Right Answer

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar a “tese da resposta correta”, contida na Teoria dos Princípios, de Ronald Dworkin, também conhecida como Teoria Liberal do Direito. Os direitos individuais são a fundamentação teórica para a elaboração de um novo conceito de direito, partindo das deficiências encontradas nos estudos sobre o positivismo jurídico, de Herbert Hart. A contribuição da pesquisa de Dworkin sobre como o direito absorve as demandas sociais, posiciona-se na centralização da atividade judicante do magistrado. A crítica central é a constatação de que os juízes não decidem somente com base em regras. O direito não seria um sistema exclusivamente formado por regras, mas composto de regras e princípios. Na conceituação de Dworkin, o magistrado é um jurista idealista que deve se guiar pelos parâmetros de um juiz especial, extremamente forte e potencialmente perfeito, que ele denominou de “juiz Hércules”. Esta terminologia metafórica se refere ao ato de criação no sistema jurídico, denominado “autopoiesis”, que é a autoprodução do direito. Utilizou-se o método indutivo, com abordagem híbrida e epistemologia cognitiva de observação direta do fenômeno analisado. A atividade interpretativa é a forma de legitimação do próprio procedimento jurídico, em que o juiz reconstrói a realidade na análise do caso concreto. A virtude da integridade na sentença judicial deve ser vista de modo diferente da mera coerência judicial. Trata-se da potencialização da sentença pela dedicação e competência do magistrado, sendo essa a definição de Dworkin para a única resposta correta, significando ter encontrado “a melhor decisão judicial”.

There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law true. The one, legal realism, takes it that propositions of law are true because they reflect an independently existing reality of legal facts. Thes e fac ts wo u ld be gen erat ed by l egal r ul es whi ch wo u ld o pera te autonomously, without need for human intervention. The institutional theory of law illustrates this view. On this view it is the function of legal arguments to reconstruct the results of the autonomous rule application. T h e o t h e r v i e w i s l e g a l c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h propositions of law are true because they are the conclusion of the best (possible) legal argument. On this view the function of legal argumentation is constitutive: argumentation determines the contents of the law. This paper argues that legal realism is not very plausible because it is based on metaphysical assumptions which cannot be verified or falsified. Legal constructivism would ...

There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law true. The one, legal realism, takes it that propositions of law are true because they reflect an independently existing reality of legal facts. These facts would be generated by legal rules which would operate autonomously, without need for human intervention. The institutional theory of law illustrates this view. On this view it is the function of legal arguments to reconstruct the results of the autonomous rule application. The other view is legal constructivism, according to which propositions of law are true because they are the conclusion of the best (possible) legal argument. On this view the function of legal argumentation is constitutive: argumentation determines the contents of the law. This paper argues that legal realism is not very plausible because it is based on metaphysical assumptions which cannot be verified or falsified. Legal constructivism would be more plausible, in particular in the variant where t...

RESUMO: O escopo do presente consiste em promover um diálogo entre a metodologia do direito civil-constitucional e o sistema brasileiro de controle de constitucionalidade das leis e atos normativos do Poder Públicos, com especial enfoque nas proposições da doutrina constitucionalistas destinadas a justificar a superação ou afastamento excepcional de uma norma-regra jurídica. Nessa empreitada, delimitar-se-ão certas premissas teóricas relevantes ao presente estudo, notadamente no que diz respeito à relação entre as noções de enunciado normativo e norma com a noção de ordenamento do caso concreto, bem como a atual compreensão das regras e dos princípios como distintas (conquanto complementares) espécies normativas, ambas sujeitas à incidência imperativa da técnica da ponderação. Na sequência, examinar-se-ão em revista alguns aspectos atinentes à insuficiência do controle abstrato de constitucionalidade. Ao fim, passar-se-ão em revista as principais proposições teóricas concebidas para justificar o dito afastamento excepcional da regra nos casos em que sua aplicação subsuntiva produziria resultado incompatível com a Constituição, buscando destacar a compatibilidade entre a finalidade usualmente subjacente às propostas desenvolvidas na doutrina constitucionalista e os postulados da metodologia do direito civil-constitucional. O estudo adota o método lógico-dedutivo, a partir de pesquisa bibliográfica e jurisprudencial acerca do direito brasileiro.

ABSTRACT: The scope of this study is to promote a dialogue between the methodology of civil-constitutional law and the Brazilian system of constitutionality review, with special focus on the constitutionalist doctrine proposals aimed at justifying the exceptional overcoming of a legal rule-norm. In this endeavor, certain theoretical premises relevant to the present study will be delimited, notably with regard to the relationship between the notions of normative statement and norm with the notion of concrete case order, as well as the current understanding of the rules and principles as distinct (although complementary) normative species, both subject to the incidence of the balancing technique. Afterwards, some aspects related to the insufficiency of the abstract control of constitutionality will be reviewed. In the end, the study will review the main theoretical propositions designed to justify the said exceptional overcoming of the rule in cases where its strict application would produce a result incompatible with the Constitution, seeking to highlight the compatibility between the purpose usually underlying the proposals developed in constitutionalist doctrine and the postulates of the methodology of civil-constitutional law. The study adopts the logical-deductive method, based on bibliographic and jurisprudential research regarding Brazilian law.

There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law true. The one, legal realism, takes it that propositions of law are true because they reflect an independently existing reality of legal facts. These facts would be generated by legal rules which would operate autonomously, without need for human intervention. The institutional theory of law illustrates this view. On this view it is the function of legal arguments to reconstruct the results of the autonomous rule application. The other view is legal constructivism, according to which propositions of law are true because they are the conclusion of the best (possible) legal argument. On this view the function of legal argumentation is constitutive: argumentation determines the contents of the law. This paper argues that legal realism is not very plausible because it is based on metaphysical assumptions which cannot be verified or falsified. Legal constructivism would be more plausible, in particular in the variant where t...

El artículo aborda dos cuestiones de método jurídico. La primera es la de si en los casos convencionalmente no resueltos (los que en principio admiten más de una respuesta) los jueces deciden discrecionalmente o tienen el deber de hallar la mejor respuesta (la única correcta). La segunda cuestión es la de cómo deben debatir los magistrados cuando se enfrentan a un caso que, en principio, admite más de una respuesta. El desafío teórico para juristas prácticos radica en que, por lo general, tienden a dar respuestas incompatibles entre sí a estas dos cuestiones.

This study comes in the aftermath of a stable set of cases of the STA, which considered as illegal Art. 16º, nº 2 of the CIRS due to the infringement of the allegedly autonomous concept of residence enshrined in the DTC's. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the dual residence of individuals in both internal, European and international dimension, the author illustrates some of the deficits and inconveniences of that line of reasoning, suggesting some solutions that could help to overcome the identified problems.

A theoretical comparison of Anglophone legal and English-education professions reveals a common commitment to respective fictional discourses that become bodies of expertise through the converging performances of individuals' professional personas. Furthermore, both professional discourses have been affected by an ideology of realism that overemphasises the empirical study of interpretive practices as a means of reductively defining the subject matter of each, thereby disregarding the fictionalising and idealising functions of socially constructed professional knowledge. This has marginalised the single right answer thesis in theories of literary and legal interpretation, resulting in a general acceptance of incompleteness and inconsistency in both professional fields of expertise. Even so, it is contended that English-education professionals can and should maintain the fiction of a single right interpretation of all texts as a means of promoting greater understanding between English users through the development of shared interpretive dispositions.

Methodological objectivism is an orientation towards teaching and learning the interpretation of language and texts as though there were a uniquely objective fact of the matter concerning language conventions and textual meaning. It challenges the realist view of language, a central commitment of the current English-education paradigm that involves passive attention to the actual linguistic practices of individuals and communities as an authoritative guide to objectives of English education. The contrary idealist view prioritises an ideal form of language as a means to actively reform empirical linguistic practices, thereby facilitating mutual understanding between communities across gulfs of time, culture, class and ideology in a way that cannot be accommodated by the realist view. Once the function of a fictional discourse concerning such an ideal form is elucidated, it can be appreciated that English education professions ought to bear responsibility for promoting common interpretive practices through the sincere maintenance and reinforcement of the professional and educational discourse in alignment with this pedagogical orientation.

Resumo: O juspositivismo em suas 03 (três) principais vertentes e antíteses tem se mostrado relevante para a compreensão e aplicação do Direito na contemporaneidade? É com base nessa questão que pretende-se abordar os problemas que se fizeram presentes, ao longo da história, na Teoria do Direito, assim como expor a respeito da importância da adoção de uma Teoria da Decisão, que leve a uma resposta constitucionalmente correta. Para tanto, realizar-se a presente pesquisa sob a ótica de uma abordagem qualitativa, através de consultas na doutrina, destacando-se, ainda, a utilização do método fenomenológico-hermenêutico, com intuito de se realizar uma revisão crítica dos temas tratados através da linguagem, a qual não é analisada meramente em um sistema fechado, mas em um plano de historicidade.
Abstract: Has juspositivism in its 03 (three) main strands and antitheses been shown to be relevant to the understanding and application of Law in contemporary times? It is on the basis of this question that we intend to address the problems that have been present throughout history in the Law Theory, as well as to expose the importance of adopting a Decision Theory that leads to a constitutionally correct answer. In order to do so, the present research should be carried out from the point of view of a qualitative approach, through consultations in the doctrine, highlighting also the use of the phenomenological-hermeneutical method, with the purpose of performing a critical review of the subjects treated through language, which is not analyzed merely in a closed system, but in a plane of historicity.

There are two competing views on what makes propositions of law
true. The one, legal realism, takes it that propositions of law are true
because they reflect an independently existing reality of legal facts.
These facts would be generated by legal rules which would operate
autonomously, without need for human intervention. The institutional
theory of law illustrates this view. On this view it is the function of legal
arguments to reconstruct the results of the autonomous rule application.
The other view is legal constructivism, according to which
propositions of law are true because they are the conclusion of the best
(possible) legal argument. On this view the function of legal
argumentation is constitutive: argumentation determines the contents of
the law.
This paper argues that legal realism is not very plausible because it is
based on metaphysical assumptions which cannot be verified or falsified.
Legal constructivism would be more plausible, in particular in the variant
where the law is determined by the best actual legal argument. This
position is defended by means of a brief exposition of the so-called
‘Erlanger-approach’ to legal justification.