Rules

Background: High screen time in children and its detrimental health effects is a major public health problem. How much screen time adults think is appropriate for children remains little explored, as well as whether adults' screen time behaviour would determine their views on screen time restrictions for children. This study aimed to investigate how adults' screen time behaviour influences their views on screen time restrictions for children, including differences by gender and parental status.

The paper aims to investigate the theoretical assumption that the value system (according to the Schwartz model) is associated with compliance with recommendations to combat the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the theoretical assumption, persons whose value system emphasizes social focus and whose values are self-transcendence and conservation will comply with measures to a greater extent. On the other hand, people whose value system is focused on personal focus and whose values self-direction and openness to change will be less compliant with measures for combating the spread of the virus. The research was conducted in three Southeastern European countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia using a survey of 1024 students. The Schwartz scale on basic human values was used as a research instrument. The research was conducted at the very beginning of the pandemic (March and April 2020). The results of the hierarchical regression showed that the values of openn...

Salah satu metode data mining yang cukup popular untuk mendapatkan hubungan antar sebuah item dengan item tertentu adalah metode aturan asosiasi dengan menggunakan algoritma APriori, metode ini cukup tepat untuk menghasilkan pola aturan hubungan antar jenis item yang terjual berdasarkan data penjualan. Nilai support pada frequent item dan confidence pada rules yang didapat bisa memberikan wawasan yang dapat ditindaklanjuti oleh pengelola minimarket, koperasi dan lain sebagainya. Pengkategorian jenis produk pada minimarket cukup banyak sementara jumlah keseluruhan transaksi dalam satu tahun juga sangat banyak, sedangkan jumlah jenis item terjual dalam suatu transaksi sangat sedikit, dengan demikian nilai threshold tidak bisa terlampau tinggi. Pada penelitian ini metode aturan asosiasi dilakukan per event atau periode tertentu yang berkaitan dengan hari besar umat Islam, didapatkan rule tertinggi yaitu makanan ringan => sembako dengan confidence sebesar 46% dan support sebesar 16% yang terjadi pada bulan Ramadhan.

Analysis of the Columbanus' monastic rules and the four 'Columbanian' monastic rules written after his death: the Regula Donati, the Regula cuiusdam ad virgines, the Regula cuiusdam patris and the fragment De accedendo ad deum. All four texts express different, and to a certain extent contentious claims on Columbanus' heritage and develop their own distinct monastic program. The Regula cuiusdam patris should be read as a voice of dissent against the path Columbanian monasticism took and might be related to the circle around the monk Agrestius. The Regula cuiusdam ad virgines was most likely written by Jonas of Bobbio, the author of the Vita Columbani. The fragment De accedendo ad deum may have been a lost chapter of the Regula cuiusdam ad virgines. As a reflection on the connection between prayer and ascetic achievements De accedendo can be read as a key text on Columbanian monastic theology.

This study aimed to find out the relationship of using game-based learning in terms of Rules, Immersive, Enjoyment, Multimedia Technology, and Challenge and Competition to the academic performance of Grade 8 students in Araling Panlipunan, specifically in terms of Remembering, Understanding, and Analyzing. Using descriptive and experimental method of research, it involved 99 Grade 8 students of Calamba City Science Integrated School which is 100% of the population under the online learning modality, School Year 2020-2021. A 50-item teacher-made test, validated by experts was utilized for the pre-test and post-test to find out the significant difference in students' academic performance. Meanwhile, a 25-item survey questionnaire, also validated by experts, elicit the respondents' perception on game-based learning in Araling Panlipunan. Furthermore, an original digital game was created exclusively for this study wherein the content involved were the topics in Araling Panlipunan 8. Using the mean and standard deviation, the study described the profile of the respondents in terms of age, gender, and time spent in playing digital games, and the students' pre-test and post-test scores. In addition, Pearson's correlation coefficient was utilized to determine the significant relationship between the perception of students in game-based learning and academic performance of students in terms of remembering, understanding, and analyzing skills. Meanwhile, it was concluded that the first null hypothesis is rejected-there is a significant difference in the pre-test and post-test scores of the respondents. Then, the second null hypothesis is accepted-there was no significant relationship between game-based learning and academic performance of students. Finally, it can be inferred that Araling Panlipunan teachers may create and incorporate digital games not only as a form of motivation, but as well as a form of presenting lectures and a form of assessment.

Boris Krivokapic

PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

This paper is in fact second part of the paper published in the previous number of the same journal as Boris Krivokapic “Odnos medjunarodnog i unutrasnjeg prava”, Strani pravni život 2/2013, 59-103.

The paper itself has three parts. The first one is introductory, where the author explains why there is a primacy of international law. In the second part of the article he answers the most common arguments that challenge this primacy. In the third, concluding part the author notes the existence of another very important problem, which consists in the request that in order to have legitime primacy, international law must be democratic, one that suits the interests of all members of the international community and not a law that could be turned into an instrument of political and other domination of the most powerful nations.

After the introductory part, the author refers to the Kievan Rus, to show that although it was undoubtedly an active participant in international relations (closing international agreements, receiving foreign representatives, etc.) there is no evidence preserved on any papers that  could be called the works of international legal science.

Moreover, even in the period from the 13th until 17th century there are neither theoretical, nor systematic works in the domain of  international law. The widely acclaimed work by P.P. Shafirov “The reflections on the legitimate reasons of the war against Sweden” (1717) could not be characterized as such either.

However, already in the 19th century the Russian science of international law went through an unbelievable period of flourishing. A number of original papers appeared, not just articles and monographs on selected issues, but the systemic works as we
ll. As early as 1880 the Russian Society of International Law was founded. Generally speaking, the Russian science international law of the time was quite advanced and advocated for the strengthening of international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, the renunciation of war, disarmament, etc.

Soon after the October Revolution (1917) there was a division among the scholars. Thus, one group of them withdrew, the others fled abroad and continued their career in exile, while the third group (the majority of them) stayed in the country, raising new generations and laying the foundations of the Soviet science of international law, with all its positive and negative sides.

In the court room, and in the law firm, where both sides have all facts and all legal citations, the case will be won, or lost, on rhetoric; on legal rhetoric; on the appreciation of legal principles, presumptions, doctrines, rules, tests, maxims, and phrases. To the legal writer, a mention of a doctrine here, a maxim there, and a test in the conclusion, will flower the article, making it to sound well researched, more persuasive and ultimately effective. To the legal speaker, the solicitor, legal rhetoric arrests attention, holds conscience captive and wins the will of the adjudicator. Legal Rhetoric!

This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper
assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here,
against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive
the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort
to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an
assertion is, and what can make it insincere.
Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be
false, or unwarranted): in the second part of the thesis, I consider
these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that
proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and
several philosophers have tried to identify this standard. After
reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative
solution to some known puzzles concerning this issue. In my view,
assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm
that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true.

La presente investigación delinea de forma sistemática una teoría general para todo género de signos distintivos. Para este propósito se vale de las investigaciones parciales que la propiedad industrial y otras ramas del derecho han realizado de algunos signos distintivos particulares, como las marcas, las indicaciones geográficas, los sellos de calidad, los nombres de pila, los nombres comerciales, entre otros. Se usa un método inductivo que recoge leyes, jurisprudencia y doctrina de varios lugares del mundo. En cuanto a la estructura, luego de una introducción, se determinar cuál es el conjunto de los signos distintivos que será el universo a analizar (Capítulo I), se señalan cuáles son los principios generales a todos esos signos (Capítulo II) y se termina con una lista de conclusiones a las que se ha llegado (Capítulo III). Entre otras cosas, concluimos que sí es posible hacer una teoría general que aplique a todo género de signo distintivo y que esta teoría beneficia mucho la profundización doctrinal de los signos distintivos menos regulados por el derecho.
This paper systematically delineates a general theory for all kinds of distinctive signs. For this purpose we use the partial studies developed by industrial property and other areas of law, on any special signs such as trademarks, geographical indications, quality seals, given names, commercial names, and others. We use an inductive approach that includes laws, jurisprudence and doctrine of several countries. Regarding the structure, after an introduction, we determine a set of signs, the one that will be the universe to analyze (Chapter I), then we indicate eleven general principles of these signs (Chapter II), ending with a list of conclusions that we have reached (Chapter III). Among other things, we conclude that it is possible to make a general theory that applies to all kinds of sign and that this theory greatly benefits the doctrinal clarification of the signs less regulated by law.

On Bernard Suits’s celebrated analysis, to play a game is to engage in a “voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles”. Voluntariness is understood in terms of the players having the “lusory attitude” of accepting the constitutive rules of the game just because they make possible playing it. In this paper I suggest that the players in Netflix’s hit show Squid Game play the ‘squid games’, but they don’t do so voluntarily, but are forced to play. I argue that this means that we should rethink Suits’s analysis by claiming that all that is needed for players to play is that someone has put the rules in force for them for the reason that it makes playing the game possible. I then illustrate the virtues of the revised analysis by showing how it helps us to defuse Hurka’s recent counterexamples to Suits’s view.

In 2013, despite deteriorating relations between Russia and the United States and increased global contention over cybersecurity issues, participating states in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly agreed on a landmark report endorsing the applicability of existing international law to state military use of information technology. Given these conditions, the timing of this agreement was surprising. I argue that state representatives engaged in a rule-governed social practice of applying old rules to new cases, and that the procedural rules governing this practice help to explain the existence, timing and form of the agreement. They also help to explain further agreements expressed in a follow-on report issued in 2015. The case study findings presented here demonstrate that social practices of rule-making are simultaneously rule-governed and politically contested, and that outcomes of these processes have been shaped by specialized rules for making, interpreting and applying rules. The effectiveness of procedural rules in shaping the outcome of a contentious, complex global security issue suggests that such rules are likely to matter even more in simpler cases dealing with less contentious issues.

Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections.

Legal rules constitute not only reasons for action, but also reasons for judicial decision. What kind of reason do legal rules provide for adjudication? Do they figure as Razian exclusionary reasons in legal reasoning? In this paper I will draw on some insights from Robert Alexy’s theory of principles to deal with these problems.

La mondialisation a pour conséquences un affaiblissement de la souveraineté des Etats-nations et de la régulation économique. Elle a ouvert la voie à une multiplication de sphères d’actions nouvelles, informelles, non légales voire illégales. En Afrique ce processus a suivi une tendance particulière en raison du contexte historique propre au continent. Les sociétés africaines sont engagées dans un processus progressif d’informalisation de leurs institutions. Bien que la définition des règles légitimes de l’échange social demeure toujours une prérogative des institutions, la régulation pratique des interactions quotidiennes sous la forme d’accords, d’arrangements, de conventions, de coutumes, d’usages, etc., s’écarte de plus en plus des « normes officielles ». Ce sont ces processus que cet ouvrage -le premier en français sur les normes pratiques – explore en profondeur.

This paper investigates the process of reasoning through which a judge determines whether a precedent-case gives her a binding reason to follow in her present-case. I review the objections that have been raised against the two main accounts of reasoning by precedent: the rule-account and the analogy-account. I argue that both accounts can be made viable by amending them to meet the objections. Nonetheless, I believe that there is an argument for preferring accounts that integrate analogical reasoning: any account of reasoning by precedent that is descriptively minimally adequate will leave some room for judicial discretion. Discretion should be used under consideration of the best legally relevant arguments for and against a decision. Integrating analogical reasoning helps the judge to bring to her own attention the strongest case for following. Analogical reasoning also eases the recognition of possible reasons for distinguishing. Thereby, it facilitates a more balanced decision-making process.

Die Sprache der Bürokratie genießt, wie wohl 'Bürokratie' insgesamt, ein eher zweifelhaftes Ansehen. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht Ursache und Berechtigung der so eher intuitiv vorgenommenen Zuschreibung nach und diskutiert Rahmenbedingungen und Strukturelemente, die die Sprache der Bürokratie als Instrument rationaler Herrschaft und insofern als "Sprache der Folgerichtigkeit" auszeichnen.

“There is no gap between Is and Ought, but there is a gap between fact and norm.”
“There is a difference between legal powers and legal competences, and there are no power-conferring rules.”
“There is no obligation to comply with contracts.”
“The notions of a right and of a norm should be removed from legal discourse.”
“There are no regulative rules, and all rules are constitutive.”

All these claims, if taken out of context, are controversial in the eyes of many legal theorists. This book argues that they are all true, or justified, if understood in the proper context. The argument starts from the relation between language and facts and continues with a distinction between three kinds of facts, and the role which rules play in the constitution of one of the three kinds. Building on this foundation, the book moves on to analyses of the building blocks of law: duties, obligations, permissions, juridical acts, powers, competences, norms and rights. Interwoven through these analyses, the reader finds discussions of the alleged gap between Is and Ought, and of the logic of normative notions (‘deontic logic’).

This book is immediately relevant for anyone interested in analytical legal theory and deontic logic, but it also has a lot to offer to those interested in social ontology. It targets not only academic legal theorists and logicians, but also advanced students who seek a clear conceptual framework for the study of law and legal reasoning.
More info on www.jaaphage.nl

Предисловие / Библиография  СТАТЬИ  ZÁSADNÍ OTÁZKY VÝVOJE A SOUČASNOSTI KODIFIKACE PRÁVNÍCH INSTITUTŮ [1975] 3–20: 1. Problém jednoty projevů myšlenky kodifikace v historii 3 / 2. Pojem vývoje a vývoj kodifikace 11 / 3. Obečný pojem kodifikace 14 // ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ ОБЩЕСТВА И ПРАВА И ВОПРОСЫ КОДИФИКАЦИИ, УДЕЛЯЯ ОСОБОЕ ВНИМАНИЕ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИМ КОДЕКСАМ [1974] 21–40: 1. Диалектика общественного изменения и сохранения в ходе исторического развития кодификации 22 / 2. Вопрос о возможности кодификации, воспринятой основным средством правотворчества общественного изменения 28 / 3. Параллельность общественного и кодификационного изменений: обратная связь и ее формы в социалистических кодексах 35 // ROZWOJ PRAWA A JEGO KODYFIKACJA [1979] 41–52: 1. Dialektyka społecznych zmian i zachowania w procesie historycznego rozwoju kodyfikacji 41 / 2. Zagadnienie možliwošci kodyfikacji jako podstawowego narzędzia prawodawstwa wprowadzającego zmiany społeczne 45 / 3. Paralelizm zmian społecznych i kodyfikacyjnych: »sprzęženie zwrotne« i jego formy w kodyfikacjach socjalistycznych 49 // СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦИЯ И КОДИФИКАЦИЯ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВА [ms] 53–58 // ВЗАИМОСВЯЗЬ ПРАВОТВОРЧЕСТВА И ПРAВОПРИМЕНЕНИЯ [ms] 59–65 // ЛЕНИН И РЕВОЛУЦИОННОЕ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВО [1969] 67–76 // ЗАВЕРШЕНИЕ СOЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ КОДИФИКАЦИИ [ms] 77–88: 1. Кодификация в европейских и азиатских странах народной демократии 77 / 2. Рекодификация как типовой знак социалистической кодификации 82 // MINISTERSKÉ ODŮVODNĚNÍ A JEHO ÚLOHA VE ZPROSTŘEDKOVÁNÍ PRÁVNÍCH HODNOT [1978] 89–108: I. Principiální a historické základy vzniku minislerského odůvodnéní 90 / II. Možné a žádoucí funkce ministerského odúvodnění v socialistickém právu 98 / III. Ministerské odúvodnění a jeho význam při výkladu právních norem 102 // PREAMBULE – OTÁZKA PRÁVNÍ VĚDY [1970] 109–134: I. Pojem preambule 111 / II. Obsah a funkce preambulí 114 / III. Normatívní dosah obsahu preambule 117 / IV. Problém odůvodněností používání preambulí z hlediska socialistické právní politiky 128 // ЗА САМОСТОЯТЕЛНОСТЬ ПРАВОВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ [ms] 135–138: 1. Связь политики и права 135 / 2. Правовая политика как проводник в связи политики и права 135 / 3. Правовая наука, правовая политика и право права 136 / 4. Необходимость самостоятельности правовой политики 138 // ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКОЕ СОДЕРЖАНИЕ ПРАВА КАК НАДСТРОЙКИ [ms] 139–143 // ПОЈАМ ПРАВА У ЛУКАЧЕВОЈ ОНТОЛОГИЈИ [1983] 145–168 // ДИАЛЕКТИКА РАЗВИТИЯ ПРАВОВЫХ ИНСТРУМЕНТОВ: ПРЕДМЕТНОЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ПРЕЗУМПЦИИ И ФИКЦИИ КАК СРЕДСТВ ЮРИДИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕХНИКИ [ms] 169–204: I. »Презумпция« 170 [1. В процессе судебного установления фактов 172 / 2. В нормативной дефиниции фактов: preasumptio juris tantum 173 / 3. В нормативной дефиниции фактов: praesumptio juris et de jure 174 / 4. В юридической области 174] Относительно »презумпции« 178 [1. Функции 178 / 2. Презумпция и фикция 180 / 3. Неоправданпость эпистемологического обоснования в отношении нормативной области 181 / 4. Технический аппарат презумпции 182] II. »Фикция« 184 [1. В лингвистическом формировании правовых норм 184 / 2. В применении правовых норм судом 185 / 3. В доктриналыюм отражении правовых норм 187 / 4. В теоретической реконструкции правовых норм 188 / 5. В правовом отношении 190] Относительно »фикции« 192 [1. История и сущность: от истоков к юридической фикции 192 / 2. Классификация 196 / 3. Право как фикция 197 / 4. Презумпция и фикция 200] // РАЗДEЛEНИЕ ВЛАСТЕЙ – ИДЕОЛОГИЯ И УТОПИЯ В ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ МЫСЛИ [1984] 205–213 // ПРАВО КАК ИСТОРИЯ [1986] 215–224 // СЛОБОДА, ЈЕДНАКОСТ И ПОЈМОВНИ МИНИМУМ ПРАВИЕ КОМУНИКАЦИЈЕ [1989] 225–244
РЕЗЮМЕ / РЕЦEНЗИИ  [by the author, including] КОДИФИКАЦИЯ КАК ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ИСТОРИЧЕСКОЕ ЯВЛЕНИЕ [1981] 259–262 // [on the author, including] B. А. Четвернин: ПРАВО КАК ИСТОРИЯ [1987] 222–224 / K[atalin] Szamel: ВНУТРЕННЯЯ МОРАЛНОСТЬ ПРАВА [1988] 279–281 & [in] Strani pravni život [Beograd] & [by] L[eonard] Bianchi, Jozef Karpat, Stefan Luby, М. А. Супатаев, J[erzy] Wróblewski

Expert systems are programs that use artificial intelligence techniques, and simulate the performance of the human expert in a given area of expertise by collecting and using one or more expert information and expertise in a particular field. We developed declarative, online procedural rule-based expert system models for psychological diseases diagnosis and classification. The constructed system exploited computer as an intelligent and deductive tool. This system diagnoses and treats more than four types of psychiatric diseases, i.e., depression, anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and hysteria. The system helps psychology practitioner and doctors to diagnose the condition of a patient efficiently and in short time. It is also very useful for the patients who cannot go to a doctor because they cannot afford the cast, or they do not have a psychological clinic in their area, or they are ashamed of discussing their situation with a doctor. The system consists of program codes that make a logic decision to classify the problem of the patient. The methodology for developing the declarative model was based on the backward chaining, also called goal-driven reasoning, where knowledge is represented by a set of IF-THEN production rules. The declarative programs were written in the PROLOG. While the design of the procedural model was based on using common languages like PHP, JavaScript, CSS, and HTML. The user of the system will enter the symptoms of the patients through the user interface and the program executes. Then the program links the symptoms to the pre-programmed psychological diseases, and will classify the disease and recommend treatment. The proposed online system link: http://esp-online.site/

Tabla de contenidos.

Prólogo, Jordi Ferrer Beltrán

I. EL CONCEPTO DE DERECHO, 30 Y 50 AÑOS DESPUÉS
1. Reconsiderando El concepto de derecho, Leslie Green
2. Releyendo a Hart, Riccardo Guastini

II. EL LIBRO Y SU METODOLOGÍA
3. El concepto de derecho puesto en un determinado contexto, Agustín Squella Narducci
Comentario de Daniela Accatino Scagliotti
4. Vigencia y honestidad de la teoría hartiana del derecho, David Quintero Fuentes
Comentario de Lorena Ramírez Ludeña
5. Dos críticas metodológicas a la teoría de Hart, María Cristina Redondo
Comentario de Fernando Quintana Bravo

III. NORMATIVIDAD Y ASPECTO INTERNO DE LAS REGLAS
6. El punto de vista interno de H.L.A. Hart (y Peter Winch): giros, comunidades y pluralidades, Salvador Millaleo Hernández
Comentario de Alejandro Nava Tovar
7. El derecho desde la perspectiva del aceptante: un debate a partir de Herbert Hart, Paula Gaido
Comentario de Juan Ormeño Karzulovic
8. Reglas sociales, formas de vida y juegos de lenguaje, Sebastián Figueroa Rubio
Comentario de Maribel Narváez Mora

IV. VARIEDAD DE REGLAS Y RAZONAMIENTO JURÍDICO
9. H.L.A. Hart según MacCormick: ¿Existe una relación necesaria entre El concepto de derecho, en tanto tarea descriptiva, y la teoría del razonamiento legal?, José Julio León
Comentario de Ernesto Riffo Elgueta
10. Los derechos subjetivos en El concepto de derecho de Hart, María Beatriz Arriagada Cáceres
Comentario de Alberto Coddou Mc Manus
11. Reglas primarias de obligación Las "reglas del derecho penal" en El concepto de derecho, Juan Pablo Mañalich Raffo
Comentario de Esteban Pereira Fredes

The paper starts by pointing out that the terms "normative" and "norm" operate in several different senses in contemporary phenomenology. It distinguishes between three main contexts in which these terms are used today: first, analyses of the basic structures of intentionality; second, investigations of interested perception and the dynamics of appearing; and third, discussions of the experiential grounds of ethics. In these three contexts, the terms "norm" and "normative" are used in different meanings and with different connotations. The basic ideas of regulation, rule-following, and correctness are implied by all usages, but the types of rules and the types of correctness at issue vary. In order to organize the field, the paper distinguishes between six different and mutually irreducible senses of the term "norm" and identifies several ambiguous usages in which these senses conflate. The paper ends by suggesting a practical solution for the specification of phenomenological discourses on normativity.

This paper describes a knowledge based system employing certain expert system rules to detect different kind of eye diseases found in Malaysia. The types of eye diseases that can be detected with this system are allergic or infectious conjunctivitis, secondary and senile cataract, open angle glaucoma and acute glaucoma, keratitis and dry eyes syndrome. These are the most frequent eye diseases infecting the Malaysian population. The project was designed and programmed via the object-oriented expert system shell software, EXSYS. Expert rules were developed based on the symptoms of each type of the eye diseases, and they were presented using a tree graph forward chaining with depth search first method. In order to enhance user interaction with the system, graphical user interfaces were employed. Previously, several similar works have been published, but they are limited to detecting a single disease and also required expert medical officer to operate. The expert system described in this paper is able to detect and gives early diagnosis of five types of eye diseases; inclusive of senile, secondary, open angle, acute, allergic and infections.

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=949629&tag=1

The epistemic status of our access to the world has always given rise to vivacious debates in Western philosophy. The crucial point of these discussions was the connection between conceptual and non-conceptual elements of our relation to the world. The core of this problem can be also formulated as a question of the connection between semantical and syntactical rules of our epistemic relation to the world. Could we know anything about some state of affairs by using only syntactical rules, which relate logical terms to one another, or we also do need semantical rules, which connect the formal syntax of our epistemic relation to the world with extra-conceptual characteristics of each state of affairs? American philosopher Wilfrid Stalker Sellars (1912–1989) has developed an approach to tackling this problem of rules. Sellars’s approach is a critical reaction to the traditional theories of rules. The main point of his criticism of the traditional theories of rules, whose origins Sellars attributed to Kant’s conception of rules (which in my argument is an erroneous attribution), could be summed up as follows: the difference between syntactical and semantical rules of our epistemic relation to the world is founded on the Myth of the Given. In his Inference and Meaning (1953) Sellars elaborated a theory of material rules of inference which tries to neutralize the traditional approach to the problem (above all, Carnap’s theory of logical syntax of the language). I am of the opinion – and it would be my major claim in this paper – that Sellars’s argument in IM suggests a way of avoiding the Myth (even if this article was published earlier than EPM). I argue that Sellars’s argument consists of three basic steps: irreducibility (1) as well as operative normativity (2) of the material rules of inference and (3) linguisticality of descriptive terms.