmanencia. Nuestra hipótesis es que la primera característica deriva de la segunda: el capitalismo pone fin a la historia porque funciona de modo inmanente. Con respecto al primer rasgo, ensayamos una comparación con la tesis del período post-histórico presentada por Kojève; con relación al segundo, desarrollamos los tres aspectos de la inmanencia capitalista (axiomática monetaria, límites interiores, expansión de la anti-producción en la producción). Luego, examinamos las dificul-tades de Deleuze, pese a sus ambiciones revolucionarias, para proponer una salida a la lógica capitalista, así como sus posiciones ambivalentes sobre el alcance de las luchas políticas y el rol de los Estados. Finalmente, sostenemos la pertenencia del pensamiento político deleuziano al horizonte post-revolucionario, en virtud de su rechazo a la consideración histórica de las revoluciones y de su comprensión del capitalismo en clave de inmanencia. Abstract The present work analyses Deleuze's conception of capitalism in the realm of the discussion led by authors who reduce the political dimension of his work to an ethic research. We sustain that his political thought begins with his view on capitalism, to which he concedes two particular traits: putting an end to universal history and organizing an economic field of pure immanence. Our hypothesis is that the first characteristic derives from the second one: capitalism puts an end to history because the former works in an immanent way. As to its first trait, we propose a comparison with the post-historical thesis elaborated by Kojève; concerning the second one, we focus on the three aspects of capitalist immanence (monetary axiomatic, inner limits

Cet article retrace les références au léninisme qui traversent la philosophie politique de Carl Schmitt. S'il mobilise plusieurs penseurs marxistes, Lénine est à la fois celui pour lequel il témoigne le plus d'intérêt et celui qu'il condamne le plus radicalement. Admiré pour sa notion de dictature du prolétariat, craint pour sa conception de l'ennemi, c'est finalement son internationalisme radical et sa potentielle adoption par les peuples colonisés qui constituent le scandale de la pensée de Lénine. Ce faisant, la critique de Schmitt révélera une nouvelle signification existentielle du concept marxiste d'internationalisme.

The article traces back references to Leninism throughout Carl Schmitt's political philosophy. If Schmitt refers to several Marxist thinkers, Lenin is both the one he is the most interested in, and the one he rejects in the most radical fashion. At first admired for his notion of Dictatorship of the proletariat, then feared for his conceptualization of the enemy, he is finally rejected for his scandalous radical internationalism and its possible appropriation by colonized peoples. Thus, Schmittian critique will be used to reveal a new existential significance of the Marxist notion of internationalism.

Онтологическо-темпоральный дуализм, развиваемый Кожевом в оппозиции онтологии Гегеля и «антропологии» Хайдеггера, сопровождается разделением людей на «не-философов», «философов» и «мудрецов». Отличие между ними состоит в разных эпистемологических предпосылках (Койре) и созерцательно-деятельных установках (Маркс). Как удается установить в настоящем исследовании, эпистемологические предпосылки Кожева не только определяют его онтологию и антропологию, но и разрушают его историософскую концепцию, сохранение которой требует изменения созерцательно-деятельной установки. Отличие эпистемологических установок состоит в разном понимании возможности мышления о бесконечном. Идея бесконечного рассматривается как следствие конечности человека и мира в контексте онтологического аргумента (Ансельм, Декарт). «Философ» отличается от «не-философа» тем, что философское понимание cogito не нуждается в гипостазировании или субстантивации идеи бесконечного в виде бесконечного мышления или мышления бесконечного сверх-существа, поэтому cogito присуще смертному человеческому существу автономно, рефлексивно и самотрансцендентно. Кожев утверждает, что мыслимая бесконечность «потенциальна», т.е. на языке схоластики является «безграничностью» (interminatum), тогда как «актуальная» бесконечность (infinitum) признается немыслимой и сводимой к «потенциальной». Редуцирование «актуальности» бесконечности делает невозможной веру в Бога, а поэтому эпистемологические расхождения не разрешаются дискурсивно, они — вопрос выбора «мировоззрения» (Weltanschauung). При этом, согласно Кожеву, эпистемологическая «ошибка», которая сделала возможными «актуальную бесконечность» и Бога авраамических религий, была эвристически продуктивной и, посредством секуляризации, помогла появиться науке Нового времени. Однако, редуцирование «актуальной» бесконечности мешает осуществлению наиболее известной идеи Кожева — идея «конца истории» темпорализуется, теряет собственную абсолютную необходимость. Поэтому «философ» должен деятельно вступить в осуществление истории и закончить историю, только так он может стать «мудрецом».

Thinking about (and of) the infinite as an epistemological problem
of the Kojève’s philosophical system


The ontological-temporal dualism developed by Kojève in opposition to Hegel’s ontology and Heidegger’s anthropology is accompanied by the division of people into “non-philosophers”, “philosophers” and “sages”. The difference between them consists in different epistemological presuppositions (Koyré) and contemplative-active attitudes (Marx). This study proved that Kojève's epistemological presupposition not only determines his ontology and anthropology, but also destroy his philosophy of history, therefore, to preserve it, a change of contemplative-active attitude is required. The difference of epistemological attitudes consists in a different understanding of the possibility of thinking about the infinite. The idea of the infinite is viewed as a consequence of the finiteness of human and the world in the context of the ontological argument (Anselm, Descartes). A “philosopher” differs from a “non-philosopher” in that the philosophical understanding of cogito does not need to hypostasize or substantivate of the idea of the infinite as an infinite thinking or a thinking of the infinite super-being, therefore cogito is inherent in a mortal human being autonomously, reflexively and self-trancendency. Kojève argues that thinkable infinity is “potential”, i.e., scholastically speaking, it is “limitlessness” (interminatum), whereas “actual” infinity (infinitum) is considered unthinkable and reducible to “potential”. Reducing the “actuality” of infinity is incompatible with faith in God, and therefore epistemological differences are not overcomed discursively, they are a matter of the “world view” (Weltanschauung) choice. At the same time, according to Kojève, the epistemological “mistake” that made possible the “actual infinity” and the God of Abrahamic religions was heuristically productive and, through secularization, helped to appear modern science. However, the reduction of the “actual” infinity prevents the implementation of the most famous Kojève’s idea - the idea of the “end of history” temporalizes, losing absolute necessity. Therefore, the “philosopher” must actively enter into the implementation of history and finish history, only in this way he can become a “sage”.

This paper will analyze the evolution and the key aspects of René Girard's critique of the Hegelian " struggle for recognition " and the master-slave dialectic. Through a discussion of Girard's views on Identity, Difference, Violence, Desire and Negativity, the study will aim to highlight the philosophical uniqueness of the mimetic theory in respect to French Hegelianism and post-Hegelianism.

Marx'ın diyalektik metodolojisinin en ergin olduğu dönem, Hegel'in ''Köle-Efendi Diyalektiği'' ile kapıyı açtığı çatışkı ile gündeme gelmektedir. Zira, Hegel'in tam karşısında yer alacak olan Marx, ''burjuva-proletarya'' çelişkisi sayesinde Hegel ile bir nevi ''entropik bağ'' kuracaktır.

Впервые на русском языке исследуется «Заметка о Гегеле и Хайдеггере» Александра Кожева. Анализируется попытка Александра Кожева обосновать взаимную переводимость философии Гегеля и философии Хайдеггера. Изучены аргументы Кожева о единстве философии Гегеля-Хайдеггера, о проблемах гегелевских и хайдеггеровских текстов и их дополнительности. Аргументы о единой философии Гегеля-Хайдеггера сопоставлены с проблемой релятивизма мировоззрений и их происхождением из проблемного начала философии и возможности иного начала. Реконструируются принципы концептуального перевода, предпринятого Кожевом. Обосновывается антирелятивистская позиция универсальной рациональности в концептуальном переводе Кожева. Ключевые положения концептуального перевода Кожева сопоставляются с общими позициями гегельянства и критикой идеи «концептуальной схемы» Дональда Дэвидсона.

Rational foundations of conceptual translation. The case of Hegel-Heidegger phenomenology in the works of Alexandre Kojève. Article two

The article is the first study of Alexandre Kojeve's “Notes on Hegel and Heidegger” in Russian. The article presents an analysis of Alexandre Kojève's attempting to prove the mutual translatability of Hegel and Heidegger philosophy. The arguments of Kojeve on the unity of the Hegel-Heidegger philosophy, on the issues of Hegelian and Heidegger texts, and on their complementarity are studied. The arguments on the common philosophy of Hegel-Heidegger are compared with an issue of relativism of worldviews and with origin of worldviews from the problematic beginning of philosophy and the possibility of another beginning. The author reconstructs principles of the Kojève's approach to the conceptual translation and substantiates the anti-relativistic position of universal rationality in the conceptual translation. Key theses of Kojève's conceptual translation are compared with the general positions of Hegelianism and with criticism of Donald Davidson's idea of a “conceptual scheme”.

Часть 1: http://bit.ly/2TOPlw1

Extracts from Seth Benardete's discussion of the theoretical high point of Plato's Sophist, with reference to the Strauss-Kojeve debate concerning the "community of ideas" (Strauss and Benardete had discussed the Sophist in depth in the 1960s), and with the addition of informal notes from Christopher Bruell's 2008 course on the Sophist.

Poderíamos afirmar que a Filosofia de Hegel independe da alteridade para o seu desenvolvimento? É possível compreendermos a alteridade como um estatuto fundamental para o pensamento hegeliano? Trata-se de perguntas que ingressam em grandes discussões a respeito do pensamento de Hegel, assim como nas críticas que este sofre por diferentes intérpretes. Se por um lado encontramos filósofos que compreendem este conceito como um elemento suprimido da doutrina hegeliana, por outro lado, verificamos leituras mais próximas que o consideram um elemento necessário para o desenvolvimento de sua estrutura sistemática como um todo. Nesse livro pretendemos investigar o estatuto da alteridade na Filosofia de Hegel. Em que sentido poderíamos falar em alteridade hegeliana? Haveria propriamente um significado determinado deste conceito ou ele atravessaria o conjunto de suas obras?

This articles examines the relation between time and concept in Hegel, with a particular attention to the final pages of Phenomenology of Spirit where the cancellation of time is discussed. The main objective of my analysis is to delineate two possible identifications of time and concept in the context of Italian translation of the sentence: " Time is the concept itself that exists there " (Zeit ist der Begriff, der da ist). The problematization begins with the question whether omission of the comma in Italian translation leads to the ontological radicalization of Hegel's thought. Having firstly taken into consideration Kojève's reading of the identity between time and concept, and secondly Vattimo's translation of Gadamer's sentence "Das Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache " , the paper points out that " translating without a comma " introduces a hermeneutical dimension of Hegel's absolute knowing through which there is no conceptuality beyond temporality. On the other side, this conclusion will shed new light on the theme of cancellation or annihilation of time: what is annihilated is not time as such, but a certain modus of time, allowing exactly the passage to the history and its constitution as begriffene Geschichte. In that regard the paper also deals with Heidegger's critique of the vulgar conception of time and with Derrida's readings as well.

The article presents a critique of Kojéve’s interpretation of Hegel’s “end of history” that can be found in the works of Paul Ricoeur, Eric Weil and Daniel Berthold-Bond. Although there is no doubt that their studies are solid and reliable, the main arguments against Kojéve’s views are based on Hegel’s works after the "Phenomenology of Spirit" (primarily on the
"Elements of the Philosophy of Right"). However, in an attempt not only to change or refine the overall image of Hegel, but also to enter into dialogue with Kojéve’s interpretation presented in the "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel", it is crucial to closely analyze and interpret the
last chapters of the "Phenomenology of Spirit". Consequently, the second part of the article is devoted to this task. Analyzing the notion of Versőhnung and its role in Absolute Knowledge, I came to the conclusion that most of Hegel’s eschatological notions are in fact quasi-eschatological. The only exception is, in my opinion, history itself, preserving the past forms of spirit and therefore being absolute and eternal.

Savaş dönemleri insanlık tarihinin en büyük yıkımları ve aynı zamanda en çağrıcı düşüncelerinin ortaya çıktığı kaotik zamanları temsil etmektedir. Böyle bir dönemi yansıtan ve faşist tutumlar karşısında toplumsal yaşamın nasıl şekillendirilmesi gerektiği ve bunun yanında bireyin toplum içindeki yaşamını ve konumunu sorgulaması üzerine çalışan Sosyoloji Koleji (Collège de Sociologie) grubunu ele aldığımız metin Kolej’in genel yapısı, Kolej’in fikirlerine yön veren düşünürler ve kullanılan temalar düzleminde ele alınmaktadır. 
Tezin en temel amacı insanın toplumsal ya da Bataillecı bir söylemle gündelik yaşam yasası, bir anlamda baba yasası karşısında olan konumunu sorgulaması ve bu sorgulamayla gelen ihlal halinin insanın toplumsal konumu üzerindeki etkilerinin ele alınmasıdır. Bu bağlamda Koleji önceleyen ve Kolej’de etkin olan düşünürlerin fikirleri incelenerek toplum ve birey üzerine bir şema oluşturulmaya çalışılmış ve ihlal sürecinin katharsis’e erişmeyen katatonik bir tavrı açığa çıkardığı, bunun da bireyde sürekli bir hale evrildiği sonucuna varılmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Collège de Sociologie, Bataille, İhlal, Toplum Yasası, Katatonik Katharsis
The periods of war represent the greatest devastations of human history, as well as the chaotic times in which the most evocative ideas emerged. The group, College of Sociology is reflecting such a period and working on how social life should be shaped in the face of fascist attitudes. Also, they question the individual's life and place in society. We will discuss all these topics in the context of the general structure of the College, the thinkers which influence them and their themes. 
The main aim of the thesis is in social or Batailian discourse, to question the view of the human being against the law of daily life or law of the father. We aim to look at the effects of the violation on the social place of the human being. By examining the ideas of the thinkers who preceded the College and active in the College, it was tried to form a schema on the society and the individual. Also, it was concluded that the process of infringement reveals a catatonic attitude that does not reach the and, this evolves into a continuous state in the individual.
Keywords: College of Sociology, Bataille, Transgression, Law of Society, Catatonic Catharsis