Kolektif Hafıza

Sokak isimleri kentsel mekânın görülebilen anlamıdır. Kentin oluşumu ve değişimini okumak kentin fiziksel dokusu üzerinden olduğu kadar sokakların isimleri üzerinden de yapılır. Sokak isimleri evrensel değildir, bir kenti farklılaştıran kültürel bir bileşendir ve fonksiyonel, tarihi, kültürel, yapısal bir işaret olarak eş zamanlı ve art zamanlı bir okuma sağlar. Kent morfolojisi yönüyle ise sokak dokularının, sokakların adres verdiği yapısal, doğal çevreyle ilişkisi ve değişimini okumak, mekansal değişimi değerlendirmekte bir araç olabilir. İstanbul kenti içinde seçilen dört tarihi kıyı meydanı özelinde sokak isimlerinin mevcut durumu ve değişimi üzerinden bir morfolojik okuma yapılmaktadır. Osman Nuri Ergin’in sokak isimlerine dair kayıtları ve İstanbul şehir rehberi verileriyle yapılan değerlendirmelere bağlı olarak elde edilen sonuçların kentsel mekanın tarihsel okumasına ve mekânsal kurgusuna katkısı değerlendirilecektir.

Memorial and Memory Spaces as Memory Interfaces: The Case of
Gallipoli Peninsula Fabrication of memory maintains its existence as
one of the most prominent determinants in the making and conservation process of national identity. This process changes in time according to
the changes in the space. Memorials and memory spaces are interfaces, which reveal how remembrance and forgetting practices of national
memory are fabricated. The purpose of this article, which focuses on the memorials and memory spaces of Dardanelle Wars in Gallipoli Peninsula, is to explore the distinctive components within these memory related designs. The article, which adopted its research methodology based on participatory observation, semi-structured interviews and literature review, suggests that there are two main memorial and memory space approaches in Gallipoli Peninsula: Interactive and Conductive Interfaces of Memory.

25-26 Haziran tarihlerinde Londra Middlesex Üniversitesinde düzenlenen üçüncü uluslararası Kürt Çalışmaları konferansında, cem evleri ve Aleviler üzerine araştırma yapan Kent Üniversitesi’nden Hayal Hanoğlu ile konuştuk. Hanoğlu, diasporadaki Aleviler için cem evleri açmanın mekân ve kimlik ilişkisi bakımından ne anlam ifade ettiğini bizlere anlattı. Cem evlerinin diasporada sadece bir ibadethane olarak görülemeyeceğinin gerekçelerini sıraladı. Daha uzatmadan, sözü Hanoğlu ile yaptığım söyleşiye bırakıyorum…

The story of establishment of Turkish nation-state as the remnant of Ottoman Empire is, at the same time, the story of an ongoing struggle of collective memory. The new Turkish nation state required a new national identity, which would unify and homogenize the society. To accomplish this task, the founders of the republic deployed methods of social engineering. They rephrased history. They invented suitable traditions for the new national identity in addition to the new myths, legends, cults and symbols. So, “as the ones who control wealth and the state also control the knowledge, they define what is acceptable as knowledge about heritage, and they withhold recognition from anything else” (Herzfeld, 2015:10). Thus, some aspects of the past had to be societally forgotten whilst their vacancy was tired to be filled by new traditions, symbols and myths. Until the end of the twentieth century, official Kemalist collective consciousness did not face any challenge big enough to overthrow the historical and ideological bases of secular Turkish republic neither from the society nor from the military. Yet, starting from the 80s changes in social, structural, technological and economical environments brought about vital alterations in the means and scope of political struggle. Hereafter, while new transportation and communication facilities were enabling new social groups to get organized for a cause, traditional left and right struggles were fading away from the political arena. When it was 90s, the institutional, political and economic upheavals, caused by the collapse of bipolar world order, had to face nation states with legitimacy crisis, accompanied with the economical and political crisis. Therefore, there was a suitable environment for oppositional groups aiming to have more efficiency in political arena. Consequently, oppositional groups benefitted from the legitimacy crisis and they revised official history in a practical way for their causes. National Outlook Movement was one of the competing groups whose political parties have been constantly closed down by constitutional court because their activities considered as a threat to the secular structure of Turkish Republic. After the closure of Virtue Party in 2001, movement divided into two. The reformists who called themselves “innovationists” established Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) whereas the traditionalists established Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). Just After its establishment, in 2002 elections AKP had a vast electoral victory while SP’s votes remained insignificant. Thenceforth AKP won every election with great success, and so managed to retain and increase its power to govern Turkey as it wish. AKP employed its power to convert collective memory and culture of Turkish people to realize its future goals. Like the founders of the republic AKP is also engaged in social engineering, which rephrases the past as well as the identities and belongings of the Turkish citizens. Without a well-planned project supported by communicational and symbolic tools to prepare people’s consciousness in favor of intended changes, AKP will fail to realize its future goals. Consequently, if we could correctly understand the codes of planned social change, we will be able to have a better understanding of government’s future goals. The dichotomy of Old and New Turkey is not used by AKP for the first time.1 Though the meaning and the usage of the terms differ time-to-time and party-to-party, such a dichotomy always had a place in Turkish rightward political rhetoric (Türk, 2014). In fact, AKP started to use the term more frequently after 2010. For example, election slogan of AKP in 2011 parliamentary elections was “Turkey is Ready: Target 2023”. Likely, in 2014 presidential elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan titled his election campaign as “On the pathway of New Turkey” (Bora, 2016). Moreover, clearly articulated schedules such as “The Vision of 2023” which is the centesimal anniversary of Turkish Republic and “The Vision of 2071” which is the millenarian anniversary of Turkish arrival to Anatolia give the impression of a well-planned and carefully-programmed “Future Proto imagine a future, which is not compatible with their experiences, each initiative to shape future, first, has to rephrase the past. Therefore, AKP’s Old and New Turkey imagery aims to trivialize the Kemalist institutional and ideological heritage by rephrasing the history (Açıkel, 2012: 14). As there is no doubt about the existence of a “New Turkey” project, the purposes of this projection are not clear. In that sense the cultural, historical and social framework symbolized in “New and Old Turkey” allegory gives us a good opportunity to have a more accurate understanding of AKP’s intentions about Turkey’s future. Correspondingly the main purpose of this study is to deepen the discussions about AKP’s future prospects within the framework of New and Old Turkey. The first part of the study includes a theoretical framework about the usage and meaning of collective memory since the pre-historic times till now. Then, it will be tried to reach a better understanding about the meaning and the purposes of AKP’s New Turkey Project by examining the symbolism created by “Old and New Turkey” dichotomy.