Gerhard Thonhauser
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Freie Universität Berlin, CRC 1171 Affective Societies, Department Memberadd
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Phenomenology, Social Philosophy, Social Ontology, Existentialism, and 15 moreSocial Theory, Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy of the Emotions, Philosophy of Mind, Critical Theory, Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Ethics, Hermeneutics, Martin Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Judith Butler, Political Science, and History of Philosophyedit
- Since February 2019 I work at the chair of practical philosophy (Prof. Sophie Loidolt) at TU Darmstadt. From 2004-201... moreSince February 2019 I work at the chair of practical philosophy (Prof. Sophie Loidolt) at TU Darmstadt. From 2004-2010 I studied philosophy and political science at the University of Vienna. Graduation in philosophy with a thesis on the concept of temporality in Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Graduation in political science with a thesis on Judith Butler’s political theory. Several study and research stays at the University of Copenhagen. 2011-2012 DOC-scholarship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW). 2012-2016 scientific assistant at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna (chair for social and political philosophy; Prof. Hans Bernhard Schmid). 2016 doctorate in philosophy with a thesis on Heidegger and Kierkegaard. 2017-2018 Erwin Schrödinger Fellow of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) at Free University of Berlin (Prof. Jan Slaby) and associated with the Collaborative Research Center 1171 Affective Societies.edit
Against the background of recent debates around "critical phenomenology", this paper discusses Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the phenomenological method, focusing on the preface of Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty traces the... more
Against the background of recent debates around "critical phenomenology", this paper discusses Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the phenomenological method, focusing on the preface of Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty traces the distinction between classical and critical phenomenology back to Husserl. He sees the Husserl of the published works as representing a version of phenomenology that is unsuited for critique and advocates for another Husserl that he finds in (at the time) unpublished manuscripts. Merleau-Ponty considers the phenomenological reduction as the key methodological step to break with the taken-for-grantedness of the world and to make manifest the inescapable entanglement of subject and world. He considers this the prerequisite for and path into an analysis and critique of social structures. Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the phenomenological method precisely because he finds it to be the most suitable approach for analysing the works of power in concrete historical movements and to develop a situated critique.
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The paper explores emotional abilities from the (neo-)existentialist perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre and Richard Moran. First, it reconstructs Sartre's understanding of emotions as active comportments achieving a magical transformation... more
The paper explores emotional abilities from the (neo-)existentialist perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre and Richard Moran. First, it reconstructs Sartre's understanding of emotions as active comportments achieving a magical transformation of the world. Second, it explores what existentialists mean by first-person authority: Regarding my own emotions, I cannot only explore what I feel, but I also need to ask myself what to feel. The claim is that my emotions depend on me committing to them. Third, I highlight a difference between a neo-existentialist account which focuses on reflective self-constitution, and a vintage existentialist approach which focuses on pre-reflective self-awareness. Forth, I point out that (neo-)existentialism helps to make explicit the normative claim which is implied when speaking of abilities regarding one's emotions. The claim is that it is up to me to either endorse my emotions or to change who I am to feel differently. Finally, I indicate the limits of such an approach when it comes to social structures of inequality and domination.
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This paper discusses key conceptual resources for an understanding of coordination processes in team sports. It begins by exploring the action guidance provided by the environment, studied in terms of affordances. When conceptualizing... more
This paper discusses key conceptual resources for an understanding of coordination processes in team sports. It begins by exploring the action guidance provided by the environment, studied in terms of affordances. When conceptualizing sporting performances in general, we might distinguish social and object affordances, think about the spatial and temporal order of affordances in terms of nested and sequential affordances, and differentiate between global, main, and micro-affordances within an action sequence. In the context of team sports, it is crucial to understand how affordances might be given to a plurality of athletes. For that purpose, the paper defines shared, common, and collective affordances. A distinguishing characteristic of team sports is the key role of collaborative intra-team coordination which take place within a setting of antagonistic team-team interactions. A key proposal from dynamical systems theory is to conceptualize intra-team coordination in terms of synergies. Synergies are emergent systems of several athletes who coordinate their movements to achieve specific performance tasks. Many of the embodied skills that players need to develop to become suitable participants in the coordination processes of sport teams are abilities to participate in dynamic sequences of collective activity. Praxeological approaches have emphasized that training processes in team sports are aimed at transforming athletes into skillful participants in sequences of collective play. Athletes need to develop their ability-to-play-with to become proficient in contributing to the formation of suitable collectives for specific performance tasks.
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Ultimate is a competitive team sport that is played, even at the highest level of competition, without external referees. The key to Ultimate as a self-refereed sport is the so-called 'Spirit of the Game.' As this paper aims to show, the... more
Ultimate is a competitive team sport that is played, even at the highest level of competition, without external referees. The key to Ultimate as a self-refereed sport is the so-called 'Spirit of the Game.' As this paper aims to show, the Spirit of the Game closely resembles Habermas's theory of communicative action. This suggests that Habermas's theory might be used to spell out the philosophical presuppositions of the Spirit of the Game. Most importantly, the requirements for players to serve as referees of their own game specified in the 'Rules of Ultimate' turn out to be reformulations of the four validity claims of communicative action. Moreover, the Spirit of the Game can be interpreted as aiming towards facilitating real-life decision-making procedures that resemble as much as possible Habermas's concept of an ideal speech situation. On the other hand, Ultimate might serve as a case study for exploring how Habermas's idea of rational deliberation works in the practice of a competitive sporting environment. Most importantly, it makes manifest that self-refereeing is a trust-based system. This suggests that communicative rationality can only unfold its power-the unforced force of the better argument-within a context in which participants trust that everyone participates in good faith towards the common goal of finding the best decision. Hence, investigating the case of Ultimate allows us to draw broader conclusions about the requirements for rational deliberation to work in practice.
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The paper critically reconstructs the crowd psychological heritage in phenomenological and social science emotion research. It shows how the founding figures of phenomenology and sociology uncritically adopted Le Bon's crowd psychological... more
The paper critically reconstructs the crowd psychological heritage in phenomenological and social science emotion research. It shows how the founding figures of phenomenology and sociology uncritically adopted Le Bon's crowd psychological imagery as well as what I suggest calling the disease model of emotion transfer. Against this background, it can be examined how Le Bon's understanding of emotional contagion as an automatic, involuntary, and uncontrollable mechanism has remained a dominant force in emotion research until today. However, a closer look at phenomenological descriptions and empirical investigations of how emotion's spread shows that there is little evidence supporting Le Bon's crowd psychological framework. Thus, I suggest that the disease model should be dismissed in favor of more plausible approaches to interpersonal emotion dynamics.
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This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between... more
This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between collective emotions as affective experiences and underpinning mechanisms. Second, it elaborates on other types of affective experience, namely the social sharing of emotion, group-based emotions, and joint emotions. Then, it proposes a working definition of collective emotion via a minimal threshold and four structural features. Finally, it develops a taxonomy of five types of collective emotion: emotional sharing, emotional contagion, emotional matching, emotional segregation, and emotional fusion.
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This is the second part of my investigation into the history of the term "Stimmung".
Research Interests: Philosophy, History of Ideas, Empathy (Psychology), Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, and 14 moreSchopenhauer, Immanuel Kant, Georg Simmel, Friedrich Schiller, Empathy (Philosophy), Empathy, Begriffsgeschichte, Atmosphere, Alois Riegl, Affectivity and the Emotions, Moods (Stimmung), Tuning, Befindlichkeit, and Stimmung
The last few years have seen increasing research interest in moods and atmospheres. While this trend has been accompanied by growing interest in the history of the word Stimmung in other disciplines, this has not yet been the case within... more
The last few years have seen increasing research interest in moods and atmospheres. While this trend has been accompanied by growing interest in the history of the word Stimmung in other disciplines, this has not yet been the case within philosophy. Against this background, this paper offers a conceptual history of the word Stimmung, focusing on the period from Kant to Heidegger, as this period is, presumably, less known to researchers working with notions like mood, attunement or atmosphere today. Thus, considering this period might provide conceptual resources not yet considered in current debate. Stimmung has the remarkable feature of encompassing the entire semantic field of mood and atmosphere, insofar as both subjects and objects can literally be in Stimmung. Stimmung might refer to the state or condition of being attuned, which is understood as a dispositional state, as well as the process or act of attuning, which includes self-activating and foreign-determined forms of attuning. The word was first used for the tuning of musical instruments, but was quickly transferred to the fields of aesthetics, psychology, and physiology. This paper will focus on the contrast between the psychological canonization of Stimmung as a type of mental state, and the use of Stimmung as an untranslatable, irreducible metaphor with unique semantic force allowing for original theorizing.
Research Interests: Psychology, Emotion, German Studies, Philosophy, Aesthetics, and 15 moreMedia Studies, History of Ideas, Art Theory, Literary Theory, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Georg Simmel, Friedrich Schiller, Theodor Lipps, Atmosphere, Alois Riegl, Tuning, and Moritz Geiger
There has been considerable progress in investigating collective actions in the last decades. However, the real progress is different from what many scholars take it to be. It lies in the fact that there is by now a wealth of different... more
There has been considerable progress in investigating collective actions in the last decades. However, the real progress is different from what many scholars take it to be. It lies in the fact that there is by now a wealth of different approaches from a variety of fields. Each approach has carved out fruitful mechanisms for explaining collective action, but is also faced with limitations. Given that situation, we submit that the next step in investigating collective action is to acknowledge the plurality of approaches and bring them into dialogue. With this aim in mind, the present article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of some of the to our mind most relevant approaches to collective action in current debates. We begin with the collective intentionality framework, the team reasoning approach, and social identity theory. Then, we move to ecological social psychology, participatory sense-making, and, through the lenses of those frameworks, dynamical systems theory. Finally, we discuss practice theory. Against this background, we provide a proposal for a synthesis of the successful explanatory mechanisms as they have been carved out by the different research programs. The suggestion is, roughly, to understand collective action as dynamical interaction of a self-organizing system with its environment, shaped by a process of collective sense-making.
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This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental... more
This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her "embodied social identity" of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective.
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According to individualism about feelings, only individuals can experience feelings, because only individuals live under the condition of embodiment. Assuming a necessary link between emotions and feelings thus seems to justify doubt... more
According to individualism about feelings, only individuals can experience feelings, because only individuals live under the condition of embodiment. Assuming a necessary link between emotions and feelings thus seems to justify doubt about the possibility of shared emotions. I challenge this line of argumentation by showing that feelings are best understood as enactments of a feeling body, which is a psycho-physically neutral expressive unity. Based on the body's embeddedness into a world and connectedness with others, feelings are perceivable and shareable. Accordingly, dynamics of mutual incorporation and interaffectivity are shown to be the ground for shared feelings.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Max Scheler, Social Cognition, Phenomenology, Philosophy of the Emotions, and 15 moreIntercorporeality, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Intersubjectivity, Phenomenology of the body, Philosophy of Emotion, Collective Intentionality, Phenomenology of the Body (Philosophy), Phenomenology of Touch, Enactivism, Mindreading, Embodied Intersubjectivity, Shared Emotions, Collective Emotions, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, and Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity
This article aims to explicate the concept of emotional sharing against the background of interactive and situated approaches to affectivity, and to contextualize emotional sharing within the broader context of emotion research. It... more
This article aims to explicate the concept of emotional sharing against the background of interactive and situated approaches to affectivity, and to contextualize emotional sharing within the broader context of emotion research. It brings together research on situated affectivity with the debate on collective emotion. Emotional sharing is defined via four requirements and distinguished from other phenomena in the broad field of collective emotion, especially from mechanisms of emotional convergence and other forms of affective we-experience. The paper makes use of the recently proposed concepts of affective scaffolding and affective arrangement to explore how emotional sharing is always enacted in sociorelational dynamics and embedded in socio-material contexts which enable, shape, and modulate the unfolding of emotional sharing and regulate who is likely to participate.
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Martin Heidegger and Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s essential contribution to the phenomenology of emotions is their discovery of the primordial role of Stimmung (attunement) for human intentionality and the intelligibility of the world. In his... more
Martin Heidegger and Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s essential contribution to the phenomenology of emotions is their discovery of the primordial role of Stimmung (attunement) for human intentionality and the intelligibility of the world. In his characterization of Dasein’s being-in- the-world, Heidegger introduces Befindlichkeit (the ontological condition of being attuned) together with understanding and discourse as three equiprimordial existentiale of Dasein. Bollnow builds on Heidegger in developing his main contribution to philosophical anthropology: the introduction of attunement as the most primordial level of human life.1
I will begin by introducing Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit and attunement in Being and Time. Heidegger’s conception of Befindlichkeit has served as the kernel of a productive philosophical perspective on affectivity (Ratcliffe 2008, 2013; Slaby and Stephan 2008; Withy 2014, 2015). In contrast, the work of Bollnow has not received much attention. I will use the second section to discuss his seminal work Das Wesen der Stimmungen (The Nature of Attunements). In the third section, I will come back to Heidegger and discuss his idiosyncratic understanding of fundamental attunements, which shows the close link between Befindlichkeit and the core of his overall philosophical project.
I will begin by introducing Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit and attunement in Being and Time. Heidegger’s conception of Befindlichkeit has served as the kernel of a productive philosophical perspective on affectivity (Ratcliffe 2008, 2013; Slaby and Stephan 2008; Withy 2014, 2015). In contrast, the work of Bollnow has not received much attention. I will use the second section to discuss his seminal work Das Wesen der Stimmungen (The Nature of Attunements). In the third section, I will come back to Heidegger and discuss his idiosyncratic understanding of fundamental attunements, which shows the close link between Befindlichkeit and the core of his overall philosophical project.
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The current debate on shared or collective emotions has seen a rediscovery of Max Scheler. In this debate, Scheler's work is mostly read independent from its historic context. In particular, the influence of crowd psychology on Scheler's... more
The current debate on shared or collective emotions has seen a rediscovery of Max Scheler. In this debate, Scheler's work is mostly read independent from its historic context. In particular, the influence of crowd psychology on Scheler's thought has not been taken into consideration, despite Scheler's explicit references to Le Bon's (1895) The Crowd. In this paper, I show that Scheler's understanding of emotional contagion is deeply indebted to Le Bon's mass psychology. Against this background, I critically discuss Scheler's distinction of emotional contagion (Gefühlsansteckung) and feeling-with-one-another (Miteinanderfühlen). This leads to the conclusion that this distinction, at least in the formulation provided by Scheler, hinders rather than enhances research on emotional sharing.
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Der Beitrag widmet sich zunächst der Frage, warum in der Debatte um die politische Differenz die Dimension der Institutionalisierung untertheoretisiert bleibt. Anhand ausgewählter Positionen wird gezeigt, wie das Denken der politischen... more
Der Beitrag widmet sich zunächst der Frage, warum in der Debatte um die politische Differenz die Dimension der Institutionalisierung untertheoretisiert bleibt. Anhand ausgewählter Positionen wird gezeigt, wie das Denken der politischen Differenz auf eine von zwei Alternativen hinausläuft: einen Philosophismus, der sich radikal von der Politik verabschiedet, oder einen Politizismus, der sich radikal der Politik verschreibt. Beide Alternativen haben zur Folge, dass aus einer Ontologie des Politischen nichts für die konkrete Gestaltung politischer Institutionen folgen kann. Zudem wird gezeigt, dass die Rede von der politischen Differenz ihre Dringlichkeit angesichts der post-politischen Situation Ende des 20. Jahrhundert erhielt, während die gegenwärtige Rückkehr des Politischen die Fokusverschiebung auf tatsächliche politische Alternativen geboten erscheinen lässt. Nach einer Rekonstruktion von Marcharts Reformulierung der politischen Differenz werden anschließend mit Hochschild und Castoriadis Mechanismen identifiziert, die dafür sorgen, dass es uns zumeist gelingt, eine Konfrontation mit der Abgründigkeit des Sozialen zu vermeiden, indem wir potenzielle Dissonanzen ausblenden und die Welt als in Ordnung erfahren. Abschließend diskutiere ich mit Castoriadis "politische Imagination" als Kraft der Instituierung und Erschütterung von Ordnungen und formuliere die These, dass die zentrale Problemkonstellation der Gegenwart vielleicht nicht fehlendes Kontingenz-und Konfliktbewusstsein ist, sondern mangelnde Ambiguitätstoleranz.
Research Interests: Sociology, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Democratic Theory, and 12 morePolitical Science, Castoriadis, Political Institutions, Democracy, Social and Political Philosophy, Radical Democracy, Contemporary Political Theory, Political Phenomenology, Critical Phenomenology, Oliver Marchart, Arlie Russell Hochschild, and Phenomenology of the Political
Public assemblies play a major role in current politics. On the one hand, the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement have generated hope on the left. On the other hand, many countries are experiencing a surge of right-wing populism.... more
Public assemblies play a major role in current politics. On the one hand, the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement have generated hope on the left. On the other hand, many countries are experiencing a surge of right-wing populism. Considering both developments as driven by the power of public assemblies, this article addresses the ontology and ethics of public assemblies. In terms of ontology, it investigates the conditions under which public assemblies unfold their power. In terms of ethics, it discusses possible criteria for a normative evaluation of public assemblies. The discussion is guided by Hannah Arendt's theory of acting together in the public sphere and Judith Butler's performative theory of assemblies. However, it will be shown that the ontology and ethics of public assemblies turn out to be more intricate than they anticipated. First, whereas Arendt (and Butler) focused on assemblies that are constituted by bodily co-presence, processes of digitalization raise new questions about the constitution of public spheres beyond the dichotomy of direct and indirect gatherings. Second, current political polarization suggests that strategies of public assembly, far from following an intrinsic normative trajectory, are ethically neutral tools that can be deployed for various political purposes.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Democratic Theory, Political Science, and 12 morePerformativity, Civil Society and the Public Sphere, Protest, Public Sphere, Judith Butler, Democracy, Social and Political Philosophy, Hannah Arendt, Political Ethics, Assemblies, Political Phenomenology, and Critical Phenomenology
Affective Societies: Key Concepts, 2019 Within the conceptual field of affect and emotion, feeling unites bodily affection and intentional world-orientation in a way that entails an irreducible form of self-awareness – a feeling is... more
Affective Societies: Key Concepts, 2019
Within the conceptual field of affect and emotion, feeling unites bodily affection and intentional world-orientation in a way that entails an irreducible form of self-awareness – a feeling is always experienced by someone and involves an evaluation of one‘s own situation. The entry draws on a phenomenological understanding of embodiment which emphasizes an understanding of the feeling body as the scene of relatedness and embeddedness. This suggests understanding feelings as relational, processual and interactively embodied instantiations within the dynamics of corporeal affection.
Within the conceptual field of affect and emotion, feeling unites bodily affection and intentional world-orientation in a way that entails an irreducible form of self-awareness – a feeling is always experienced by someone and involves an evaluation of one‘s own situation. The entry draws on a phenomenological understanding of embodiment which emphasizes an understanding of the feeling body as the scene of relatedness and embeddedness. This suggests understanding feelings as relational, processual and interactively embodied instantiations within the dynamics of corporeal affection.
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The negative aim of this paper is to identify shortcomings in received theories. First, we criticize approaching audiences, and large gatherings more general, in categories revolving around the notion of the crowd. Second, we show how... more
The negative aim of this paper is to identify shortcomings in received theories. First, we criticize approaching audiences, and large gatherings more general, in categories revolving around the notion of the crowd. Second, we show how leading paradigms in emotion research restrict research on the social-relational dynamics of emotions by reducing them to physiological processes like emotional contagion or to cognitive processes like social appraisal. Our positive aim is to offer an alternative proposal for conceptualizing emotional dynamics in audiences. First, we offer a notion of emotional sharing for studying the social-relational dynamics of emotions. Second, we propose a working concept of audience as a dynamic and dispersed social collective. Finally, we bring these elements together in the description of two scenes of jubilation.
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The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an... more
The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela’s concern-based accounts and Schmid’s phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features.
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The aim of this paper is to present an account of shared emotions and to embed it within a broader understanding of collective affective intentionality. Over the course of this paper, I will address four questions concerning shared... more
The aim of this paper is to present an account of shared emotions and to embed it within a broader understanding of collective affective intentionality. Over the course of this paper, I will address four questions concerning shared emotions: (1) What is a shared emotion? This question addresses the specificity of the sharing of emotions in contrast to the sharing of other mental states like beliefs or intentions. (2) How is an emotion shared? This question concerns the collectivity constitutive of the sharing of an emotional episode. (3) What are the conditions of possibility for the sharing of emotions? This issue addresses the social mechanisms that need to be in place to enable the sharing of emotions. It will also concern the contextualization of shared emotions within the broader field of collective affective intentionality. Dealing with this third issue will point towards a fourth question: (4) What are the social functions of shared emotions?
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The ambiguous relation of critical theory and existentialism is particularly obvious in the case of Martin Heidegger: On the one hand, there are comprehensive theoretical and political reasons to see him as an enemy of critical social... more
The ambiguous relation of critical theory and existentialism is particularly obvious in the case of Martin Heidegger: On the one hand, there are comprehensive theoretical and political reasons to see him as an enemy of critical social theory. On the other hand, his work has been noted as providing valuable resources for a critique of alienated and reified social structures. In this contribution, those resources will be explored via a discussion of Heidegger's notion of Eigentlichkeit. In contrast to Steven Crowell's Kantian reading of Being and Time, Eigentlichkeit will be explicated as the ontological transparency of ungroundedness. The transparency of authentic or owned Dasein does not disclose a new or deeper ground, but rather the ungroundedness of existence, that is, the contingency of all possible grounds. As a consequence, an authentic or owned Dasein understands that it has to take responsibility for its existence despite the fact that none of its reasons will ever be sufficiently justified. This self-transparency of Dasein coincides with Dasein's awareness of the ungroundedness of all social structures, norms, rules, and practices. Such awareness of contingency and alterability can become a resource for social critique and motivate a request for social change.
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This chapter addresses the question whether the notion of ownedness or authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) in Being and Time can serve as a model for social change. To answer this question, I build on the late Dreyfus’s understanding of owned... more
This chapter addresses the question whether the notion of ownedness or authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) in Being and Time can serve as a model for social change. To answer this question, I build on the late Dreyfus’s understanding of owned Dasein as a “world transformer”, Butler’s understanding of contingent foundations, and Kyle Stroh’s conception of owned Dasein in the plural, in order to develop a notion of social ownedness (soziale Eigentlichkeit). In my reading, ownedness concerns primarily the transparency (Durchsichtigkeit) of ontological structures on the part of the owned self (eigentliches Selbst), including a proper understanding of the role of the anyone (das Man). The owned self realizes that the anyone remains the foundation of intelligibility, but understands it as a contingent foundation and thereby contests its absolutization and the tendency of conformism. After an interpretation of Heidegger’s remarks on “nullity” (Nichtigkeit) and “abyss of ground“ (Abgrund) in relation to Butler’s theory of post-foundationalism, a discussion of „historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit) in relation to Butler’s notion of performativity as iterability, and an investigation into three sources for the notion of ownedness in Being und Time, I offer a reinterpretation of the figure of the “world transformer” and end with a proposal on how to understand social ownedness.
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In contrast to the focus on Being and Time in traditional accounts of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, new sources reveal that Heidegger referred to Kierkegaard much more frequently during the 1930s. In the note “My Relation to... more
In contrast to the focus on Being and Time in traditional accounts of
the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, new sources reveal that Heidegger referred
to Kierkegaard much more frequently during the 1930s. In the note “My Relation
to Kierkegaard” Heidegger’s presents his own account of this relationship.
Discussing Heidegger’s account, my essay focuses on Kierkegaard’s role in Heidegger’s
history of being: First, I highlight two reasons why Heidegger considers
Kierkegaard a Hegelian. Second, I show that it was not the turn to Nietzsche that
caused Heidegger to move away from Kierkegaard but a later transformation of
his view that excluded Kierkegaard from that history. Finally, I provide an account
of Heidegger’s understanding of Kierkegaard and especially his take on
Kierkegaard’s Christianity.
the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, new sources reveal that Heidegger referred
to Kierkegaard much more frequently during the 1930s. In the note “My Relation
to Kierkegaard” Heidegger’s presents his own account of this relationship.
Discussing Heidegger’s account, my essay focuses on Kierkegaard’s role in Heidegger’s
history of being: First, I highlight two reasons why Heidegger considers
Kierkegaard a Hegelian. Second, I show that it was not the turn to Nietzsche that
caused Heidegger to move away from Kierkegaard but a later transformation of
his view that excluded Kierkegaard from that history. Finally, I provide an account
of Heidegger’s understanding of Kierkegaard and especially his take on
Kierkegaard’s Christianity.
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This paper presents an overview of the sources that Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe provides for a discussion of the Heidegger–Kierkegaard relationship. I identify the translations Heidegger used and the writings that had the most impact on... more
This paper presents an overview of the sources that Heidegger’s
Gesamtausgabe provides for a discussion of the Heidegger–Kierkegaard
relationship. I identify the translations Heidegger used and the writings that
had the most impact on him. Moreover, I show that Heidegger’s relation to
Kierkegaard was not consistent over his intellectual life, distinguishing five
periods: an initial period of productive engagement (1919–1923); a complex
period during the years in Marburg (1923–1928); an affirmative period back in
Freiburg (1929–1934); a period of historical classification in the history of
being (1935–1945); and an absence in the late writings (1946–1976).
Gesamtausgabe provides for a discussion of the Heidegger–Kierkegaard
relationship. I identify the translations Heidegger used and the writings that
had the most impact on him. Moreover, I show that Heidegger’s relation to
Kierkegaard was not consistent over his intellectual life, distinguishing five
periods: an initial period of productive engagement (1919–1923); a complex
period during the years in Marburg (1923–1928); an affirmative period back in
Freiburg (1929–1934); a period of historical classification in the history of
being (1935–1945); and an absence in the late writings (1946–1976).
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Dieser Text stellt den Versuch dar, die in "Sein und Zeit" zu findenden Ansätze zu einer „Sozialphilosophie“ zu systematisieren. Es soll dabei gezeigt werden, dass das Problem weniger ein Mangel an Sozialität ist, sondern ein... more
Dieser Text stellt den Versuch dar, die in "Sein und Zeit" zu findenden Ansätze zu einer „Sozialphilosophie“ zu systematisieren. Es soll dabei gezeigt werden, dass das Problem weniger ein Mangel an Sozialität ist, sondern ein unzureichendes Verständnis von Gemeinschaft, in dem der Komplexität menschlichen Miteinanderseins nicht hinreichend Rechnung getragen wird. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch die Rolle Kierkegaards für die Ausführungen zum "Sozialen" in "Sein und Zeit" untersucht, was zudem Rückschlüsse auf die deutschsprachige Rezeption dieser beiden Denker zulässt.
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Dieser Band bietet eine systematische Interpretation von „Sein und Zeit“ mit Blick auf das geplante Gesamtprojekt. Heideggers eigentümliche Terminologie wird allgemeinverständlich erklärt und so die systematische Auseinandersetzung mit... more
Dieser Band bietet eine systematische Interpretation von „Sein und Zeit“ mit Blick auf das geplante Gesamtprojekt. Heideggers eigentümliche Terminologie wird allgemeinverständlich erklärt und so die systematische Auseinandersetzung mit den Kernthesen erleichtert. Der Kommentar macht dabei einerseits die ungeminderte Relevanz dieses Projekts verständlich und weist andererseits auf problematische (z.B. politische) Tendenzen im Text hin. Ein Glossar sämtlicher altgriechischen Stellen in „Sein und Zeit“ samt Transliteration und Übersetzung unterstützt das Verständnis relevanter Textstellen.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-662-64689-2
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-662-64689-2
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Many claim that political deliberation has become exceedingly affective, and hence, destabilizing. The authors of this book revisit that assumption. While recognizing that significant changes are occurring, these authors also point out... more
Many claim that political deliberation has become exceedingly affective, and hence, destabilizing. The authors of this book revisit that assumption. While recognizing that significant changes are occurring, these authors also point out the limitations of turning to contemporary democratic theory to understand and unpack these shifts. They propose, instead, to reframe this debate by deploying the analytic framework of affective societies, which highlights how affect and emotion are present in all aspects of the social. What changes over time and place are the modes and calibrations of affective and emotional registers. With this line of thinking, the authors are able to gesture towards a new outline of the political.
Research Interests: Social Theory, Political Philosophy, Interdisciplinarity, Political Science, Philosophy of the Emotions, and 13 moreDeliberative Democracy, Media and Democracy, Social Norms, Social and Political Philosophy, Affect Studies, Sociology of Emotions, Sensus Communis, Sense of Community, Political Judgment, Affective Politics, Politics of Aesthetics, Politics of Affect, Feeling and Emotion, and Affective Publics
This volume is a collection of works by young researchers who discuss Martin Heidegger’s thinking in their texts in ways both affirmatively and critically. This book is an important contribution to the question as to whether and how... more
This volume is a collection of works by young
researchers who discuss Martin Heidegger’s
thinking in their texts in ways both affirmatively
and critically. This book is an important
contribution to the question as to whether and
how research on Heidegger can be continued.
The international spectrum of contributors
allows us to oversee the current status of
research on Heidegger beyond national and
traditional boundaries and anticipate future
trends in research.
With contributions by Jason Alvis, Andreas
Beinsteiner, Diego D’Angelo, Giovanna Caruso,
Umut Eldem, Gregory Floyd, Francesca Greco,
Lucilla Guidi, Choong-Su Han, Lucian Ionel,
Anna Jani, Karl Kraatz, Morganna Lambeth,
Giulia Lanzirotti, Manuela Massa, Edward
McDougall, Ian Alexander Moore, Johannes
Achill Niederhauser, Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Maria
Agustina Sforza, Joseph Emmanuel Sta. Maria
and Hongjian Wang.
researchers who discuss Martin Heidegger’s
thinking in their texts in ways both affirmatively
and critically. This book is an important
contribution to the question as to whether and
how research on Heidegger can be continued.
The international spectrum of contributors
allows us to oversee the current status of
research on Heidegger beyond national and
traditional boundaries and anticipate future
trends in research.
With contributions by Jason Alvis, Andreas
Beinsteiner, Diego D’Angelo, Giovanna Caruso,
Umut Eldem, Gregory Floyd, Francesca Greco,
Lucilla Guidi, Choong-Su Han, Lucian Ionel,
Anna Jani, Karl Kraatz, Morganna Lambeth,
Giulia Lanzirotti, Manuela Massa, Edward
McDougall, Ian Alexander Moore, Johannes
Achill Niederhauser, Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Maria
Agustina Sforza, Joseph Emmanuel Sta. Maria
and Hongjian Wang.
Research Interests:
This book offers the first exhaustive presentation of Heidegger’s reception of Søren Kierkegaard that is grounded in historical philology and, at the same time, systematically oriented to philosophy. By placing their relationship in the... more
This book offers the first exhaustive presentation of Heidegger’s reception of Søren Kierkegaard that is grounded in historical philology and, at the same time, systematically oriented to philosophy. By placing their relationship in the context of Kierkegaard’s German-language transmission history and Heidegger’s thought processes, it reveals the singular features of Heidegger’s reception of Kierkegaard across various phases of his thinking.
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In this paper, we follow a double strategy: Our negative aim is to identify shortcomings in received theories that have hindered the development of adequate conceptual tools for researching emotional dynamics in football audiences. First,... more
In this paper, we follow a double strategy: Our negative aim is to identify shortcomings in received theories that have hindered the development of adequate conceptual tools for researching emotional dynamics in football audiences. First, we criticize patterns of approaching audiences, and large gatherings more general, in categories revolving around the notion of the crowd. Second, we show how the leading paradigms in 20 th century emotion research restricted research on the social-relational dynamics of emotions by reducing them either to physiological processes like emotional contagion, or to cognitive processes like social appraisal. Our positive aim is to offer an alternative proposal on how to conceptualize emotional dynamics in audiences. First, we introduce an understanding of emotional sharing that allows investigating emotions in their social-relational dynamics and within specific socio-material setting. Second, we propose a working concept of audience as s dynamic and dispersed social collective that is always in the making. Finally, we bring these elements together in the description of two scenes of jubilation, which are taken from the videographic observation of the German Bundesliga game Hertha Berlin against Freiburg.
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Public assemblies play a major role in current politics. On the one hand, the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement have generated hope on the left. On the other hand, many countries experience a surge of right-wing populism. Considering... more
Public assemblies play a major role in current politics. On the one hand, the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement have generated hope on the left. On the other hand, many countries experience a surge of right-wing populism. Considering both developments as driven by the power of public assemblies, this article addresses the ontology and ethics of public assemblies. In terms of ontology, it investigates the conditions under which public assemblies unfold their power. In terms of ethics, it discusses possible criteria for a normative evaluation of public assemblies. The discussion is guided by Hannah Arendt’s theory of acting together in the public sphere and Judith Butler’s performative theory of assemblies. However, it will be shown that the ontology and ethics of public assemblies turn out to be more intricate then they anticipated. First, whereas Arendt and Butler focused on assemblies that are constituted by bodily co-presence, processes of digitalization raise new questions about the constitution of public spheres beyond the dichotomy of direct and indirect gatherings. Second, current political polarization suggests that strategies of public assembly, far from following an intrinsic normative trajectory, are ethically neutral tools that can be deployed for various political purposes.
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A phenomenology of social change needs to take into account the dimension of an affective (un)grounding of social order. Affectivity is understood here along the lines of what Heidegger discovered in terms of "Befindlichkeit." Our... more
A phenomenology of social change needs to take into account the dimension of an affective (un)grounding of social order. Affectivity is understood here along the lines of what Heidegger discovered in terms of "Befindlichkeit." Our fundamental mode of being in the world is co-constituted by the way in which we 'find ourselves' in situations that outrun our active grasp. We cannot capture the ubiquity and pervasiveness of attunements if we understand them in terms of the psychology of inner feeling states; instead, we need to account for attunements as basic determinates of our being-in-the-world.
Against Heidegger's own conviction, I will submit that attunements lend themselves to an alternative political reading along the lines of so-called "left-Heideggerianism." According to such a postfoundational reading of basic attunements, they primarily provide two insights: First, they reveal the ungroundedness of established socio-political orders; second, basic attunements expose ourselves as thrown; we are placed into socio-political structures that are not of our own making and outrun our capacity to fully grasp their composition and genealogy.
In a first step, I will spell out how such a political reading of basic attunements as disclosing ungroundedness can be developed into a postfoundational political ontology (Marchart 2007). In a second step, I will come back to findingness. Following Slaby (2017), we can read findingness as radical situatedness, focusing on how our past, which goes beyond what we can become aware of or actively relate to, sets the stage for our present and future being.
Against Heidegger's own conviction, I will submit that attunements lend themselves to an alternative political reading along the lines of so-called "left-Heideggerianism." According to such a postfoundational reading of basic attunements, they primarily provide two insights: First, they reveal the ungroundedness of established socio-political orders; second, basic attunements expose ourselves as thrown; we are placed into socio-political structures that are not of our own making and outrun our capacity to fully grasp their composition and genealogy.
In a first step, I will spell out how such a political reading of basic attunements as disclosing ungroundedness can be developed into a postfoundational political ontology (Marchart 2007). In a second step, I will come back to findingness. Following Slaby (2017), we can read findingness as radical situatedness, focusing on how our past, which goes beyond what we can become aware of or actively relate to, sets the stage for our present and future being.
Research Interests:
The task of a critical social theory can be described as the identification and critique of alienated structures. A situation becomes alienated when it is reified in such a way that its rules are followed without knowledge of their... more
The task of a critical social theory can be described as the identification and critique of alienated structures. A situation becomes alienated when it is reified in such a way that its rules are followed without knowledge of their creation and without awareness of the possibility of changing them. The identification of alienated and reified structures unfolds against the background of some ideal of non-alienated or authentic life. In this paper, I will offer a discussion of Heidegger’s notion of Eigentlichkeit and explore
the possible resources it provides for a critical social theory. I will approach this task by discussing Steven Crowell’s Kantian reading of Being and Time. On the one hand, this interpretation offers certain systematic strengths in reading Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein in terms of a constitutional model of agency. On the other hand, an interpretation which reads the being of Dasein in terms of practical identity falls short of capturing the full potential of Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit. I will propose an understanding of Eigentlichkeit as describing a specific kind of transparent self-knowledge of Dasein: In Eigentlichkeit Dasein understands that it has to take responsibility for its existence despite the fact that none of its reasons will ever be sufficiently justified. It is confronted with the task of grounding its existence in light of fundamental ungroundedness. This self-knowledge coincides with an awareness of the contingency of all social structures, norms, rules, and practices. I will conclude by indicating that ungroundedness becoming transparent can be a resource for social critique and motivate a request for social change.
the possible resources it provides for a critical social theory. I will approach this task by discussing Steven Crowell’s Kantian reading of Being and Time. On the one hand, this interpretation offers certain systematic strengths in reading Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein in terms of a constitutional model of agency. On the other hand, an interpretation which reads the being of Dasein in terms of practical identity falls short of capturing the full potential of Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit. I will propose an understanding of Eigentlichkeit as describing a specific kind of transparent self-knowledge of Dasein: In Eigentlichkeit Dasein understands that it has to take responsibility for its existence despite the fact that none of its reasons will ever be sufficiently justified. It is confronted with the task of grounding its existence in light of fundamental ungroundedness. This self-knowledge coincides with an awareness of the contingency of all social structures, norms, rules, and practices. I will conclude by indicating that ungroundedness becoming transparent can be a resource for social critique and motivate a request for social change.
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Heidegger’s views on affectivity can figure as a starting point for an ontological perspective on the political. An account of Befindlichkeit can prepare such a reading, while especially his views on the ontological character of anxiety... more
Heidegger’s views on affectivity can figure as a starting point for an ontological perspective on the political. An account of Befindlichkeit can prepare such a reading, while especially his views on the ontological character of anxiety and boredom lead into what arguably is a founding dimension of the political as such. This is because these affective conditions reveal the ungroundedness and thus radical contingency of human existence. The flip side of this ungroundedness is the inevitable requirement of self-determination. Although Heidegger’s own politics did not explicitly relate to the affectively disclosed ungroundedness of existence, but rather curtailed this openness and indeterminacy in an individualistic and decisionistic closure, we argue that Heidegger’s view yields to a radically political reading. This is evidenced by a significant current of French political thought since the 1960s which heavily draws on Heidegger’s ontological difference (see Marchart 2007). The political as such does not refer to politics as a sub-system of society, but to the questioning of the foundations of politics, which turn out to be necessarily “contingent foundations” (Butler 1992).
Research Interests: Emotion, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Phenomenology, Emotions And Political Theory, and 17 morePhilosophy of the Emotions, Martin Heidegger, Philosophy of Emotion, Heidegger, Affect/Emotion, Affect (Cultural Theory), Claude Lefort, Boredom, Anxiety, Heidegger's Being and Time, Affect, Emotion and Feeling, Angst, Boredom and Culture, Boredom Studies, Politics of Affect, Feeling and Emotion, Political Emotions, and Oliver Marchart
These are the slides of my talk given at the workshop "Early Phenomenology an Affective Sharing", which took place at the Free University Berlin on February 16-17, 2018.
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Conference on Heidegger on Affect.
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WORKSHOP NOW ONLINE THROUGHOUT MARCH 2021 Online event, Freie Universität Berlin, March 4, 11, 18 & 25, 2021 Are emotions vehicles of knowledge, and if yes, in virtue of which features? What is the role of emotions in social epistemic... more
WORKSHOP NOW ONLINE THROUGHOUT MARCH 2021
Online event, Freie Universität Berlin, March 4, 11, 18 & 25, 2021
Are emotions vehicles of knowledge, and if yes, in virtue of which features? What is the role of emotions in social epistemic practices? What is the impact of local affective arrangements on epistemic communities?
In this workshop we will discuss the epistemic value of emotions at the intersection of philosophy of emotion and social epistemology. The aim is to foster an understanding of the role played by emotions in epistemic life. Different philosophical approaches and methodologies are brought into critical conversation.
Online event, Freie Universität Berlin, March 4, 11, 18 & 25, 2021
Are emotions vehicles of knowledge, and if yes, in virtue of which features? What is the role of emotions in social epistemic practices? What is the impact of local affective arrangements on epistemic communities?
In this workshop we will discuss the epistemic value of emotions at the intersection of philosophy of emotion and social epistemology. The aim is to foster an understanding of the role played by emotions in epistemic life. Different philosophical approaches and methodologies are brought into critical conversation.
Research Interests:
Die Tagung setzt es sich zum Ziel, innerhalb der deutschsprachigen Forschungslandschaft die aktuellen Entwürfe einer Ontologie des Politischen kritisch miteinander in Diskussion zu setzen. Die Positionen von DenkerInnen wie Aristoteles... more
Die Tagung setzt es sich zum Ziel, innerhalb der deutschsprachigen Forschungslandschaft die aktuellen Entwürfe einer Ontologie des Politischen kritisch miteinander in Diskussion zu setzen. Die Positionen von DenkerInnen wie Aristoteles und Spinoza, Georgio Agamben, Hannah Arendt, Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Cornelius Castoriadis, Pierre Clastres, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Donna Haraway, Emanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, Antonio Negri oder Jacques Rancière sollen vor dem Hintergrund dieser rezenten Fragestellung nicht nur dargestellt, sondern im Kontext der aktuellen deutschen Debatte systematisch- argumentativ vertreten und gegeneinander abgewogen werden.Vortragen werden Kerstin Andermann, Thomas Bedorf, Heike Delitz, Katja Diefenbach, Nicolai von Eggers Mariegaard, Matthias Flatscher, Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, Katharina Hoppe, Sophie Loidolt, Maria Muhle, Dirk Setton, Jan Slaby, Gerhard Thonhauser, Frieder Vogelmann und Peter Zeillinger.
Research Interests: Ontology, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Social Philosophy, Poststructuralism, and 15 moreJean-Luc Nancy, Political Science, Continental Philosophy, History Of Political Thought (Political Science), Émmanuel Lévinas, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Rancière, Social Ontology, Jacques Derrida, History of Political Thought, Baruch Spinoza, Social and Political Philosophy, Hannah Arendt, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Contemporary Continental Philosophy
This is a review of Oliver Marchart: Thinking Antagonism: Political Ontology after Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2018) to be published in Journal Phänomenologie.