European Legal Culture

The  transnational  dimension  of ius  mercatorum,  whose  very  name  bears  the  hallmark  of  its  juridical particularism, led some contemporary jurists to refer to lex mercatoria as an ‘a-national’ legal order. However, this  negative definition overlooks the common cultural basis in Europe that has shaped commercial law, a cultural basis that goes beyond just its legal aspects. Indeed, if this deeply ‘proprium’ law sought consistency and harmonisation in Europe, accounting for this phenomenon cannot arguably merely rely on the unstoppable strength of the market. The Early-modern period offers a first-rate testing ground in order to establish whether that  shared  European  legal  culture,  whatever  its  authority,  has  effectively  proved  a  solid,  deep-rooted  and resilient bulwark against the abrupt changes of the time, whether as a result of the great discoveries overseas or the globalisation of trade

Roman Law: An Introduction offers a clear and accessible introduction to Roman law for students of any legal tradition. In the thousand years between the Law of the Twelve Tables and Justinian’s massive Codification, the Romans developed the most sophisticated and comprehensive secular legal system of Antiquity. Roman law remains at the heart of the civil law tradition of Europe and much of the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Roman lawyers created new legal concepts, ideas, rules, and mechanisms that most Western legal systems still apply. The study of Roman law thus facilitates understanding among people of different cultures by inspiring a kind of legal common sense and breadth of knowledge.

W książce przedstawiono zasadę proporcjonalności jako instrument umożliwiający kontrolę politycznie umocowanych działań władzy, które w nomenklaturze prawnej określa się mianem „władzy dyskrecjonalnej” lub „swobodnego uznania”. Oznaczało to konieczność zbadania doktrynalnych podstaw oraz instytucjonalnego rozwoju sądowej kontroli działań organów władzy, zwłaszcza tych, które pozostawały w sferze swobodnego uznania. Przedmiotem analizy były treści doktrynalne oraz prawo we Francji, Niemczech, Austrii i Anglii oraz w Polsce od XIX w., do czasów obecnych. Pozwoliło to, obok prezentacji samego zagadnienia kontroli kompetencji dyskrecjonalnych i zasady proporcjonalności w podstawowych europejskich kulturach prawnych, ukazać również rozwój nowoczesnej teorii politycznej i szeroko pojmowanego prawa publicznego ze wskazaniem na charakterystyczne dla tych procesów prawidłowości.
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The principle of proportionality is presented as a means which makes the judicial review of discretionary powers possible. For this reason, the book starts with an analysis of the very concept of discretionary powers in itself, its philosophical origins and legal consequences, as well as the development of the judicial review of action by the state on its different levels (first administrative, then legislative) in various European countries. The legal systems of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Austria are examined from the 19th century to the present day, and the Polish legal system since 1918. This is the context in which the emergence of the principle of proportionality in German law is described, as well as its development and subsequent reception throughout the whole of Europe. Particular attention is devoted to the principle of proportionality in EU law and within the system of the European Convention of Human Rights. An investigation is carried out of the crucial role of case law under the ECHR for the pan-European reception of proportionality. This is followed by an examination of the way in which the German and French legal methods for the judicial review of discretionary powers have shaped the identity of the proportionality principle within EU law.The adoption of the principle of proportionality at the turn of the 20th and 21st century is described in detail in relation to the legal systems of France, Austria, the United Kingdom and Poland. Particular attention is devoted to the fact that the principle was first adopted on the level of constitutional law and only later in administrative law, with a certain exception for the United Kingdom?, due to the absence of a regular constitutional review. It is also pointed out that the judicial means of reviewing discretionary powers (including the principle of proportionality) are very powerful instruments for the strengthening of one political centre against another. This aspect is analysed in the context of administrative – parliamentary relations in 19th-century Europe and in the relations between national legislatures and EU transnational administration in the late 20th and early 21st century.

1. Antoni Dębiński: Introduction to the subject of the conference: the role and significance  of Roman law in the legal history of Europe 
2. Tomasz Giaro: Roman Law always dies with a codification
3: Mychajło Bajmuratow From Roman municypia to modern local government
4: Paul du Plessis The development of legal doctrine in the ius commune: a case study
5: Wołodymyr Kossak The reception of Roman law regulations on mortgage in the legislation  of Ukraine 
6: Michal Skreipek Roman roots of contract of bailment in Czech law
7: Jewhen Charytonow Roman law reception  in contemporary Ukrainian civil law
8: Wojciech Dajczak The civilian tradition and the modern debate on the rules of private law. Remarks against the factors of unjustified enrichment
9: Marek Kurylowicz Roman law as a universal ethical metaphor (on the example of Louis Aragon and Mieczyslaw Jastrun)

Justinian’s Legislation in Italy before and after the Gothic War
As was already clear in Dante Alighieri’s mind, the main legacy of the emperor Justinian is undoubtedly his legislation. Especially starting from the 12th century and up to recent times, the Corpus Iuris Civilis influenced European legal history in a very deep way. The long period, however, between Justinian and Henry IV was by no means devoid of knowledge of the CIC. Neither Lombard domination nor that of the Carolingians and the Ottonians could completely eradicate from Italy the memory and the ideal appreciation of Justinian’s laws. In each case, the fortune of Justinian’s legislation would surely not have been possible if the Byzantine texts had not arrived in Italy already in the 6th century (perhaps even before the Gothic War), and if someone, somewhere, had not preserved them (together with the perception of their value) over the centuries of the very early Middle Ages. As showed in particular by the oldest manuscript tradition of Justinian’s texts, the role of the Roman Church in the survival of this legacy was decisive. A couple of examples make it clear how ideological motivations as much as practical interests pushed the Church towards a decision with profound future consequences.

This Article delves into the reasons for the current crisis in
the traditional international law system, considering how the
system developed through the centuries in order to respond to
the needs and circumstances of past historical epochs, as well as
how the system is no longer capable of meeting the unique
developments and needs of life in the Third Millennium. The
Article considers the fundamental problems of a state-based
system of international law that—rather than focusing on the
prime actor and focus of the law, the human person, and his
inherent dignity—concentrates on and gives enormous power to
the artificial construct of the nation-state, and its animating
principles of sovereignty and over-dependence on territoriality.
This inborn defect in the system (i.e., the emphasis on the
nation-state) was imported wholesale into the United Nations
system, ultimately rendering it incapable of meeting the basic
security, social, and economic needs of a world that longs for a
true global community of persons. The nation-state paradigm,
as well as the United Nations system, requires essential and
profound reform. New institutions with real global power must
established to meet the demands of our globalized world,
especially as regards defending human rights from the
incessant assault from both state and non-state actors.

http://www.centropgm.unifi.it/cache/quaderni/44/0216.pdf

An unpublished speech of Alberico Gentili to the Oxford scholars in defence of jurisprudence.
Several manuscripts of Alberico Gentili (S. Ginesio 1552 - London 1608) are conserved in the Bodleian Library in Oxford. In 1580 the Italian jurist, exiled for his adherence to the Reformation doctrine, arrived in England where in 1587 was appointed regius professor of civil law at Oxford University. Here, after the publication of Dialogi (1582) and Lectiones et epistolae (1583-1584), he ran into a number of problems, initially with Jean Hotman and the humanistic circles and later with the theological-puritan ones. The speech - which is published here in Appendix - is conserved in the Collection D'Orville 612 and has been written after 12 March 1594, at the end of a bitter controversy with the puritan theologian John Rainolds. The controversy had developed between 1593 and 1594 and it was about the competence of the jurist and the theologian. In it Gentili, besides defending himself from the accusation of being trico italicus, machiauelicus et athaeus, he also protects the good reasons of the iurisprudentia in the light of its long history and the merit of those who, over the centuries, had professed legal science.

Un discorso inedito di Alberico Gentili agli accademici di Oxford in difesa della "iurisprudentia".

Nella Bodleian Library di Oxford sono conservati numerosi manoscritti di Alberico Gentili (S. Ginesio 1552 – Londra 1608). Il giurista italiano, esule per la sua adesione alle dottrine della Riforma, giunge in Inghilterra nel 1580 dove, nel 1587, viene nominato regius professor of civil law. Qui, dopo la pubblicazione dei Dialogi (1582) e delle Lectiones et epistolae (1583-1584) incontra numerose difficoltà, dapprima con Jean Hotman e con alcuni ambienti umanistici, e successivamente con quelli teologici puritani. Il discorso che qui si pubblica in Appendice, è conservato nel Fondo D’Orville 612, e viene scritto dopo il 12 marzo 1594, al termine di un’aspra polemica con il teologo puritano John Rainolds, che si era sviluppata fra 1593 e 1594 circa le competenze del giurista e del teologo. In essa Gentili, oltre a difendere sé stesso dalle accuse di “trico italicus, machiauelicus et athaeus”, difende le buone ragioni del diritto alla luce della sua lunghissima storia e del valore di coloro che, nel corso dei secoli, avevano professato la scienza giuridica.

itt: bibliográfiai és egyéb ismertető. Szerkesztette: Takács Péter. Szerzők: Bódiné Beliznai Kinga, Bóka Zsolt, Bors Szilvia, Deli Gergely, Egresi Katalin, Erdős Csaba, Ganczer Mónika, Herédi Erika, Horváthy Balázs, Kajtár István…, Kecskés Gábor, Kelemen Roland, Knapp László, Lezsovits Gergely, Magyar Zsóka, Maróti Gábor, Megyeri-Pálffi Zoltán, Mezey Barna, Milassin László, Paksy Máté, Pődör Lea, Rokolya Gábor, Smuk Péter, Szigeti Péter, Takács Péter, Varga Piroska, Váczi Péter, Veöreös András. Megjelent: Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 2020. pp. 840.  ISBN: 978 963 556 070 7 - Mtmt-azonosító: 31726775

Ius vigilantibus scriptum est / Nec stultis solere succurri / Ignorantia iuris.
Roman jurist Papinian paraphrased his master’s saying and incorporated it into the imperial rescript. The maxims: Scaevola’s "vigilantibus iura scripta sunt" and Papinian’s "nec stultis solere succurri" are parallel, embodying the same principle. "Nec stultis solere succurri" differs not only because it is cynical or sarcastic. Its formulation is self-explaining and for that reason more convincing. Yet, it is not less general, therefore the question about its nature remains essential. The maxims were not designed to declare the law, i.e. they cannot be considered legal rules. They rather reveal a general feature of the Roman way of treating individuals and organizing social life. Scaevola and Papinian articulated it centuries before Herbert Spencer pronounced his social evolutionism. In ancient Rome, it was not a theory. It allowed legal institutions to operate in public and private life. Thus, the desired organization of society could be achieved. The principle embodied in both maxims was therefore a matter of practice.

Riassunto: Il testo illustra la condizione giuridica della donna nel Medio Evo, con particolare riferimento al suo status processuale. Malgrado i divieti contenuti nel "Corpus iuris civilis" e nel "Decretum Gratiani", i giuristi attivi tra la seconda metà del XII secolo e l'inizio del XIII ammettono l'esercizio femminile della funzione giurisdizionale "ex licentia principis" o in ragione dello status personale. Con la decretale " Dilecti filii " del 4 novembre 1202, Innocenzo III riconosce la "potestas iudicandi et arbitrandi" femminile quando viene esercitata sulla base di una "consuetudo approbata". La decretale pontificia e il pensiero dei giuristi possono essere pienamente compresi alla luce dei rapporti fra "ius commune" e "iura propria": un tema, quello del sistema del diritto comune, sul quale si torna nuovamente a riflettere
Abstract: This work illustrates the women's juridical condition during the Middle Ages, with specific reference to their processual status. Despite the prohibitions contained in the Corpus iuris civilis and Decretum Gratiani, the jurists active from the second half of the 12 th century to the beginning of the 13 th century, allow the women's exercise of judicial functions ex licentia principis or because of their personal status. With the decretal " Dilecti filii " of 4 November 1202, Innocent III recognizes the women's potestas iudicandi et arbitrandi when it is exercised on the basis of a consuetudo approbata. The papal decretal and the thought of the jurists can be fully understood looking at the relationship between ius commune and iura propria, and give us the opportunity to reflect again about the system of the "ius commune".

La relación entre la historia del derecho y la historia del libro no ha sido muy estrecha. Ambas disciplinas han tenido una vida académica y un recorrido dispar. Sin embargo, no dejan de tener notables parentescos y puntos de encuentro, que en ocasiones iluminan al alimón de una forma asombrosa algunos temas nucleares de la historia jurídico-intelectual. Es lo que sucede en el libro que aquí se reseña. Se trata de un muy infrecuente estudio de historia de las ideas, que aúna la paciente erudición de quienes cultivan la historia librorum con el contextualismo político y social de la historia jurídica. Este volumen trata de la curiosa vida que tuvo el Commentarius academicus et forensis (Leiden, 1642) del jurista protestante Arnoldus VINNIUS en la España de los siglos XVIII y XIX. A los historiadores del derecho les es cara la fi gura de VINNIUS, y a quienes han trabajado la época del despotismo ilustrado y de la revolución liberal –para decirlo con las palabras de los hermanos PESET–, no les resulta extraña la recurrencia a este autor, reco-mendado por Carlos III en sucesivas ocasiones (p. 243). Sin embargo, la presencia de este autor holandés no estaba bien estudiada y apenas se entendía el por qué de la infl uencia de un jurista reformado en la España católica. El tema, de entrada, parece una paradoja, puesto que la contaminación libresca entre católicos y reformados se obstaculizó por ambas partes. Sin embargo, estudios de las últimas décadas han mostrado la infl uencia de SUÁREZ y de los maestros conimbricenses en las prensas de los países reformados, en los que no sufrieron una censura profunda, aunque sí una cierta distorsión. El caso que aquí nos ocupa es un caso inverso: un autor protestante que fue impreso en países católicos y tuvo en ellos un gran predicamento, aun a costa de ser expurgado, dañado y reescrito. La cuestión no acaba aquí: VINNIUS no sólo fue un jurista relativamente destacado durante su vida, sino que pervivió en la res publica iuristarum después de muerto, tras ha-ber sido una autoridad que no merecía tan amplio recorrido. La sombra de VINNIUS fue mucho más alargada que su fi gura. Y el reto para el investigador era saber quién y cómo

Il realismo giuridico scandinavo ha fondato i propri assunti su premesse epistemologiche assolutamente originali: la Scuola di Uppsala -- fulcro di questo particolare indirizzo di pensiero -- si è caratterizzata per il saldo retroterra filosofico, per un approccio che l’ha spinta a rivisitare in chiave empiristica i concetti fondamentali della grammatica giuridica, ma soprattutto per un progetto culturale coerente ed unitario. Questa coerenza è stata assicurata da un collante di straordinaria efficacia: la volontà di rifondare lo studio del diritto espellendo dal vocabolario giuridico qualsiasi lemma che non avesse un referente semantico ‘reale’. Questo percorso analitico, tra l’altro, ha portato il giusrealismo scandinavo ad adottare un metodo ‘archeologico’ in modo da riportare alla luce il nucleo primigenio dell’esperienza giuridica. Si giustifica così la priorità attribuita alla forza della parola, il valore riconosciuto al rito, la forte sottolineatura della potenza simbolica dell’apparato statale. Si comprende altresì l’importanza attribuita al diritto romano che agli occhi della Scuola di Uppsala assume un valore assolutamente paradigmatico. Il saggio intende ripercorrere le modalità di questa interfaccia con un’esperienza giuridica solo all’apparenza remota, evidenziandone l’originalità nel dibattito giusfilosofico novecentesco.

When confronted with cases of self-killing, medieval jurors had to contend with a vast array of often conflicting concerns, from religious and folkloric condemnations of the act of suicide, to fears for the welfare of the family of the dead, and to coping with royal confiscations of a felon's goods. All of these factors had a profound impact on the verdicts put forward by members of the jury during the various stages of the legal process. While these elements form the base of jury verdicts relating to self-killings, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that medieval juries did not respond uniformly to cases of suicide. Rather, jurors at various stages of the process differed widely in their familiarity with the dead and this familiarity had an impact on their judgments. Members of the coroners’ inquest juries were often neighbors of the dead, and thus their verdicts reflected a more local resolution to the death of a community member than the verdicts of presentment or trial juries.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. - 2. Il testo manoscritto: sua presumibile datazione. - 3. Alberico indica al padre i testi agostiniani relativi all’origine dell’anima. - 4. I quattro Sonetti già noti di Alberico Gentili. - 5. Una contestualizzazione storica: la polemica diritto-teologia negli anni 1593/1594. - 6. Il Sonetto inedito alla Regina Elisabetta I d’Inghilterra: le probabili ragioni della sua redazione. - Appendice.
ABSTRACT: The Bodleian Library in Oxford, MS. D’Orville 617, conserves the draft of a letter written by Alberico Gentili to his father Matteo probably on 18th September 1592.
In the letter Alberico shows to the father the Augustinian texts about the origin of the soul: an issue probably debated within the religious and academic circles of London. In the same letter Alberico sends the text of a sonnet dedicated to Queen Elizabeth I, giving a further demonstration of the devotion that he feels towards the Sovereign. Indeed, she received him in 1580 when he was exile and in 1587 appointed him as Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford.

Il secondo tomo di Almum Studium Papiense rappresenta una nuova tappa del viaggio nella storia dell’Università di Pavia, tra personalità, luoghi e vicende che hanno caratterizzato l’epoca della dominazione spagnola (1535-1706). Come rilevato dalla storiografia recente, questo fu un periodo di modernizzazione, e non di stasi, per lo Studium pavese, in cui operarono figure di grande rilievo come Gerolamo Cardano. Giovan Battista Giraldi Cinzio, Giacomo Menochio e Gaspare Aselli. Questo tomo completa il primo volume, e ne contiene gli indici complessivi dei nomi e dei manoscritti.

The Judicial and Legal Reality of Odnodvortsy in the Light of Wincenty Dunin-Marcinkiewicz’s Work The Nobility of Pinsk
Abstract
The article presents an analysis of historical and legal reality depicted in Wincenty Dunin-Marcinkiewicz’s work Th e Nobility of Pinsk. It is the work of utmost importance for the Belarusian national culture, and an outstanding primary source depicting the legal culture of the epoch. The Nobility of Pinsk was written in 1866, and it refl ects the situation of the degraded nobility who aft er 1831 was ranked as the odnodvortsy – ‘owners of one homestead’. Th ey had their own laws and duties that placed them between the dvorians and the peasantry. Despite the text’s form of comedy, the political culture of this class was painted in extremely dark colours. According to Wincenty Dunin-Marcinkiewicz, the judicial and police omnipotence of the land court and local court pristavs was total. On the other hand, the knowledge of law and their liberties among the odnodvortsy was at a very low level. Th e only way for them to settle the case was either through fraud (to bribe witnesses) or through omnipresent corruption. What draws attention is constant reminding of the Th ird Lithuanian Statute, which – despite being legally invalid for 26 years (1840) – was notoriously quoted in court, for it was regarded as the symbol of the judiciary by the contemporaries. Under the pretence of the cited normative acts which in fact did not exist or did not apply, the problem of non-application of the rules of law in judicial and police organs and far-reaching corruption is emphasised.

Un duc et pair se scandalise qu'un premier Président du Parlement de Paris ne le salue pas tête découverte en prenant son opinion. Les parlementaires rechignent à recevoir le garde des Sceaux avec les honneurs dus au premier d'entre eux, préférant le tenir pour un simple commissaire du pouvoir. Les conflits liés aux rangs et aux préséances sont-ils réglés par les mœurs, les usages ou par le droit ? Les autorités qui les vident tranchent-elles en vertu de leur bon plaisir ou de règles établies ? Cet ouvrage s'intéresse à la question de la juridicité implicite mais substantielle d'une matière laissée aux marges du droit et de la politique. L'analyse de ces querelles offre l'occasion d'approfondir le débat sur la « constitution » de l'ancienne France : constitution sociale, constitution sans constitutionnalisme ou constitutionnalisme sans constitution ? La hiérarchie qui transparaît à travers les conflits de rang du xvii e siècle prend le relais de la hiérarchie des relations féodo-vassaliques dont la signification s'obscurcit. La logique des dignités, solidaires d'une conception ancienne de l'autorité, résiste toutefois fermement face à un absolutisme en pleine maturité. Malgré l'épaisseur constitutionnelle de la matière, la doctrine semble pécher par prudence. Cette étude permet de relever qu'il n'est de constitution que hiérarchique, la hiérarchie des normes s'étant substituée à la hiérarchie des hommes.

En envisageant les différentes occurrences du phénomène juridique dans l’œuvre de Pascal (à la fois comme sujet, comme moyen et comme lieu pour la polémique ou l’apologétique), il s’agit dans cet article de montrer que le rapport de Pascal au droit, à la pensée juridique et à l’ethos des magistrats de son temps ne se résume pas à l’acquiescement à la pure positivité (thèse défendue par Villey) mais combine de façon originale l’héritage thomiste et le scepticisme renaissant. Son œuvre fait état d’une compréhension profonde du régime de légitimité du droit prononcé par les magistrats des cours souveraines, à l’opposé des tentations intellectuelles de la doctrine dans ses variantes historiciste ou rationaliste.

Sin dal suo arrivo in Inghilterra Alberico Gentili è al centro di una fitta corrispondenza con giuristi, teologi, uomini di cultura che, attraverso il rapporto epistolare, sollevano questioni di natura giuridica. Buona parte di questa corrispondenza viene pubblicata a Londra nel 1583-84 nei Lectionum et epistolarum quae ad ius civile pertinent libri I-IV. Quest’opera, ma soprattutto quella di poco precedente, dal titolo De iuris interpretibus dialogi sex, (Londini 1582), hanno spesso indotto la storiografia ad annoverarlo fra gli strenui difensori del mos italicus iura docendi ed un acerrimo avversario delle novità prodotte dall’umanesimo giuridico: un’opinione talvolta fondata su una pura e semplice lettura dei soli titoli dei sei Dialoghi. Gli anni successivi sono densi di attività: Gentili. pubblica, infatti, il monumentale volume, in tre libri, rappresentato dal De iure belli (Hanoviae 1598): l’opera per la quale è annoverato fra i padri fodatori del diritto internazionale moderno. La tensione fra tradizione e innovazione, fra continuità e discontinuità caratterizza la produzione scientifica del G. nell’ultimo decennio della sua vita allorquando torna a riflettere sul metodo del giurista e sul valore autoritativo dei due corpora iuris. Dopo aver rivisto, più volte, i giudizi negativi espressi nei Dialogi su alcuni degli umanisti più autorevoli, facendo spesso ricorso alle loro elaborazioni dottrinali (ad esempio nel Commentario ad legem Juliam de adluteriis),il Gentili torna su questioni metodologiche nel primo libro del De nuptiis (Hanoviae 1601) intitolato “qui est de interprete”: testo nel quale definisce il ruolo dei teologi e dei giuristi nel mutato quadro politico e religioso europeo. Alla luce di quest’opera, il silete theologi in munere alieno del De iure belli (I, xii) non può essere inteso come un’aprioristica ingiunzione ai teologi di non occuparsi dell’uomo e delle sue azioni, ma come un’espressione che tenta di definirne il ruolo comparandolo con quello dei giuristi i quali, peraltro, non possono ignorare quanto, da secoli, la teologia ha apportato alla storia della civiltà. Ai primi, sommi interpreti della Sacra Scrittura, compete la comprensione dei precetti divini regolatori delle azioni dell’uomo col fine esclusivo di guidarne la coscienza (foro interno); ai giuristi resta il compito di “definire explicate quid in quaque quaestione est iuris”. A differenza di quanto aveva teorizzato nei Dialogi del 1582 - nei quali aveva sostenuto che per il giurista erano necessari i soli libri della civilis prudentia, mentre non occorreva una profonda conoscenza del latino o del greco, né della dialettica, della storia e delle altre discipline - i principii regolatori dei comportamenti umani, in foro esterno, sono ora desumibili, per Gentili, non solo dalla compilazione giustinianea (della quale farà una attenta illustrazione, soffermandosi anche sui profili eminentemente filologici, nella Disputatio de libris iuris civilis, Hanoviae 1605) e dalle altre fonti normative (fra le quali avrà un ruolo di rilievo anche il diritto canonico cui G. dedicherà una apposita Disputatio de libris iuris canonici, Hanoviae 1605;), ma anche dalle elaborazioni che la scienza giuridica e le altre arti e scienze (storia, filologia, filosofia e teologia) da lui ritenute superflue in un non troppo lontano passato, avevano prodotto in un secolare cammino, teso a separare aequum ab iniquo, iustum ab iniusto, ed a ricercare, quindi, i cardini sui quali fondare l’edificio dell’umana convivenza. Lo studio della storia, la conoscenza del pensiero filosofico e teologico degli antichi autori, l’analisi filologica del testo normativo che non può prescindere da una conoscenza delle lingue greca e latina, un esame accurato delle opere dovute ai grandi giuristi fra le quali debbono essere necessariamente comprese quelle dovute alle menti più brillanti ed autorevoli del complesso movimento di rinnovamento rappresentato dall’umanesimo giuridico, appaiono ora alcuni degli strumenti imprescindibili per l’interpres iuris della prima età moderna. Un ruolo che non può più essere affidato al canonista o al civilista, una suddivisione che in un’epoca caratterizzata da fortissimi contrasti politici e religiosi risulta inaccettabile e, tanto meno, per i motivi che si sono sopra evidenziati, al teologo, ma all’interpres iuris. Questi, però, non agisce da puro e semplice interprete del diritto giustinianeo («corruptus est usus disciplinae nostrae: qui non istam artem aequi, et boni, sed legum Iustinianicarum notitiam solam profitetur» (De nuptiis, p. 57) ma, alla luce del frammento di Ulpiano (Dig. 1.1.1), espressamente citato e fatto proprio da Alberico, quale sacerdos iustitiae, l’unico in grado di proporsi come mediatore e traduttore..., come tramite necessario a intendere il diritto nella sua dimensione più alta e inviolabile. Il giurista di San Ginesio, nel redigere le sue ultime opere, si presenta come l’erede della tradizione universalistica del diritto comune e, contestualmente, come il tramite del rinnovamento della scienza giuridica che si affaccia al secolo nuovo: la ricerca della giustizia, non è più esclusivamente frutto di una interpretazione evolutiva del diritto giustinianeo, ma è il risultato di uno sforzo ermeneutico condotto dal giurista che, grazie alle conoscenze enciclopediche ormai acquisite, può effettivamente proporsi come l’unico intellettuale in grado di formulare principii universalmente validi.

Cette these porte sur les mutations semantiques qu'a subies le mot "personne" depuis la codification de Bonaparte jusqu'a la Premiere guerre mondiale. Elle montre que le mot conservait ses emplois et sens traditionnels dans le langage des juges et des praticiens, qu'exemplifient bien des sources jurisprudentielles en matieres diverses, et la litterature sur l'abolition de l'esclavage et sur l'adage "le mort saisit le vif". Elle montre egalement que le mot n'a ete associe aux idees d'homme et de sujet de droit qu'a partir de la lecture neologique de fragments romains proposee par Savigny, et que ce changement semantique s'installait apres 1870 a travers les ecrits doctrinaux.

An obvious downside of any slogan or motto is that it is necessarily a simplified version of what it attempts to convey. Thus while they may provide a handy hook, the very 'catchiness' and accessibility of mottoes often serve to disguise the complexity of the concept(s) at their heart. This paper submits that the European Union watchword of unitas in diversitate, or 'united in diversity', suffers from this problem, in particular in terms of its utilisation in Europeanisation debates involving law and legal culture.

The aim of this paper is to present the argument that the optimal way of conceptualising 'unity in diversity' in the European Union is as an expression of unity without uniformity and diversity without fragmentation, and this will be done in two sections. This paper will firstly analyse the concepts of 'unity' and 'diversity' and then their juxtaposition, while the second section will look to considerations of culture in order to determine whether it can be seen as either a positive or negative factor in the process of the Europeanisation of law. In doing so it will present two alternative dichotomies of the concept, namely: culture as grounds for unity or grounds for diversity, and culture as instrumentalist or contextualist.

The paper presents two ways of understanding human dignity i.e. rational dimension of our human nature, making us ethically exceptional and deserving for special protection. Those two ways of understanding human rationality have inspired two different anthropologies: one presuming social nature of man and the other considering man as an individual for whom any form of community life is artificial and secondary to natural solipsistic condition. The argument within this paper is, that in fact, only one of those two ways in which we understand our rationality allows for true distinction between man and animals i.e. only one of them is defending moral exceptionality of man. Strikingly, this is not the way of understanding human dignity, which is underpinning contemporary intellectual culture of the West.
The question thus arises, whether we are really seeking for rationally reliable explanation of our moral distinctiveness from animals? If so, we have to realise it is not possible to uphold special character of human dignity within the intellectual framework that is provided by modern way of perceiving rationality. Therefore, it seems that the only way to save proper understanding of humanity and human dignity is the return to intellectual foundations of classical (i.e. pre-modern) intellectual culture. This classical intellectual framework seems to be able to securing moral status of human being as radically distinct from animals.

Les plaidoyers publiés par l’avocat Antoine Le Maistre (1608-1658) permettent de relever les techniques employées, les autorités invoquées, la dialectique mise en œuvre. Cet avocat a passé la seconde partie de sa vie à parfaire des traductions des Pères de l’Eglise et de divers ouvrages spirituels dans sa retraite de Port-Royal. Fruit de cette expérience, il a énoncé des règles synthétiques pour la traduction. Un champ de comparaison fructueux est ainsi ouvert avec le travail d’interprète des lois auquel l’avocat de l’ancien droit se livrait dans ses plaidoyers.

L’objet de cet article est d’éclairer à partir de l’exemple de Jérôme Bignon (1589-1656), avocat général au Parlement de Paris, la relation entre les formes et la topique du raisonnement juridique tel qu’il apparaît dans ses plaidoyers et la culture des lettrés de son temps. Il s’agit en outre d’éclairer un paradoxe. Cet intellectuel qui passait pour un des esprits les plus savants de l'époque, et qui a produit plusieurs travaux d’érudition ou d’ordre philologique (édition des Formules des Marculphe) n’a pas livré l’œuvre attendue de lui : un traité des origines du droit français. Illustrant bien en cela la leçon pascalienne sur la posture pratique du jurisconsulte ou du magistrat de l’ancien droit, il s’est refusé à définir le contenu de cette origine juridique. Dans ce contexte où un caractère d’autorité est attribué à l’origine historique - qu’il s’agisse d’une règle juridique, d’une institution, ou d’un corps - une assignation trop précise de celle-ci compromet l’exercice même d’une juridiction dont la légitimité repose sur un esprit coutumier rebelle à l’historicisme. La thèse ici avancée est que l’entreprise de réduction en traité des sources du droit français portait en soi une contradiction avec la vision du « sacerdoce de la justice » propre à Jérôme Bignon.