Presumptions

Boris Krivokapic

PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

This paper is in fact second part of the paper published in the previous number of the same journal as Boris Krivokapic “Odnos medjunarodnog i unutrasnjeg prava”, Strani pravni život 2/2013, 59-103.

The paper itself has three parts. The first one is introductory, where the author explains why there is a primacy of international law. In the second part of the article he answers the most common arguments that challenge this primacy. In the third, concluding part the author notes the existence of another very important problem, which consists in the request that in order to have legitime primacy, international law must be democratic, one that suits the interests of all members of the international community and not a law that could be turned into an instrument of political and other domination of the most powerful nations.

El trabajo se propone alcanzar tres objetivos. El primero es aclarar la disputada cuestión de la "naturaleza" (teórica o práctica) de las presunciones en el Derecho; el análisis que se realiza pretende separar adecuadamente las llamadas presunciones hominis (del hombre) de las presunciones establecidas por las "normas de presunción". El segundo objetivo es aclarar dos cuestiones vinculadas con las normas de presunción: una, el carácter constitutivo o regulativo de dichas normas; y, otra, si a ellas les es aplicable la distinción entre principios y reglas. El tercer objetivo es mostrar que las llamadas "presunciones iuris et de iure" no son, en realidad, presunciones; pues el razonamiento que se genera a partir de ellas no presenta ninguna de las propiedades características del “razonamiento presuntivo”.

After the introductory part, the author refers to the Kievan Rus, to show that although it was undoubtedly an active participant in international relations (closing international agreements, receiving foreign representatives, etc.) there is no evidence preserved on any papers that  could be called the works of international legal science.

Moreover, even in the period from the 13th until 17th century there are neither theoretical, nor systematic works in the domain of  international law. The widely acclaimed work by P.P. Shafirov “The reflections on the legitimate reasons of the war against Sweden” (1717) could not be characterized as such either.

However, already in the 19th century the Russian science of international law went through an unbelievable period of flourishing. A number of original papers appeared, not just articles and monographs on selected issues, but the systemic works as we
ll. As early as 1880 the Russian Society of International Law was founded. Generally speaking, the Russian science international law of the time was quite advanced and advocated for the strengthening of international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, the renunciation of war, disarmament, etc.

Soon after the October Revolution (1917) there was a division among the scholars. Thus, one group of them withdrew, the others fled abroad and continued their career in exile, while the third group (the majority of them) stayed in the country, raising new generations and laying the foundations of the Soviet science of international law, with all its positive and negative sides.

In the court room, and in the law firm, where both sides have all facts and all legal citations, the case will be won, or lost, on rhetoric; on legal rhetoric; on the appreciation of legal principles, presumptions, doctrines, rules, tests, maxims, and phrases. To the legal writer, a mention of a doctrine here, a maxim there, and a test in the conclusion, will flower the article, making it to sound well researched, more persuasive and ultimately effective. To the legal speaker, the solicitor, legal rhetoric arrests attention, holds conscience captive and wins the will of the adjudicator. Legal Rhetoric!

La presente investigación delinea de forma sistemática una teoría general para todo género de signos distintivos. Para este propósito se vale de las investigaciones parciales que la propiedad industrial y otras ramas del derecho han realizado de algunos signos distintivos particulares, como las marcas, las indicaciones geográficas, los sellos de calidad, los nombres de pila, los nombres comerciales, entre otros. Se usa un método inductivo que recoge leyes, jurisprudencia y doctrina de varios lugares del mundo. En cuanto a la estructura, luego de una introducción, se determinar cuál es el conjunto de los signos distintivos que será el universo a analizar (Capítulo I), se señalan cuáles son los principios generales a todos esos signos (Capítulo II) y se termina con una lista de conclusiones a las que se ha llegado (Capítulo III). Entre otras cosas, concluimos que sí es posible hacer una teoría general que aplique a todo género de signo distintivo y que esta teoría beneficia mucho la profundización doctrinal de los signos distintivos menos regulados por el derecho.
This paper systematically delineates a general theory for all kinds of distinctive signs. For this purpose we use the partial studies developed by industrial property and other areas of law, on any special signs such as trademarks, geographical indications, quality seals, given names, commercial names, and others. We use an inductive approach that includes laws, jurisprudence and doctrine of several countries. Regarding the structure, after an introduction, we determine a set of signs, the one that will be the universe to analyze (Chapter I), then we indicate eleven general principles of these signs (Chapter II), ending with a list of conclusions that we have reached (Chapter III). Among other things, we conclude that it is possible to make a general theory that applies to all kinds of sign and that this theory greatly benefits the doctrinal clarification of the signs less regulated by law.

Presumption is often discussed in law, less often in epistemology. Is it an attitude? If so where can we locate it within the taxonomy of epistemic attitudes? Is it a kind of belief, a judgment, an assumption or a supposition? Or is it a species of inference? There are two basic models of presumption: judgmental, as a kind of judgment, and legal, taken from the use of presumptions in law. The legal model suggests that presumption is a practical inference, whereas the judgmental model suggests that presumption is an epistemic attitude. I argue that presumption is neither a practical inference nor a merely epistemic attitude: it involves both, within the category of what we may call the inquiring attitudes

Standards and norms for reasoning function, in part, to manage epistemic risk. Properly used, modal qualifiers like presumably have a role in systematically managing epistemic risk by flagging and tracking type-specific epistemic merits and risks of the claims they modify. Yet, argumentation-theoretic accounts of presumption often define it in terms of modalities of other kinds, thereby failing to recognize the unique risk profile of each. This paper offers a stipulative account of presumption, inspired by Ullmann-Margalit (J Philos 80:143–163, 1983), as an inferentially generated modal qualifier, " presumably, p, " distinguishing it from other, particularly epistemic modalities, e.g., standing commitments, assumptions, assertions, suppositions, hypotheses, and defeasible claims. By avoiding the tranching of inferential instruments of qualitatively different bona fides and risk profiles, this account provides a more accurate risk-rating system that better manages epistemic risk in inference, as well as contributing to the normative theory of the operation of presumption in reasoning and argument.

By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance.

Legal rules constitute not only reasons for action, but also reasons for judicial decision. What kind of reason do legal rules provide for adjudication? Do they figure as Razian exclusionary reasons in legal reasoning? In this paper I will draw on some insights from Robert Alexy’s theory of principles to deal with these problems.

According to the classical view, conclusive presumptions are nothing but an abstruse way of referring to substantive rules. At most, the peculiarity of these putatively alleged presumptions would be that they are devices from which one can infer substantive rules. Hence, according to the classical view, conclusive presumptions are not presumptions at all. This paper shows that, despite its wide acceptance, the classical picture is misleading. The article indicates where the presumptive nature of the conclusive presumptions lays. In addition, it highlights the enormous practical relevance of conclusive presumptions so conceived.

La tesis según la cual las expresiones ‘presunciones absolutas’ o ‘presunciones iuris et de iure’ no son más que un modo abstruso de referir a reglas sustantivas prohibitivas de ciertas conductas se ha vuelto un lugar común entre juristas. A lo sumo, se sostiene, la peculiaridad de esas presunciones putativas radicaría en que son dispositivos que permiten inferir reglas sustantivas. De aquí que muchas veces se niegue sin más a las iuris et de iure el carácter de auténticas presunciones. Este artículo muestra que, a pesar de su amplia aceptación, esta tesis está desencaminada. En primer término, se indica dónde reside el caracter presuntivo de las presunciones absolutas o iuris et de iure. En segundo lugar, se hace explícita la peculiaridad de este tipo de presunciones. Por último, se demuestra que ellas poseen una enorme relevancia práctica dentro de la praxis jurídico argumentativa.

Rules of procedure and the regulations concerning forms of proof are often indicative of the place of law in a certain society. In this presentation, it is elaborated on the development of the theory of presumptions during the 12th and 13th Century in the interaction between the jurists of civil and canon law. On the basis of Roman legal texts, presumptions were very early recognized as shifting the burden of proof, however, in the preserved sources the early authors of 12th Century could not find a coherent set of general rules on the matter. Only during the second half of the 12th Century intensified the efforts of jurists to classify and define different types of presumptions. In this process, the glossators stressed the division into praesumptiones legis and iudicis, while the decretists put the emphasis on distinction between praesumptiones temerariae, probabiles et violentae. The aim is to examine the convergence of two systems in the literature of Romano-canonical procedure, and the establishment of categories of presumptions as they are used today

In their extensive overview of various concepts of presumption Godden and Walton recognise ''the heterogeneous picture of presumptions that exists in argumentation theory today'' (Pragmatics & Cognition, 15: 333, 2007). I argue that this heterogeneity results from an epiphenomenal character of the notion of presumption. To this end, I first distinguish between three main classes of presumptions. Framework presumptions define the basic conditions of linguistic understanding and meaningful conversation. The ''presumption of veracity'' (Kauffeld) is their paradigm case. I argue that such presumptions are satisfactorily covered by the Principle of Charity (Davidson, Quine), or else Gricean maxims or satisfaction conditions for speech acts (Austin, Searle). Formal presumptions are general presumptive rules of argument, theorised as topoi or acceptable inference warrants, including institutional warrants (''If not proven guilty, then innocent''). Material presumptions are acceptable outcomes of nested or outsourced arguments, which entitles arguers to use them as acceptable premises or opinions (endoxa) in further arguments without the typical burden of proof. If this is correct, then the study of presumption always collapses into the study of other, likely more fundamental , concepts. Does it render presumptions, by Occam's Razor, altogether redundant in argumentation theory? I tentatively answer this question from a consistently conversational perspective on argumentation; I argue that the pragmatic grounds for presumptions are to be found in the conditions for speech act performance in the institutional social world, as developed by Searle.

Предисловие / Библиография  СТАТЬИ  ZÁSADNÍ OTÁZKY VÝVOJE A SOUČASNOSTI KODIFIKACE PRÁVNÍCH INSTITUTŮ [1975] 3–20: 1. Problém jednoty projevů myšlenky kodifikace v historii 3 / 2. Pojem vývoje a vývoj kodifikace 11 / 3. Obečný pojem kodifikace 14 // ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ ОБЩЕСТВА И ПРАВА И ВОПРОСЫ КОДИФИКАЦИИ, УДЕЛЯЯ ОСОБОЕ ВНИМАНИЕ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИМ КОДЕКСАМ [1974] 21–40: 1. Диалектика общественного изменения и сохранения в ходе исторического развития кодификации 22 / 2. Вопрос о возможности кодификации, воспринятой основным средством правотворчества общественного изменения 28 / 3. Параллельность общественного и кодификационного изменений: обратная связь и ее формы в социалистических кодексах 35 // ROZWOJ PRAWA A JEGO KODYFIKACJA [1979] 41–52: 1. Dialektyka społecznych zmian i zachowania w procesie historycznego rozwoju kodyfikacji 41 / 2. Zagadnienie možliwošci kodyfikacji jako podstawowego narzędzia prawodawstwa wprowadzającego zmiany społeczne 45 / 3. Paralelizm zmian społecznych i kodyfikacyjnych: »sprzęženie zwrotne« i jego formy w kodyfikacjach socjalistycznych 49 // СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦИЯ И КОДИФИКАЦИЯ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВА [ms] 53–58 // ВЗАИМОСВЯЗЬ ПРАВОТВОРЧЕСТВА И ПРAВОПРИМЕНЕНИЯ [ms] 59–65 // ЛЕНИН И РЕВОЛУЦИОННОЕ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВО [1969] 67–76 // ЗАВЕРШЕНИЕ СOЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ КОДИФИКАЦИИ [ms] 77–88: 1. Кодификация в европейских и азиатских странах народной демократии 77 / 2. Рекодификация как типовой знак социалистической кодификации 82 // MINISTERSKÉ ODŮVODNĚNÍ A JEHO ÚLOHA VE ZPROSTŘEDKOVÁNÍ PRÁVNÍCH HODNOT [1978] 89–108: I. Principiální a historické základy vzniku minislerského odůvodnéní 90 / II. Možné a žádoucí funkce ministerského odúvodnění v socialistickém právu 98 / III. Ministerské odúvodnění a jeho význam při výkladu právních norem 102 // PREAMBULE – OTÁZKA PRÁVNÍ VĚDY [1970] 109–134: I. Pojem preambule 111 / II. Obsah a funkce preambulí 114 / III. Normatívní dosah obsahu preambule 117 / IV. Problém odůvodněností používání preambulí z hlediska socialistické právní politiky 128 // ЗА САМОСТОЯТЕЛНОСТЬ ПРАВОВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ [ms] 135–138: 1. Связь политики и права 135 / 2. Правовая политика как проводник в связи политики и права 135 / 3. Правовая наука, правовая политика и право права 136 / 4. Необходимость самостоятельности правовой политики 138 // ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКОЕ СОДЕРЖАНИЕ ПРАВА КАК НАДСТРОЙКИ [ms] 139–143 // ПОЈАМ ПРАВА У ЛУКАЧЕВОЈ ОНТОЛОГИЈИ [1983] 145–168 // ДИАЛЕКТИКА РАЗВИТИЯ ПРАВОВЫХ ИНСТРУМЕНТОВ: ПРЕДМЕТНОЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ПРЕЗУМПЦИИ И ФИКЦИИ КАК СРЕДСТВ ЮРИДИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕХНИКИ [ms] 169–204: I. »Презумпция« 170 [1. В процессе судебного установления фактов 172 / 2. В нормативной дефиниции фактов: preasumptio juris tantum 173 / 3. В нормативной дефиниции фактов: praesumptio juris et de jure 174 / 4. В юридической области 174] Относительно »презумпции« 178 [1. Функции 178 / 2. Презумпция и фикция 180 / 3. Неоправданпость эпистемологического обоснования в отношении нормативной области 181 / 4. Технический аппарат презумпции 182] II. »Фикция« 184 [1. В лингвистическом формировании правовых норм 184 / 2. В применении правовых норм судом 185 / 3. В доктриналыюм отражении правовых норм 187 / 4. В теоретической реконструкции правовых норм 188 / 5. В правовом отношении 190] Относительно »фикции« 192 [1. История и сущность: от истоков к юридической фикции 192 / 2. Классификация 196 / 3. Право как фикция 197 / 4. Презумпция и фикция 200] // РАЗДEЛEНИЕ ВЛАСТЕЙ – ИДЕОЛОГИЯ И УТОПИЯ В ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ МЫСЛИ [1984] 205–213 // ПРАВО КАК ИСТОРИЯ [1986] 215–224 // СЛОБОДА, ЈЕДНАКОСТ И ПОЈМОВНИ МИНИМУМ ПРАВИЕ КОМУНИКАЦИЈЕ [1989] 225–244
РЕЗЮМЕ / РЕЦEНЗИИ  [by the author, including] КОДИФИКАЦИЯ КАК ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ИСТОРИЧЕСКОЕ ЯВЛЕНИЕ [1981] 259–262 // [on the author, including] B. А. Четвернин: ПРАВО КАК ИСТОРИЯ [1987] 222–224 / K[atalin] Szamel: ВНУТРЕННЯЯ МОРАЛНОСТЬ ПРАВА [1988] 279–281 & [in] Strani pravni život [Beograd] & [by] L[eonard] Bianchi, Jozef Karpat, Stefan Luby, М. А. Супатаев, J[erzy] Wróblewski

On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous (because two types of presumptions entail distinct conceptions of the "burden of proof"), and likely implausible. As a result, they require qualifications.

James Bradley Thayer is traditionally known in the field of Constitutional Law for his influential essay on the standard of constitutional review (“The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law” [1893]). However, Thayer is also one of the most outstanding figures in the Law of Evidence. This paper describes Thayer’ significance as a forerunner of the theory of presumptions in Law and legal reasoning. His essay on presumptions, published in his A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), is the locus classics for theorizing on the concept of presumption. The paper is divided in three parts. The first part puts Thayer’s thought in context. Knowing who the author is will be useful to better understand his ideas. The second part presents Thayer’s conception of evidence. Finally the third part is dedicated to depict Thayer’s theory of presumptions and assess the influence of his contribution today.

James Bradley Thayer es habitualmente conocido en el ámbito del Derecho Constitucional por su conocido ensayo sobre el estándar del control de constitucionalidad (“The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law” [1893]). Sin embargo, Thayer es también una de las figuras más importantes en el ámbito de la prueba en el Derecho. Este trabajo muestra la importancia de Thayer como precursor de la teoría de las presunciones en el derecho y en el razonamiento jurídico. El ensayo de Thayer sobre las presunciones, incluido en su libro A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), representa el locus classicus para teorizar sobre el concepto de presunción. El trabajo se divide en tres partes. En la primera parte se sitúa a Thayer en contexto. Saber quién es este autor es útil para entender mejor sus ideas. En la segunda parte se presenta la concepción de la prueba de Thayer. Finalmente, la tercera parte está dedicada a exponer la teoría de las presunciones de Thayer y a hacer um balance sobre la relevancia actual de su aportación

This paper explores two persistent questions in the literature on presumptions: the place and the nature of presumptions in law and legal argumentation. These questions were originally raised by James Bradley Thayer, one of the masters of the Law of Evidence and the author of the classic chapter devoted this subject in A preliminary treatise on Evidence (1898). Like Thayer, I believe that these questions deserve attention. First the paper shows that the connection between presumptions and argumentation is a constant feature in the literature on presumptions, since its foundation in the Middle Ages to modern times. James Bradley Thayer was probably the last jurist who clearly saw that presumptions belong to argumentation. Second, the paper examines two sources of controversy in the language of presumptions. First, “presumption” is an ambiguous word in the legal discourse. As a result, it is almost impossible to provide a clear and succinct answer to the question “What is a presumption?”. Second, there are at least four reconstructions of the concept of presumption whose merits and shortcomings are relevant to explore. The analysis presented here may be of interest for legal and non-legal scholars and, hopefully, it may help to shed light on the possibilities and limits of an interdisciplinary dialogue about presumptions.

Foreword [1994] 1–4
LAW AS PRACTICE  QUELQUES QUESTIONS MÉTHODOLOGIQUES DE LA FORMATION DES CONCEPTS EN SCIENCES JURIDIQUES [1970] 7–33: 1. Introduction 7 / 2. La particularité de l’objet des sciences juridiques 8 / 3. La particularité de la méthodologie des sciences juridiques 10 / 4. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques: Quelques problèmes 15 [4.1. Le concept du droit 16 / 4.2. Le concept dogmatique du contenu du droit 21 / 4.3. Le concept de la normativité juridique 23 / 4.4. Le concept des lacunes en droit 24] / 5. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciencesjuridiques: Quelques conclusions 26 / 6. La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques et la réalité: Conclusion finale 29 / 7. Annexe: Des bases d’une classification possible des définitions en sciences juridiques 31 // GELTUNG DES RECHTS – WIRKSAMKEIT DES RECHTS [1978] 35–42 // MACROSOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LAW: A SURVEY AND APPRAISAL [1983] 43–76: I. Issues of the Macrosociological Theories of Law 46 / II. The Role of the Macrosociological Theories in the Social Science Foundation of Legal Thinking 63 // REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ITS INNER MORALITY [1984] 77–89: 1. Law and Morals As Two Systems of Norms, and the Inner Morality of Law 77 / 2. Law As A Value Bearer and As A Mere External Indicator 78 / 3. The Inner and External Moral Credit of Legislator 83 / 4. The Inner Morality of Law 86 // THE LAW AND ITS LIMITS [1985] 91–96
LAW AS TECHNIQUE  DOMAINE »EXTERNE« ET DOMAINE »INTERNE« EN DROIT [1983] 99–117: 1. Le »juridique« et le »non-juridique« 99 / 2. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que groupes de phénomènes 104 / 3. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que points de références 112 / 4. Conclusion 116 // DIE MINISTERIELLE BEGRÜNDUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER SICHT [1977] 119–139: I. Die prinzipiellen und geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Herausforderung der ministeriellen Begründungen 120 / II. Die möglichen und erwünschten Funktionen der ministeriellen Begründung im sozialistischen Rechts 128 / III. Die ministerielle Begründung und ihr Wert in der Auslegung derRechtsnormen 132 // THE PREAMBLE: A QUESTION OF JURISPRUDENCE [1970] 141–167: I. The Notion of the Preamble 142 / II. Content and Functions of the Preambles 146 / III. Normativity of the Preamble Content 150 / IV. The Problem of the Justifiability of Preamble-drafting in the Light of Socialist Legal Policy 161 // PRESUMPTION AND FICTION: MEANS OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 169–185: I. Presumption 169 [1. In the Judicial Process of Establishing the Facts: praesumptio homini vel facti 170 / 2. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris tantum 170 / 3. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris et de jure 171 / 4. In a Possible Theoretical Reconstruction 171] On »Presumption« 172 [1. Function 172 / 2. Presumption and Fiction 173 / 3. Irrelevancy of Epistemological Foundation 173 / 4. The Technique of Presumption 174] II. Fiction 175 [1. In the Linguistic Formation of Legal Norms 175 / 2. In the Judicial Application of Legal Norms 175 / 3. In the Doctrinal Processing of Legal Norms 176 / 4. In the Theoretical Reconstruction of Legal Norms 176 / 5. Approaches to and Understandings of Fiction 177] On »Fiction« 178 [1. History and Understandings 178 / 2. Classification 180 / 3. Law as Fiction 181 / 4. Presumption and Fiction 182] // LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 187–198: I. Legal Technique 187 [1. In the Large Sense 1987/ 2. In Legal Practice 189 / 3. In Legal Science 189 / 4. As a Special Technique 190] II. On Legal Technique [1. Definition and Function 190 / 2. Legal Technique and Legal Cultures 192 / 3. Postulates of Legal Technique in the Cultures of Modem Formal Law 195 {a) The Principle of Consequentiality 195 / b) The Principle of Coherency 195 / c) The Principle of Conceptual Economy 196 / d) The Principle of Non-redundancy 196}]
LAW AS LOGIC  MODERNE STAATLICHKEIT UND MODERNES FORMALES RECHT [1982] 201–207: 1. Die Klassifizierung als logisches und als gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Verfahren 202 / 2. Typologie der staatlichen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen 202 / 3. Der moderne Staat und das moderne formale Recht: Frage der Zusammenhänge und Entwicklungsalternativen 204 // HETEROGENEITY AND VALIDITY OF LAW: OUTLINES OF AN ONTOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION [1986] 209–218 // LEIBNIZ UND DIE FRAGE DER RECHTLICHEN SYSTEMBILDUNG [1973] 219–232: 1. Aktualität von Leibniz 219 / 2. Der Gedanke der universalen mathematischen Methode 221 / 3. Die logischen Konzeption der Rechtswissenschaft 224 / 4. Die geometrische Vision der rechtlichen Systembildung 227 / 5. Das Scheitern der Leibnizschen Idee und seine Lehre 230 // LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM [1975] 233–255: 1. The Logical Structure of Law as a Historical Product 233 / 2. Tendencies of Formal Rationalization in Legal Development 234 / 3. Historical Development of the Approach to Law as a System 239 / 4. Present State of the Attempts at a Logical Reconstruction of Law and Legal Reasoning 243 / 5. Question of the Axiomatic Conception of Law 248 / 6. Heuristic Value of the Approach to Law as a System 250 // LOGIC OF LAW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVITY: A GAP BETWEEN IDEALS, REALITY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES [1982] 258–288: 1. Historical Background 259 / 2. Ideals 264 / 3. Reality 270 / 4. Future Perspectives 277 // KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW – YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW [ms] 289–293, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF NORMS: SCIENCE- AND LANGUAGE-PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS [ms] 295–314: 1. Presuppositions 295 / 2. The Context of the Application of Norms 300 [2.1 Actualisation in Concrete Meaning 300 / 2.2 Linguistic Undefinedness 304 / 2.3 Lack of Logical Consequence in the Normative Sphere 308]
LAW AS EXPERIENCE  ON THE SOCIALLY DETERMINED NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING [1971] 317–374: 1. Interrelation of the Creation and Application of Law 317 / 2. The Socially Determined Nature of the Application of Law 332 / 3. The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning 337 / 4. The Question of Perspectives 363 // TOWARDS THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW: SOME THESES ON THE BASIS OF LUKÁCS’ ONTOLOGY [1983] 375–390, IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? [1984] 391–398: 1. Working Models of Law 391 / 2. Senses of ContExtuality in Law 393 / 3. Jurisprudential Approach and Socio-ontological Approach 394 / 4. Conclusions 396 [4.1. Law as Historical Continuum 396 / 4.2.Law as Open System 396 / 4.3. / Law as Complex Phenomenon with Alternative Strategy 396 / 4.4. Law as an Irreversible Process 397 / 4.5. The Genuinely Societal Character of Law 397] // EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF NATIONAL LEGAL CULTURES [1992] 399–411: 1. The Philosophical Framework 399 / 2. Law as Tradition 403 / 3. European Integration and the Preservation of the Uniqueness of National Legal Orders 407 // INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS: NOTES ON THE CLOSED SETS, OPEN VISTAS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSCENDENCY OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS [1991] 413–424: I. A Logic of Systems 413 / II. Ideal Types and Historically Concrete Manifestations 416 / III. Ideal Type As A Normative Ideology 418 / IV.Objectivity and Contingency of Systems 420 / V. Limits and Bonds, ConsEquEntiality and Practicability of a System 423
LAW AS HISTORY  FROM LEGAL CUSTOMS TO LEGAL FOLKWAYS [1981] 427–436, ANTHROPOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE? LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL CULTURES [1985] 437–457: 1. Rule, Fact and Principle in the Concept of Law 438 [a) Abstract rules 439 / b) Abstracts from actual behaviour 439 / c) Principles Upheld by Legal Decisions 440] 2. Attributes of Law 445 [a) Authority 446 / b) Intention of Universal Application 446 / c) Obligatio 447 / d) Sanction 447] 3. Law and its Social Functional Definition 450 [(1) Law is a Global Phenomenon 451 / (2) Law is a Phenomenon Able to Settle Conflicts of Interests 451 / 3) Law is a Phenomenon Prevailing as the Supreme Controlling Factor 452] 4. Conclusion 454 // LAW AS A SOCIAL ISSUE [1985] 459–475: I. The Social Prestige of Law 459 / II. The Social Nature of Law 463 / III. Law and Language in the Service of Social Mediation 466 (1. Passive Mediation and Active Intervention 468 / 2. The Dilemma of the Mediation of Values 472) // LAW AS HISTORY? [1986] 477–484: 1. Understandings of the Term »Law« 477 / 2. Law and History 478 / 3. Law as History 481 // RECHTSKULTUR – DENKKULTUR: EINFÜHRUNG ZUM THEMA [1988] 485–489
Curriculum Vitae 491 / Bibliography 493 // Index 515 / Index of Normative Materials 523 / Index of Names 525

Certainty is an epistemological category implied in at least two crucial issues of early-modern jurisprudence: the certainty of law (legal certainty) and the certainty of facts (factual certainty). Any historical study approaching questions related to early-modern legal certainty should therefore focus both on laws and on facts. Francis Bacon's emphasis on legal certainty in his project for law reform has been widely acknowledged in earlier and recent works. It has even been suggested that certainty “is the quality Bacon associates with a general positivist science capable of producing laws valid for both nature and the state.” However, no studies so far have attempted to explain in what sense Bacon understood legal certainty. The same can be said of his notion of factual certainty. Although studies have suggested that Bacon applied criteria drawn from the domain of the law in order to establish facts, assess testimonies and transmit factual reports in the methodology of natural history, his views concerning legal facts, and particularly concerning factual certainty in jurisprudence, have never been systematically explored.
My overarching view is somewhat different from the interpretations which associate Bacon's legal views on certainty to his ideas on natural philosophy in that I think his concept of certainty in jurisprudence needs to be clarified and specified before drawing conclusions about its possible commonalities with natural philosophy and natural history. The present study will explore Bacon's views on certainty in his legal thought and practice, hoping that it may lead to a better understanding of the epistemological side of his legal thought and prompt further studies to examine its possible connections to his treatment of certainty as it applies to the laws and facts of nature.
Although throughout his legal career Bacon encountered and dealt with problems arising from legal as well as factual certainty, he never defined or described the kind of certainty typical of laws and facts. His elusive notions of certainty have to be traced throughout the wide extent of his legal writings and his interventions in legal cases. As we shall see, legal certainty was a major preoccupation in Bacon's law reform project, while factual certainty did not play such a significant role. This lesser interest in factual certainty evinced in Bacon's writings and practices does not imply, however, that he considered factual certainty any less important than legal certainty: he clearly expressed that the work of the “judges of facts” who “try and decide the issues and points of facts” is “a matter no less important to the sum of justice than the true and judicious expositions of the laws themselves.”6 If anything, Bacon's lack of emphasis on factual certainty reflects his belief that the current practices and doctrines in English law regarding the establishment of facts were not in need of substantive reform. Conversely, he judged that English law sorely needed legal certainty and concentrated his efforts on achieving it through reform.

This thesis examines the historical development and the significance of a legal literary genre, brocards, from its birth in the 1160s until the stabilisation of brocardic collections around 1215. In particular, this work reconsiders the historiographical understanding of brocards through a re-evaluation of the primary sources. In this regard, a significant case study is offered by the Perpendiculum, the most influential of the earliest collections of brocards. Through a careful textual analysis of the Perpendiculum and other brocardic works, this study draws some general conclusions on the development of brocards during the twelfth century, considered as a dynamic process with precise geographical and intellectual connotations. More specifically, I argue that the historical transformation of brocards during that timeframe corresponds to a path from the Anglo-Norman world to the school of Bologna, and from a technique based on rhetoric to one based on dialectic. For this reason, the twelfth-century collections of brocards shed valuable light upon various aspects of the learned legal milieu of the time. Firstly, they show the existence of a common Western European legal culture, from the British Isles to Sicily, where legal schools seem much more closely connected that conventionally thought. Furthermore, the historical development of brocards vividly exemplifies the impact that the changes in scholastic disputation techniques had on the twelfth-century legal world. The popularity of these argumentative tools can be also connected with the deep procedural changes of the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, and with the establishment of Romanocanonical procedure. Finally, it will be argued that the transformation of brocardic collections reflects the existence of two different attitudes towards law during the twelfth century: an old ecclesiastical, instrumental use of legal norms for practical purposes and a new Bolognese systematic approach.

The main aim of my project is to contribute to the existing scholarship on twelfth-century legal presumptions, by analysing the treatment that those presumptions provide regarding the inquiry into the subjective element in legally relevant facts. In particular, I will use some twelfth-century canonical works produced in the northern French legal schools as a case study.

According to Douglas Walton, the concept of presumption relates to both logical and dialogical components. Logically, a presumption is the conclusion of a presumptive defeasible inference. Dialogically, the function of presumptions is to shift the burden of proof to the respondent in order to move the dialogue forward when the proponent, due to an objective lack of evidence, cannot present a sufficiently persuasive proposition. Presumptive status, assigned only at the argumentation stage of dialogue, is provisional: a particular presumption stands until further counter-indications are found. This paper points out some possible difficulties pertaining to Walton's dialogical model of presumption. Firstly, once a presumption's typical practical function is made precise, Walton's idea of presumption starts to lose its conceptual cohesion, thereby becoming applicable in the opening stage of dialogue, as well. Secondly, cohesion is lost also in practical contexts, since Walton's ''seat belts'' example might indicate that presumptions are not evidentially defeasible if the practical stakes are raised high enough. Most importantly, contextual evaluation may reveal that presumptions do not shift the burden of proof in any specific or genuine way.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has the solemn responsibility of protecting human rights recognized in the American convention on human rights (ACHR). When doing so, the IACtHR significantly engages in evidentiary assessments. This chapter analyses some principles and rules of evidence applied by the IACtHR. It assesses their coherence, the extent to which they are applied consistently, and whether they are successful in ensuring fair trial. In the course of such analysis, this contribution confronts the IActhr's practices with some classical elements of evidence, such as admissibility, the burden of proof, and presumptions. one of the conclusions of this contribution is that, in some cases, the IACtHR's commitment to the application of the rights established in the ACHR may have led it to be somewhat dismissive of its own rules of evidence, which may generate some criticisms.

El trabajo se propone alcanzar tres objetivos: 1) Aclarar la disputada cuestión de la “naturaleza” de las presunciones en el Derecho; para ello se muestra la distancia que media entre el sintagma “es presumible” y el sintagma “se presumirá (o debe presumirse)” como forma de aislar adecuadamente la noción de “normas de presunción”. 2) Aclarada esta noción, mostrar la necesidad de introducir en su análisis la distinción entre reglas y principios; lo que permite distinguir, a su vez, entre normas de presunción-regla (presunciones-regla) y normas de presunción- principio (presunciones-principio). 3) Tratar de disolver en términos teóricos las llamadas “presunciones iuris et de iure”, para ello se distingue entre “normas de presunción” (que obligan a presumir) y “normas basadas en una presunción” (que no obligan a presumir).

עולם המשפט משתמש תדיר בחזקות, ועניינן נדון בספרות התאורטית מזוויות שונות. במאמר זה אבקש להראות כיצד השימוש בחזקה עשוי לסייע לכינונו של ריבוד נורמטיבי, כלומר ליצירתו של עולם נורמטיבי שבו משמשות בד בבד הכרעות נורמטיביות שונות. החזקה המשפטית מתמקדת בשאלה העובדתית (מה אירע), אולם קביעתה עשויה להתבסס על שיקולים נורמטיביים. כפל הפנים הזה מאפשר לחזקה להשמיע הכרעה נורמטיבית מסוימת, אך בד בבד לקבוע נורמה המבוססת על הכרעה נורמטיבית אחרת. תוצאה זו מסייעת לשחקנים בשדה המשפט במצבים שבהם ההכרעה הנורמטיבית היא "טרגית", כלומר במצבים שבהם קיים קושי בקבלת כל הכרעה בינארית שהיא.
את הטענה הזאת אדגים באמצעות חזקת המסוכנות של פורץ לבית מגורים כפי שעוצבה בתלמוד. ראשית, אראה כיצד השיקולים הנורמטיביים באשר להיקף הזכות להגנה עצמית בבית המגורים מקשים להכריע הכרעה נורמטיבית חדה, וכיצד מחוקקים מודרניים מתמודדים עם קושי זה, לרבות באמצעות מנגנון החזקה. לאחר מכן אדון בחזקה התלמודית ואראה כיצד עיצובה – במישור הנורמטיבי והספרותי – מכוון לכינונו של ריבוד נורמטיבי בסוגיה זו. בשלב השלישי אצביע על זיקות שבין החזקה המשפטית למנגנון נוסף היוצר ריבוד נורמטיבי – מנגנון ההפרדה האקוסטית ועל ההבדלים בין המנגנונים הללו. לבסוף אתייחס לפערים אפשריים בין חזקת המסוכנות במשפט התלמודי לחזקות במשפט המודרני על מנת לבחון בעין ביקורתית את היכולת ללמוד מן התופעה שהודגמה במאמר לעולם החזקות המודרני.

The in dubio pro tributario principle from 1 January 2016 is (for the first time in history) ex-pressly articulated in Polish legislation, i.e. in article 2a of act of 29 August 1997 – Tax Ordi-nance. However, for years before that date the principle was cited in judicature of administra-tive courts, being perceived as a consequence of a group of prescriptions e.g. constitutional democratic state ruled by law principle. In this article I tried to evaluate if a change in the sta-tus of in dubio pro tributario principle yields any noticeable changes in administrative courts’ approach to the argument from the principle.

The balancing or weighing of principles by reference to their dimension of weight or importance seems to represent the prevailing method for solving contradictions (antinomies) arising between legal principles when the latter are applied in practice. However, as I argue in the paper, the method of balancing or weighing might not be the only method for solving antinomies or at least a specific type of antinomy between implicit legal principles (the so-called total-partial antinomy, according to Ross’s taxonomy). Instead of resorting to the prevailing method of weighing or balancing principles, I argue that the criterion for solving the so-called total-partial antinomies between implicit legal principles could also be the classical juridical criterion of speciality (lex specialis derogat legi generali) which is one of the criteria used for solving antinomies between legal rules.

O presente artigo pretende não só conceituar as regras jurídicas, mas também demonstrar o seu funcionamento. Para tanto, são descritas as buscas por coordenação, expertise, eficiência e segurança jurídica, descrevendo, outrossim, as características de generalidade, abstração, recurso a generalizações e à linguagem. Ao final, defende-se a importância do respeito às regras.