Legal Principles

An advocate must be aware of the mental environment of the judge, particularly the appellate judge.  Their quiet presence has not impeded the use of labels, including judicial attitude as well as a whole subset of ideological labels such as conservative, liberal, activist, restraintist, interpretivist, noninterpretivist, positivist, and with a pejorative ring, biased.

Such bents of mind are the pylons around which the persuasive course must be raced.  After the judge masters the facts and distills the relevant legal principles from a case, something must push him toward a decision.  In the great percentage of cases, the process of assimilating facts and principles points unerringly to one outcome.  However, in a small percentage of cases consensus cannot be readily attained.  In these cases, the holding may be influenced one way or another by the attitude of the judges.  Fortunately, the advocate can acquire the necessary sensitivity to these attitudes through episodic ventures to a court of appeals.

El autor examina los criterios para distinguir entre los principios y las reglas, tomando como punto de partida la teoría de Robert Alexy. El autor expone las críticas que Aulis
Aarnio y Luis Prieto Sanchís han hecho a dicha teoría. El primero de éstos niega que exista una distinción entre unos y otros, mientras que el segundo sostiene que, aunque existe tal distinción, es irrelevante, pues no significa ningún avance en la crítica al positivismo jurídico. Posteriormente, el autor rebate cada uno de estos argumentos
críticos y elabora una propuesta de distinción entre principios fuertes y otros principios, enfatizando la razonabilidad de los primeros.

У статті досліджується розвиток стандартів прав людини, гарантованих Європейською конвенцією з прав людини, крізь призму європейського праворозуміння. Автор аналізує рішення Європейського суду з прав людини щодо тлумачення та ефективного забезпечення прав і основних свобод людини, а також практику їх застосування в Україні. Key words: human rights, dynamic interpretation, consensus, autonomous interpretation,margin of appreciation, principle of proportionality.

The main aim of this article is to discuss the essence and distinctive features of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, all Council of Europe member States have an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation. It is worth mentioning that in the text of the Convention and in the preparatory work there is no such term as «margin of appreciation». Nevertheless, this doctrine is well established in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (in the case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom etc.). The guarantees enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights are a minimum standard. The European Court of Human Rights doesn’t define, how exactly the States must secure these rights. Thus, the member States enjoy the margins of appreciation, that is, the national authorities are better placed to settle a dispute than the Strasbourg institutions (so-called the better position rationale)....

The 1961 Criminal Procedure Code has been in operation for so long with its significant gaps and vagueness. The lack of properly enshrined guiding principles both in the law and the practice made the fairness of the criminal justice administration doubtful. The 2019 Draft Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code is intended to make positive changes to the rules of procedure in order to ensure fairness of the process. Such changes are guided by fundamental principles, the presumption of innocence being the first principle, provided for in the section covering fundamental principles in the criminal procedure.
Both the substantive and procedural aspects of the principle of presumption of innocence are incorporated into the Draft Code. Thus, while there are express rules requiring the public prosecutor to prove the facts of his case, there are also rules that require the accused (and the suspect) to be treated with dignity and respect befitting a person presumed innocent. Those subjects specifically discussed here are the right to liberty, burden and standard of proof.

Příspěvek pojednává o zákazu zneužití práva, který chápe jako právní princip vlastní také právu procesnímu. Nabízí komparativní přehled právní úpravy, ve které je zákaz zneužití práva obsažen, definice zákazu zneužití práva, argumenty podporující pojětí zákazu zneužití práva jako právního principu, význam a pojetí zákazu zneužití procesního práva. Zabývá se " zjevnosti " zneužití práva a nakonec pojednává o možných příčinách a řešeních zneužívání práva.

About the Fiction of the Overall Knowledge of Law and the Hope for the Social Knowledge of Legal Principles.
Starting considerations from the counterfactual assumption of overall knowledge of law and combining it with the results of the achievements of the sociology of law in the field of legal awareness, both of a social group and individuals, the question about what in fact constitutes a legal awareness can be posed. Accepting the opinions presented in the literature that legal awareness is on the one hand the overall knowledge of law and on the other hand the evaluation of law and demands to change it, once again a question can be raised of what should be a part of such general understanding of law. In the case of non-professional actors (ordinary people) it is shaped significantly by the experience concerning the law application (understood both broadly and narrowly), as well as the life of a specific legal and political organization (state). In response to these assumptions, the Author presents the opinion that a key element of the overall knowledge of law, which is the part of a legal awareness, is the knowledge of legal principles, particularly the principles of constitutional law.

The work of Robert Alexy is closely associated with the “principle theory”. For Alexy himself, the principle theory represents the heart of his theoretical work, around which most of his publications are organized. In Alexy’s work, and in the work of his students, the label “principle theory” suggests theoretical unity. Despite this impression of unity, the principle theory is far more multilayered and multifaceted than the “unitary” label would suggest. The critique of Alexy’s principle theory, which is the topic of this article, has two objectives. First, I distinguish between the different types of theory which have found refuge under the unitary label. By clarifying the different theoretical aspirations pursued by proponents of the principle theory, I systematize these different theoretical and doctrinal efforts which are often not clearly separated in the debate. The critique aims to offer a framework within which to situate the different arguments and criticisms, so that it becomes clearer which type, level or aspect of principle theory the argument is about. This is the constructive part of the critique. Second, the critique aims to evaluate the theoretical and doctrinal positions and achievements of the various principle theories on each of the levels identified. This analysis is for the most part critical. The claim is that the principle theory is wrong on most counts and misunderstands itself by confusing the different levels of its theoretical and doctrinal aspirations. At its origins, as put forward by Josef Esser and Ronald Dworkin in the framework of a theory about the concept of law, it has its merit in rejecting the simplifications of positivist theories of adjudication. A defense of the role of specifically legal principles in the process of adjudication against arguments to the contrary from Larry Alexander and Ken Kress is offered. But the acceptance of legal principles does not entail a validity relation between the law and morality as supported by Alexy. As a theory of norms, the principle theory fails in its effort to claim a structural difference between rules and principles. It also fails as a methodological theory that reduces adjudication to subsumption under rules or the balancing of principles. It misunderstands itself when it is conceived as a doctrinal theory especially of fundamental rights as it is developed in Alexy’s main work “A Theory of Constitutional Rights”. The most promising aspect of Alexy’s principle theory could be its contribution to a more comprehensive theory of legal argumentation.

This paper argues that human dignity is a sui generis status principle whose function lies in unifying our normative orders. More fully, human dignity denotes a basic status to be preserved in any institution or process; it is a principle demanding determination in different contexts; and it has its most characteristic application where the legal, moral, and political place competing obligations on individuals. The implication of this account is that we should not seek to reduce human dignity to either a legal norm or a legal principle.

Boris Krivokapic

PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

This paper is in fact second part of the paper published in the previous number of the same journal as Boris Krivokapic “Odnos medjunarodnog i unutrasnjeg prava”, Strani pravni život 2/2013, 59-103.

The paper itself has three parts. The first one is introductory, where the author explains why there is a primacy of international law. In the second part of the article he answers the most common arguments that challenge this primacy. In the third, concluding part the author notes the existence of another very important problem, which consists in the request that in order to have legitime primacy, international law must be democratic, one that suits the interests of all members of the international community and not a law that could be turned into an instrument of political and other domination of the most powerful nations.

The so-called principle of the personal character of the testament becomes more and more often raised as an argument by Polish legal scholars. The text provides the first systematic analysis of the principle in Polish law. To verify the view that such a principle is a norm and that it could be treated as a principle, two approaches have been used: a theoretical one (based on Dworkin’s and Alexy’s concept of principles and rules) and a practical one (based on concepts developed in academic analyses of Polish private law).

The validity of the principle of the personal character of testament is unquestionable in Article 944 § 2 of the Polish civil code, which prohibits making and revoking testaments by a representative. There is, however, a wide range of situations with no clear answer concerning the applicability of that principle, e.g. a variant or alternative bequest (zapis wariantowy or zapis alternatywny) or a special-purpose bequest (zapis celowy) – these situations have been analysed in the text.

The thesis deals with the tools of filling gaps in law, respectively with gaps in statutes. Its aim is to explain not only these tools which are traditionally mentioned in literature but mostly these which are bound with gaps in law only rarely, if at all. The thesis handles in the beginning with the question of the existence of gaps in law and drafts its unique classification. In the next parts, it already clarifies the functioning of the tools of filling gaps in statutes with the help of the extensive amount of current case law (domestic and also foreign), statutes and literature mostly from foreign authors. Mentioned and explained tools are analogia iuris, analogia legis, teleological reduction, argumentum per
eliminationem, argumentum ad absurdum, constitutionally conforming interpretation and proportionality test. The thesis also deals with the topics of judge making law, its borders, contra legem decision making and legal principles. The importance of this thesis is not only the unique summary of different tools of filling gaps in statutes, but also a draft of the most current problems connected with this topic in practice and also their solutions through the application of the theoretical knowledge.                                                                                                                                          Práca sa zaoberá nástrojmi vypĺňania medzier v práve, resp. v zákone. Jej cieľom je vysvetliť nielen tie nástroje, ktoré sa tradične uvádzajú v literatúre, ale najmä tie, ktoré sa s medzerami v práve spájajú menej frekventovane, ak vôbec. Práca sa v úvode venuje existencii medzier v práve, resp. v zákone a načrtáva ich klasifikáciu. V ďalšej časti už objasňuje fungovanie nástrojov vypĺňania medzier v zákone s pomocou domácej aj zahraničnej judikatúry, právnych predpisov a literatúry najmä od zahraničných autorov. Rozoberanými nástrojmi práce sú analógia zákona, analógia práva, teleologická redukcia, argumentum per eliminationem, argumentum ad absurdum, ústavne konformný výklad a test proporcionality. Práca rozoberá aj problematiku sudcovskej tvorby práva, jej hranice, rozhodovanie súdov contra legem a právne princípy. Významom tejto práce je sumarizácia rozmanitých nástrojov vypĺňania medzier v zákone, ale aj načrtnutie problémov spojených s touto problematikou v praxi spolu s ich riešeniami pomocou aplikácie teoretických poznatkov.

The notion of principle in the normative sense is fundamentally polysemous. Beyond the plethora of definitions, one can identify a set of qualities that apply to most of these legal norms: generality, primacy, and in some cases a jurisprudential origin; in addition, principles also fulfil a function of increasing legal intelligibility and the completeness of the legal order. In this respect, a legal principle is a twofold notion, defined both by its constitutive elements and by the functions it fulfils. It is both conceptual and functional.

Romanian Abstract:

Caracterul obligatoriu al hotărârilor și ordonanțelor Curții de Justiție a Uniunii Europene („CJUE”) este analizat din perspectiva efectului general al hotărârii, atât prin prisma jurisprudenței Curții de la Luxemburg, cât și a Curții Constituționale din România. Autoritatea de lucru judecat, precedentul la nivelul CJUE, precum și eventualul efect retroactiv sunt evidențiate prin jurisprudența relevantă. În final, sunt analizate, de asemenea, în lumina jurisprudenței europene efectele autonomiei procedurale în legislația și jurisprudența din România, precum și două situații particulare referitoare la reexaminarea deciziei administrative rămasă definitivă pentru a ține cont de o hotărâre ulterioară a CJUE și la decizia judecătorească definitivă și posibilitatea reexaminării ei în cazul contrarietății cu dreptul Uniunii Europene. Lucrarea a fost prezentată la conferința natională „Procedura trimiterii preliminare. Principii de drept al Uniunii Europene și experiențe ale sistemului român de drept”, ediția a III-a, 5 decembrie 2019, organizată de Centrul de Studii de Drept European („CSDE”) al Institutului de Cercetări Juridice „Acad. Andrei Rădulescu” din cadrul Academiei Române, Asociația Forumul Judecătorilor din România și Asociația Română de Drept și Afaceri Europene („ARDAE”). Detalii: www.csde.ro

Cuvinte cheie: Curtea de Justiție a Uniunii Europene; obligativitatea hotărârilor; ordonanță; Curtea Constituțională din România

English Abstract:

The binding nature of the judgments and orders of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is analysed in the light of the general effect of the judgment, both in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the Constitutional Court of Romania. The res judicata, the precedent at the level of the CJEU, as well as the possible retroactive effect are highlighted by relying on relevant case law. The effects of procedural autonomy in Romanian legislation and case law, along with two particular situations related to the review of the final administrative decision in order to take into account a later judgment of the CJEU and the final judicial decision and the possibility of reviewing it as being contrary to European Union law are also considered in the light of European case law.

Note: Downloadable document is in Romanian.

L’articolo individua nella teoria dell’efficacia giuridica il proprium carat-terizzante dell’intera opera scientifica di Angelo Falzea e ne coglie il filo conduttore in una peculiare (ma non per questo meno radicale) revisio-ne del positivismo giuridico, il quale, capovolgendo, ma non propria-mente superando il naturalismo giuridico, è apparso all’a. non meno ingenuo di quest’ultimo e, in definitiva, irrisolto. Al formalismo kelse-niano, com’è noto, l’a. ha contrapposto una teoria assiologica del dirit-to come sistema di valori reali e oggettivi, culminanti nel Grund-Wert della società nel suo complesso. Ne consegue una concezione forte-mente olistica dell’ordinamento giuridico, il quale è caratterizzato dall’a. come un sottosistema culturale che si manifesta mediante la prassi sociale e il linguaggio.

Advance directives emerge in the doctor-patient relationship as a way to ensure that the autonomy of the patient is observed, prior to a potential state of incapacity. Thus, autonomy can be exercised ensuring patient´s dignity and self-determination. Advance directives yet have the power to drive the medical practitioner and his staff so that it is given the treatment and care previously chosen by the patient. The main purpose of this paper is to show the lack of legislation on the matter in Brazil versus the recognition of Advance Directives by the Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine. Can a mere resolution of the Council transform directives into enforceable wishes? This is an answer we intend to offer throughout the text.

The task to reshape governments in the countries confronted with the Arab Spring prompts the question whether there are necessary conditions to realize a stable society that simultaneously seeks to eliminate the elements that have led to the uprisings. Acknowledging some constitutional rights seems indispensable in such a process. I argue that such a state of affairs is indeed the case, at least now that the ‘old’ justifications to differentiate between people do not suffice anymore. That is not to say that the countries involved will have identical laws in each respect, but merely that a common basis has to be realized, manifested in political and legal equality, so this given does not derogate from the fact that each country’s specific legislation needs to be shaped in the light of its own history. Such a basis has no ‘moral’ character, but is simply a necessary condition to prevent sedition.

O Direito Ambiental é um Direito do Meio Ambiente e um Direito Ecológico e, conforme o art. 225 da Constituição Federal, é um dos direitos humanos fundamentais, por se considerar o meio ambiente como um bem de uso comum a todos e por ser fundamental para a qualidade de vida. Este é o cenário do presente estudo, e o objeto é a elaboração de uma crítica reflexiva sobre o arcabouço jurídico ambiental brasileiro, analisando-se os critérios mínimos para aplicação das normas ambientais e visando a identificar os princípios que regem a Hermenêutica Jurídica frente aos novos desafios do Direito Ambiental. O estudo parte do pressuposto de relevância internacional dos direitos fundamentais equiparados aos direitos humanos pertencentes à terceira geração de direitos, conhecida como direitos difusos, abordando a presente dissertação o tratamento desses direitos na área do Direito Ambiental. O objetivo geral é demonstrar que a Hermenêutica Ambiental questiona as novas fronteiras que o Direito Ambiental impõe. Os objetivos específicos são: a análise crítica acerca do conceito de direitos fundamentais; a análise a respeito da natureza jurídica do direito ao meio ambiente, no intuito de desvendar se pertence à categoria dos direitos fundamentais; e o estudo das conseqüências para a interpretação jurídica ao se considerar o direito ao meio ambiente como direito fundamental. A hipótese de estudo é que esse novo conhecimento na área do Direito se constitui um desafio aos clássicos institutos jurídicos, de origem romano-germânica, e por isso exige pesquisar quais contribuições a Hermenêutica Jurídica pode trazer, como arcabouço teórico e como práxis de vida e de doutrina, ao saber jurídico, ao se considerar o Direito Ambiental como um dos direitos fundamentais. A questão a ser analisada visa a identificar sob quais critérios e princípios a categorização do Direito do Ambiente como direito fundamental se torna essencial para a devida aplicação e posterior efetivação do Direito do Ambiente como fonte protetora de novos bens jurídicos relativos a presentes e futuros sujeitos do Direito, conforme garantido na Constituição Federal de 1988. A metodologia utilizada é a pesquisa bibliográfica e documental.

The status of ‘international law’ is examined critically. In the first section, the basis of (national) legislation is described. This consists of an inquiry into a credible meaning of ‘natural law’. It is focused on the question whether universal principles exist and, if so, of what kind. Section 2 deals with the issue of enforcement. National legislation invariably realizes this, but this is not obvious at the international level. Section 3 deals with human rights. It is discussed whether their presence points to the existence of ‘international law’. To this end, a possible reason for these rights to have developed is expounded.

After the introductory part, the author refers to the Kievan Rus, to show that although it was undoubtedly an active participant in international relations (closing international agreements, receiving foreign representatives, etc.) there is no evidence preserved on any papers that  could be called the works of international legal science.

Moreover, even in the period from the 13th until 17th century there are neither theoretical, nor systematic works in the domain of  international law. The widely acclaimed work by P.P. Shafirov “The reflections on the legitimate reasons of the war against Sweden” (1717) could not be characterized as such either.

However, already in the 19th century the Russian science of international law went through an unbelievable period of flourishing. A number of original papers appeared, not just articles and monographs on selected issues, but the systemic works as we
ll. As early as 1880 the Russian Society of International Law was founded. Generally speaking, the Russian science international law of the time was quite advanced and advocated for the strengthening of international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, the renunciation of war, disarmament, etc.

Soon after the October Revolution (1917) there was a division among the scholars. Thus, one group of them withdrew, the others fled abroad and continued their career in exile, while the third group (the majority of them) stayed in the country, raising new generations and laying the foundations of the Soviet science of international law, with all its positive and negative sides.

In the court room, and in the law firm, where both sides have all facts and all legal citations, the case will be won, or lost, on rhetoric; on legal rhetoric; on the appreciation of legal principles, presumptions, doctrines, rules, tests, maxims, and phrases. To the legal writer, a mention of a doctrine here, a maxim there, and a test in the conclusion, will flower the article, making it to sound well researched, more persuasive and ultimately effective. To the legal speaker, the solicitor, legal rhetoric arrests attention, holds conscience captive and wins the will of the adjudicator. Legal Rhetoric!

La presente investigación delinea de forma sistemática una teoría general para todo género de signos distintivos. Para este propósito se vale de las investigaciones parciales que la propiedad industrial y otras ramas del derecho han realizado de algunos signos distintivos particulares, como las marcas, las indicaciones geográficas, los sellos de calidad, los nombres de pila, los nombres comerciales, entre otros. Se usa un método inductivo que recoge leyes, jurisprudencia y doctrina de varios lugares del mundo. En cuanto a la estructura, luego de una introducción, se determinar cuál es el conjunto de los signos distintivos que será el universo a analizar (Capítulo I), se señalan cuáles son los principios generales a todos esos signos (Capítulo II) y se termina con una lista de conclusiones a las que se ha llegado (Capítulo III). Entre otras cosas, concluimos que sí es posible hacer una teoría general que aplique a todo género de signo distintivo y que esta teoría beneficia mucho la profundización doctrinal de los signos distintivos menos regulados por el derecho.
This paper systematically delineates a general theory for all kinds of distinctive signs. For this purpose we use the partial studies developed by industrial property and other areas of law, on any special signs such as trademarks, geographical indications, quality seals, given names, commercial names, and others. We use an inductive approach that includes laws, jurisprudence and doctrine of several countries. Regarding the structure, after an introduction, we determine a set of signs, the one that will be the universe to analyze (Chapter I), then we indicate eleven general principles of these signs (Chapter II), ending with a list of conclusions that we have reached (Chapter III). Among other things, we conclude that it is possible to make a general theory that applies to all kinds of sign and that this theory greatly benefits the doctrinal clarification of the signs less regulated by law.

Сборник Научни четения на тема "Правни норми и правни принципи" - Сборник доклади от научна конференция, организирана от катедра "Теория и история на държавата и правото" и катедра "Наказателноправни науки" на ЮФ на СУ, проведена в София на 15 май 2017 г.

Съставители: Д. Вълчев, Пл. Панайотов, С. Гройсман, Кр. Манов.

Scholarly Readings: Legal Norms and Legal Principles - Collection of the reports of a scientific conference organized by the Departament of Theory and History of State and Law and the Departament of Criminal Law Sciences of the Law Faculty of Sofia University, held in Sofia on 15th of May 2017

Editet by Daniel Valchev, Plamen Panayotov, Simeon Groysman, Krasimir Manov

El trabajo es una crítica a la concepción del constitucionalismo jurídico defendida por Ferrajoli. Se concluye que el constitucionalismo que propone es impracticable porque su asunción desemboca en sinsentidos prácticos. Para mostrarlo, el trabajo se centra en la crítica de tres tesis ferrajolianas: 1) la tesis de la rigidez (el Estado constitucional se identifica jurídicamente sólo por la lex superior); 2) la tesis de la normatividad (no hay diferencia estructural entre principios y reglas), y 3) la tesis de la correlatividad (los enunciados de derechos significan exactamente lo mismo que los enunciados que expresan sus deberes correlativos). Cada una de estas tesis se cruza con tres momentos (y/o contextos) que, en opinión del autor, una buena teoría de la constitución debe ser capaz de distinguir y de integrar: 1) «Tener una constitución»; 2) «darse una constitución», y 3) «vivir en constitución».

The main aim of this article is to discuss the essence and distinctive features of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, all Council of Europe member States have an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation.
It is worth mentioning that in the text of the Convention and in the preparatory work there is no such term as «margin of appreciation». Nevertheless, this doctrine is well established in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (in the case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom etc.).
The guarantees enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights are a minimum standard. The European Court of Human Rights doesn’t define, how exactly the States must secure these rights. Thus, the member States enjoy the margins of appreciation, that is, the national authorities are better placed to settle a dispute than the Strasbourg institutions (so-called the better position rationale).
If different rights of the European Convention on Human Rights collide, the member States have a certain degree of discretion when deciding which right has priority. Furthermore, the member States enjoy a certain degree of discretion in the definition of such terms, as «national security» (paragraph 2 of Articles 8, 9 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights) or «necessity in a democratic society» (Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to that, it is allowed to restrict the freedom of expression, provided that it is necessary in a democratic society).
In the doctrine of the «margin of appreciation» such significant principles as effective protection, subsidiarity and review, permissible interferences with Convention rights, proportionality and the «European Consensus» standard are developed.
Keywords: margin of appreciation, effective protection, dynamic interpretation of human rights, proportionality, subsidiarity and review, European Consensus.

Got a day in court… I remember a particular case this year before the High Court of Singapore. It was a steamy day in itself and over this, the parties in the case were involved in a hotly disputed application on whether should a granted injunction be continued. Counsels for the parties produced tooth-combing evidences, relying on obscure cases drawn from the long established principles to the recent obiter dicta setting a new stream of interpretation. Heavy analysis was given on these concepts in the court room which tensed the air around.

A look at the history and legacy of the Magna Carta elucidates the many ways in which it shaped American jurisprudence and the law of Texas.  The Magna Carta is held in high regard because the unknown drafters understood the importance of legal principles, fair procedures, proportional punishment, official accountability, and respect for human dignity.  Its unquestionable commitment to the primacy of legal principles and anticipation of the development of judicial ethics significantly influenced and contributed to the construction and content of the Texas Constitution, Bill of Rights, and many Texas cities’ ethics codes.  Although it was intensely focused on the issues of feudal England, the Great Charter set the high expectations that have inspired lawyers and reformers for 800 years.

Resumen Este artículo repasa los fundamentos supranacionales y constitucionales del principio de desarrollo sostenible en materia de territorio y urbanismo, analiza su acogida legal y su aplicación judicial y reflexiona sobre su consolidación actual y posible evolución futura. Abstract This article reviews the supranational and constitutional basis of the principle of sustainable development in the field of spatial and urban planning, analyzes its legal formulation and judicial enforcement and reflects on its current consolidation and its future evolution.

This article examines the principle of effectiveness in the interpretative practice of the European Court of Human Rights by analyzing its nature and illustrating its application, as well as its role in the light of the distinction between judicial activism and judicial self-restraint.

Legal rules constitute not only reasons for action, but also reasons for judicial decision. What kind of reason do legal rules provide for adjudication? Do they figure as Razian exclusionary reasons in legal reasoning? In this paper I will draw on some insights from Robert Alexy’s theory of principles to deal with these problems.

This paper reviews the traditional distinction between legal norms and legal principles. In relation to the categorical (non-hypothetical) nature of legal principles, I suggest that these standards can be seen as purposive legal prescriptions which, instead of requiring specific behavior, give general direction for the achievement of a particular legal goal. The proposed model for differentiation is analyzed in connection to other uses of the notion "purpose" well-known by the works of Rudolf v. Jhering, Roscoe Pound and Bulgarian legal theorist as Venelin Ganev and Mihaylina Mihaylova.