Moods

In this article I first analyze the meaning of mixed feelings and what this expression refers to. I argue that what the term mixed feelings is commonly taken to mean are not mixed feelings because there is no mixture, and also because the same object and the same time condition of what is supposed to be mixed is not satisfied. I then pass on to a case of genuine mixed feelings. Genuinely mixed feelings are feelings composed of simple or basic feelings as well as occurrences of compounds and sets of feelings. I then discuss three categories adjacent to mixed feelings: layered feelings, metaemotions, and moods. Layered feelings are not mixed but superposed one over another, metaemotions have a mixed phenomenology, and moods are an affective mixture par excellence. In conclusion, I suggest that wrong labelling coincides with a category mistake which hampers further progress in the philosophy of affectivity.

Personalisation can improve the acceptability and prolonged use of a product. This paper reports on the use of colours in user-initiated personalisation of privacy settings and a mood tracker. Colours and their associations were discussed in participatory design activities with young patients (13-21 years old) in a children's hospital in Canada and in Norway and explored in a survey among university students. Colours are an effective way to personalise data. The young patients preferred to select their own colours for the personalisation of data and that colour associations and preferences should be re-configurable during the use of the technology. We found that in the case of the privacy settings, the re-configuration could lead to privacy risks. We illustrate our findings by presenting two prototypes we designed with and for young people with chronic health challenges. The first one shows the use of colours in privacy settings in a social networking site for teenage patients and the second one shows the use of colours in the mood tracking function of a mobile application supporting teens in their transition to adult health care.

What is it like to be an earthly, worldly, “secular” creature? Is it a blessing or is it a curse? During the last two centuries, this question has generally been answered with an appeal to disengagedness and objectivity, that is, to an indisputable “scientific” representation of the whole of “reality.”  The world then seems to serve as a justification, through the “facts of the matter,” of the superiority of optimism or pessimism. On the contrary, I want in this essay to show that, in order to argue convincingly about our basic attitudes towards the world and the reasons pro or con for them (if we have any reasons at all), we do not have to insist on disinterest; we need, rather, to move toward primary and apparently objectless emotions, of the kind that are called Stimmungen in German. In other words, we need an epistemology of basic existential moods.
In particular, I examine, out of many possible, one basic attitude toward world – the readiness to be surprised or amazed by things or events – on the hypothesis that one of the preconditions for feeling at home in the world has to be sought exactly here.

Вопрос наклонений в нахских и других кавказских языках – один из самых противоречивых по предлагаемым различными авторами решениям. В статье сделана попытка систематизировать некоторые общие понятия, связанные с наклонением и модальностью, с опорой на теоретический и практический материал кавказских и иных языков, и определить место в системе глагола некоторых глагольных форм, относимых в вайнахском языкознании к формам наклонения.
Ключевые слова: наклонения, модальность, глагол, морфология, грамматика, чеченский язык, кавказские языки.

Abstract. The question of moods in the Nakh and in other Caucasian languages is one of the most controversial by the proposed solutions by different authors. The article attempts to systematize some general concepts in this direction, based on the theoretical and practical material of the Caucasian and other languages, and to define the place of some verbal forms in the verb system that are attributable to the mood forms in the Vainakh linguistics.
Keywords: mood, modality, verb, morphology, grammar, Chechen language, Caucasian languages.

I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one’s body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognizing that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between bodily-feeling based and appraisal-based theories of emotion.

This paper undertakes a critical analysis, development, and defense of Heidegger’s account of mood with the larger aim of showing why his account is worth holding onto, especially outside the context of his fundamental ontology in which it was advanced. In order to make my case, first I summarize his account of mood. I then raise four problems that befall his account, followed by some suggestions as to how they can be resolved. I conclude by highlighting the importance of a Heideggerian account of mood within the context of some of the shortcomings in the empirically-based accounts of mood.

Melancholia is an attunement of despair and despondency that can involve radical disruptions to temporal experience. In this article I extrapolate from the existing analyses of melancholic time in order to examine some of the important existential implications of these temporal disruptions. In particular, I focus on the way in which the desynchronization of melancholic time can complicate the melancholic’s relation to death and, consequently, to the meaning and significance of their life. Drawing on Heidegger’s distinction between death and demise, I argue that melancholic time leaves the melancholic in an impossible state of existing, where they are both unable to live and unable to die. Turning to the role of the physician, I consider the significant role that clinical interventions might have in resynchronizing the melancholic with time and examine these ideas further through a case study on physician assisted suicide. In so doing, I demonstrate that the desynchronization of melancholic time should indeed be understood as a matter of life and death.

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which (1) directed moods and emotions represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and (2) at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects.

Taking public moods seriously as an analytical concept, this article relies on recent work on the moods of individuals as a means of exploring the moods of the public. To be in a certain mood is to attune oneself to the situation in which one finds oneself. Our mood is the report we give on the state of our attunement. A public mood can either be understood as the mood of a certain age, the mood of an audience which jointly attends to a public performance, or the bonding which takes places between bodies which are in closely physical proximity to each other.  It is in the public mood that emotions, thoughts and plans for action arise.

According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intention-alism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism about other kinds of states can be motivated. In this paper, I respond to both challenges: First, I propose a novel intentionalist treatment of moods on which they represent unbound affective properties. Then, I argue that this view is indirectly supported by the same kinds of considerations that directly support intentionalism about other mental states.

Ongoing research in the elds of semantic analysis and language processing has showcased many instances where aggregated opinions and moods uttered on the Internet lead to a collective intelligence capable of predicting events in the real world. So far much of this research observed large datasets produced by numerous contributors, this thesis however tries to identify smaller groups of people and evaluate the content they produce. Specifically the attempt is made to predict the development of stock prices for a single company based on the mood of that company's employees. Twitter serves as a source of information, while the companies observed are big companies listed on NASDAQ. A Multinomial Naive Bayes classier was programmed and trained with manually classified tweets and then used to determine the mood of the tweets written by the identied employees. Both the number of tweets and their mood were examined for a possible correlation with stock performance and trading volumes. While no correlation could be found between stock performance and moods, there were 4 conclusive instances were the number of tweets showed a signicant correlation with the trading volume on the same day.

Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being in a mood that illustrates the limitations of the colored lens metaphor and demonstrates the basic inadequacy of the perceptualist account of moods. I argue that when we are in a mood, it is common to experience a kind of "emotional disconnection" in which we perceive evaluative properties that would normally elicit strong emotional reactions from us, but nonetheless we find that, in our present mood, we remain emotionally numb to these perceptions. Such experiences of "seeing but not feeling" are difficult to understand from within the perceptualist paradigm. Building on the work of Martin Heidegger, I sketch an alternative, phenomenological analysis of moods that can better account for experiences of emotional disconnection. On this alternative account, being in a mood does not merely alter the content of our perceptions but, rather, alters the way we interpret the overall significance of what we perceive, relative to a certain situational context.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Geiger’s realist and Wollheim’s projectionist accounts on expressive properties and expressive perception by considering them within the larger contexts from which they emerged, by using as far as possible a common language and by focusing on the questions of the nature of expressive properties and of how we grasp them. My aim is to show that it is possible to put into dialogue phenomenological and Anglo-American aesthetics and that this dialogue might lead to new insights about how we engage with art.

Generational conflict is more contingent than a numbers-based (years and generational cohort) understanding of generations would expect. I suggest that a focus on the concept of ‘creative destruction’, as derived from Nietzsche’s various works, can provide us further theorization of these transitions, and also gain us leverage into the risks, and rewards, that generations face in dislodging older generations still in power.  The chapter proceeds through three sections.  The first extracts the two components from within the generational transition ‘story’, and then brings forth the import of each, reviewing how they have been utilized in generational analysis so far.  The formative element of generations takes issue with the notion that generations ebb and flow purely in terms of ‘epochs’ which can be cleanly divided demographically.  Instead, being a part of a generation is more than just a numbers game, it is a social experience brought into focus during a period of political and philosophical formation, during crises that we might title ‘ruptures’, and often in reaction to an iconic ‘paradigm-changing’ or traumatic event. Thus, the formative experience is not only cohesive (intra-generationally), it is also disintegrative and even destructive. The second section engages various works by Nietzsche, focusing on the import of memory, aesthetics, and history in what some title the ‘creative destruction’ process.  This process provides us another way of understanding– in a ‘politics of forgetting’ fashion -  how particular formative events that prevent previous generations from dynamically engaging the here and now can be left behind.  The third section assesses the analytical benefits of generational analysis; how it is suggestive (if not necessarily predictive) of future political trends, and how it can be improved upon if we recognize both the polyvalence of formative events that can lead to intra-generational splintering, and the inherent contingency of a generational transition as it competes with alternative forms of identity. I conclude with some abbreviated considerations of how generational analyses might engage the domain of the academy and the ebb and flow of trends in, and practices of, IR scholarship.

En esta tesis se mostrará el lugar de preeminencia que ocupan los estados de ánimo de angustia y aburrmiento para Martin Heidegger en el período que se recorreddesde 1927 a 1930 y tal como se aprecia desde "Ser y Tiempo", la conferencia  "Que es Metafisica" y "Conceptos Fudnamentales de la Metafísica".Teniendo en cuenta la caracterización heideggeriana de fundamentales se mostrará que dicha determinación obedece a diversos motivos. Los principales se reducen principalmente al lugar estratégico que ocupan metodológica y temáticamente,  pero también a quer ambos llevan al Dasein a su propiedad  y por lo tanto a atravesar el plano óntico para llegar al ontológico. Por último se argumentará que la nada desempeña un papel central y permite la vuelta al Dasein a si mismo

A separation of state and trait factors, and an allocation of modulation values to situations, was attempted by giving the Eight State Battery (8SQ) and the Motivation Analysis Test (MAT) to two groups, each under two situations, one aversive. The difference scores between a pre- and post-exposure to the mild and the severe aversive situations were
significant on all 8SQ factors but mainly on ergs, not sentiments, in the MAT. The state changes, notably on Anxiety, Regression, Depression and Guilt, were greater on the more shocking stimulus, while Fear rose and Narcism fell significantly on the MAT. Changes were greater on the unintegrated than integrated motivational components, confirming hypotheses by others.

Moral anthropology has recently highlighted a variety of sine quibus non (virtue, freedom, evil, and so on) that are conceptually needed if anthropologists are to better understand morality. I add to this list the concept of “telos” and offer an account for how it features in the emotional lives of ethical subjects. Applying recent work in moral anthropology on ultimate values to a discussion of moods, I argue that moods disclose attunements to telic values, and do so in three key ways, namely, as attunements of absence, proximity, and fulfillment, what collectively I call “telic attunements.” I illustrate this through my own ethnographic research on the kinds of moods that turned up for a community of Shambhala Buddhist meditators, showing how meditation was used to move away from absence and toward fulfillment.

This essay is mainly made of excursions into Continental philosophy, art and literatures, with special reference to a relationship between philosophical imagery and philosophy moods. Reliably wonder, melancholy, boredom and other feelings, were by no means extraneous to rational reflection. Nay, it is a reasonable guess that European philosophy could not even be born and grow up without a contribution from an affective background like that.

We examined the content and consequences of people’s naïve theories about the effects of group mood. These theories are a potential input in Kelly and Spoor’s (2006) Input- Process-Outcome model of group moods and performance. In Study 1, participants generated potential positive and negative consequences of group moods, which were coded using an adapted form of Bales’ Interaction Process Analysis (Bales, 1970). Participants believed that positive and negative moods have implications for both task and relationship processes, and these consequences varied according to group type (creativity, friendship, decision making, and sport team). In Study 2, participants watched an ostensible group interaction among friends or strangers who had just had positive or negative experiences. Perceptions of the interaction varied in a manner consistent with naïve theories about group moods and their effects. Implications for future research on group moods are discussed.

We examined the extent to which individuals’ affective experiences are influenced during group interaction by examining whether negative or positive moods tend to become more similar or converge, and whether leader versus subordinate roles affect this process. Dyads completed a discussion task, and we manipulated each dyad member’s mood (positive or negative) and role (leader or subordinate) prior to the task. Consistent with predictions derived from Spoor and Kelly (2004), negative moods showed stronger convergence than positive moods. Contrary to predictions, leaders’ moods seemed to show more mood convergence than those of subordinates, although this may have been affected by both dyad members’ greater attention to the leader’s mood. Implications for group processes and group performance are discussed.

En el marco de la teoría de la intencionalidad de John Searle, se plantea cómo las emociones y los estados de ánimo pueden analizarse en cuanto estados mentales intencionales, en la medida en que se considere la intencionalidad no solo como una relación de “acerquidad” (aboutness) entre un estado mental del sujeto y los objetos o eventos del mundo. Se critica la teoría de Searle y se muestra que los estados mentales están corporizados y situados. Para una mente encarnada y situada, las emociones y los estados de ánimo no son meras reacciones mecánicas de un cuerpo objetivado, sino que exhiben rasgos no necesariamente conscientes de intencionalidad con respecto a problemas existenciales concretos. Se muestra la necesidad que tiene la filosofía de considerar cuestiones empíricas provenientes de varias ciencias particulares, así como la necesidad de la psiquiatría de abordar cuestiones conceptuales vinculadas con el problema de la intencionalidad, que constituye uno de los problemas centrales de la filosofía de la mente. El beneficio de este encuentro interdisciplinar será una mejor comprensión de la mente humana.

Tracking mood or emotional experiences over time is a popular function found in mobile health applications. In this study, young patients with chronic health challenges consider this also an important function of a multifunctional app supporting them in the transition to adult care. At the same time they expressed the need to be seen as a young person, not a diagnosed body. A lifeworld-led design approach, based on a Participatory Design methodology, resulted in a mood tracking and a mood mapping design, which was meaningful to the young persons’ everyday experiences. Photos tagged with colors representing different emotional states were chosen as the best way to represent their moods. An overview of moods, by day as well as by color, gives an understanding of the wider context in which these moods appear and can play a motivational role in dealing with a difficult day or episode in

High artistic achievements were repeatedly connected with poetry in the tradition of Western aesthetical thought, and the poetry with eliciting emotions. The same has happened within the tradition of film reviewing and theorising: poetry has been repeatedly evoked as a paradigmatic artistic achievement of particular films. But among the different affective states that can be elicited in humans by arts, attribution of ‘poetry’ typically addresses the eliciting and articula- tion of particular general moods, not the specific, episodic, short-term emotions. In this paper, specified are the differences among emotions and moods, and how a distinct (‘dark’) mood is achieved is demonstrated by the close analysis of the introductory descriptive scene in the film Citizen Kane. However, the crucial question is how very different and heterogeneous stylistic means pointed out in the analysis of the scene could elicit a particular, unique, holistic mood. In short, the answer is given by understanding that in the same way in which the moods selectively regulate our relations toward the world, choosing for the perception mood-congruent features of the world to sustain a particular mood, so the filmmakers choose a repertory of stylistic solu- tions congruent with the selectivity of the intended mood to elicit it in the immersed film viewer.

Tracking mood or emotional experiences over time is a popular function found in mobile health applications. In this study, young patients with chronic health challenges consider this also an important function of a multifunctional app supporting them in the transition to adult care. At the same time they expressed the need to be seen as a young person, not a diagnosed body. A lifeworld-led design approach, based on a Participatory Design methodology, resulted in a mood tracking and a mood mapping design, which was meaningful to the young persons' everyday experiences. Photos tagged with colors representing different emotional states were chosen as the best way to represent their moods. An overview of moods, by day as well as by color, gives an understanding of the wider context in which these moods appear and can play a motivational role in dealing with a difficult day or episode in their lives.