Culpability

“Desde mi visión, la obra es en sustancia un abordaje axiológico, una construcción compleja que merece reconocimiento, pues consagra una teoría iusfilosófica de la culpa.

Pero no se debe extraer de ello que la obra ha sido escrita para el regodeo de una élite intelectual. Solemos decir que, para entender la modernidad: los clásicos; pues bien, para resolver las cuestiones prácticas nada mejor que la filosofía.

Las derivaciones prácticas del ensayo son numerosas, intramuros y extramuros de un ordenamiento particular, ya que, con base en el fundamento penal de la responsabilidad, se proyectan soluciones adecuadas, respuestas claras a muchos desvíos propiciados por los esquemas jurídicos formales, los que suelen ser empleados por los tres poderes del Estado como instrumentos funcionales a la recaudación.

En suma, está claro, y no puedo más que adherir a ello que para el Dr. Weffe un derecho sin valores es el revés del derecho, y es por ello que también recomiendo fervientemente la lectura del libro”.

Alberto Tarsitano (Argentina)
Ex Presidente del Instituto Latinoamericano de Derecho Tributario (ILADT)
Profesor de Derecho Tributario, Universidad de Buenos Aires
Profesor de Derecho Tributario, Universidad Católica Argentina
Director de la Maestría en Derecho Tributario, Universidad Católica Argentina

“No es éste un libro de Derecho Penal en el sentido frecuente, con abundancia de citas de autores, escuelas y textos sobre las distintas concepciones jurídico-penales de la culpabilidad. Tampoco es de Derecho Tributario, en el mismo sentido, ni de Derecho Administrativo, según la supradicha premisa. Entonces, ¿qué es y de qué es? ¿Cómo desarrolla su tema, cualquiera que él fuese?

En primer término, esta obra versa sobre la culpabilidad vinculada al Derecho Tributario, lo que de suyo representa continuidad con su tesis doctoral, en un área novedosa en nuestro mundo jurídico, pero –como antes dije– no es una obra sobre la culpabilidad en el Derecho Tributario del modo como se haría desde la perspectiva más frecuente del Derecho Penal, entre otras razones, porque la conexión con una rama que no es penal lo hace posible, sino también –y he ahí lo decisivo– porque los fines perseguidos se orientan desde la Teoría General del Derecho o, si se prefiere, la filosofía del Derecho, como pronto se verá.
Weffe no trata la culpabilidad mediante un simple acercamiento entre el Derecho Penal y el Derecho Tributario, sino que involucra reflexiones filosóficas que incrementan exponencialmente los méritos de su autor, pues son escasas las veces en que los juristas hacen expresamente suyas consideraciones que escapan del terreno dogmático de sus disciplinas, salvo, por supuesto, aquellos que se dedican a los temas teóricos más abstractos y generales, aunque mantienen hacia los horizontes más estrictamente técnicos del saber jurídico, una prudencial distancia, a su vez, pocas veces acortada por las ciencias jurídicas particulares.

El discurso ético-filosófico de la obra desemboca en la esfera de la culpabilidad y la triple función que el autor de ella predica: instrumental de la libertad, la dignidad y la igualdad como contenidos mínimos esenciales de todas las fórmulas jurídicas; ello, como axioma del garantismo y como límite al ejercicio del ius puniendi cada vez que el sujeto ha ejercido de forma desviada su libertad.

Los espíritus proclives a la reflexión filosófica hallarán en esas páginas ocasión para su deleite intelectual, y también para las inquietudes e incertidumbres a las que el ejercicio del pensamiento induce.

En fin, invito al lector a que inicie la aventura intelectual que significa adentrarse en estas páginas, para saciar no sólo inquietudes conceptuales de elevada abstracción, sino también para guiarlo en la interpretación y aplicación de un derecho concreto en un momento histórico específico, en un contexto sociopolítico abiertamente adverso a las propuestas garantistas del Derecho Penal moderno y liberal.

Weffe no cedió ante el desafío, seguramente usted tampoco retrocederá”.

Prof. Dr. Carlos Simón Bello Rengifo
Profesor Asociado de Derecho Penal y Procesal Penal, Universidad Central de Venezuela
Director del Doctorado en Ciencias, Mención Derecho, Universidad Central de Venezuela.

In this article, I offer the opposing view (con-side) against reparations for American slavery, as if in a forensic debate before a moot court: I presume the American public will judge the merits of my opposing arguments. I oppose reparations for slavery based on: 1) the legal standard of culpability, 2) the “clean-hands doctrine,” 3) Black people who were themselves slave owners, and 4) fairness in the administration justice. While anyone else is welcome to argue the pro-side, I argue the con-side of the following proposition: America owes Black Americans reparations because of its history of plantation slavery, which has privileged White Americans economically over Black Americans. I provide a plethora of evidence that reparations and justice are incompatible in the application of American justice. Moreover, any law requiring reparations for slavery could create an unintended liability for far too many Black Americans whose ancestry extends far beyond Sub-Saharan Africa.

Les mouvements de contestation dans les démocraties qui se revendiquent de la désobéissance civile se multiplient. Avant d’entrevoir la désobéissance, encore faut-il comprendre les raisons de notre obéissance en démocratie. L’objectif de cet exposé est de saisir l’origine et le fondement, la forme et le contenu de l’obéissance en démocratie. Nous nous demandons de quelle façon la démocratie réussit à accorder la liberté et l’égalité qui façonnent l’individualisme avec la nécessité d’obéir aux règles communes, condition de toute vie collective.

Nous étudions d’abord la pensée libertarienne qui fait de l’Etat démocratique une négation de l’essence des individus. Nous répondons que l’Etat démocratique est ce lieu vide où le pouvoir est désincarné. Les individus obéissent à des principes abstraits qui soutiennent la vie en société. Ces principes sont la base du sentiment de culpabilité envisagé dans sa dimension
politique. Il est utilisé ici à la suite du travail de J. Rawls entreprit dans sa Théorie de la justice.

Les sociétaires, avant de commettre un acte répréhensible, ressentent de la culpabilité qui les enjoint à respecter les règles de la collectivité. A la suite de cela, nous considérons la désobéissance civile et l’objection de conscience. La désobéissance civile doit être cantonnée aux cas incontestables de la transgression de l’égale liberté pour tous. L’objection de conscience concilie la conscience individuelle de chacun avec la nécessité d’obéir aux lois communes.

La liberté est conservée dans le questionnement constant de notre obéissance. Sinon, elle n’est que soumission et annihilation de l’idéal démocratique que représente l’autonomie et le jugement du citoyen. Là est le prix du régime qui fait de nous des êtres dignes.

El libro versa sobre la teoría de la culpabilidad y los fines de la pena, con especial referencia al pensamiento de Claus Roxin. Concepto, estructura con relación al injusto, y función de la culpabilidad se tratan como problemas interconectados, con relevancia en el plano de la fundamentación del Derecho penal, la teoría del delito, y la individualización de la pena.

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The book deals with the theory of guilt and the purposes of the punishment, with special reference to the thinking of Claus Roxin. Concept, structure as related to the unjust one, and the function of  guilt are treated as interconnected problems, with relevance to the foundations of  Criminal law, the theory of crime, and individual sentencing.

Article dans L’Encyclopédie critique des mots du témoignage et de la mémoire, Maître d’œuvre : Philippe Mesnard (CELIS / UBP Clermont-Ferrand) ; direction du projet : Philippe Mesnard et Luba Jurgenson (Eur’ORBEM / Paris IV - CRAL.EHESS), novembre 2017.

I argue that the criminal law operates in distinct temporal stages, and that concept of culpability operates differently at these stages. At its initial stage, the criminal law provides advance conduct guidance to the general public on how to avoid criminality, and at this stage, culpability helps define conduct that, if performed, would prima facie be criminal. After prima facie criminal conduct occurs, the criminal law evaluates the criminality of the agent responsible. At this stage, culpability identifies blameworthy agents. I argue that it does so by reference to the conduct guidance previously offered by the criminal law, and demonstrate that this account of criminal culpability after the act explains the criminality of almost all instances of criminal wrong causation. I argue that it is fair, and not implausibly revisionist, to reject the few instances of hitherto criminal wrong causation that are not explained by this theory of culpability.

Resumen:

Se busca dar cuenta del origen y naturaleza de la noción  ética y  psicoanalítica de culpa. Tanto Freud como Nietzsche se han ocupado de la genealogía de este concepto; cada uno, desde ámbitos distintos, pero que en forma sorprendente confluyen. Asimismo se examina como la noción de culpa es el motivo literario y clave hermenéutica de la sobrecogedora obra de Kafka, lector de Freud. Obras como El Proceso, La condena, etc., lo evidencian. La tesis central que auna este amplio registro de obras y autores –referidos–  y en la que radica el valor de este trabajo– es la idea freudiana que la conciencia de culpa preexiste a la falta, esto es, de la existencia de una culpabilidad constitutiva o internalizada que podría ser atribuida a la tradición judeo-cristiana, según la imputación de Nietzsche que se funda en un entramado genealógico más complejo.


Palabras clave: Culpa, crueldad, conciencia,  criminal, delito, psicoanálisis, genealogía, moral

The Legislative Decree No. 173/2017 sets forth the sanctions for the infringement of EC Regulation No. 216/2008. The wording of the decree, in particular of article 12 on the rules of the air, may be a threat to the long path which led to the establishment in the Italian civil aviation of a just culture, defined as the «atmosphere of trust» in which front-line operators are encouraged to provide essential safety-related information. By the analysis of the international and European regulatory framework on just culture currently in force, the paper examines the sanctions set forth by the recent Legislative Decree, highlighting its contradictions and the risk that the protection of the just culture moves backwards due to the wording of such decree, which does not differentiate between «wilful violations» or «gross negligence» and «honest mistakes».

El libro versa sobre la teoría de la culpabilidad y los fines de la pena, con especial referencia al pensamiento de Claus Roxin. Concepto, estructura con relación al injusto, y función de la culpabilidad se tratan como problemas interconectados, con relevancia en el plano de la fundamentación del Derecho penal, la teoría del delito, y la individualización de la pena / The book deals with the theory of guilt and the purposes of the punishment, with special reference to the thinking of Claus Roxin. Concept, structure as related to the unjust one, and the function of  guilt are treated as interconnected problems, with relevance to the foundations of  Criminal law, the theory of crime, and individual sentencing.

Rights-based approaches to forced marriage in wartime document forms of harm women experience, to the exclusion of men's experiences. Such framing problematically reiterates a binary of women/men, victim/perpetrator and consent/coercion. Arguably, this delineation is useful in supporting projects of culpability and legal redress. However, what does such vocabulary obfuscate or render invisible? We draw from the experiences of men demobilized from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and presently living in northern Uganda to consider how relationships and social account-abilities are governed in settings of coercion. We argue that forced marriage in wartime cannot be understood without examining the multiple relationalities on which it is contingent. We broaden the remit of men's relationships to women in the LRA to consider how men's relations to each other and to their children shaped their experiences of marriage during the war. We conclude by reflecting on concepts of consent and culpability in coercive settings.

Cet article examine les liens entre, pour l’aspect technique, le plan séquence et le montage, et, pour l’aspect philosophico-historique, la vie quotidienne et la politique mondiale, du point de vue d’une profanation capable de désamorcer la puissance et avec une attention particulière portée à l’unique film expérimental de Pasolini : La sequenza del fiore di (1968). Ce court métrage n’a pas seulement un statut spécial dans la filmographie de Pasolini, il marque aussi un tournant du tragique vers un ton comique/pessimiste de son cinéma profanateur. Cet article révèle aussi une réception inattendue de Heidegger, par l’intermédiaire du marxisme heideggerien de Karel Kosik et d’une conception benjaminienne du profane fondée sur l’idée de bonheur.

In looking at the IV Meditation of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, many Augustinian roots can be examined by analyzing it with Augustine’s primary texts, especially The Confessions and On Free Choice of the Will. These connections between Descartes and Augustine can be seen notably concerning the source of error and sin, respectively, linked to the misuse of the will. This perversity of the will for Augustine is a turning from God to lesser things, and for Descartes it is the will unbounded by the intellect. Thus, I will look into the epistemic similarities between Descartes’ and Augustine’s philosophies. Though Augustine’s view on sin is primarily moral in nature, I will show how Augustine’s concept of God provides the epistemic undertone for understanding sin. From this epistemological viewpoint of sin, Descartes’ IV Meditation concerning human error can be analyzed more closely as hearkening to Augustinian roots. Descartes’ and Augustine’s work will also be examined within the notion of The Great Chain of Being, which is the functional worldview of the cosmos that they use in developing their epistemologies. The Great Chain of Being allows for degrees of goodness, which can help illuminate what exactly error and sin is for Descartes and Augustine, respectively. Following this illumination of the good and defining of error and sin, notions of negation and privation between Descartes and Augustine can help explicate a proper use of the will. It will also be shown how indifference in the will can be overcome in both Augustine’s and Descartes’ philosophies, especially in the epistemic realm.

Strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities is entirely different from strict products liability.  Since strict liability has been applied to so-called dangerous or ultra-hazardous activities, the application has been limited to instances where the defendant has, for his own purpose, created an abnormal risk of harm to those surrounding him, and therefore should pay for any resulting injury.  Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains how one weighs the risk of harm emanating from ultra-hazardous activities against the appropriateness to its surroundings.  This is not, however, how one determines the applicability of strict liability in the area of defective products under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Section 402A has well-established standards for the concept of defectiveness, particularly when the defect was discovered through examining mismanufactured, misdesigned, and mismarketed products.  The best standard to determine whether the product is mismanufactured is the reasonable expectations test.  The risk-benefit analysis test, on the other hand, has emerged as the prevailing standard for determining misdesigned and mismarked products.

Strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities is concerned with the appropriateness of the defendant’s activities to the locale, while strict products liability requires the defendant to introduce a defective product into the stream of commerce that is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.  These are two lines of reasoning that are distinct, separate, and independent of each other, and should never meet.

Legitimacy of criminal sanction is originated on its own purposes pursued in a state governed by the Rule of Law. That legitimacy should include the penalty as well as security measures, bearing in mind that both are imposed to someone breaking a rule of conduct, and therefore, someone capable to do it. Reviewing penal capacity or criminal liability concepts is required because if penal capacity means the capacity to understand the reality and adjust the behavior to it, and if every legitimate criminal sanction have to be imposed to someone who have the capacity of break it, then security measures also have to be imposed only to people responsible, capable to understand rules and act in accordance. With regard to people not subject to criminal liability they are standing outside Criminal Law and punish them would be illegitimate. In this line, criminal liability should be seen not only as a crime assumption but also as a basic statement for any dialogue the state shall have with the citizens: at the level of crime itself, proceedings and sentence execution.

Jean Echenoz’s text presents Victoria’s story who runs away from Paris, believing that she has killed her lover. Her straying (that embraces the form of a relative deterritorialization in a Deleuzian sense) lasts one year and it is built up geographically upon a descent (more or less symbolical) to the South of France and, after that, she comes back to Paris and encloses the spatial and textual curl. From a spatial point of view, she turns into a heterotopia (Foucault) every place where she is located, fact that reflects her incapability of constituting a personal, intimate space. The railway stations, the trains, the hotels, the improvised houses of those with no fixed abode are turning, according to Marc Augé’s terminology, into a « non-lieux » that excludes human being. Her vagrancy is characterized through a continuous flight from police and people and through a continuous decrease of her standard of living and dignity. It’s not about a quest of oneself, but about a loss of oneself. Urged by a strong feeling of culpability, her vagrancy is a self-punishment that comes to an end when the concerns of her problems disappear and she finds out that her lover is alive.

This paper compares the familiar Purpose, Knowledge, Recklessness, and Negligence (‘PKRN’) conception of subjective culpability laid out in the Model Penal Code and dominant in American criminal law with the ‘Reasons-Responsiveness’ conception of subjective culpability widespread among contemporary moral theorists. While many criminal law theorists are cognizant of these different conceptions of subjective culpability, this paper argues that criminal law theorists has deeply underestimated the degree to which these conceptions are in tension with one another. In particular, while criminal law theorists have noted ways in which a reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability may lead to more fine-grained distinctions of criminal responsibility than the PKRN picture, almost all theorists have assumed that the two pictures of subjective culpability converge when it comes to the general relative culpability judgements of actions performed purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.

In contrast, this paper shows that the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability leads not just to intra-hierarchical differences but to inter-hierarchical differences. That is, if the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability is correct, we should expect frequent cases where, e.g., an agent who acts purposefully is less culpable than an agent who performs that same action recklessly, or negligently.

This result has both important normative and empirical consequences for the downstream practice and study of substantive American criminal law. In particular, this paper argues that if the ‘reasons-responsiveness’ account of subjective culpability is correct then not only is the PKRN picture of subjective culpability mistaken, so too is the Model Penal Code’s PKRN grading regime. If PKRN are not the final grounds of moral responsibility, then the Model Penal Code’s grading system will often fail to track offenders’ relative culpability and result in predictably disproportionate punishments not merely within but also across grades of crimes. The paper concludes with some preliminary suggestions for amending the MPC in light of these concerns.

My empirical study, which examines neuroscience evidence in 800 criminal cases over the course of two decades, is the first to determine how, when, and why victim brain scan evidence is introduced and used in court. My study reveals that although courts commonly rely on brain scans to show the extent of a victim's injury, the actual application of this neuroscience evidence extends far beyond the purpose for which it is admitted. Indeed, victim brain scans are introduced primarily by prosecutors , and nearly half of these cases are based on medical expert testimony that the victims suffer from shaken baby syndrome, a medical diagnosis with controversial scientific underpinnings and distorted legal ramifications. The diagnosis often successfully serves as the sole foundation for a prosecutor's case, with no proof of the defendant's act or intent beyond the victim's brain scan and the accompanying medical expert testimony. Shaken baby syndrome cases thus portray a troubling phenomenon in which the key element of mens rea is either unclear or overlooked altogether and prosecutors are permitted to concoct intent out of brain scans that were admitted for the sole purpose of presenting the victim's injury. My study further reveals that shaken baby syndrome cases are merely the more transparent examples of the criminal justice system's failure to deal adequately with the surging influx of neuroscience evidence into the courtroom. Shaken baby cases thus represent a microcosm of prosecutorial misuse of victim neuroscience evidence more generally, particularly when the evidence is employed to determine a defendant's mental state.

U radu se propituje teorijska koherentnost i praktična svrhovitost zakonske odredbe o sastojcima krivnje. S tim ciljem, autor se uvodno osvrće na različite načine sistematizacije pojma kaznenog djela, te ukratko izlaže promjene u razumijevanju neprava i krivnje tijekom klasičnog, neoklasičnog i finalističkog učenja o kaznenom djelu. Potom se analizira geneza, teorijski smisao i praktično značenje materijalnog (teleološkog) modela razlikovanja neprava i krivnje, čiju potpunu implementaciju u hrvatskom kaznenom pravu priječi upravo odredba o sastojcima krivnje. Materijalni model razlikovanja neprava i krivnje promatra se kroz prizmu razlikovanja opravdanja i ekskulpacije kao pravnoetičkog postulata, da bi se zatim ukazalo na praktične prednosti tog modela, prvenstveno iz perspektive dualističkog sustava kaznenopravnih sankcija. U završnom dijelu rada, autor se kritički osvrće na proturječnosti koje se u hrvatskom kaznenom pravu pojavljuju kao posljedica neuravnoteženog odnosa između dualističkog sustava sankcija i formalističkog modela kaznenog djela, koji namjeru i dalje smatra sastojkom krivnje. Pritom se analiziraju dvije alternative postojećem zakonskom uređenju: prelazak na monistički sustav sankcija, te brisanje odredbe o sastojcima krivnje. Potonju alternativu autor smatra realnijom i nomotehnički provedljivijom.

Jean Echenoz’s text presents Victoria’s story who runs away from Paris, believing that she has killed her lover. Her straying (that embraces the form of a relative deterritorialization in a Deleuzian sense) lasts one year and it is built up geographically upon a descent (more or less symbolical) to the South of France and, after that, she comes back to Paris and encloses the spatial and textual curl. From a spatial point of view, she turns into a heterotopia (Foucault) every place where she is located, fact that reflects her incapability of constituting a personal, intimate space. The railway stations, the trains, the hotels, the improvised houses of those with no fixed abode are turning, according to Marc Augé’s terminology, into a « non-lieux » that excludes human being. Her vagrancy is characterized through a continuous flight from police and people and through a continuous decrease of her standard of living and dignity. It’s not about a quest of oneself, but about a loss of ones...

This paper aims to solve some of the interpretative problems that arise from the obscure drafting of article 118.1, rule 1, of the Spanish Criminal Code (CP), as regards the liability in tort of those who have committed a criminal offence, but are exempted from criminal liability as per article 20.1º (mental anomaly or alteration) or 3º (alterations in perception from the time of birth or from childhood) CP. Whether, and if so how, requirements like culpability, so well established in the theory of criminal law, fit within the structure of the tort of negligence is as of yet an open question. Against this background, the following issues arise: What is the subjective scope of the rule? Does it impose liability upon the non-culpable or does it simply refer to the general civil norms? And, if it does impose it, is this liability subject to any further requirements? Who are the “culpable” mentioned in the last sentence of the rule’s first paragraph?

O Princípio da Co-culpabilidade já existe no ordenamento brasileiro, porém não é quase aplicado na prática. A sociedade e o Estado não efetivam políticas de inclusão social para melhorar as condições da população de classe mais baixa, mas não consideram isso no momento de condenar os mais pobres. Nota-se um iminente colapso da política prisional, incapaz de abrigar tantos condenados e, menos eficaz, ainda, quando o assunto é reabilitação. Além de um sistema penal moribundo, não existem políticas que promovam o desenvolvimento social efetivo dos menos favorecidos, de modo a dificultar a escolha deles pelo caminho do crime. Ainda assim, a sociedade clama, cada vez mais, pelo asseveramento da penalização dos criminosos, sem exigir, na mesma intensidade, medidas governamentais que reduzam as diferenças sociais, e desestimulem o ingresso dos marginalizados na atividade criminosa. Sob esse prisma, nasceu o interesse de pesquisar se havia, em sede de doutrina e jurisprudência, algum fator relacionado à origem social do agente infrator, que fosse considerado no momento da respectiva penalização. Dessa forma, identificou-se o Princípio da Co-Culpabilidade, instituto que situa o Estado como determinante parcial da conduta do indivíduo, que se vale do crime para alcançar objetivos que não lhes são oportunizados pela sociedade. Por fim, o aspecto, não só da existência do referido princípio, como a verificação da aplicação prática do mesmo, tornaram-se o objeto do trabalho de pesquisa a ser realizado, conforme o presente projeto, objetivando demonstrar que a Co-culpabilidade encontra fundamento jurídico no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, porém não vem sendo tão aplicada na prática, como poderia ser.

The two categorical exclusions of age and mental capacity will impact not only those offenders who are excluded from the death penalty, but also those offenders who remain subject to this punishment.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia raise the issue that a capital-punishment-limiting decision possesses wrongs of its own.  Both decisions limit the death penalty—Roper excludes from this punishment offenders who committed their crimes before they were eighteen years old and Atkins excludes offenders who are mentally retarded.  But in both cases, the Supreme Court overstated the uniformity and universality of traits associated with diminished culpability among juvenile and mentally retarded offenders.  Contrary to that impression, not all offenders who are excluded from the death penalty under Atkins and Roper are necessarily less culpable than are offenders who remain subject to this punishment.

Categorical exclusions such as age and culpability might solve the problem of improperly sentenced mentally retarded or juvenile offenders, but they raise other problems. The Roper Court failed to consider those problems, and the Atkins Court could not possibly have considered those problems because accepting the Court's reasoning requires denying that these problems even exist.  Although the many wrongs of capital punishment provide strong motivation for believing that the Atkins and Roper decisions are right, the rightness of these decisions becomes far from certain when the consequences for non-excluded offenders are considered.  Capital punishment after Atkins and Roper might appear to be more just, but this appearance is misleading.

Mit Politischer Theologie verbinden wir Autoren des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts – Walter Benjamin und Carl Schmitt, später auch Jacob Taubes oder Eric Voegelin  –, die mit sehr unterschiedlichen Intentionen das Nachleben struktureller Elemente jüdisch-christlicher Religion und des römischen Rechts im modernen Verständnis von Politik, Ökonomie und Ästhetik untersuchten. Karl Löwiths Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen (1953) und Hans Blumenbergs Legitimität der Neuzeit (1966) lösten später eine Debatte zur modernen Säkularisierung aus, die in Jürgen Habermas’ Diagnose, wonach wir uns seit dem 11. September 2001 in einer „postsäkularen Gesellschaft“ befänden, ihr vorerst letztes Wort fand.

Doch war eine derart strikte Trennung zwischen theologischen Fragen und „bewußtmachender“ Kritik in jeder Hinsicht begründet? Was wären – anders gefragt – die Gegenargumente einer politischen Theologie, wenn sie zu Benjamins „rettender Kritik“ zurückkehren und sich auf dessen intime Vertrautheit mit der Gegenwartskunst seiner Zeit besinnen würde? Was würde dann der „profanen Erleuchtung“, von der Benjamin angesichts des Surrealismus der 1920er-Jahre sprach, heute entsprechen und wie wäre eine solche Erfahrung zu vergegenwärtigen?

Benjamins frühes Fragment Kapitalismus als Religion (1921) richtet sich gegen Beschreibungen einer trivialen ‚De‘- oder ‚Rechristianisierung‘. Viel umfassender sei der Kapitalismus als die extremste, wenn auch „parasitäre“ Ausprägung des Christentums, „eine reine Kultreligion“ und zudem der „erste Fall eines nicht entsühnenden, sondern verschuldenden Kultus“. Die Bewegung aus den Zwängen dieser Schuldgeschichte nennt Benjamin Profanierung. Ihre „Idee des Glücks“, derer sich jede Ordnung des Profanen allererst zu versichern habe, finden wir in der Liebe, in der Kindheit und als ein Ideal eben auch in der Kunst.

Seit der Moderne entwerfen die Avantgarden und Kunstreligionen politische Utopien für neue Lebensformen. Kunst „profaniert“, wenn sie die Gewalt normativer Ordnungen außer Kraft setzt, wenn sie neue Gestaltungs- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten für kommende Gemeinschaften erfindet und ihr dies zugleich, anders als der Politik, auf spielerische Weise gelingt. Die Beiträge dieses Heftes, die auf verschiedene Weise die Profanierung der Künste in der Schuldgeschichte des Kapitalismus verorten, gehen selbst oft spielerisch mit der komplexen Vorgabe der politischen Theologie um – teils nachdenklich, oft leichtfüßig, mitunter auch in skeptischer Distanz zu Walter Benjamin, der für uns, gut ein Jahrhundert später – wenn auch mit einem Fragezeichen – ein Schleifstein theologisch-politischer Kunstkritik bleibt.

Texas’ recent departure from culpability based crimes now means luck plays a bigger role in the punishment for these crimes. Texas has departed from the traditional notion of punishment based on individual fault, and has arrived at a place where these “new” ways of conceptualizing criminal responsibility adequately and satisfactorily account for the interests served by a more restrictive definition of criminal fault. Traditionally, criminal responsibility attached only when mens rea combined with volitional conduct--or the withholding of some required act--to produce a public harm.

In Texas, there seems to be a trend to punish actors for the harm they cause, regardless of their culpability and conduct. The reliance on transferred intent principles is not limited to felony-murder in Texas. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held transferred intent, as applied in Honea, supplements the felony-murder rule to provide punishment for all manner of unforeseen consequences. Also, the “Calderon Law” provides punishment enhancement without regard for the culpability of the person fleeing or the risk assumed by the pursuing officer; the net result is that the lucky are punished in accordance with their fault. Neither retributivism or the “just deserts” theory is served by the increased punishment for unintended consequences.

By exploiting opportunities in pre-existing law, and creating new opportunities to punish randomly those who cause harm, Texas's courts and legislature risk undermining confidence in the criminal justice system. Texas may not identify or sympathize easily with all of those whose actions produce such harm, but reliance on “just deserts” rather than the pull of retribution will establish a system in which criminal responsibility turns primarily, and sometimes exclusively, on chance.

Am I writing angrily or are you reading angrily? When someone is morally outraged at a perceived injustice, where does the outrage stem from, the injustice or the person perceiving it? And even if it really is an injustice (who would guarantee this?), is being outraged productive or might we benefit from a Stoic approach?

Courts commonly allow willful ignorance to satisfy the knowledge element of a crime. The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that willfully ignorant misconduct is just as culpable as knowing misconduct. But it is not obvious that this “equal culpability thesis” holds across the board. Is it true in all cases of willful ignorance or only some? This is the question I investigate here. Specifically, I argue against several common versions of the equal culpability thesis before defending my own restricted version. First, I argue that the broadest version of the thesis, adopted by many courts, is overinclusive. Then I argue against several restricted versions of the thesis offered by legal theorists including Doug Husak, David Luban, and Deborah Hellman. My own account, by contrast, is premised on a duty of reasonable investigation. If my account is on the right track, the widely employed willful ignorance doctrine stands in need of reform.

The purpose of this study is, firstly, to find out what kind of suffering has caused lepers to despair, and, secondly, to better understand their sufferings by realising that each of us shares more or less the same suffering as theirs, as long as we live. This should make us realise that their sufferings were not exceptional, and we will come to know that they suffered more as a human being than as a leper. This work was developed on the analysis of the facts exposed by the testimonies that I found in the monthly periodical published between November 1952 and December 1982 of the Protestant church Akebono, located in the national leper colony Nagashima Aiseien, Okayama prefecture in Japan.

Episodios recientes y noticiosos como la censura sobrevenida en el catálogo cinematográfico de la plataforma HBO; la neo-iconoclasia popular en las principales ciudades del mundo o el kneel como alegoría, son fiel reflejo del nuevo orden moral ya plenamente instalado en la sociedad occidental donde el rol de víctima se ha hipertrofiado exponencialmente en detrimento de cualquier otra consideración. Adquirir hoy el estatus de ofendido dispensa de forma automática una confortable aura de superioridad moral; una inapelable legitimidad; el desigual reconocimiento a un trato de favor y la rentable eximente de cualquier tipo de responsabilidad, habilitándole además para descargar aquella en el chivo expiatorio o la cabeza de turco correspondiente. Y en este sentido, la sociedad occidental siempre es la elegida para cumplimentar a Azazel. La antropóloga Ruth Benedict [The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Patterns of Japanese Culture (1946)], al analizar los diversos mecanismos para promover el cumplimiento de las normas en una sociedad, distinguió entre las «culturas de la vergüenza», típicas de Oriente y «culturas de la culpa», más propias de Occidente. En las primeras, la punición se manifiesta de forma exógena al individuo que vulnera la prescripción, siendo el concepto de la vergüenza ante el reproche social y moral de los demás, la motivación que guía la conducta del ciudadano lo cual, todo sea dicho, fomenta al mismo tiempo la iniquidad doméstica o interna que escapa lógicamente de la reprobación social. Por el contrario, en la cultura de la culpa, hija del pecado cristiano, la activación del reproche es puramente interna, lo que se cohonesta mucho mejor con la idea de libertad y el respeto por los derechos individuales, pues no requiere de interferencia exterior. La invención mesopotámica del pecado fue el modo de transferir la culpa del poder al impotente: son los hombres los que yerran, los que provocaban las desgracias y los que, por tanto, deben asumir su coste. El cristianismo, en este sentido, supuso un avance extraordinario cuando recurrió a la idea de pecado para imponer un código de conducta, devolvió a sus prosélitos cierta autonomía, la de elegir el cuándo y el cómo quebrar esas reglas. La eficacia del mecanismo es ciertamente incontestable, no en vano estamos ya tan acostumbrados al castigo que, de hecho, medimos las conductas, las