Geoengineering/Climate Engineering

Solar geoengineering has been proposed as a means to cool the Earth by increasing the reflection of sunlight back to space, for example, by injecting reflective aerosol particles (or their precursors) into the lower stratosphere. Such proposed techniques would not be able to substitute for mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a response to the risks of climate change, as they would only mask some of the effects of global warming. They might, however, eventually be applied as a complementary approach to reduce climate risks. Thus, the Earth system consequences of solar geoengineering are central to understanding its potentials and risks. Here we review the state-of-the-art knowledge about strato-spheric sulfate aerosol injection and an idealized proxy for this, 'sunshade geoengineering,' in which the intensity of incoming sunlight is directly reduced in models. Studies are consistent in suggesting that sunshade geoengineering and stratospheric aerosol injection would generally offset the climate effects of elevated GHG concentrations. However, it is clear that a solar geoengineered climate would be novel in some respects, one example being a notably reduced hydrological cycle intensity. Moreover, we provide an overview of nonclimatic aspects of the response to stratospheric aerosol injection, for example, its effect on ozone, and the uncertainties around its consequences. We also consider the issues raised by the partial control over the climate that solar geoengineering would allow. Finally, this overview highlights some key research gaps in need of being resolved to provide sound basis for guidance of future decisions around solar geoengineering.

In recent years, the idea of geoengineering, understood as large-scale interventions in the planet's climate to counteract anthropogenic climate change, has steadily increased its visibility. Presented explicitly as an approach to climate change, geoengineering is positioned as a response, a reactive fix. Geoengineering, however, has a longer and broader history than the current climate crisis. It has long been an umbrella term for large-scale projects in which various Earth sciences meet dreams about human ecosphere interventions, especially regarding lithosphere and climate and weather modifications. In this paper, we review the history of geoengineering, focusing specifically on climate geoengineering and lithosphere geoengineering. We draw attention to the difference between “proactive” (“high-modernist”), aimed at mastery over nature, and “reactive” forms of geoengineering, hoping to address anthropogenic environmental degradation technologically. Additionally, we trace historical (dis)continuities between the older, proactive, form of geoengineering and their recent reframing as a technological fix—specifically around the question to what extent nature's complex systems can be known and controlled. Finally, we argue for the need to further research the intersections and shared histories between various forms of geoengineering.

Geoengineering is a proposed response to anthropogenic global warming (AGW). Conventionally it consists of two strands: Solar Radiation Management (SRM), which is fast-acting, incomplete but inexpensive, and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), which is slower acting, more expensive, and comprehensive. Pairing SRM and CDR offers a contractually complete solution for future emissions if effectively-scaled and coordinated. SRM offsets warming, while CDR takes effect.We suggest coordination using a blockchain, i.e. smart contracts and a distributed ledger. Specifically, we integrate CDR futures with time and volume-matched SRM orders, to address emissions contractually before release. This provides an economically and environmentally proportionate solution to CO2 emissions at the wellhead, with robust contractual transparency, and minimal overhead cost.

Our proposal offers a ‘polluter pays’ implementation of Long & Shepherds SRM ‘bridge’ concept. This ‘polluter geoengineers’ approach mandates and verifies emissionslinked payments with minimal friction, delay, or cost. Finally, we compare alternative market designs against this proposal, finding that this proposal offers several advantages. We conclude that blockchain implementation of the ‘polluter geoengineers’ approach is attractive and feasible for larger wellhead contracts. We also identify a handful of advantages and disadvantages that merit further study.

The online video-sharing website YouTube is extremely popular globally, also as a tool for information on science and environmental topics. However, only little is known about what kind of information users find when they are searching for information about climate science, climate change, and climate engineering on YouTube. This contribution presents results from an exploratory research project that investigates whether videos found on YouTube adhere to or challenge scientific consensus views. Ten search terms were employed to search for and analyze 200 videos about climate and climate modification topics, which are contested topics in online media. The online anonymization tool Tor has been used for the randomization of the sample and to avoid personalization of the results. A heuristic qualitative classification tool was set up to categorize the videos in the sample. Eighty-nine videos of the 200 videos in the sample are supporting scientific consensus views about anthropogenic climate change, and climate scientists are discussing climate topics with deniers of climate change in four videos in the sample. Unexpectedly, the majority of the videos in the sample (107 videos) supports worldviews that are opposing scientific consensus views: 16 videos deny anthropogenic climate change and 91 videos in the sample propagate straightforward conspiracy theories about climate engineering and climate change. Videos supporting the scientific mainstream view received only slightly more views (16,941,949 views in total) than those opposing the mainstream scientific position (16,939,655 views in total). Consequences for the public communication of climate change and climate engineering are discussed in the second part of the article. The research presented in this contribution is particularly interested in finding out more about strategically distorted communications about climate change and climate engineering in online environments and in critically analyzing them.

Proposed ways of governing climate engineering have most often been supported by narrowly framed and unreflexive appraisals and processes. This article explores the governance implications of a Deliberative Mapping project that, unlike other governance principles, have emerged from an extensive process of reflection and reflexivity. In turn, the project has made significant advances in addressing the current deficit of responsibly defined criteria for shaping governance propositions. Three such propositions argue that (1) reflexive foresight of the imagined futures in which climate engineering proposals might reside is required; (2) the performance and acceptance of climate engineering proposals should be decided in terms of robustness, not optimality; and (3) climate engineering proposals should be satisfactorily opened up before they can be considered legitimate objects of governance. Taken together, these propositions offer a sociotechnical framework not simply for governing climate engineering but for governing responses to climate change at large.

The development of climate engineering research has historically depended on mostly western, holistic perceptions of climate and climate change. Determinations of climate and climate change as a global system have played a defining role in the development of climate engineering. As a result, climate engineering research in general, and solar radiation management (SRM) in particular, is primarily engaged in research of quantified, whole-Earth solutions. I argue that in the potential act of solar radiation management, a view of climate change that relies on the holistic western science of the climatic system is enshrined. This view, dependent on a deliberative intentionality that seems connected to anthropocenic notions of responsibility and control, profoundly influences the assumptions and research methods connected to climate engineering. While this may not necessarily be to the detriment of climate engineering proposals-in fact, it may be the only workable conception of SRM-it is a conceptual limit to the enterprise that has to be acknowledged. Additionally, in terms of governance, reliability, and cultural acceptance, this limit could be a fundamental objection to future experimentation (or implementation).

The climatic effects of climate engineering - or geoengineering - via cirrus cloud thinning are examined. Thinner cirrus clouds can allow more outgoing longwave radiation to escape to space, potentially cooling the climate. The cloud properties and climatic effects due to perturbing the ice crystal fall speed are investigated in a set of hemispheric-scale sensitivity experiments with the Community Earth System Model. It is found that increasing the ice crystal fall speed, as an analogue to cirrus cloud seeding, depletes high level clouds and reduces the longwave cloud forcing. Deliberate depletion of cirrus clouds increases outgoing longwave radiation, reduces the upper tropospheric water vapor and cools the climate. Global cirrus cloud thinning gave a net cloud forcing change of -1.55 Wm -2 and a global annual mean temperature change of -0.94 K. Though there is negligible change in the global annual mean precipitation (-0.001 mm/day), the spatially non-homogeneous forcing induces circulation changes, and hence remote climate changes. Climate engineering the Southern Hemisphere only results in a northwards shift of the Intertropical Convergence Zone and possible Sahelian drought alleviation, whilst targeting the Northern Hemisphere alone causes a greater cooling. It was found that targeting cirrus clouds everywhere outside of the tropics results in changes to the circulation and precipitation even in the non - climate engineered regions, underscoring the risks of remote side effects and indeed the complexity of the climate system.

It is increasingly recognised that meeting the obligations set out in the Paris Agreement on climate change will not be physically possible without deploying large-scale techniques for either removing greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere or reflecting sunlight away from the Earth. In this article we report on the findings of a scenarios method designed to interrogate how far these ‘climate engineering’ ideas may develop in the future and under what governance arrangements. Unlike previous studies in climate engineering foresight that have narrowly focussed on academic perspectives, a single climate engineering idea and a restricted range of issues, our approach sought to respond to theoretical imperatives for ‘broadening out’ and ‘opening up’ research methods applied to highly uncertain and ambiguous topics. We convened a one-day event with experts in climate change and climate engineering from across the sectors of government, industry, civil society and academia in the UK, with additional experts from Brazil, Germany and India. The participants were invited to develop scenarios for four climate engineering ideas: bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, direct air capture and storage, stratospheric aerosol injection and marine cloud brightening. Manifold challenges for future research were identified, placing the scenarios in sharp contrast with early portrayals of climate engineering research as threatening a ‘slippery slope’ of possible entrenchments, lock-ins and path dependencies that would inexorably lead to deployment. We suggest that the governance challenges for climate engineering should therefore today be thought of as less of a slippery slope than an ‘uphill struggle’ and that there is an increasingly apparent need for governance that responsibly incentivises, rather than constrains, research. We find that affecting market processes by introducing an effective global carbon price and direct government expenditure on research and development are incentives with broad potential applications to climate engineering. Responsibly incentivising research will involve a pluralistic architecture of governance arrangements and policy instruments that attends to collective ambitions as well as national differences and emerges from an inclusive and reflexive process.

Fears of a moral hazard effect deterring mitigation have dogged solar radiation management (SRM) research since before 2006. Researchers have debated the significance and relevance of this concern from multiple disciplines and perspectives. This article explores this debate, highlighting the significance of policy goals and the actual and perceived substitutability of SRM for mitigation. The continuing problems in detecting mitigation deterrence in practice are noted. Different forms of moral hazard effect are distinguished, and the plausibility of mitigation galvanization considered. It is predicted that attention will turn to the situated, contingent expressions of mitigation deterrence and mitigation galvanization among different actors and at different scales; and to more sophisticated practical means to minimize the incidence and impacts of mitigation deterrence.

Among proposed mechanisms for counteracting global warming through solar radiation management is the deliberate injection of sea salt acting via marine cloud brightening and the direct effect of sea-salt aerosols. In this study, we show results from multidecadal simulations of such sea-salt climate engineering (SSCE) on top of the RCP4.5 emission scenario using three Earth system models. As in the proposed “G3” experiment of the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project, SSCE is designed to keep the top-of-atmosphere radiative forcing at the 2020 level for 50 years. SSCE is then turned off and the models run for another 20 years, enabling an investigation of the abrupt warming associated with a termination of climate engineering (“termination effect”). As in former idealized studies, the climate engineering in all three models leads to a significant suppression of evaporation from low-latitude oceans and reduced precipitation over low-latitude oceans as well as in the storm-track regions. Unlike those studies, however, we find in all models enhanced evaporation, cloud formation, and precipitation over low-latitude land regions. This is a response to the localized cooling over the low-latitude oceans imposed by the SSCE design. As a result, the models obtain reduced aridity in many low-latitude land regions as well as in southern Europe. Terminating the SSCE leads to a rapid near-surface temperature increase, which, in the Arctic, exceeds 2 K in all three models within 20 years after SSCE has ceased. In the same period September Arctic sea ice cover shrinks by over 25%.

Nation states need to incentivize negative emissions technologies if they are to take the decarbonization of whole energy systems seriously. This incentivization must account for public values and interests in relation to which technologies to incentivize, how they should be incentivized and how they should be governed once incentivized.

In recent work, Joshua Horton and David Keith argue on distributive and consequentialist grounds that research into solar radiation management (SRM) geoengineering is justified because the resulting knowledge has the potential to benefit everyone, particularly the ‘global poor.’ I argue that this view overlooks procedural and recognitional justice, and thus relegates to the background questions of how SRM research should be governed. In response to Horton and Keith, I argue for a multidimensional approach to geoengineering justice, which entails that questions of how to govern SRM research should be addressed from the very outset – that is, now.  Link to paper: https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2018.1562525

The feckless response of the world community to the mounting threat of climate change has led to a growing interest in climate geoengineering research. In early 2015, the us National Academy of Sciences released two major reports on the topic. While it is notable that both reports recommended some form of public participation to inform research, this article argues that the vagueness of these recommendations could mean that their implementation might not comport with optimal approaches for public deliberation. We outline some options for public deliberation on climate geoengineer-ing and important design considerations.

The possibility of altering the world's climate through intentional stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI)—or indeed through any other solar radiation management (SRM) technology—brings with it not just a new technology for humans to consider but a new category of problem. As authors such as Bron Szerszynski, Willis Jenkins, and Christopher J. Preston have pointed out, intervening deliberately in the skies would " begin the era of global artificing. "  In his article " Carbon Emissions, Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, and Unintended Harms, " which explores the relative moral culpability of agents inducing climate harms through their actions, Preston applies the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to investigate one specific question: Does intentionality make an ethical difference when considering culpability for causing climate harms? He reaches the conclusion—surprising both to him and to me—that those who might deliberately engineer the world's climate through SAI may be less culpable than those who continue to emit greenhouse gases (GHGs). Preston’s exploration of the application of the DDE as a partial ethical defense for SAI is provocative and useful, but it leads to a confusing and unpersuasive conclusion.

Chapter 6 (“Multilevel Policy Incentives for BECCS in Sweden”) builds on the high potential for BECCS in Sweden identified in chapter 4, summarizing the current policy incentives for BECCS research, development, demonstration, and diffusion (RDD&D). It examines the given policy drivers and obstacles at multiple scales (e.g., international, supranational, and national) and in terms of various forms of instruments (e.g., economic, regulatory, and informational). The chapter concludes that current policy instruments mostly fail to incentivize BECCS RDD&D in Sweden. The instruments partly favor R&D yet fail to provide incentives covering operational costs. Under current circumstances, BECCS is unlikely to reach demonstration scale in Sweden.

After more than two decades of UN negotiations,
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue
to rise, with current projections indicating the
planet is on a pathway to a temperature increase of
approximately 3.2°C by 2100, well beyond what is
considered a safe level. This has spurred scientific and
policy interest in the possible role of solar radiation
management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) geoengineering activities to help avert passing
critical climatic thresholds, or to help societies recover
if global temperatures overshoot expectations of
safe levels. There are various proposals for SRM and
CDR marine geoengineering, but aside from ocean
iron fertilization (OIF) and marine cloud brightening
(MCB), none of these options have moved beyond
conceptual development and laboratory testing.
Marine geoengineering proposals show significant
diversity in terms of their purpose, scale of application,
likely effectiveness, requisite levels of international
cooperation and intensity of environmental risks. This
diversity of marine geoengineering activities will likely
place significant new demands upon the international
law system to govern potential risks and opportunities.
International ocean law governance is comprised
of a patchwork of global framework agreements,
sectoral agreements and customary international
law rules that have developed over time in response
to disparate issues. These include maritime access,
fisheries management, shipping pollution, ocean
dumping and marine scientific research (MSR). This
patchwork of oceans governance contains several
bodies of rules that might apply in governing marine
geoengineering activities. However, these bodies
of rules were negotiated for different purposes,
and not specifically for the governance of marine
Executive Summary
vii
geoengineering. The extent to which this patchwork
of rules might contribute to marine geoengineering
governance will vary, depending on the purpose
of an activity, where it is conducted, which state is
responsible for it and the types of impacts it is likely
to have. Applying this patchwork to a specific marine
geoengineering activity is complex, and existing
rules may provide only limited concrete guidance as
to how an activity ought to be conducted. The 2013
amendment to the London Protocol on ocean dumping
provides the most developed and specific framework
for marine geoengineering governance to date. But the
capacity of this amendment to bolster the capacity of
international law to govern marine geoengineering
activities is limited by some significant shortcomings.
Negotiations are under way to establish a new global
treaty on conservation of marine biodiversity in areas
beyond national jurisdiction, including new rules
for area-based management, environmental impact
assessments (EIAs) and capacity building/technology
transfer. The potential provisions of this agreement
could be pertinent to marine geoengineering options.
This negotiation is both an opportunity and a risk
for marine geoengineering governance. A new
agreement has the potential to fill key gaps in the
existing patchwork of international law for marine
geoengineering activities in high-seas areas. However,
it is also important that this new treaty be structured
in a way that is not overly restrictive, which might
hinder responsible research and development
of marine geoengineering in high-seas areas.

Many feel a sense of aversion and tragedy about proposals for engineering the climate. Precautionary concerns only partly explain these feelings. For a fuller understanding, we need a thicker conception of the values and ends of political society than “neutralitarian” political theories offer. To this end, I examine how Buddhist and Greek notions of temperance, justice, and freedom bear on the question of geo-engineering. My intention is not to pronounce on whether geo-engineering is morally “right” or “wrong,” but to highlight reasons for thinking it unattractive in a broader sense, thereby strengthening the case for exhausting conventional emissions reductions options.

The climate geoengineering is already inevitable to avoid imminent global climate disasters. Even extremely cautious approach is not enough for any grand-scale practices of climate geoengineering as we never understand the complex global climate system exactly.  However, modern human beings have unintentionally done the global-scale climate geoengineering that increases the  atmospheric CO2 level with the wide-spread massive burning of fossil fuels.     
The CCS-geoengineering in the broad sense includes the CO2 capture and sequestration, CO2 capture and CO2-EOR/EGR, air capture and sequestration, air capture and CO2-EOR/EGR and also underground microbial CO2 recycling. The CCS-geoengineering only reduces the artificial emission of CO2 into the atmosphere or suck the excessive CO2 from the atmosphere. The CCS-geoengineering is a naturally safe geoengineering technology as the CCS-geoengineering restore the atmosphere only toward the natural CO2 level minimizing untoward effects.

Recent assessments of the international community’s
ability to hold the increase of global average temperature
to well below 2°C, while pursuing efforts to limit
that increase to 1.5°C, indicate that this goal is unlikely
to be achieved without large-scale implementation of
climate engineering (CE) technologies. In light of the
prominent, albeit contested, role that CE is likely to
play in international climate policy, this Article analyzes
the specific provisions of the Paris Agreement
with a view to assessing the extent to which the Agreement
can provide an institutional framework to effectively
govern CE internationally, and how it may shape
the development and implementation of CE options.
In particular, the Article examines a number of critical
interpretive questions that will need to be addressed as
states begin to develop CE technologies at large scales,
including the need to provide guidance respecting
the acceptability of exceeding the Paris targets before
drawing down atmospheric CO2 levels, the challenges
for equity, human rights, and sustainability objectives
that CE poses, and the need to incorporate CE technologies into accounting and incentive structures.

Chapter 5 (“Governing BECCS: “Slippery Slope” or “Uphill Struggle”?”) highlights how BECCS and other large-scale interventions in the Earth’s climate system, proposed to moderate anthropogenic global warming, are commonly portrayed as threatening to initiate a “slippery slope” from research to deployment. The argument suggests that governance should constrain or even proscribe research into BECCS on the grounds that allowing it to proceed unchecked could lead to a chain of events resulting in deployment and the undesirable consequences that this might bring. This chapter begins by critically examining the slippery slope argument as articulated in relation to BECCS. It then draws on the empirical findings of an expert scenario method designed to explore how far BECCS might develop in the future and under what governance arrangements. Rather than a slippery slope, the scenarios instead illustrate what might best be described as an “uphill struggle,” in which BECCS innovators confront manifold technical, political, and societal challenges to deployment. The chapter concludes by seeking to reframe the governance task as one of responsible incentivization, rather than one of constraint or proscription.

Warnings about climate change often come wrapped in apocalyptic language and scenarios, often as a rhetorical strategy to convey the sense of urgency with which action is required. Similarly, technologies that promise to deliver us from the impending climate apocalypse often come shrouded as savior-technologies. Once such example are carbon capture and storage solutions. Language and imagery on websites and in marketing material presents these technologies as transformative technologies: they promise to transform something harmful in the atmosphere (CO2) into paradisiacal plentitude: carbon as infinite energy resource. This paper will discuss and explore the underlying ideas behind carbon capture and storage technologies and discuss how language used to talk about the climate opportunities they offer transcends the everyday and the ordinary. Based on David Chidester’s understanding of religion, this paper argues that the power of carbon capture narratives is grounded in religious tropes and ideas.

Poster's note : discusses the potential for hostile use of geoengineering technologies in interplanetary warfare. Preview available, showing most of the article text.

http://www.jbis.org.uk/paper.php?p=2015.68.150
Deliberate Destruction of Planets and Biospheres
Science fiction offers scenarios in which a planet is destroyed in combat. However, these are often impractical. Instead of supplying all the energy required, more plausible attacks may use leverage in order to damage or destroy the planet or its biosphere. In order to study the conduct, observation, or defence associated with such attacks, a range of potentially practical weapon and defence technologies are discussed. These are: altering the radiation budget of a planet so as to substantially change its temperature; introducing invasive species to transform the biogeochemistry; and using orbital perturbations of comets and asteroids to cause collisions, or to move the planet to an unstable or uninhabitable orbit. Weapon transit and effect times associated with these technologies render them suitable only for extreme slow-motion warfare, assuming near-term technologies.

Both of energy conservation and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) are needed to stop the global warming. Coal is not only abundant in the proven deposits, but although there exist 10 to 100 times as much deep unminable coal deposits. When use of coal increases, however, global warming may be accelerated. In China, a coal-fired power plant is built every four days on the average. Carbon sequestration is globally expected as technology which makes zero most greenhouse gas emission of a coal-fired power plant. However, people’s concern to cost and safety has barred the early spread of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) projects. Cost reduction and the advancement in safety of carbon sequestration are among the most important technological subjects globally. In order to develop the safety of carbon dioxide subterranean storage reflecting the natural analog research findings, micro-bubbles of carbon dioxide is dispersed in underground rocks to promote the dissolution to brine and the fixation into carbonates.

A new geoengineering scheme (”air-CCS in the remote regions”) is proposed to assure the long-term safety of the carbon storage and to overcome the energy penalty for the carbon capture and injection. Because of the concentration of population and economic activities, the energy demands and therefore CO2 emission sources are also concentrated in the restricted industrial and urban regions. The energy demands and CO2 emission sources are rare in the remote regions far from the industrial regions. The wide remote areas in the high-latitude, high altitude and oceanic regions are suitable as CO2 sink areas. The conventional carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) scheme is not viable in the remote areas due to the large infrastructure investment and energy loss for long-distance transportation of huge amount of CO2. But some new modified versions of carbon capture and technology (”air-CCS”) may be viable while CO2 is extracted directly from the atmosphere instead of the flue gas of fossil fuels. The transportation of CO2 is not inevitable for the air-CCS. However, as the atmospheric CO2 concentration is very thin ( about 390ppm), the excess energy is required to extract the CO2 from the atmosphere. The unused natural energy (wind, solar, geothermal and natural gas) is used for the recovery of CO2 from the atmosphere and for the underground injection of CO2-rich gas. Energy penalty of air-CCS can be compensated by use of unused natural energy in the remote regions. The CO2-hydrate-sealed layer is formed at the cool temperature combined with high pressure (”self-sealing”) at the aquifers deeper than about 300m in the high-latitude regions such as Canada, Alaska and Siberia, in the high-altitude regions such as the Tibetan plateau and in the sediments under the ocean floor deeper than about 300m. The air-CCS provides vast leakage-free reservoirs beneath the remote regions enough to accommodate all of the excess CO2 in the atmosphere. The air-CCS in the remote areas is the ultimate greenhouse gas mitigation option.

The presence of experts holding patents and simultaneously providing policy advice on areas where they hold patents pose several normative questions. Through a comparative study of several IPCC reports, this article documents the scope of this phenomenon and discusses it with respect to a theory of conflict of interest. Seemingly, it is more likely to be patent-holders on issues of infrastructures, industry and transport rather than for single technologies as such. According to insights from studies on conflict of interest, there is an increased risk for bias. The article investigates the possible relations between patenting and conflicts of interest according to theoretical and empirical insights from the relation between science and society.

The latest emissions data from the International Energy Agency suggest that our current methods for dealing with climate change have not worked.
This means we will have to adapt to climate change, for example by selecting crops more suited to a warmer climate and abandoning low-lying coastal areas.
But adaptation cannot be our only response; there are limits to adaption, particularly if the rate at which temperature rises is such that the natural ecosystems we depend upon cannot adjust in time.

The concept of climate engineering (CE, also: geoengineering) is discussed as a “plan B” against climate change. This makes CE an alternative to low-carbon energy approaches which help to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and therefore mitigate effects of climate change. CE intervenes directly into the climate system.
The central question of this paper: Is responsibility an adequately respond to the need for governance of CE?
The concept of responsibility will be sociologically analysed. I did not look much into the Horizon2020 documents and will not work with the fixed term of Responsible Research and Innovation. My impression is that often the term responsibility is used to insert some ethics without discussion the term itself.