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    Randolph Beard

    One of the cornerstones of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (without which the Act probably would not have been passed) is Section 271.1 This Section establishes the criteria under which the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs)... more
    One of the cornerstones of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (without which the Act probably would not have been passed) is Section 271.1 This Section establishes the criteria under which the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) will be allowed to enter (or, more accurately, reenter) the interLATA long-distance market. Specifically, under the 271 provisions, an RBOC’s reintegration within its certificated geographic territory is made contingent upon the satisfaction of four necessary preconditions.3
    While scores of papers have drawn on the basic insights of the early founders of the economic theory of regulation, the ability to cogently present the general form of the theory in a readily accessible graphical format has only recently... more
    While scores of papers have drawn on the basic insights of the early founders of the economic theory of regulation, the ability to cogently present the general form of the theory in a readily accessible graphical format has only recently emerged. While providing a promising approach for illustrating and analyzing regulatory (and deregulatory) outcomes, however, the analysis presented to this point appears to require the derivation of several different graphs. The result is that, while stemming from a single paradigmatic framework, the graphical approach fails thus far to offer a single unified basis for illustrating the general economic theory of regulation. In this paper, we seek to fill this lacuna by providing a simple, yet powerful, unifying graphical construct for presenting the myriad implications of that theory. (JEL D72, L51)
    ABSTRACT Although many authors have drawn on the basic insights of the early founders of the economic theory of regulation, the ability to cogently present the general form of the theory in a readily accessible graphical format has only... more
    ABSTRACT Although many authors have drawn on the basic insights of the early founders of the economic theory of regulation, the ability to cogently present the general form of the theory in a readily accessible graphical format has only recently emerged. Although providing a promising approach for illustrating and analyzing regulatory and deregulatory outcomes, the analysis presented to this point appears to require the derivation of several graphs. The result is that, although stemming from a single paradigmatic framework, the graphical approach fails to offer a single unified basis for illustrating the general economic theory of regulation. The authors seek to fill this lacuna by providing a simple yet powerful unifying graphical construct for presenting the myriad implications of that theory.
    The assumption that agents engage in maximizing behavior, while ubiquitous in economic theory, differs from the assumption that agents are willing to rely on the maximizing behavior of others. This paper offers an empirical examination of... more
    The assumption that agents engage in maximizing behavior, while ubiquitous in economic theory, differs from the assumption that agents are willing to rely on the maximizing behavior of others. This paper offers an empirical examination of this distinction using experimental methods. Utilizing a series of experimental treatments based on a simple, two player extensive form game of perfect information, we find strong evidence that apparently rational people are often unwilling to rely on the self-interested behavior of others, despite the observed near universality of maximizing play.
    We study the implications of extending public-insurance coverage to an existing medical market in Salop's spatial model of imperfect competition. In this setup a public insurer sets a price to medical providers, which must maintain... more
    We study the implications of extending public-insurance coverage to an existing medical market in Salop's spatial model of imperfect competition. In this setup a public insurer sets a price to medical providers, which must maintain their reservation pro…t from selling on the spot market directly to consumers. We show that the public insurer can manipulate this reservation pro…t by setting the coinsurance rate, and that setting the coinsurance rate properly yields the market …rst best product diversi…cation. The results survive generalizations including moral hazard and incomplete coverage. When adding quality choice to the analysis, a minimum quality standard that is combined with a proper coinsurance rate can still support market e¢ ciency. JEL Classi…cation: : I-13, I-18, K-35
    We study the implications of extending public-insurance coverage over differentiated medical products of the same therapeutic group to market outcomes. The public insurer can set the reimbursement level for medical providers and the... more
    We study the implications of extending public-insurance coverage over differentiated medical products of the same therapeutic group to market outcomes. The public insurer can set the reimbursement level for medical providers and the copayment for the insured for medical care provided under the policy coverage, but cannot directly control providers’ spot sales (outside of insurance) price. In this setup, the price offered by the public insurer to medical providers must maintain their reservation profit from selling on the spot market directly to consumers. We show that the public insurer can manipulate this reservation profit by setting the copayment rate, and thereby promote market welfare while increasing consumers’ surplus due to lower medical prices and lower market entry. The results survive generalizations including moral hazard and incomplete insurance coverage.
    ABSTRACT To effect an IPO in modern times the private company must seek permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In administering the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC requires the selling company to publicly disclose... more
    ABSTRACT To effect an IPO in modern times the private company must seek permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In administering the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC requires the selling company to publicly disclose pertinent facts about the firm’s business, current operations, management, primary shareholders, and financial condition. Before the regulation and process of a current-day IPO is considered, a brief review of early IPOs may be appropriate.
    ABSTRACT
    Regulation of the health care sector of the US economy is pervasive. Virtually all industries contained in this sector are subjected to myriad government controls over one or more dimensions of performance-price, output, investment,... more
    Regulation of the health care sector of the US economy is pervasive. Virtually all industries contained in this sector are subjected to myriad government controls over one or more dimensions of performance-price, output, investment, entry, and quality [7; 8]. It is our general thesis that, ...
    Flow through refers to the effect of a change in incremental production costs on the prices of goods or services, and is a topic of great interest to regulators and others. This article provides a framework for both analyzing flow... more
    Flow through refers to the effect of a change in incremental production costs on the prices of goods or services, and is a topic of great interest to regulators and others. This article provides a framework for both analyzing flow through, and for evaluating whether or not flow through, properly defined, occurs in the long distance telecommunications industry. We focus
    This paper examines possible adjustments to a change in a binding quota in the context of an international duopoly. Consumers directly value embodied quality of goods, which is chosen simultaneously with quantity, and before quan - tity... more
    This paper examines possible adjustments to a change in a binding quota in the context of an international duopoly. Consumers directly value embodied quality of goods, which is chosen simultaneously with quantity, and before quan - tity in a sequential model. Possible responses to a small change in a binding quota are derived. The same three types of equilibria occur in the simultaneous and sequential models. Foreign quality downgrading can occur if domestic quality falls, and is more likely starting with a low quantity of high quality imports. Domestic quality and quantity respond in opposite directions. Welfare effects are discussed.
    ABSTRACT To effect an IPO in modern times the private company must seek permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In administering the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC requires the selling company to publicly disclose... more
    ABSTRACT To effect an IPO in modern times the private company must seek permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In administering the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC requires the selling company to publicly disclose pertinent facts about the firm’s business, current operations, management, primary shareholders, and financial condition. Before the regulation and process of a current-day IPO is considered, a brief review of early IPOs may be appropriate.
    ABSTRACT In this POLICY PAPER, we show how the Federal Communications Commission’s regulatory process may be used to impede the efficient functioning of a secondary market for commercial spectrum. In particular, we show that imposing (and... more
    ABSTRACT In this POLICY PAPER, we show how the Federal Communications Commission’s regulatory process may be used to impede the efficient functioning of a secondary market for commercial spectrum. In particular, we show that imposing (and threatening to impose) significant conditions when firms seek to repurpose spectrum from a low-value to a higher-value use acts as a “tax” and thus reduces the incentives of firms to exchange spectrum in the secondary market. As a result, “taxation by condition” will discourage the larger scale transactions necessary to resolve spectrum exhaust, though we may still observe many deals of a less material nature that will attract less attention and thus fewer conditions. Our analysis also reveals that in many cases the arguments to condition spectrum licenses based on “market power” concerns are misguided. Market power does not over-motivate licensees to repurpose spectrum. In fact, economic theory shows that a monopolist will repurpose spectrum to a degree less than or equal to a benevolent “social planner.” Accordingly, under the constant threat of spectrum exhaust, “taxing” efforts to repurpose spectrum is perhaps the worst of all policies. Instead, if the Commission is serious about alleviating exhaust for commercial spectrum, then barring legitimate competitive or interference concerns, the agency should expeditiously approve efforts to repurpose spectrum without extraneous conditions.
    ABSTRACT
    Page 1. T. Randolph Beard Henry Thompson Auburn University Efficient versus "Popular" Tariffs for Regulated Monopolies* I. Introduction ... Further, distortions in pricing due to the political nature of regulation are... more
    Page 1. T. Randolph Beard Henry Thompson Auburn University Efficient versus "Popular" Tariffs for Regulated Monopolies* I. Introduction ... Further, distortions in pricing due to the political nature of regulation are systematically related to the effects of income on product demand. ...
    Deviations between closed-end investment fund share prices and underlying net asset values represent a historically important anomaly requiring theoretical explanation. In this article, we provide evidence that the processes generating... more
    Deviations between closed-end investment fund share prices and underlying net asset values represent a historically important anomaly requiring theoretical explanation. In this article, we provide evidence that the processes generating prices and NAVs differ among fund types, implying that explanations of mispricing will necessarily be somewhat parochial. Using a multivariate GARCH model for estimated common factors, we empirically examine discounts of both equity and bond funds, and we find an important asymmetry between them. In particular, we show a structural break in this relationship for bond funds after the Lehman bankruptcy and suggest an explanation based on persistence in NAVs arising from market illiquidity.
    Research Interests:
    In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of government spending on private-sector job growth. Rather than contemplate the average or typical effect of government stimulus on private-sector jobs, we divide the past fifty years of U.S.... more
    In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of government spending on private-sector job growth. Rather than contemplate the average or typical effect of government stimulus on private-sector jobs, we divide the past fifty years of U.S. economic history into low-growth and high-growth periods. We then apply a non-linear, two-regime model to study whether the stimulus effects of government and private investment differ between recessionary and expansionary periods. During periods of economic sluggishness, we find that government spending has zero effect on private-sector job creation. This result is consistent with the apparent impotence of huge federal government spending increases aimed at reducing unemployment. In contrast, when it comes to job growth, expansions in private investment are effective in both regimes, but its efficacy is greatest during economic stagnation. By implication, policies that discourage private investment may have severe job-killing effects during economic...
    This article examines the role of resale entry in achieving competition in local exchange telecommunications markets in the US under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Contrary to the claims of many incumbent local exchange providers, we... more
    This article examines the role of resale entry in achieving competition in local exchange telecommunications markets in the US under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Contrary to the claims of many incumbent local exchange providers, we argue that: (1) resale entry produces direct competitive benefits; (2) resale entry will not reduce incumbent incentives to invest in the local network; and
    In a recent paper in this Journal, Possai and Goetz [10] (PG) offer an explanation of why a hospi-tal might choose to provide a service (organ transplants) or continue to provide a service that, on its own merits, may appear to be... more
    In a recent paper in this Journal, Possai and Goetz [10] (PG) offer an explanation of why a hospi-tal might choose to provide a service (organ transplants) or continue to provide a service that, on its own merits, may appear to be unprofitable. Their explanation is based upon ...

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