Maxims

In communication, there are a set of rules applied to make a successful conversation. The rules help both the speaker and the hearer in delivering their messages and conveying the meanings of their messages. Grice (1975) introduced the Cooperative Principle to throw light on how people use language. It acts as a device for the speaker and the hearer in their communication. The Cooperative Principle (CP) contains four sub-principles, called maxims: Maxim of quality, quantity, relevance, and manner. The interlocutors in order to achieve a successful conversation adhere to those maxims. For sustained and healthy relationship they should not violate or flout the four maxims. Speakers usually obey them to reach the purpose of conversation so that they can avoid any miscommunication. Flouting of maxims is a situation wherein a speaker manipulates a particular maxim that results in a conversational implicature. Ideally, the speaker and the hearer need to cooperate to convey and to understand each other’s speech clearly in each turn. Hence, the speaker can deliver his/her massage in an understandable fashion and the hearer can understand the speaker’s intended massage. Otherwise, the speaker and hearer might misunderstand each other and finally fall into a breakdown in their communication. However, one should be aware that there are layers of meanings to a speech.

Boris Krivokapic

PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

This paper is in fact second part of the paper published in the previous number of the same journal as Boris Krivokapic “Odnos medjunarodnog i unutrasnjeg prava”, Strani pravni život 2/2013, 59-103.

The paper itself has three parts. The first one is introductory, where the author explains why there is a primacy of international law. In the second part of the article he answers the most common arguments that challenge this primacy. In the third, concluding part the author notes the existence of another very important problem, which consists in the request that in order to have legitime primacy, international law must be democratic, one that suits the interests of all members of the international community and not a law that could be turned into an instrument of political and other domination of the most powerful nations.

Second edition, 2016. Over 8800 Latin quotations, proverbs, mottos, etc., for learning and entertainment purposes (grammar, vocabulary, culture, wisdom).  Wide range of sources (ancient, medieval, modern), but heavy on Virgil, Ovid, Horace, Juvenal, Seneca, Cicero, and Publilius Syrus. This edition adds about 50,000 words to the first one.

As with anything written or spoken the language that is used is always from somebody’s viewpoint (Wood-Wallace, 2011: 2) and due to the fact that there are a multitude of different lexical items and syntactical structures for the speaker to choose from, the recipient of communication not only has to understand the literal meaning of the string of words and sentences composed by the speaker or writer but also what the intention of the communicative piece is (Grice, 1989: 86; Huang, 2009: 118). For example ‘It’s hot in here’ could pragmatically mean ‘open the window’, or ‘I’m hungry’ could equally mean ‘I don’t want to go to bed yet’ (Peccei, 1999: 3). Speech is never ‘value free’, it is an encoded piece of communication that in turn is decoded and understood by the recipient. This decoding of sentence meaning, word structure and the lexicon has been studied for a number of years by many linguists (Atlas, 2005: 37, Blunter, 1998: 115; 2004: 488, Grice, 1975: 117; 1989: 86, McCawley, 1978: 245), with a separate branch of lexical pragmatics emerging in the 1990s (Huang, 1998: 1; 2009: 118). The aims of the current essay are to venture further in the semantic-pragmatic field to look more specifically within the realms of entailment and implicature; with the intent of explaining the differences between both entailed and implicated utterances. Equally, the essay will also look into the relationship between semantic and pragmatic utterances and attempt to draw similarities in how entailment and implicature relate to these distinctions. The text will look into how speakers encode and decode language and how context plays a big part in this. Finally, the essay will look at Grice’s Maxims and the Cooperative Principle and attempt to discuss features of conversational implicature with reference to these.

The apothegms of Maxims I present a number of female archetypes. Among those gnomes, the laconic episode of the frysan wyf welcoming her husband (ll. 94b-99) still deserves further attention. Critics have generally read frysan as “Frisian”, yet  Ettmüller he derives it from the adjective frise (frese) and translates it with the Latin crispus, comatus. The purpose of this paper is to expand on Ettmüller’s reading by examining whether the theme of a woman’s hair – as to her conduct, social status, and relationship with her spouse – might also be relevant with regard to the frame of mind of the Anglo-Saxons. If one places the episode of the frysan wyf in a Christian context, the whole passage surely acquires a new perspective. This essay aims at reconsidering Maxims I 94b-99 and its likely relationship with the views on women and their hairstyle held by the Church Fathers – whose veiled sway was certainly present in any scriptorium where Maxims I was either compiled or copied. Hence, the laconic passage of the frysan wyf could be part of a larger cluster of lines, and Maxims I 94b-106 stand as a unique warning for the conduct of Anglo-Saxon women.

This chapter on the manuscript tradition of the moral maxims (sententiae) associated with the mimographer Publilius has already appeared in the volume "Aliento. La traversée européenne des Proverbia Senecae: de Publilius Syrus à Érasme et au-delà", No. 5, coordonné par Marta López Izquierdo (Éditions Universitaires de Lorraine, 2013), 15-50. I publish here the final version of the paper before it went to proofs.

After the introductory part, the author refers to the Kievan Rus, to show that although it was undoubtedly an active participant in international relations (closing international agreements, receiving foreign representatives, etc.) there is no evidence preserved on any papers that  could be called the works of international legal science.

Moreover, even in the period from the 13th until 17th century there are neither theoretical, nor systematic works in the domain of  international law. The widely acclaimed work by P.P. Shafirov “The reflections on the legitimate reasons of the war against Sweden” (1717) could not be characterized as such either.

However, already in the 19th century the Russian science of international law went through an unbelievable period of flourishing. A number of original papers appeared, not just articles and monographs on selected issues, but the systemic works as we
ll. As early as 1880 the Russian Society of International Law was founded. Generally speaking, the Russian science international law of the time was quite advanced and advocated for the strengthening of international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, the renunciation of war, disarmament, etc.

Soon after the October Revolution (1917) there was a division among the scholars. Thus, one group of them withdrew, the others fled abroad and continued their career in exile, while the third group (the majority of them) stayed in the country, raising new generations and laying the foundations of the Soviet science of international law, with all its positive and negative sides.

In the court room, and in the law firm, where both sides have all facts and all legal citations, the case will be won, or lost, on rhetoric; on legal rhetoric; on the appreciation of legal principles, presumptions, doctrines, rules, tests, maxims, and phrases. To the legal writer, a mention of a doctrine here, a maxim there, and a test in the conclusion, will flower the article, making it to sound well researched, more persuasive and ultimately effective. To the legal speaker, the solicitor, legal rhetoric arrests attention, holds conscience captive and wins the will of the adjudicator. Legal Rhetoric!

La presente investigación delinea de forma sistemática una teoría general para todo género de signos distintivos. Para este propósito se vale de las investigaciones parciales que la propiedad industrial y otras ramas del derecho han realizado de algunos signos distintivos particulares, como las marcas, las indicaciones geográficas, los sellos de calidad, los nombres de pila, los nombres comerciales, entre otros. Se usa un método inductivo que recoge leyes, jurisprudencia y doctrina de varios lugares del mundo. En cuanto a la estructura, luego de una introducción, se determinar cuál es el conjunto de los signos distintivos que será el universo a analizar (Capítulo I), se señalan cuáles son los principios generales a todos esos signos (Capítulo II) y se termina con una lista de conclusiones a las que se ha llegado (Capítulo III). Entre otras cosas, concluimos que sí es posible hacer una teoría general que aplique a todo género de signo distintivo y que esta teoría beneficia mucho la profundización doctrinal de los signos distintivos menos regulados por el derecho.
This paper systematically delineates a general theory for all kinds of distinctive signs. For this purpose we use the partial studies developed by industrial property and other areas of law, on any special signs such as trademarks, geographical indications, quality seals, given names, commercial names, and others. We use an inductive approach that includes laws, jurisprudence and doctrine of several countries. Regarding the structure, after an introduction, we determine a set of signs, the one that will be the universe to analyze (Chapter I), then we indicate eleven general principles of these signs (Chapter II), ending with a list of conclusions that we have reached (Chapter III). Among other things, we conclude that it is possible to make a general theory that applies to all kinds of sign and that this theory greatly benefits the doctrinal clarification of the signs less regulated by law.

In Hamlet 1.3.57-81, Polonius’s instructions to Laertes are imparted in the form of either advice or admonition. There is still debate amongst scholars as to the sources Shakespeare might have had in mind in writing these maxims. The purpose of this work is not only to consider the source behind Polonius’s precepts; it also aims to show the main occurrences of such a theme in the Bible and in English literature, especially in the Middle Ages, up to Shakespeare’s time. The works considered in this essay have the same topos: they are the endeavour of a father/mentor to guide his child/disciple on some specific issues. The sage often speaks to the addressee calling him by name and utters his maxims in the imperative. The addressee is never fictional. Writers turn to such a father-to-son pattern not only to instruct their own children, but also to reach out to all those who seek guidance and words of wisdom on a specific matter. This theme has never lost its peculiar essence despite the different literary sensibilities and styles. In fact, throughout history, children always needed warnings and counsels in order to be successful in their own lives; the advice is delivered by a caring father/mentor who, by means of his wisdom and example, will lead them in the world in which they live. Despite cultural, religious and national differences, the rich legacy of moral instructions is an unfailing path which accompanies sons or disciples on a successful course. The hearts of the fathers will turn to those of their children (Mal. 4:6). And the hearts of the children will be filled with the knowledge provided by their fathers. Hence, they will pursue a successful course and will be guided by the wisdom of old – the truest of all compasses.

Legal rules constitute not only reasons for action, but also reasons for judicial decision. What kind of reason do legal rules provide for adjudication? Do they figure as Razian exclusionary reasons in legal reasoning? In this paper I will draw on some insights from Robert Alexy’s theory of principles to deal with these problems.

Предисловие / Библиография  СТАТЬИ  ZÁSADNÍ OTÁZKY VÝVOJE A SOUČASNOSTI KODIFIKACE PRÁVNÍCH INSTITUTŮ [1975] 3–20: 1. Problém jednoty projevů myšlenky kodifikace v historii 3 / 2. Pojem vývoje a vývoj kodifikace 11 / 3. Obečný pojem kodifikace 14 // ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ ОБЩЕСТВА И ПРАВА И ВОПРОСЫ КОДИФИКАЦИИ, УДЕЛЯЯ ОСОБОЕ ВНИМАНИЕ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИМ КОДЕКСАМ [1974] 21–40: 1. Диалектика общественного изменения и сохранения в ходе исторического развития кодификации 22 / 2. Вопрос о возможности кодификации, воспринятой основным средством правотворчества общественного изменения 28 / 3. Параллельность общественного и кодификационного изменений: обратная связь и ее формы в социалистических кодексах 35 // ROZWOJ PRAWA A JEGO KODYFIKACJA [1979] 41–52: 1. Dialektyka społecznych zmian i zachowania w procesie historycznego rozwoju kodyfikacji 41 / 2. Zagadnienie možliwošci kodyfikacji jako podstawowego narzędzia prawodawstwa wprowadzającego zmiany społeczne 45 / 3. Paralelizm zmian społecznych i kodyfikacyjnych: »sprzęženie zwrotne« i jego formy w kodyfikacjach socjalistycznych 49 // СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦИЯ И КОДИФИКАЦИЯ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВА [ms] 53–58 // ВЗАИМОСВЯЗЬ ПРАВОТВОРЧЕСТВА И ПРAВОПРИМЕНЕНИЯ [ms] 59–65 // ЛЕНИН И РЕВОЛУЦИОННОЕ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВО [1969] 67–76 // ЗАВЕРШЕНИЕ СOЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ КОДИФИКАЦИИ [ms] 77–88: 1. Кодификация в европейских и азиатских странах народной демократии 77 / 2. Рекодификация как типовой знак социалистической кодификации 82 // MINISTERSKÉ ODŮVODNĚNÍ A JEHO ÚLOHA VE ZPROSTŘEDKOVÁNÍ PRÁVNÍCH HODNOT [1978] 89–108: I. Principiální a historické základy vzniku minislerského odůvodnéní 90 / II. Možné a žádoucí funkce ministerského odúvodnění v socialistickém právu 98 / III. Ministerské odúvodnění a jeho význam při výkladu právních norem 102 // PREAMBULE – OTÁZKA PRÁVNÍ VĚDY [1970] 109–134: I. Pojem preambule 111 / II. Obsah a funkce preambulí 114 / III. Normatívní dosah obsahu preambule 117 / IV. Problém odůvodněností používání preambulí z hlediska socialistické právní politiky 128 // ЗА САМОСТОЯТЕЛНОСТЬ ПРАВОВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ [ms] 135–138: 1. Связь политики и права 135 / 2. Правовая политика как проводник в связи политики и права 135 / 3. Правовая наука, правовая политика и право права 136 / 4. Необходимость самостоятельности правовой политики 138 // ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКОЕ СОДЕРЖАНИЕ ПРАВА КАК НАДСТРОЙКИ [ms] 139–143 // ПОЈАМ ПРАВА У ЛУКАЧЕВОЈ ОНТОЛОГИЈИ [1983] 145–168 // ДИАЛЕКТИКА РАЗВИТИЯ ПРАВОВЫХ ИНСТРУМЕНТОВ: ПРЕДМЕТНОЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ПРЕЗУМПЦИИ И ФИКЦИИ КАК СРЕДСТВ ЮРИДИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕХНИКИ [ms] 169–204: I. »Презумпция« 170 [1. В процессе судебного установления фактов 172 / 2. В нормативной дефиниции фактов: preasumptio juris tantum 173 / 3. В нормативной дефиниции фактов: praesumptio juris et de jure 174 / 4. В юридической области 174] Относительно »презумпции« 178 [1. Функции 178 / 2. Презумпция и фикция 180 / 3. Неоправданпость эпистемологического обоснования в отношении нормативной области 181 / 4. Технический аппарат презумпции 182] II. »Фикция« 184 [1. В лингвистическом формировании правовых норм 184 / 2. В применении правовых норм судом 185 / 3. В доктриналыюм отражении правовых норм 187 / 4. В теоретической реконструкции правовых норм 188 / 5. В правовом отношении 190] Относительно »фикции« 192 [1. История и сущность: от истоков к юридической фикции 192 / 2. Классификация 196 / 3. Право как фикция 197 / 4. Презумпция и фикция 200] // РАЗДEЛEНИЕ ВЛАСТЕЙ – ИДЕОЛОГИЯ И УТОПИЯ В ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ МЫСЛИ [1984] 205–213 // ПРАВО КАК ИСТОРИЯ [1986] 215–224 // СЛОБОДА, ЈЕДНАКОСТ И ПОЈМОВНИ МИНИМУМ ПРАВИЕ КОМУНИКАЦИЈЕ [1989] 225–244
РЕЗЮМЕ / РЕЦEНЗИИ  [by the author, including] КОДИФИКАЦИЯ КАК ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ИСТОРИЧЕСКОЕ ЯВЛЕНИЕ [1981] 259–262 // [on the author, including] B. А. Четвернин: ПРАВО КАК ИСТОРИЯ [1987] 222–224 / K[atalin] Szamel: ВНУТРЕННЯЯ МОРАЛНОСТЬ ПРАВА [1988] 279–281 & [in] Strani pravni život [Beograd] & [by] L[eonard] Bianchi, Jozef Karpat, Stefan Luby, М. А. Супатаев, J[erzy] Wróblewski

Este artículo reflexiona sobre la escritura aforística a partir de una tríada de autores de gran relevancia para la evolución del género en los siglos XX y XXI: Antonio Machado, Antonio Porchia y José Bergamín. La obra de estos creadores supone un buen punto de partida para analizar algunas de las principales características del aforismo hispánico contemporáneo.

En el presente trabajo se pretende establecer las diferencias básicas entre dos los tipos de expresiones sa- pienciales breves: la γνώμη y la παροιμία. Este es un paso previo necesario para poder realizar el estudio central del trabajo, que se centra en la formación, uso y deformación de las γνῶμαι y παροιμίαι dentro de un contexto literario concreto, en este caso, el del drama ático, centrándonos en dos autores: Eurípides, el trágico gnómico por excelencia, y Aristófanes, célebre por su particular uso de estas expresiones, es- pecialmente de las παροιμίαι. De este modo, expondremos, por una parte, los distintos modos y grados de adaptación de una γνώμη o παροιμία en estos dos autores; por otra, cómo este uso y deformación de estas expresiones afecta al significado que toman dentro del contexto en el que se insertan. Siendo estas expresiones un recurso tan fosilizado ¿Son por ello menos παροιμίαι o menos γνῶμαι? ¿Implican estas modificaciones una supresión de su reconocimiento como tales recursos?

This article surveys post-1945 scholarly attempts to interpret Jesus’ command to ‘render to Caesar the things of Caesar and to God the things of God’ (Mk 12.17; Mt. 22.21; Lk. 20.25). It suggests that part of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of this phrase lies not only in the disputed nature of the data, but also in the failure to clearly define the interpretive categories. This has resulted in contradictory interpretations being described with the same label, as well as scholars failing to notice similarities between the different readings. To this end, the following article attempts to more precisely outline the four major approaches to the command which have emerged since the Second World War (while also noting the various connections between some of these views): (1) exclusivist interpretations in which ‘the things of God’ nullify the ‘the things of Caesar’; (2) complementarian readings in which the two elements are held to be parallel; (3) ambivalent readings that stress the ambiguity and open-ended nature of the utterance; and (4) subordinationist readings that seek to uphold both elements of the command while prioritizing the second element (‘the things of God’) over the first (‘the things of Caesar’). The discussion then turns to considering four areas that might prove fruitful in future analysis of this command.

Villani Stefano, “Raccolte di aforismi. Gli Avvertimenti di Alessandro Amidei come plagio e riscrittura di alcune massime di Francesco Guicciardini, Giovan Francesco Lottini e Francesco Sansovino,” in Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore – Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, serie 5, 9/1 (2017), pp. 127-149

On January 3, 1661 a certain Amidei Alessandro offered to the king of England Charles II a manuscript collection of political aphorisms, that is currently preserved at the Library of Clarke, University of California at Los Angeles. He presented himself as the author of the maxims, which in reality were copied from a printed collection of aphorisms by Guicciardini, Lottini and Sansovino edited by the latter under the title Propositioni, overo Considerationi in materia di cose di Stato in 1583 and republished multiple times in the following decades. A singular figure with a shifting and elusive identity, Amidei was an Italian Jew who moved to England in 1656. As an audacious plagiarist, Amidei took full advantage of the flexibility of the manuscript form, recomposing the maxims to serve his own aims. This case study helps us to understand this creative reuse of aphoristic matter as a common practice of the Baroque age.

Foreword [1994] 1–4
LAW AS PRACTICE  QUELQUES QUESTIONS MÉTHODOLOGIQUES DE LA FORMATION DES CONCEPTS EN SCIENCES JURIDIQUES [1970] 7–33: 1. Introduction 7 / 2. La particularité de l’objet des sciences juridiques 8 / 3. La particularité de la méthodologie des sciences juridiques 10 / 4. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques: Quelques problèmes 15 [4.1. Le concept du droit 16 / 4.2. Le concept dogmatique du contenu du droit 21 / 4.3. Le concept de la normativité juridique 23 / 4.4. Le concept des lacunes en droit 24] / 5. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciencesjuridiques: Quelques conclusions 26 / 6. La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques et la réalité: Conclusion finale 29 / 7. Annexe: Des bases d’une classification possible des définitions en sciences juridiques 31 // GELTUNG DES RECHTS – WIRKSAMKEIT DES RECHTS [1978] 35–42 // MACROSOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LAW: A SURVEY AND APPRAISAL [1983] 43–76: I. Issues of the Macrosociological Theories of Law 46 / II. The Role of the Macrosociological Theories in the Social Science Foundation of Legal Thinking 63 // REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ITS INNER MORALITY [1984] 77–89: 1. Law and Morals As Two Systems of Norms, and the Inner Morality of Law 77 / 2. Law As A Value Bearer and As A Mere External Indicator 78 / 3. The Inner and External Moral Credit of Legislator 83 / 4. The Inner Morality of Law 86 // THE LAW AND ITS LIMITS [1985] 91–96
LAW AS TECHNIQUE  DOMAINE »EXTERNE« ET DOMAINE »INTERNE« EN DROIT [1983] 99–117: 1. Le »juridique« et le »non-juridique« 99 / 2. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que groupes de phénomènes 104 / 3. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que points de références 112 / 4. Conclusion 116 // DIE MINISTERIELLE BEGRÜNDUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER SICHT [1977] 119–139: I. Die prinzipiellen und geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Herausforderung der ministeriellen Begründungen 120 / II. Die möglichen und erwünschten Funktionen der ministeriellen Begründung im sozialistischen Rechts 128 / III. Die ministerielle Begründung und ihr Wert in der Auslegung derRechtsnormen 132 // THE PREAMBLE: A QUESTION OF JURISPRUDENCE [1970] 141–167: I. The Notion of the Preamble 142 / II. Content and Functions of the Preambles 146 / III. Normativity of the Preamble Content 150 / IV. The Problem of the Justifiability of Preamble-drafting in the Light of Socialist Legal Policy 161 // PRESUMPTION AND FICTION: MEANS OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 169–185: I. Presumption 169 [1. In the Judicial Process of Establishing the Facts: praesumptio homini vel facti 170 / 2. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris tantum 170 / 3. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris et de jure 171 / 4. In a Possible Theoretical Reconstruction 171] On »Presumption« 172 [1. Function 172 / 2. Presumption and Fiction 173 / 3. Irrelevancy of Epistemological Foundation 173 / 4. The Technique of Presumption 174] II. Fiction 175 [1. In the Linguistic Formation of Legal Norms 175 / 2. In the Judicial Application of Legal Norms 175 / 3. In the Doctrinal Processing of Legal Norms 176 / 4. In the Theoretical Reconstruction of Legal Norms 176 / 5. Approaches to and Understandings of Fiction 177] On »Fiction« 178 [1. History and Understandings 178 / 2. Classification 180 / 3. Law as Fiction 181 / 4. Presumption and Fiction 182] // LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 187–198: I. Legal Technique 187 [1. In the Large Sense 1987/ 2. In Legal Practice 189 / 3. In Legal Science 189 / 4. As a Special Technique 190] II. On Legal Technique [1. Definition and Function 190 / 2. Legal Technique and Legal Cultures 192 / 3. Postulates of Legal Technique in the Cultures of Modem Formal Law 195 {a) The Principle of Consequentiality 195 / b) The Principle of Coherency 195 / c) The Principle of Conceptual Economy 196 / d) The Principle of Non-redundancy 196}]
LAW AS LOGIC  MODERNE STAATLICHKEIT UND MODERNES FORMALES RECHT [1982] 201–207: 1. Die Klassifizierung als logisches und als gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Verfahren 202 / 2. Typologie der staatlichen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen 202 / 3. Der moderne Staat und das moderne formale Recht: Frage der Zusammenhänge und Entwicklungsalternativen 204 // HETEROGENEITY AND VALIDITY OF LAW: OUTLINES OF AN ONTOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION [1986] 209–218 // LEIBNIZ UND DIE FRAGE DER RECHTLICHEN SYSTEMBILDUNG [1973] 219–232: 1. Aktualität von Leibniz 219 / 2. Der Gedanke der universalen mathematischen Methode 221 / 3. Die logischen Konzeption der Rechtswissenschaft 224 / 4. Die geometrische Vision der rechtlichen Systembildung 227 / 5. Das Scheitern der Leibnizschen Idee und seine Lehre 230 // LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM [1975] 233–255: 1. The Logical Structure of Law as a Historical Product 233 / 2. Tendencies of Formal Rationalization in Legal Development 234 / 3. Historical Development of the Approach to Law as a System 239 / 4. Present State of the Attempts at a Logical Reconstruction of Law and Legal Reasoning 243 / 5. Question of the Axiomatic Conception of Law 248 / 6. Heuristic Value of the Approach to Law as a System 250 // LOGIC OF LAW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVITY: A GAP BETWEEN IDEALS, REALITY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES [1982] 258–288: 1. Historical Background 259 / 2. Ideals 264 / 3. Reality 270 / 4. Future Perspectives 277 // KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW – YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW [ms] 289–293, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF NORMS: SCIENCE- AND LANGUAGE-PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS [ms] 295–314: 1. Presuppositions 295 / 2. The Context of the Application of Norms 300 [2.1 Actualisation in Concrete Meaning 300 / 2.2 Linguistic Undefinedness 304 / 2.3 Lack of Logical Consequence in the Normative Sphere 308]
LAW AS EXPERIENCE  ON THE SOCIALLY DETERMINED NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING [1971] 317–374: 1. Interrelation of the Creation and Application of Law 317 / 2. The Socially Determined Nature of the Application of Law 332 / 3. The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning 337 / 4. The Question of Perspectives 363 // TOWARDS THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW: SOME THESES ON THE BASIS OF LUKÁCS’ ONTOLOGY [1983] 375–390, IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? [1984] 391–398: 1. Working Models of Law 391 / 2. Senses of ContExtuality in Law 393 / 3. Jurisprudential Approach and Socio-ontological Approach 394 / 4. Conclusions 396 [4.1. Law as Historical Continuum 396 / 4.2.Law as Open System 396 / 4.3. / Law as Complex Phenomenon with Alternative Strategy 396 / 4.4. Law as an Irreversible Process 397 / 4.5. The Genuinely Societal Character of Law 397] // EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF NATIONAL LEGAL CULTURES [1992] 399–411: 1. The Philosophical Framework 399 / 2. Law as Tradition 403 / 3. European Integration and the Preservation of the Uniqueness of National Legal Orders 407 // INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS: NOTES ON THE CLOSED SETS, OPEN VISTAS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSCENDENCY OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS [1991] 413–424: I. A Logic of Systems 413 / II. Ideal Types and Historically Concrete Manifestations 416 / III. Ideal Type As A Normative Ideology 418 / IV.Objectivity and Contingency of Systems 420 / V. Limits and Bonds, ConsEquEntiality and Practicability of a System 423
LAW AS HISTORY  FROM LEGAL CUSTOMS TO LEGAL FOLKWAYS [1981] 427–436, ANTHROPOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE? LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL CULTURES [1985] 437–457: 1. Rule, Fact and Principle in the Concept of Law 438 [a) Abstract rules 439 / b) Abstracts from actual behaviour 439 / c) Principles Upheld by Legal Decisions 440] 2. Attributes of Law 445 [a) Authority 446 / b) Intention of Universal Application 446 / c) Obligatio 447 / d) Sanction 447] 3. Law and its Social Functional Definition 450 [(1) Law is a Global Phenomenon 451 / (2) Law is a Phenomenon Able to Settle Conflicts of Interests 451 / 3) Law is a Phenomenon Prevailing as the Supreme Controlling Factor 452] 4. Conclusion 454 // LAW AS A SOCIAL ISSUE [1985] 459–475: I. The Social Prestige of Law 459 / II. The Social Nature of Law 463 / III. Law and Language in the Service of Social Mediation 466 (1. Passive Mediation and Active Intervention 468 / 2. The Dilemma of the Mediation of Values 472) // LAW AS HISTORY? [1986] 477–484: 1. Understandings of the Term »Law« 477 / 2. Law and History 478 / 3. Law as History 481 // RECHTSKULTUR – DENKKULTUR: EINFÜHRUNG ZUM THEMA [1988] 485–489
Curriculum Vitae 491 / Bibliography 493 // Index 515 / Index of Normative Materials 523 / Index of Names 525

The aim of the article is to analyze the speech act compliment as an integral part of successful interpersonal communication based on the principles and maxims of speech communication of G. P. Grice, R. Lakoff, J. Leech, and in the context of politeness theory of P. Brown and S. Levinson, as well as the study of compliment as a manifestation of conventional, etiquette politeness. The study of this aspect of compliments is carried out within the linguopragmatic approach by the method of continuous sampling, the method of intent analysis and the method of quantitative calculation. The article shows exactly how compliments are realized in the plane of the principles of speech communication and how we distinguish sincere compliments from ironic ones. Therefore, we believe that the expression of ironic compliments violates the principles and maxims of speech communication, because it destroys the communicative balance and harmonious communication between interlocutors. In the proposed work, we consider first of all sincere compliments, which are not included in the Face Threatening Acts according to the classification of P. Brown and S. Levinson. We hold the opinion that ironic compliments only formally, thanks to the tokens of positive evaluation resemble a compliment, in fact, the purpose of the speaker is to offend the interlocutor. The main marker of sincerity is the meaning constructed by the linguistic consciousness of the communicators in the discourse and implemented through a compliment to show a positive, friendly attitude to the interlocutor, express a positive emotional assessment, show good intentions and adhere to the principle of cooperation to preserve your face and the face of the partner. We also distinguish etiquette compliments, which are an element of the conventional strategy of politeness, phatic communication, due to certain socio-cultural norms and rules of etiquette, they are clichéd, ritual, uninformative, and, therefore, do not involve the sincerity of the speaker. As a result of the analysis of the factual material, it is established that such compliments are not inherent in dramatic works of the 18.-20 th centuries.

Key words: speech act, compliment, principle of cooperation, principle of politeness, maxims, theory of politeness, ironic compliments, etiquette compliments.

Метою статті є аналіз мовленнєвого акту компліменту як невід’ємної складової успішного міжособистісного спілкування на основі принципів та максим мовленнєвої комунікації Г. П. Грайса, Р. Лакофф, Дж. Ліча та в контексті теорії ввічливості П. Браун і С. Левінсона, а також дослідження компліменту як вияву конвенційної, етикетної ввічливості. Вивчення цього аспекту висловлень компліментів здійснено в межах лінгвопрагматичного підходу методом суцільної вибірки, прийомом інтент-аналізу та методом кількісного підрахунку. У статті показано, як саме відбувається реалізація компліменту в площині принципів мовленнєвої комунікації та як відмежовуємо щирі компліменти від іронічних. Відтак вважаємо, що висловлювання іронічних компліментів порушує принципи та максими мовленнєвої комунікації, адже руйнує комунікативну рівновагу та гармонійне спілкування між співрозмовниками. У пропонованій роботі розглядаємо насамперед щирі компліменти, які не зараховуємо до Face Threatening Acts згідно з класифікацією П. Браун і С. Левінсона. Дотримуємося думки, що іронічні компліменти тільки формально, завдяки лексемам позитивної оцінки нагадують комплімент, насправді ж метою мовця є образити співрозмовника. Головним маркером щирості вважаємо смисл, сконструйо ваний мовною свідомістю комунікантів у дискурсі та реалізований через комплімент з метою показати позитивне, доброзичливе ставлення до співрозмовника, виразити позитивну емоційну оцінку, засвідчити добрі наміри та дотриматися принципу кооперації з метою збереження свого обличчя та обличчя свого партнера. Розрізняємо також етикетні компліменти, що є елементом конвенційної стратегії ввічливості, фатичної комунікації, зумовлені певними соціокультурними нормами та правилами етикету, вони є клішованими, ритуальними, малоінформативними, відтак не передбачають щирості мовця. У результаті аналізу фактичного матеріалу встановлено, що такі компліменти не притаманні драматичним творам XVIII–XX століття.

Ключові слова: мовленнєвий акт, комплімент, принцип кооперації, принцип ввічливості, максими, теорія ввічливості, іронічні компліменти, етикетні компліменти.

An analogy of how God is viewed in the terms of the law that is our heritage. We are endowed by our Creator with unalienable rights and this has always been looked upon as the greatest law and as natural law.

Outlined in law, God is simply identified as a supreme being of good. Key documents that declare the roots of our liberties recognize God as supreme with rules that have been long established over numerous centuries.

Read the entire article here - God In Law: http://www.nomoretyranny.net/god-in-law-its-not-what-you-think/

Proverbs are very much a component of traditional culture; often used and patterned for “retention and ready recall” by balance, rhythm, alliteration, assonance, or rhyme, they have become a constituent part of common memory (Ong 2012, 34). They are “storehouses of wisdom” and in them- selves often resemble legal rules (Brink 2005, 96-97); note, for example, the use of the compelling auxiliary verb mot (‘must’) in morth mot ma mith morthe kela (“murder must be cooled [i.e., placated] with murder”). Proverbs also transmit communal norms and values to posterity, they give advice or warn, articulate desired behaviour or unwanted conduct (Brink 2005, 91; Sumner 1999, 22). Their presence in medieval Frisian laws has long been recognized, and they were gratefully collected and included in the  rst col- lection of German/Germanic legal proverbs. Conrad Borchling (1908, 32) praised the “beautiful, old, alliterative formulas” in which proverbs had fre- quently been cast. Sympathetic, yet romantic, is a brief discussion by Man- fred Szadrowsky (1959-61, 155-56), who quali ed the Frisian proverbs as“urgermanisch” in nature. Wybren Jan Buma (1961, 74-83) also devoted due attention to their occurrence in the First Rüstring Manuscript (Oldenburg, Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv, Bestand 24-1, Ab. Nr. 1), but his treatment is little more than an enumeration and lacks any contextualization. More recently, critics have been less generous with praise. Klaus von See (1967, 1), for example, opined that alliterative legal verse, especially in the Frisian legal texts, and alliterative proverbs should not be completely neglected in a study of Germanic poetics, but in view of the continuing presence of al- literation in proverbs and formulas one should be careful not to assume Germanic, pre-Christian traditional matter whenever alliteration emerges in a text. With the above in mind, this paper begins with a brief survey of proverbial literature in the various Germanic languages so as to provide a proper backdrop against which to view the medieval Frisian tradition. Next, the nature of proverbs and their function in Old Frisian legal texts will be subjected to a close consideration in the light of recent scholarship.

Certainty is an epistemological category implied in at least two crucial issues of early-modern jurisprudence: the certainty of law (legal certainty) and the certainty of facts (factual certainty). Any historical study approaching questions related to early-modern legal certainty should therefore focus both on laws and on facts. Francis Bacon's emphasis on legal certainty in his project for law reform has been widely acknowledged in earlier and recent works. It has even been suggested that certainty “is the quality Bacon associates with a general positivist science capable of producing laws valid for both nature and the state.” However, no studies so far have attempted to explain in what sense Bacon understood legal certainty. The same can be said of his notion of factual certainty. Although studies have suggested that Bacon applied criteria drawn from the domain of the law in order to establish facts, assess testimonies and transmit factual reports in the methodology of natural history, his views concerning legal facts, and particularly concerning factual certainty in jurisprudence, have never been systematically explored.
My overarching view is somewhat different from the interpretations which associate Bacon's legal views on certainty to his ideas on natural philosophy in that I think his concept of certainty in jurisprudence needs to be clarified and specified before drawing conclusions about its possible commonalities with natural philosophy and natural history. The present study will explore Bacon's views on certainty in his legal thought and practice, hoping that it may lead to a better understanding of the epistemological side of his legal thought and prompt further studies to examine its possible connections to his treatment of certainty as it applies to the laws and facts of nature.
Although throughout his legal career Bacon encountered and dealt with problems arising from legal as well as factual certainty, he never defined or described the kind of certainty typical of laws and facts. His elusive notions of certainty have to be traced throughout the wide extent of his legal writings and his interventions in legal cases. As we shall see, legal certainty was a major preoccupation in Bacon's law reform project, while factual certainty did not play such a significant role. This lesser interest in factual certainty evinced in Bacon's writings and practices does not imply, however, that he considered factual certainty any less important than legal certainty: he clearly expressed that the work of the “judges of facts” who “try and decide the issues and points of facts” is “a matter no less important to the sum of justice than the true and judicious expositions of the laws themselves.”6 If anything, Bacon's lack of emphasis on factual certainty reflects his belief that the current practices and doctrines in English law regarding the establishment of facts were not in need of substantive reform. Conversely, he judged that English law sorely needed legal certainty and concentrated his efforts on achieving it through reform.

Up to age 5, children are known to experience difficulties in the derivation of implicitly conveyed content, sticking to literally true, even if underinformative, interpretation of sentences. The computation of implicated meanings is connected to the (apparent or manifest) violation of Gricean conversational maxims. We present a study that tests unmotivated violations of the maxims of Quantity, Relevance, and Manner and of the Maximize Presupposition principle, with a Truth Value Judgment task with three options of response. We tested pre-schoolers and school-aged children, with adults as controls, to verify at which age these pragmatic rules are recognized and to see whether there is a difference among these tenets. We found an evolutionary trend and that, in all age groups, violations of the maxims of Quantity and of Relation are sanctioned to a higher degree compared to infringements of the Maim of Manner and of the Maximize Presupposition principle. We conjecture that this relates to the effects that the violation of a certain maxim or principle has on the goals of the exchange: listeners are less tolerant with statements that transmit inaccurate or incomplete information, while being more tolerant with those that still permit to understand what has happened.

Introduction and significance of the study:
Sharīʻah Maxims (Legal Maxims) are such leading principles and regulations in the light of which legal scholars and academic philosophers explore the permissible commands of the enduring issues. One deducted legal rule doesn’t cover up all the situations and matters underneath but its maximum states.
The assumption of laws is just by the Qur’ān and the Nobel statements of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), or the Ijm’a (Consensus of Opinion), Ijtihad and Qias (Analogy) which are deduced from these sources of the Sharīʻah.
These Maxims are the idioms of the legal discipline that make easy to understand the ideology behind. As the other fundamental and branched rules of Islamic Jurisprudence are directly or indirectly figure out from the Qurʼān and Sunah, similarly these Legal explanations are constructed from the main sources of sharīʻah.
These explanatory officially authorized conventions are deducible so their application in the various fields of practical life is an easy approach to the day today generating issues. One of the leading aspects of the human life is Economics. It is the main pillar of the social and political life and major demand of an individual’s life. As the importance of this factor is quite obvious in all domains of life so it’s concerned matters, problems and issues are at the utmost peak.
At the time of Hijrah the economic condition of Madina city was under crisis, the poor had forced to remain as poor from centuries, they were plunged to slavery life. This critical downfall of human life was strategically switched by the wisdom of the Prophethood, which elevated the surety level on this divine religion.
Muslim world with all its resources, is now suffering from decline, due to the lack of advantageously religious and academic, potential and technological skill generating. In the existing scenario of our globe the major reason behind every conflict is the economic crisis.
Islam not only warns to be beneficial in one’s own life instead it emphasis the equal availability of opportunities among the human beings. The glorious history of Islam shows tremendous such examples when there was no one available to receive Zakah (alms).
To overcome the present financial defeat, destruction of natural resources and unavailability of basic life requirements, the religious and literary persons have to combine their efforts. In order to sort out the best possible solutions of the contemporary economic crisis, especially in the Muslim countries the Islamic Economic system needs to be restructuring.
Regardless of depending that others make financial policies for our resources and consumption balance. There is a dire need to make working our intellectual, literary persons, thinkers, researchers & economists to rise up their mutual exertions. This research activity will categorically be a part of this inevitable need.
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El trabajo se propone alcanzar tres objetivos: 1) Aclarar la disputada cuestión de la “naturaleza” de las presunciones en el Derecho; para ello se muestra la distancia que media entre el sintagma “es presumible” y el sintagma “se presumirá (o debe presumirse)” como forma de aislar adecuadamente la noción de “normas de presunción”. 2) Aclarada esta noción, mostrar la necesidad de introducir en su análisis la distinción entre reglas y principios; lo que permite distinguir, a su vez, entre normas de presunción-regla (presunciones-regla) y normas de presunción- principio (presunciones-principio). 3) Tratar de disolver en términos teóricos las llamadas “presunciones iuris et de iure”, para ello se distingue entre “normas de presunción” (que obligan a presumir) y “normas basadas en una presunción” (que no obligan a presumir).

Author of this paper deals with the theoretical definition of the principles and fundamentals. Further he defines the relationship between the principle of legitimacy and the principle of legal protection with regard to their mutual conditionality. He focuses in the paper on the concretization of the individual principles and he intends in this respect on the importance of the principles and their effect on realization of tax administration. He also points out on decisions of the Slovak and Czech judiciary with respect to these principles.

The balancing or weighing of principles by reference to their dimension of weight or importance seems to represent the prevailing method for solving contradictions (antinomies) arising between legal principles when the latter are applied in practice. However, as I argue in the paper, the method of balancing or weighing might not be the only method for solving antinomies or at least a specific type of antinomy between implicit legal principles (the so-called total-partial antinomy, according to Ross’s taxonomy). Instead of resorting to the prevailing method of weighing or balancing principles, I argue that the criterion for solving the so-called total-partial antinomies between implicit legal principles could also be the classical juridical criterion of speciality (lex specialis derogat legi generali) which is one of the criteria used for solving antinomies between legal rules.

O presente artigo pretende não só conceituar as regras jurídicas, mas também demonstrar o seu funcionamento. Para tanto, são descritas as buscas por coordenação, expertise, eficiência e segurança jurídica, descrevendo, outrossim, as características de generalidade, abstração, recurso a generalizações e à linguagem. Ao final, defende-se a importância do respeito às regras.

Writing for social engagement in an academic context indicates the authors' attitude towards the propositional content and the text's audience through metadiscursive maxims markers employment. This study tried to determine whether there are any differences in metadiscourse marking in research articles across different disciplines and different quartile ranks. To this end, Abdi's (2010) CP-based model of metadiscourse marking was used to study how writers use metadiscursive maxims markers to see any differences in metadiscourse maxims marking in their writings. To this end, we selected 193 research articles from recently published journals (2018-2020) and balanced them based on size. Then, we carefully went through them and extracted maxims markers manually. The results showed that the cooperation categories of quality, quantity, manner, and interaction were widely used among philosophy writers, which can help understand, study, and teach this critical area of language us...