Patrick Grim
SUNY: Stony Brook University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- University of Michigan, Center for the Study of Complex Systems, Department Memberadd
- Patrick Grim is Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Stony Brook University and Philosopher in ... morePatrick Grim is Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Stony Brook University and Philosopher in Residence with the Center for Study of Complex Systems at the University of Michigan.
Graduating with highest honors in both Anthropology and Philosophy from the University of California at Santa Cruz, Professor Grim was named a Fulbright Fellow to the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. With a B.Phil from St. Andrews and a Ph.D. from Boston University, he spent a year as a Mellon Faculty Fellow at Washington University before taking the long-term position at Stony Brook. He has also spent time as a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh and has been honored as the Marshall Weinberg Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Michigan.
Grim has published extensively in computational modeling on topics in theoretical biology, linguistics, decision theory, sociology, political science, and artificial intelligence. His work spans ethics, philosophical logic, game theory, philosophy of science, philosophy of law, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, contemporary metaphysics, and philosophy of religion.
He is the author of The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge, and Truth; the co-author of The Philosophical Computer: Exploratory Essays in Philosophical Computer Modeling (with Gary Mar and Paul St. Denis); and Beyond Sets and Reflexivity: From Paradox to Consciousness (both with Nicholas Rescher). He is the editor of Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions; of Philosophy of Science and the Occult; and a founding co-editor of more than 37 volumes of The Philosopher’s Annual, an anthology of the best articles published in philosophy each year (www.philosophersannual.org). As of 2019 he is serving as editor of the American Philosophical Quarterly.
Grim has also produced four lecture series for the Great Courses: Questions of Value; Philosophy of Mind: Brains, Consciousness, and Thinking Machines; The Philosopher’s Toolkit; and Mind-Body Philosophy.edit
Our scientific theories, like our cognitive structures in general, consist of propositions linked by evidential, explanatory, probabilistic, and logical connections. Those theoretical webs 'impinge on the world at their edges,' subject to... more
Our scientific theories, like our cognitive structures in general, consist of propositions linked by evidential, explanatory, probabilistic, and logical connections. Those theoretical webs 'impinge on the world at their edges,' subject to a continuing barrage of incoming evidence (Quine 1951, 1953). Our credences in the various elements of those structures change in response to that continuing barrage of evidence, as do the perceived connections between them. Here we model scientific theories as Bayesian nets, with credences at nodes and conditional links between them modelled as conditional probabilities. We update those networks, in terms of both credences at nodes and conditional probabilities at links, through a temporal barrage of random incoming evidence. Robust patterns of punctuated equilibrium, suggestive of 'normal science' alternating with 'paradigm shifts,' emerge prominently in that change dynamics. The B Patrick Grim
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We model scientific theories as Bayesian networks. Nodes carry credences and function as abstract representations of propositions within the structure. Directed links carry conditional probabilities and represent connections between... more
We model scientific theories as Bayesian networks. Nodes carry credences and function as abstract representations of propositions within the structure. Directed links carry conditional probabilities and represent connections between those propositions. Updating is Bayesian across the network as a whole. The impact of evidence at one point within a scientific theory can have a very different impact on the network than does evidence of the same strength at a different point. A Bayesian model allows us to envisage and analyze the differential impact of evidence and credence change at different points within a single network and across different theoretical structures.
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This article distinguishes nine senses of polarization and provides formal measures for each one to refine the methodology used to describe polarization in distributions of attitudes. Each distinct concept is explained through a... more
This article distinguishes nine senses of polarization and provides formal measures for each one to refine the methodology used to describe polarization in distributions of attitudes. Each distinct concept is explained through a definition, formal measures, examples, and references. We then apply these measures to GSS data regarding political views, opinions on abortion, and religiosity-topics described as revealing social polarization. Previous breakdowns of polarization include domain-specific assumptions and focus on a subset of the distribution's features. This has conflated multiple, independent features of attitude distributions. The current work aims to extract the distinct senses of polarization and demonstrate that by becoming clearer on these distinctions we can better focus our efforts on substantive issues in social phenomena. ARTICLE HISTORY
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An extended version of the paper that appeared as “Diversity, Ability, and Expertise in Epistemic Communities" in Philosophy of Science
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How do conventions of communication emerge? How do sounds or gestures take on asemantic meaning, and how do pragmatic conventions emerge regarding the passing of adequate, reliable, and relevant information? My colleagues and I have... more
How do conventions of communication emerge? How do sounds or gestures take on asemantic meaning, and how do pragmatic conventions emerge regarding the passing of adequate, reliable, and relevant information?
My colleagues and I have attempted in earlier work to extend spatialized game theory to questions of semantics. Agent-based simulations indicate that simple signaling systems emerge fairly naturally on the basis of individual information maximization in environments of wandering food sources and predators. Simple signaling emerges by means of any of various forms of updating on the behavior of immediate neighbors: imitation, localized genetic algorithms, and partial training in neural nets.
Here the goal is to apply similar techniques to questions of pragmatics. The motivating idea is the same: the idea that important aspects of pragmatics, like important aspects of semantics, may fall out as a natural results of information maximization in informational networks. The attempt below is to simulate fundamental elements of the Gricean picture: in particular, to show within networks of very simple agents the emergence of behavior in accord with the Gricean maxims. What these simulations suggest is that important features of pragmatics, like important aspects of semantics, don't have to be added in a theory of informational networks. They come for free.
My colleagues and I have attempted in earlier work to extend spatialized game theory to questions of semantics. Agent-based simulations indicate that simple signaling systems emerge fairly naturally on the basis of individual information maximization in environments of wandering food sources and predators. Simple signaling emerges by means of any of various forms of updating on the behavior of immediate neighbors: imitation, localized genetic algorithms, and partial training in neural nets.
Here the goal is to apply similar techniques to questions of pragmatics. The motivating idea is the same: the idea that important aspects of pragmatics, like important aspects of semantics, may fall out as a natural results of information maximization in informational networks. The attempt below is to simulate fundamental elements of the Gricean picture: in particular, to show within networks of very simple agents the emergence of behavior in accord with the Gricean maxims. What these simulations suggest is that important features of pragmatics, like important aspects of semantics, don't have to be added in a theory of informational networks. They come for free.
Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different forms of information aggregation and decision-making. The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms of votes, and the Hong-Page... more
Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different forms of information aggregation and decision-making. The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms of votes, and the Hong-Page ‘diversity trumps ability’ result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation in the form of collaborative search. Both results, however, are models of full and direct participation across a population. In this paper, we contrast how these results hold up within the familiar structure of a representative hierarchy. We first consider extant analytic work that shows that representation inevitably weakens the voting results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We then go on to show that collaborative search, as modeled by Hong and Page, holds its own within hierarchical representation. In a variation on the dynamics of group search, representation even shows a slight edge over direct participation. This contrast illustrates how models of information aggregation vary when put into a representative structure. While some of the epistemic merits of democracy are lost when voting is done hierarchically, modeling results show that representation can preserve and even slightly amplify the epistemic virtues of collaborative search.
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Talk of ‘robustness’remains vague, despite the fact that it is clearly an important parameter in evaluating models in general and game-theoretic results in particular. Here we want to make it a bit less vague by offering a graphic measure... more
Talk of ‘robustness’remains vague, despite the fact
that it is clearly an important parameter in evaluating
models in general and game-theoretic results in
particular. Here we want to make it a bit less vague by
offering a graphic measure for a particular kind of
robustness— ‘matrix robustness’— using a threedimensional display of the universe of 2 x 2 game
theory. In a display of this form, familiar games such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken and
Deadlock appear as volumes, making comparison easy
regarding the extent of different game-theoretic effects.
We illustrate such a comparison in robustness between
the triumph of Tit for Tat in a spatialized environment
(Grim 1995, Grim, Mar, and St. Denis 1998) and a
spatialized modeling of the Contact Hypothesis
regarding prejudice reduction (Grim, et. al 2005a,
2005b). The geometrical representation of relative
robustness also offers a possibility for links between
geometrical theorems and results regarding robustness
in game theory.
that it is clearly an important parameter in evaluating
models in general and game-theoretic results in
particular. Here we want to make it a bit less vague by
offering a graphic measure for a particular kind of
robustness— ‘matrix robustness’— using a threedimensional display of the universe of 2 x 2 game
theory. In a display of this form, familiar games such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken and
Deadlock appear as volumes, making comparison easy
regarding the extent of different game-theoretic effects.
We illustrate such a comparison in robustness between
the triumph of Tit for Tat in a spatialized environment
(Grim 1995, Grim, Mar, and St. Denis 1998) and a
spatialized modeling of the Contact Hypothesis
regarding prejudice reduction (Grim, et. al 2005a,
2005b). The geometrical representation of relative
robustness also offers a possibility for links between
geometrical theorems and results regarding robustness
in game theory.
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In this paper we make a simple theoretical point using a practical issue as an example. The simple theoretical point is that robustness is not 'all or nothing': in asking whether a system is robust one has to ask 'robust with respect to... more
In this paper we make a simple theoretical point using a practical issue as an example. The simple theoretical point is that robustness is not 'all or nothing': in asking whether a system is robust one has to ask 'robust with respect to what property?' and 'robust over what set of changes in the system?' The practical issue used to illustrate the point is an examination of degrees of linkage between sub-networks and a pointed contrast in robustness and fragility between the dynamics of (1) contact infection and (2) information transfer or belief change. Time to infection across linked sub-networks, it turns out, is fairly robust with regard to the degree of linkage between them. Time to infection is fragile and sensitive, however, with regard to the type of sub-network involved: total, ring, small world, random, or scale-free. Aspects of robustness and fragility are reversed where it is belief updating with reinforcement rather than infection that is at issue. In information dynamics, the pattern of time to consensus is robust across changes in network type but remarkably fragile with respect to degree of linkage between sub-networks. These results have important implications for public health interventions in realistic social networks, particularly with an eye to ethnic and socioeconomic sub-communities, and in social networks with sub-communities changing in structure or linkage.
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Beyond belief change and meme adoption, both genetics and infection have been spoken of in terms of information transfer. What we examine here, concentrating on the specific case of transfer between sub-networks, are the differences in... more
Beyond belief change and meme adoption, both genetics and infection have been spoken of in terms of information transfer. What we examine here, concentrating on the specific case of transfer between sub-networks, are the differences in network dynamics in these cases: the different network dynamics of germs, genes, and memes. Germs and memes, it turns out, exhibit a very different dynamics across networks. For infection, measured in terms of time to total infection, it is network type rather than degree of linkage between sub-networks that is of primary importance. For belief transfer, measured in terms of time to consensus, it is degree of linkage rather than network type that is crucial. Genes model each of these other dynamics in part, but match neither in full. For genetics, like belief transfer and unlike infection, network type makes little difference. Like infection and unlike belief, on the other hand, the dynamics of genetic information transfer within single and between linked networks are much the same. In ways both surprising and intriguing, transfer of genetic information seems to be robust across network differences crucial for the other two.
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Modeling and simulation clearly have an upside. My discussion here will deal with the inevitable downside of modeling-the sort of things that can go wrong. It will set out a taxonomy for the pathology of models-a catalogue of the various... more
Modeling and simulation clearly have an upside. My discussion here will deal with the inevitable downside of modeling-the sort of things that can go wrong. It will set out a taxonomy for the pathology of models-a catalogue of the various ways in which model contrivance can go awry. In the course of that discussion, I also call on some of my past experience with models and their vulnerabilities. 1 Models My discussion will deal with the down-side of modeling-the sort of things that can go wrong. It will set out a taxonomy for the pathology of models-a catalogue of the various ways in which model contrivance can go awry. The aim of the enterprise of modeling to construct an artificial manifold M, the model, whose salient features or operations replicate those of a corresponding realty R. We resort to models primarily because of incapacity: how something works is too complex for us to manage and we resort to a simplified simulacrum to stand in it stead. A model seeks to replicate the salient features of its object in a simpler, more manageable, more perspicuous way. The aim is to provide a larger, functionally more complex whole with a simulacrum whose mode of operation mirrors that of this object in those respects, at least, that are relevant and informative in the setting of an investigation. The name of the game is to make tractable a complex reality which-in its real-life
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The three papers that follow formed part of a 3-day conference in the Epistemology of Modeling and Simulation at the University of Pittsburgh, 1st through 3rd April 2011 (www.modelingepistemology.pitt.edu). They reflect variations on a... more
The three papers that follow formed part of a 3-day conference in the Epistemology of Modeling and Simulation at the University of Pittsburgh, 1st through 3rd April 2011 (www.modelingepistemology.pitt.edu). They reflect variations on a theme that emerged in the course of the conference both in more traditional paper sessions and in breakout workshops on specific computational models: the Long House Valley Anasazi model, 1 the CCSM3 climate change model, 2 and the Epstein smallpox model. 3 The papers collected here concentrate on issues of modeling and simulation, experimentation , and materiality. Tarja Knuuttilla and Andrea Loettger's "Modeling and Experimenting: The Combinatorial Modeling Strategy of Synthetic Biology" explores a triangulation strategy between model organisms, synthetic experimentation, and mathematical models and associated simulations. The authors argue that each of these fulfills a specific epistemic role, with an analysis of cases that adds significant nuance to older debates regarding simulation, experimentation, and materiality.
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The topics of modeling and information come together in at least two ways. Computational modeling and simulation play an increasingly important role in science, across disciplines from mathematics through physics to economics and... more
The topics of modeling and information come together in at least two ways. Computational modeling and simulation play an increasingly important role in science, across disciplines from mathematics through physics to economics and political science. The philosophical questions at issue are questions as to what modeling and simulation are adding, altering, or amplifying in terms of scientific information. What changes with regard to information acquisition, theoretical development, or empirical confirmation with contemporary tools of computational modeling? In this sense the title of this chapter is read in the following way: What kind of information is modeling information? What kind of information does modeling give us? Modeling and information also come together in a second way, however. The character of information transfer is one of the topics to which computational models have been quite successfully applied. Here the questions at issue are questions of informational dynamics. How can we expect information to flow across a network of agents? What characteristics of networks correlate with what aspects of that information flow-speed, for example, or accuracy? In this sense the title of this chapter is read in a different way: an outline of ongoing efforts to model information. Because the topics come together in these two ways, this chapter will be divided into two parts. The first will be an examination of the particular informational role of computational modeling and simulation. The second will survey some contemporary efforts to use computational tools in order to model information in general. Section I, then, offers a philosophical outline of a basically descriptive question across a range of scientific disciplines: how do models produce information? Section II samples a range of modelling work exploring the flow of information in general. Intriguingly, one aspect of this second section is a return to the scientific procedure but from a distinctly prescriptive angle: How, for particular epistemic purposes, might we best optimize scientific information networks?
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We are increasingly exposed to polarized media sources, with clear evidence that individuals choose those sources closest to their existing views. We also have a tradition of open face-to-face group discussion in town meetings, for... more
We are increasingly exposed to polarized media sources, with clear evidence that individuals choose those sources closest to their existing views. We also have a tradition of open face-to-face group discussion in town meetings, for example. There are a range of current proposals to revive the role of group meetings in democratic decision-making. Here, we build a simulation that instantiates aspects of reinforcement theory in a model of competing social influences. What can we expect in the interaction of polarized media with group interaction along the lines of town meetings? Some surprises are evident from a computational model that includes both. Deliberative group discussion can be expected to produce opinion convergence. That convergence may not, however, be a cure for extreme views polarized at opposite ends of the opinion spectrum. In a large class of cases, we show that adding the influence of group meetings in an environment of self-selected media produces not a moderate central consensus but opinion convergence at one of the extremes defined by polarized media.
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The structure of communication networks can be more or less “democratic”: networks are less democratic if (a) communication is more limited in terms of characteristic degree and (b) is more tightly channeled to a few specifc nodes.... more
The structure of communication networks can be more or less “democratic”: networks are less democratic if (a) communication is more limited in terms of characteristic degree and (b) is more tightly channeled to a few specifc nodes. Together those measures
give us a two-dimensional landscape of more and less democratic networks. We track opinion volatility across that landscape: the extent to which random changes in a small percentage of binary opinions at network nodes result in wide changes across the network as a whole. If wide and frequent swings of popular opinion are taken as a mark of instability, democratic communication networks prove far more stable than anti-democratic ones. In a fnal section, we consider the democratic or anti-democratic character of networks that respond to volatility by rewiring at random, in a search for community, or in a search for a leader.
give us a two-dimensional landscape of more and less democratic networks. We track opinion volatility across that landscape: the extent to which random changes in a small percentage of binary opinions at network nodes result in wide changes across the network as a whole. If wide and frequent swings of popular opinion are taken as a mark of instability, democratic communication networks prove far more stable than anti-democratic ones. In a fnal section, we consider the democratic or anti-democratic character of networks that respond to volatility by rewiring at random, in a search for community, or in a search for a leader.
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Epistemic justications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different forms of information aggregation and decision-making. The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justication in terms of votes, and the Hong-Page... more
Epistemic justications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different forms of information aggregation and decision-making. The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justication in terms of votes, and the Hong-Page 'diversity trumps ability' result is appealed to as a justication in terms of deliberation in the form of collaborative search. Both results, however, are models of full and direct participation across a population. In this paper, we contrast how these results hold up within the familiar structure of a representative hierarchy. We rst consider extant analytic work that shows that representation inevitably weakens the voting results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We then go on to show that col-laborative search, as modeled by Hong and Page, holds its own within hierarchical representation. In a variation on the dynamics of group search, representation even shows a slight edge over direct participation. This contrast illustrates how models of information aggregation vary when put into a representative structure. While some of the epistemic merits of democracy are lost when voting is done hierarchically , modeling results show that representation can preserve and even slightly amplify the epistemic virtues of collaborative search.
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What structure of scientific communication and cooperation, between what kinds of investigators, is best positioned to lead us to the truth? Against an outline of standard philosophical characteristics and a recent turn to social... more
What structure of scientific communication and cooperation, between what kinds of investigators, is best positioned to lead us to the truth? Against an outline of standard philosophical characteristics and a recent turn to social epistemology, this paper surveys highlights within two strands of computational philosophy of science that attempt to work toward an answer to this question. Both strands emerge from abstract rational choice theory and the analytic tradition in philosophy of science rather than postmodern sociology of science. The first strand of computational research models the effect of communicative networks within groups, with conclusions regarding the potential benefit of limited communication. The second strand models the potential benefits of cognitive diversity within groups. Examples from each strand of research are used in analyzing what makes modeling of this sort both promising and distinctly philosophical, but are also used to emphasize possibilities for failure and inherent limitations as well.
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This article aims to describe the last 10 years of the collaborative scientific endeavors on polarization in particular and collective problem-solving in general by our multidisciplinary research team. We describe the team's disciplinary... more
This article aims to describe the last 10 years of the collaborative scientific endeavors on polarization in particular and collective problem-solving in general by our multidisciplinary research team. We describe the team's disciplinary composition-social psychology, political science, social philosophy/epistemology, and complex systems science-highlighting the shared and unique skill sets of our group members and how each discipline contributes to studying polarization and collective problem-solving. With an eye to the literature on team dynamics, we describe team logistics and processes that we believe make our multidisciplinary team persistent and productive. We emphasize challenges and difficulties caused by disciplinary differences in terms of terminology, units/levels of analysis, methodology, and theoretical assumptions. We then explain how work disambiguating the concepts of polarization and developing an integrative theoretical and methodological framework with complex systems perspectives has helped us overcome these challenges. We summarize the major findings that our research has produced over the past decade, and describe our current research and future directions. Last, we discuss lessons we have learned, including difficulties in a "three models" project and how we addressed them, with suggestions for effective multidisciplinary team research.
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We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic... more
We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic outcomes as how they share information. But, how we forget, unlike how we form beliefs, isn't typically taken to be the sort of thing that can be epistemically rational or justified. We consider what we take to be the most promising argument for this claim and find it lacking. We conclude that understanding how agents forget should be as central to social epistemology as understanding how agents form beliefs and share information with others.
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Philosophers have long tried to understand scientific change in terms of a dynamics of revision within 'theoretical frameworks,' 'disciplinary matrices,' 'scientific paradigms' or 'conceptual schemes.' No-one, however, has made clear... more
Philosophers have long tried to understand scientific change in terms of a dynamics of revision within 'theoretical frameworks,' 'disciplinary matrices,' 'scientific paradigms' or 'conceptual schemes.' No-one, however, has made clear precisely how one might model such a conceptual scheme, nor what form change dynamics within such a structure could be expected to take. In this paper we take some first steps in applying network theory to the issue, modeling conceptual schemes as simple networks and the dynamics of change as cascades on those networks. The results allow a new understanding of two traditional approaches-Popper and Kuhn-as well as introducing the intriguing prospect of viewing scientific change using the metaphor of self-organizing criticality.
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Computational philosophy is the use of mechanized computational techniques to instantiate, extend, and amplify philosophical research. Computational philosophy is not philosophy of computers or computational techniques; it is rather... more
Computational philosophy is the use of mechanized computational techniques to instantiate, extend, and amplify philosophical research. Computational philosophy is not philosophy of computers or computational techniques; it is rather philosophy using computers and computational techniques. The idea is simply to apply advances in computer technology and techniques to advance discovery, exploration and argument within any philosophical area. After touching on historical precursors, this article discusses contemporary computational philosophy across a variety of fields: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, ethics and social philosophy, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, often with examples of operating software. Far short of any attempt at an exhaustive treatment, the intention is to introduce the spirit of each application by using some representative examples.
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The Hong and Page 'diversity trumps ability' result (Hong and Page 2004, 2009; Page 2007, 2011) has been used to argue for the more general claim that a diverse set of agents is epistemically superior to a comparable group of experts.... more
The Hong and Page 'diversity trumps ability' result (Hong and Page 2004, 2009; Page 2007, 2011) has been used to argue for the more general claim that a diverse set of agents is epistemically superior to a comparable group of experts. Here we extend Hong and Page's model to landscapes of different degrees of randomness and demonstrate the sensitivity of the 'diversity trumps ability' result. This analysis offers a more nuanced picture of how diversity, ability, and expertise may relate. Though models of this sort can indeed be suggestive for diversity policies, we advise against interpreting such results overly broadly.
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Chapter 6 of the Philosophical Computer
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Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network... more
Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network contact in which agents are characterized not in terms of single beliefs but in terms of internal belief suites. Individuals update elements of their belief suites on input from other agents in order both to maximize internal belief coherence and to incorporate 'trickled in' elements of truth as correspondence. Results, though often intuitive, prove more complex than in simpler models (Hegselmann and Krause 2002, 2006; Grim et al. 2015). The optimistic finding is that pressures toward internal coherence can exploit and expand on small elements of truth as correspondence is introduced into epistemic networks. Less optimistic results show that pressures for coherence can also work directly against the incorporation of truth, particularly when coherence is established first and new data are introduced later.
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Polarization is a topic of intense interest among social scientists, but there is significant disagreement regarding the character of the phenomena and little understanding of underlying mechanics. A first problem , we argue, is that... more
Polarization is a topic of intense interest among social scientists, but there is significant disagreement regarding the character of the phenomena and little understanding of underlying mechanics. A first problem , we argue, is that polarization appears in the literature as not one concept but many. In the first part of the paper, we distinguish nine phenomena that may be considered polarization with suggestions of appropriate measures for each. In the second part of the paper, we apply this analysis to evaluate the types of polarization generated by the three major families of computational models proposing specific mechanisms of opinion polarization.
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A scientific community can be modeled as a collection of epistemic agents attempting to answer questions, in part by communicating about their hypotheses and results. We can treat the pathways of scientific communication as a network.... more
A scientific community can be modeled as a collection of epistemic agents attempting to answer questions, in part by communicating about their hypotheses and results. We can treat the pathways of scientific communication as a network. When we do, it becomes clear that the interaction between the structure of the network and the nature of the question under investigation affects epistemic desiderata, including accuracy and speed to community consensus. Here we build on previous work, both our own and others’, in order to get a firmer grasp on precisely which features of scientific communities interact with which features of scientific questions in order to influence epistemic outcomes.
Here we introduce a measure on the landscape meant to capture some aspects of the difficulty of answering an empirical question. We then investigate both how different communication networks affect whether the community finds the best answer and the time it takes for the community to reach consensus on an answer. We measure these two epistemic desiderata on a continuum of networks sampled from the Watts-Strogatz spectrum. It turns out that finding the best answer and reaching consensus exhibit radically different patterns. The time it takes for a community to reach a consensus in these models roughly tracks mean path length in the network. Whether a scientific community finds the best answer, on the other hand, tracks neither mean path length nor clustering coefficient.
Here we introduce a measure on the landscape meant to capture some aspects of the difficulty of answering an empirical question. We then investigate both how different communication networks affect whether the community finds the best answer and the time it takes for the community to reach consensus on an answer. We measure these two epistemic desiderata on a continuum of networks sampled from the Watts-Strogatz spectrum. It turns out that finding the best answer and reaching consensus exhibit radically different patterns. The time it takes for a community to reach a consensus in these models roughly tracks mean path length in the network. Whether a scientific community finds the best answer, on the other hand, tracks neither mean path length nor clustering coefficient.
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Agent-based models have played a prominent role in recent debates about the merits of democracy. In particular, the formal model of Lu Hong and Scott Page and the associated “diversity trumps ability” result has typically been seen to... more
Agent-based models have played a prominent role in recent debates about the merits of democracy. In particular, the formal model of Lu Hong and Scott Page and the associated “diversity trumps ability” result has typically been seen to support the epistemic virtues of democracy over epistocracy (i.e., governance by experts). In this paper we first identify the modeling choices embodied in the original formal model and then critique the application of the Hong-Page results to philosophical debates on the relative merits of democracy. In particular we argue that the “best-performing agents” in the Hong-Page model should not be interpreted as experts. We next explore a closely related model in which best-performing agents are more plausibly seen as experts and show that the diversity trumps ability result fails to hold. However, with changes in other parameters (such as the deliberation dynamic) the diversity trumps ability result is restored. The sensitivity of this result to parameter choices illustrates the complexity of the link between formal modeling and more general philosophical claims; we use this debate as a platform for a more general discussion of when and how agent-based models can contribute to philosophical discussions.
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Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it's standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we... more
Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it's standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources tend to polarize into different subgroups. We argue that using that strategy is epistemically rational for limited agents. So even though group polarization looks like it must be the product of human irrationality, polarization can be the result of fully rational deliberation with natural human limitations.
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It is widely accepted that the way information transfers across networks depends importantly on the structure of the network. Here, we show that the mechanism of information transfer is crucial: in many respects the effect of the... more
It is widely accepted that the way information transfers across networks depends importantly on the structure of the network. Here, we show that the mechanism of information transfer is crucial: in many respects the effect of the specific transfer mechanism swamps network effects. Results are demonstrated in terms of three different types of transfer mechanism: germs, genes, and memes. With an emphasis on the specific case of transfer between sub-networks, we explore both the dynamics of each of these across networks and a measure of their comparative fitness.
Germ and meme transfer exhibit very different dynamics across linked networks. For germs, measured in terms of time to total infection, network type rather than degree of linkage between sub-networks is the primary factor. For memes or belief transfer, measured in terms of time to consensus, it is the opposite: degree of linkage trumps network type in importance.
The dynamics of genetic information transfer is unlike either germs or memes. Transfer of genetic information is robust across network differences to which both germs and memes prove sensitive.
We also consider function: how well germ, gene, and meme transfer mechanisms can meet their respective objectives of infecting the population, mixing and transferring genetic information, and spreading a message. A shared formal measure of fitness is introduced for purposes of comparison, again with an emphasis on linked sub-networks. Meme transfer proves superior to transfer by genetic reproduction on that measure, with both memes and genes superior to infection dynamics across all networks types. What kinds of network structure optimize fitness also differ among the three. Both germs and genes show fairly stable fitness with added links between sub-networks, but genes show greater sensitivity to the structure of sub-networks at issue. Belief transfer, in contrast to the other two, shows a clear decline in fitness with increasingly connected networks.
When it comes to understanding how information moves on networks, our results indicate that questions of information dynamics on networks cannot be answered in terms of networks alone. A primary role is played by the specific mechanism of information transfer at issue. We must first ask about how a particular type of information moves.
Germ and meme transfer exhibit very different dynamics across linked networks. For germs, measured in terms of time to total infection, network type rather than degree of linkage between sub-networks is the primary factor. For memes or belief transfer, measured in terms of time to consensus, it is the opposite: degree of linkage trumps network type in importance.
The dynamics of genetic information transfer is unlike either germs or memes. Transfer of genetic information is robust across network differences to which both germs and memes prove sensitive.
We also consider function: how well germ, gene, and meme transfer mechanisms can meet their respective objectives of infecting the population, mixing and transferring genetic information, and spreading a message. A shared formal measure of fitness is introduced for purposes of comparison, again with an emphasis on linked sub-networks. Meme transfer proves superior to transfer by genetic reproduction on that measure, with both memes and genes superior to infection dynamics across all networks types. What kinds of network structure optimize fitness also differ among the three. Both germs and genes show fairly stable fitness with added links between sub-networks, but genes show greater sensitivity to the structure of sub-networks at issue. Belief transfer, in contrast to the other two, shows a clear decline in fitness with increasingly connected networks.
When it comes to understanding how information moves on networks, our results indicate that questions of information dynamics on networks cannot be answered in terms of networks alone. A primary role is played by the specific mechanism of information transfer at issue. We must first ask about how a particular type of information moves.
Research Interests:
What is it for a sound or gesture to have a meaning, and how does it come to have one? In this paper, a range of simulations are used to extend the tradition of theories of meaning as use. The authors work throughout with large... more
What is it for a sound or gesture to have a meaning, and how does it come to have one? In this paper, a range of simulations are used to extend the tradition of theories of meaning as use. The authors work throughout with large spatialized arrays of sessile individuals in an environment of wandering food sources and predators. Individuals gain points by feeding and lose points when they are hit by a predator and are not hiding. They can also make sounds heard by immediate neighbours in the array, and can respond to sounds from immediate neighbours. No inherent meaning for these sounds is built into the simulation; under what circumstances they are sent, if any, and what the response to them is, if any, vary initially with the strategies randomized across the array. These sounds do take on a specific function for communities of individuals, however, with any of three forms of strategy change: direct imitation of strategies of successful neighbours, a localized genetic algorithm in which strategies are 'crossed' with those of successful neighbours, and neural net training on the behaviour of successful neighbours. Starting from an array randomized across a large number of strategies, and using any of these modes of strategy change, communities of 'communicators' emerge. Within these evolving communities the sounds heard from immediate neighbours, initially arbitrary across the array, come to be used for very specific communicative functions. 'Communicators' make a particular sound on feeding and respond to that same sound from neighbours by opening their mouths; they make a different sound when hit with a predator and respond to that sound by hiding. Robustly and persistently , even in simple computer models of communities of self-interested agents, something suggestively like signalling emerges and spreads.
Research Interests:
A crucial question for artificial cognition systems is what meaning is and how it arises. In pursuit of that question, this paper extends earlier work in which we show the emergence of simple signaling in biologically inspired models... more
A crucial question for artificial cognition systems is what meaning is and how it arises. In pursuit of that question, this paper extends earlier work in which we show the emergence of simple signaling in biologically inspired models using arrays of locally interactive agents. Communities of 'communicators' develop in an environment of wandering food sources and predators using any of a variety of mechanisms: immitation of successful neighbors, localized genetic algorithms and partial neural net training on successful neighbors. Here we focus on environmental variability, comparing results for environments with (a) constant resources, (b) random resources, and (c) cycles of 'boom and bust.' In both simple and complex models across all three mechanisms of strategy change the emergence of communication is strongly favored by cycles of 'boom and bust.' These results are particularly intriguing given the importance of environmental variability in fields as diverse as psychology, ecology and cultural anthropology.
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Public health care interventions-regarding vaccination, obesity, and HIV, for example-standardly take the form of information dissemination across a community. But information networks can vary importantly between different ethnic... more
Public health care interventions-regarding vaccination, obesity, and HIV, for example-standardly take the form of information dissemination across a community. But information networks can vary importantly between different ethnic communities, as can levels of trust in information from different sources. We use data from the Greater Pittsburgh Random Household Health Survey to construct models of information networks for White and Black communities--models which reflect the degree of information contact between individuals, with degrees of trust in information from various sources correlated with positions in that social network. With simple assumptions regarding belief change and social reinforcement, we use those modeled networks to build dynamic agent-based models of how information can be expected to flow and how beliefs can be expected to change across each community. With contrasting information from governmental and religious sources, the results show importantly different dynamic patterns of belief polarization within the two communities.
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Abstract We work with a large spatialized array of individuals in an environment of drifting food sources and predators. The behavior of each individual is generated by its simple neural net; individuals are capable of making one of two... more
Abstract We work with a large spatialized array of individuals in an environment of drifting food sources and predators. The behavior of each individual is generated by its simple neural net; individuals are capable of making one of two sounds and are capable of responding to sounds from their immediate neighbors by opening their mouths or hiding. An individual whose mouth is open in the presence of food is “fed” and gains points; an individual who fails to hide when a predator is present is “hurt” by losing points. Opening mouths, hiding, and making sounds each exact an energy cost. There is no direct evolutionary gain for acts of cooperation or “successful communication” per se. In such an environment we start with a spatialized array of neural nets with randomized weights. Using standard learning algorithms, our individuals “train up” on the behavior of successful neighbors at regular intervals.Given that simple setup, will a community of neural nets evolve a simple language for signaling the presence of food and predators? With important qualifications, the answer is “yes.” In a simple spatial environment, pursuing individualistic gains and using partial training on successful neighbors, randomized neural nets can learn to communicate.
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There are many social psychological theories regarding the nature of prejudice, but only one major theory of prejudice reduction: under the right circumstances, prejudice between groups will be reduced with increased contact. On the... more
There are many social psychological theories regarding the
nature of prejudice, but only one major theory of prejudice
reduction: under the right circumstances, prejudice between
groups will be reduced with increased contact. On the one hand,
the contact hypothesis has a range of empirical support and has
been a major force in social change. On the other hand, there are
practical and ethical obstacles to any large-scale controlled test
of the hypothesis in which relevant variables can be
manipulated. Here we construct a spatialized model that tests
the core hypothesis in a large array of game-theoretic agents.
Robust results offer a new kind of support for the contact
hypothesis: results in simulation do accord with a hypothesis of
reduced prejudice with increased contact. The spatialized gametheoretic model also suggests a deeper explanation for at least some of the social phenomena at issue.
nature of prejudice, but only one major theory of prejudice
reduction: under the right circumstances, prejudice between
groups will be reduced with increased contact. On the one hand,
the contact hypothesis has a range of empirical support and has
been a major force in social change. On the other hand, there are
practical and ethical obstacles to any large-scale controlled test
of the hypothesis in which relevant variables can be
manipulated. Here we construct a spatialized model that tests
the core hypothesis in a large array of game-theoretic agents.
Robust results offer a new kind of support for the contact
hypothesis: results in simulation do accord with a hypothesis of
reduced prejudice with increased contact. The spatialized gametheoretic model also suggests a deeper explanation for at least some of the social phenomena at issue.
Research Interests:
Abstract.The goal of philosophy of information is to understand what information is, how it operates, and how to put it to work. But unlike ‘information’ in the technical sense of information theory, what we are interested in is... more
Abstract.The goal of philosophy of information is to understand what information is, how it operates, and how to put it to work. But unlike ‘information’ in the technical sense of information theory, what we are interested in is meaningful information. To understand the nature and dynamics of information in this sense we have to understand meaning. What we offer here are simple computational models that show emergence of meaning and information transfer in randomized arrays of neural nets. These we take to be formal instantiations of a tradition of theories of meaning as use. What they offer, we propose, is a glimpse into the origin and dynamics of at least simple forms of meaning and information transfer as properties inherent in behavioral coordination across a community.
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'The problem with simulations is that they are doomed to succeed.' So runs a common criticism of simulations—that they can be used to 'prove' anything and are thus of little or no scientific value. While this particular objection... more
'The problem with simulations is that they are doomed to succeed.' So runs a common criticism of simulations—that they can be used to 'prove' anything and are thus of little or no scientific value. While this particular objection represents a minority view, especially among those who work with simulations in a scientific context, it raises a difficult question: what standards should we use to differentiate a simulation that fails from one that succeeds? In this paper we build on a structural analysis of simulation developed in previous work to provide an evaluative account of the variety of ways in which simulations do fail. We expand the structural analysis in terms of the relationship between a simulation and its real-world target emphasizing the important role of aspects intended to correspond and also those specifically intended not to correspond to reality. The result is an outline both of the ways in which simulations can fail and the scientific importance of those various forms of failure.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of... more
The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in an ecological model based on population percentages (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), but 'generous tit for tat&'; (GTFT), which repays cooperation with a probability of cooperation approaching 1 but forgives defection with a probability of 1/3. In this paper, we consider a spatialized instantiation of the stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma, using two-dimensional cellular automata (Wolfram, 1984, 1986; Gutowitz, 1990) to model the spatial dynamics of populations of competing strategies. The surprising result is that in the spatial model it is not GTFT but still more generous strategies that are favored. The optimal strategy within this spatial ecology appears to be a form of 'bending over backwards', which returns cooperation for defection with a probability of 2/3--a rate twice as generous as GTFT.
Research Interests: Engineering, Game Theory, Spatial Ecology, Altruism, Cellular Automata, and 12 moreBio-Inspired Systems, Stochastic processes, Biological Sciences, Humans, Computer Simulation, Evolution of Cooperation, Standard Model, Biological evolution, Ecological Model, Biosystems, Tit for Tat, and Spatial Model
In the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor's strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May,... more
In the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor's strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May, 1993; Mar and St. Denis, 1993a, b; ...
Research Interests:
Environmental variability has been proposed as an important mechanism in behavioral psychology, in ecology and evolution, and in cultural anthropology. Here we demonstrate its importance in simulational studies as well. In earlier work we... more
Environmental variability has been proposed as an important mechanism in behavioral psychology, in ecology and evolution, and in cultural anthropology. Here we demonstrate its importance in simulational studies as well. In earlier work we have shown ...
Research Interests:
A small consortium of philosophers has begun work on the implications of epistemic networks (Zollman 2008 and forthcoming; Grim 2006, 2007; Weisberg and Muldoon forthcoming), building on theoretical work in economics, computer science,... more
A small consortium of philosophers has begun work on the implications of epistemic networks (Zollman 2008 and forthcoming; Grim 2006, 2007; Weisberg and Muldoon forthcoming), building on theoretical work in economics, computer science, and ...
Abstract: We extend previous work by modeling evolution of communication using a spatialized genetic algorithm which recombines strategies purely locally. Here cellular automata are used as a spatialized environment in which individuals... more
Abstract: We extend previous work by modeling evolution of communication using a spatialized genetic algorithm which recombines strategies purely locally. Here cellular automata are used as a spatialized environment in which individuals gain points by ...
Research Interests:
Most current modeling for evolution of communication still underplays or ignores the role of local action in spatialized environments: the fact that it is immediate neighbors with which one tends to communicate, and from whom one learns... more
Most current modeling for evolution of communication still underplays or ignores the role of local action in spatialized environments: the fact that it is immediate neighbors with which one tends to communicate, and from whom one learns strategies or conventions of communication. Only now are the lessons of spatialization being learned in a related field: game-theoretic models for cooperation. In work on altruism, on the other hand, the role of spatial organization has long been recognized under the term ‘viscosity’.Here we offer some simple simulations that dramatize the importance of spatialization for studies of both cooperation and communication, in each case contrasting (a) a model dynamics in which strategy change proceeds globally, and (b) a spatialized model dynamics in which interaction and strategy change both operate purely locally. Local action in a spatialized model clearly favors the emergence of cooperation. In the case of communication, spatialized models allow commu...
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Is simulation some new kind of science? We argue that instead simulation fits smoothly into existing scientific practice, but does so in several impor-tantly different ways. Simulations in general, and computer simulations in particular,... more
Is simulation some new kind of science? We argue that instead simulation fits smoothly into existing scientific practice, but does so in several impor-tantly different ways. Simulations in general, and computer simulations in particular, ought to be understood as techniques which, like ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The iterated Prisoner';s Dilemma is the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior in a community of egoistic agents. Within that model, a strategy of 'tit-for-tat' has established a reputation for being particularly robust.... more
The iterated Prisoner';s Dilemma is the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior in a community of egoistic agents. Within that model, a strategy of 'tit-for-tat' has established a reputation for being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund have shown ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Page 1. Pattern and Chaos: New Images in the Semantics of Paradox GARY MAR AND PATRICK GRIM Group for Logic and Formal Semantics Department of Philosophy SUNY at Stony Brook Dedicated to the Memory of Hector-Neri Castanieda. ...
Research Interests: Philosophy, Chaos Theory, Fractals, Model, Paradox, and 5 moreFractal, Logics, Nous, Logical Semantics, and Noûs
We extend previous work on cooperation to some related questions regarding the evolution of simple forms of communication. The evolution of cooperation within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been shown to follow different... more
We extend previous work on cooperation to some related questions regarding the evolution of simple forms of communication. The evolution of cooperation within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been shown to follow different patterns, with significantly different outcomes, ...
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We outline major stages in an ongoing attempt to model the dynamics of polarization. The emphasis throughout is on the role of conceptual issues in computational modeling, firmly in a long tradition of philosophical analysis. In order... more
We outline major stages in an ongoing attempt to model the dynamics of polarization. The emphasis throughout is on the role of conceptual issues in computational modeling, firmly in a long tradition of philosophical analysis. In order to model opinion polarization, it turns out, one must distinguish between, and construct measures for, nine very different senses of polarization that appear in the literature.
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What the Sorites has to tell us is a simple truth regarding our categories. It appears to saddle us with something other than a simple truth--something worse, a contradiction or a problem or a paradox--only when we insist on viewing it... more
What the Sorites has to tell us is a simple truth regarding our categories. It appears to saddle us with something other than a simple truth--something worse, a contradiction or a problem or a paradox--only when we insist on viewing it through a discrete logic of categories. Discrete categories and discrete logic are for robots. We aren't robots, and the simple truth is that we don't handle categories in the way any discrete logic would demand. For us non-robots, what the Sorites has to offer is a straightforward truth regarding how incapable robots and their logic are of handling categories like ours. Categories come first. Discrete logic comes later.
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This paper surveys our inescapable limits as cognitive agents with regard to a full world of fact: the well-known metamathematical limits of axiomatic systems, limitations of explanation that doom a principle of sufficient reason,... more
This paper surveys our inescapable limits as cognitive agents with regard to a full world of fact: the well-known metamathematical limits of axiomatic systems, limitations of explanation that doom a principle of sufficient reason, limitations of expression across all possible languages, and a simple but powerful argument regarding the limits of conceivability. In ways demonstrable even from within our limits, the full world of fact is inescapably beyond us. Here we propose that there must nonetheless be a totality of fact, and that despite our limits we can know something of its general character. The world as the totality of fact must form a plenum, with a radically unfamiliar formal structure that contains distinct elements corresponding to each element of its own power set.
Research Interests: Logic and Limitations
The purpose of this paper is to open for investigation a range of phenomena familiar from dynamical systems or chaos theory which appear in a simple fuzzy logic with the introduction of self-reference. Within that logic, self-referential... more
The purpose of this paper is to open for investigation a range of phenomena familiar from dynamical systems or chaos theory which appear in a simple fuzzy logic with the introduction of self-reference. Within that logic, self-referential sentences exhibit properties of fixed point attractors, fixed point repellers, and full chaos on the [0, 11 interval. Strange attractors and fractals appear in two dimensions in the graphing of pairs of mutually referential sentences and appear in three dimensions in the graphing of mutually referential triples.
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Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modatities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with... more
Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modatities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom. A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities need not raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to challenge the current wisdom in another way as well: to show that mere appeal to modal operators in the sense of sentence-to-sentence devices is insufficient to escape the Paradox of the Knower. A family of systems is outlined in which closed formulae can encode other formulae and in which the diagonal lemma and Paradox of the Knower are thereby demonstrable for operators in this sense. P r e d i c a t e s a r e t e r m-t o-s e n t e n c e d e v i c e s : f u n c t i o n s t h a t t a k e t h e t e r m s o f a l a n g u a g e as i n p u t a n d r e n d e r s e n t e n c e s (or o p e n f o r m u l a e) as o u t p u t. S e n t e n t i a l o p e r a t o r s o r c o n n e c t i v e s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a r e s e n t e n c e-t o-s e n t e n c e d e v i c e s : t h e y t a k e s e n t e n c e s (or o p e n f o r m u l a e) as i n p u t a n d r e n d e r s e n t e n c e s (or o p e n f o r m u l a e) as o u t p u t. Such at least is t h e c u r r e n t w i s d o m. Q u i n e ' s ' N e c ' is i n t e n d e d as a p r e d i c a t e. T h e f a m i l i a r '[2' o f m o d a l logic, in c o n t r a s t , is an o p e r a t o r. 2 A n o t h e r c l a i m that a p p e a r s as p a r t o f t h e c u r r e n t w i s d o m is this: that w h a t K a p l a n a n d M o n t a g u e ' s P a r a d o x o f t h e K n o w e r d e m o n s t r a t e s is t h a t n e c e s s i t y a n d o t h e r m o d a l i t i e s c a n n o t b e t r e a t e d as p r e d i c a t e s , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a r i t h m e t i c. T h e y m u s t b e t r e a t e d as s e n t e n t i a l o p e r a t o r s , i n s t e a d. 3 I n M o n t a g u e ' s w o r d s , if necessity is to be treated syntactically, that is, as a predicate of sentences,., then virtuaIly all of modal logic, even the weak system $1, must be sacrificed. This is not to say that the Lewis systems have no natural interpretation. Indeed, if necessity is regarded as a sentential operator, then perfectly natural model-theoretic interpretations may be found. (Montague [1963]/1974, p. 294) I n P u t n a m ' s w o r d s , there is no paradox associated with the notion of necessity as long as we take the '[]' as a statement connective (in the degenerative sense of 'unary connective') and not-in spite of Quine's urging-as a predicate of sentences.
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Abstract The Law of Non-Contradiction holds that both sides of a contradiction cannot be true. Dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions both sides of which are true. Crucial to the dispute, then, is the central notion of... more
Abstract The Law of Non-Contradiction holds that both sides of a contradiction cannot be true. Dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions both sides of which are true. Crucial to the dispute, then, is the central notion of contradiction. My first step here is to work toward clarification of that simple and central notion: Just what is a contradiction
Research Interests:
Summary form only given. The iterated prisoner's dilemma has become the standard model of evolution in a community of egoistic agents, often cited for implications in biology and aspects of sociology. The technical core of this paper... more
Summary form only given. The iterated prisoner's dilemma has become the standard model of evolution in a community of egoistic agents, often cited for implications in biology and aspects of sociology. The technical core of this paper is presentation of a formal undecidability result for an instantiation of the prisoner's dilemma in the spatial form of cellular automata. The proof has some features of interest in its own right: it proceeds: 1) by outlining a species of abstract machines closely related to both Turing machines and Minsky register machines, 2) by embedding these machines in fairly complex cellular automata which mimic wires and standard gates, and 3) by showing that there are strategies of the prisoner's dilemma which behave in spatial arrays in precisely the manner of the basic elements of these automata. The purpose of this paper is to use the case of undecidability within the spatialized prisoner's dilemma as an example of philosophical implications ...
Research Interests:
In the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor's strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May,... more
In the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor's strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May, 1993; Mar and St. Denis, 1993a,b; Grim 1995, 1996). Often a question arises as to what the eventual outcome of an initial spatial configuration of strategies will be: Will a single strategy prove triumphant in the sense of progressively conquering more and more territory without opposition, or will an equilibrium of some small number of strategies emerge? Here it is shown, for finite configurations of Prisoner's Dilemma strategies embedded in a given infinite background, that such questions are formally undecidable: there is no algorithm or effective procedure which, given a specification of a finite configuration, will in all cases tell us whether that configuration will or will not result in progressive conquest by a single strategy when embedded in the given field. The proof introduces undecidability into decision theory in three steps: by (1) outlining a class of abstract machines with familiar undecidability results, by (2) modelling these machines within a particular family of cellular automata, carrying over undecidability results for these, and finally by (3) showing that spatial configurations of Prisoner's Dilemma strategies will take the form of such cellular automata.
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There is of course nothing special about T1 here-we could have used any particular truth in its place. There are also myriad other ways of constructing a distinct truth for each element of the power set Y9'. To each element of... more
There is of course nothing special about T1 here-we could have used any particular truth in its place. There are also myriad other ways of constructing a distinct truth for each element of the power set Y9'. To each element of the power set will correspond a distinct truth, and ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Plena are large-scale macro-totalities appropriate to the realms of all facts, all truths, and all things. Our attempt here is to take some first technical steps toward an adequate conception of plena. Why should we care about such... more
Plena are large-scale macro-totalities appropriate to the realms of all facts, all truths, and all things. Our attempt here is to take some first technical steps toward an adequate conception of plena.
Why should we care about such objects: what are they good for? The answer lies in the very aim and ambition of abstract thought. Theorizing aspires to universality—to a transcendence of the episodic particularization of this and that, reaching to generalization about totalities of different kinds and—in the end—to the totality of everything-at-large. What plena offer is the prospect of giving substance and structure to this line of thought. Traditional approaches to ontology and universalization exhibit a range of theoretical deficiencies which, it is hoped, this further and decidedly different conception may enable us to overcome.
Why should we care about such objects: what are they good for? The answer lies in the very aim and ambition of abstract thought. Theorizing aspires to universality—to a transcendence of the episodic particularization of this and that, reaching to generalization about totalities of different kinds and—in the end—to the totality of everything-at-large. What plena offer is the prospect of giving substance and structure to this line of thought. Traditional approaches to ontology and universalization exhibit a range of theoretical deficiencies which, it is hoped, this further and decidedly different conception may enable us to overcome.
Research Interests:
... 237 Self-Reference and Chaos in Fuzzy Logic Patrick Grim Abstract-The purpose of this paper is to open for investigation a range of phenomena familiar from dynamical systems or chaos theory which appear in a simple fuzzy logic with... more
... 237 Self-Reference and Chaos in Fuzzy Logic Patrick Grim Abstract-The purpose of this paper is to open for investigation a range of phenomena familiar from dynamical systems or chaos theory which appear in a simple fuzzy logic with the introduction of self-reference. ...
Research Interests:
Abstract The Liar paradox is a familiar sentence that asserts its own falsehood. Just slightly less familiar is the Dualist, involving a pair of mutually referential sentences. Here we consider variations on the Dualist and Triplist,... more
Abstract The Liar paradox is a familiar sentence that asserts its own falsehood. Just slightly less familiar is the Dualist, involving a pair of mutually referential sentences. Here we consider variations on the Dualist and Triplist, modelling their dynamical semantics using ...
Research Interests:
We will model the world as a collection of facts, where we model facts with tuples (R, ay,..., aB, i) consisting of any n-ary relation (for some n), an n-tuple of objects, and a polarity i^{\, 0}, representing the having (i= 1) or not... more
We will model the world as a collection of facts, where we model facts with tuples (R, ay,..., aB, i) consisting of any n-ary relation (for some n), an n-tuple of objects, and a polarity i^{\, 0}, representing the having (i= 1) or not having (i= 0) of the relation. Since situations are ...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Analysis
Abstract The Law of Non-Contradiction holds that both sides of a contradiction cannot be true. Dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions both sides of which are true. Crucial to the dispute, then, is the central notion of... more
Abstract The Law of Non-Contradiction holds that both sides of a contradiction cannot be true. Dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions both sides of which are true. Crucial to the dispute, then, is the central notion of contradiction. My first step here is to work toward clarification of that simple and central notion: Just what is a contradiction? The notion of contradiction is far from simple, it turns out, and the search for clarification points up a menagerie of different forms of the Law of Non-Contradiction and Dialetheism as well. ...
Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates,... more
Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Though my ultimate concern is with issues in epistemology and metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in terms evocative of philosophy of religion: What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor... more
Though my ultimate concern is with issues in epistemology and
metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in
terms evocative of philosophy of religion:
What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor
and G6del-for the possibility of omniscience?
metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in
terms evocative of philosophy of religion:
What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor
and G6del-for the possibility of omniscience?
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Philosophy and Analysis
But what of more carefully constructed precise replacements such as gizzle gicks? With a few hedges these are defined as con- figurations of plastic molecules within a 100 molecule range of the closest physical approximation to a perfect... more
But what of more carefully constructed precise replacements
such as gizzle gicks? With a few hedges these are defined as con- figurations of plastic molecules within a 100 molecule range of the
closest physical approximation to a perfect 5" swizzloid, a shape
patterned on that of an imagined paradigm swizzle stick.
Might not gizzle gicks escape sorites arguments? No.
such as gizzle gicks? With a few hedges these are defined as con- figurations of plastic molecules within a 100 molecule range of the
closest physical approximation to a perfect 5" swizzloid, a shape
patterned on that of an imagined paradigm swizzle stick.
Might not gizzle gicks escape sorites arguments? No.
Research Interests:
Peter Unger and Samuel C. Wheeler have recently used sorites arguments--adaptations of Eubulides' argument of the heap--n order to argue against the existence of swizzle sticks, stones, tables, people, and Peter Unger.
Research Interests:
I N [4] I offered a Cantorian argument that there can be no set of all truths, and noted one application: against an approach to possible worlds in terms of maximal consistent sets of propositions. Shortly thereafter Selmer Bringsjord... more
I
N [4] I offered a Cantorian argument that there can be no set of
all truths, and noted one application: against an approach to
possible worlds in terms of maximal consistent sets of propositions. Shortly thereafter Selmer Bringsjord offered a similar argument
against set-theoretical worlds in [1].
In [7], a recent and important contribution to the discussion, Christopher Menzel has raised a number of critical points regarding
Bringsjord's argument. But these points also apply against my
earlier and more general argument. I want to address them directly
here.
N [4] I offered a Cantorian argument that there can be no set of
all truths, and noted one application: against an approach to
possible worlds in terms of maximal consistent sets of propositions. Shortly thereafter Selmer Bringsjord offered a similar argument
against set-theoretical worlds in [1].
In [7], a recent and important contribution to the discussion, Christopher Menzel has raised a number of critical points regarding
Bringsjord's argument. But these points also apply against my
earlier and more general argument. I want to address them directly
here.
Research Interests: Philosophy and Analysis
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Among the most telling atheistic arguments are those to the effect that the existence of any being that meets standard divine specifications is impossible – that there not only is not but could not be any such being.
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The problems of omniscience that I want to address here are generally neglected. One set of neglected problems consists of paradoxes of omniscience clearly recognizable as forms of the Liar, and these I have never seen raised at all.... more
The problems of omniscience that I want to address
here are generally neglected. One set of neglected problems consists of paradoxes of omniscience clearly recognizable as forms of the Liar, and these I have never seen raised at all. Other neglected problems are difficulties for omniscience posed by recent work on belief de se and essential indexicals. These have not yet been given the attention they deserve.
here are generally neglected. One set of neglected problems consists of paradoxes of omniscience clearly recognizable as forms of the Liar, and these I have never seen raised at all. Other neglected problems are difficulties for omniscience posed by recent work on belief de se and essential indexicals. These have not yet been given the attention they deserve.
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John Abbruzzese has recently attempted a defense of omniscience against a series of my attacks. 1 This affords me a welcome occasion to clarify some of the arguments, to pursue some neglected subtleties, and to re-think some important... more
John Abbruzzese has recently attempted a defense of omniscience against a series of my attacks. 1 This affords me a welcome occasion to clarify some of the arguments, to pursue some neglected subtleties, and to re-think some important complications. In the end, ...
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... The impatience with which I quickly grab my popcorn and the haste with which I scamper in to find a seat, for example, are quite fully explained by saying that I realize that the first scene ... (Adams & Castafieda, 1983, p.... more
... The impatience with which I quickly grab my popcorn and the haste with which I scamper in to find a seat, for example, are quite fully explained by saying that I realize that the first scene ... (Adams & Castafieda, 1983, p. 294)24 ... Patrick Grim knows that he (himself) is making a mess ...
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Bringsjord takes the power set axiom to be at the core of the Cantorian difficulties at issue, and the first escape he offers is simply to do without it: to adopt an alternative set theory such as ZF-Power in which such an axiom doesn't... more
Bringsjord takes the power set axiom to be at the core of the Cantorian difficulties at issue, and the first escape he offers is simply to do without it: to adopt an alternative set theory such as ZF-Power in which such an axiom doesn't appear. The truth of the matter, however — as I tried to indicate in my reply to Menzel ([5]) —is that even sacrifice of the power set axiom isn't enough to escape Cantorian difficulties regarding a set of all
truths. We'd have to sacrifice significantly more.
truths. We'd have to sacrifice significantly more.
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Against a deontic argument by Kordig for the existence of God.
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In 'A Paradox Regained'l David Kaplan and Richard Montague offer a purified form of the paradox of the surprise examination that they call the paradox of the Knower. In later work, Montague uses a form of the paradox against syntactical... more
In 'A Paradox Regained'l David Kaplan and Richard Montague offer a
purified form of the paradox of the surprise examination that they call
the paradox of the Knower. In later work, Montague uses a form of the
paradox against syntactical treatments of modality.
The full impact of the Knower, however, has not yet been realized --
or so I will argue. For what the Knower offers is a surprisingly powerful
argument against the coherence of a broad range of common notions
if taken in full generality. Most importantly for my purposes here, it
offers an intriguing argument against any notion of all truth or of
omniscience.
purified form of the paradox of the surprise examination that they call
the paradox of the Knower. In later work, Montague uses a form of the
paradox against syntactical treatments of modality.
The full impact of the Knower, however, has not yet been realized --
or so I will argue. For what the Knower offers is a surprisingly powerful
argument against the coherence of a broad range of common notions
if taken in full generality. Most importantly for my purposes here, it
offers an intriguing argument against any notion of all truth or of
omniscience.
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The Philosopher's Annual attempts to present the ten best articles published in philosophy each year.
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Had set theory been devised to meet the needs of less formalized thinking than is requisite for mathematics, collectivity theory in the sense of this exploration--or something much like it--would have emerged.
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The book seeks to characterize reflexive conceptual structures more thoroughly and more precisely than has been done before, making explicit the structure of paradox and the clear connections to major logical results. The goal is to... more
The book seeks to characterize reflexive conceptual structures more thoroughly and more precisely than has been done before, making explicit the structure of paradox and the clear connections to major logical results. The goal is to trace the structure of reflexivity in sentences, sets, and systems, but also as it appears in propositional attitudes, mental states, perspectives and processes. What an understanding of patterns of reflexivity offer is a deeper and de-mystified understanding of issues of semantics, free will, and the nature of consciousness.
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The book has two aims: to introduce the philosophy of science through an examination of the occult, and to examine the occult rigorously enough to raise central issues in philosophy of science.
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The book has two aims: to introduce the philosophy of science through an examination of the occult, and to examine the occult rigorously enough to raise central issues in philosophy of science
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This is an exploration of a cluster of related logical results. Taken together, these seem to have something philosophically important to teach us: something about knowledge and truth and something about the logical impossibility of... more
This is an exploration of a cluster of related logical results. Taken together, these seem to have something philosophically important to teach us: something about knowledge and truth and something about the logical impossibility of totalities of knowledge and truth.
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Interviews with major figures regarding 5 questions of mind and consciousness
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Abstract 1. Comments on the article on out-of-body experiences (OBEs) in which MB Woodhouse (see record 1994-36114-001) claims (1) that the case for Internalism has not been made,(2) that the case for Externalism can be made, and (3) that... more
Abstract 1. Comments on the article on out-of-body experiences (OBEs) in which MB Woodhouse (see record 1994-36114-001) claims (1) that the case for Internalism has not been made,(2) that the case for Externalism can be made, and (3) that Externalism does ...
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He insists that the'because'of the formulation is used in'its ordinary, conversational, causal-explanatory sense'. He later notes that'When we say the function of X is Z in these [conscious]... more
He insists that the'because'of the formulation is used in'its ordinary, conversational, causal-explanatory sense'. He later notes that'When we say the function of X is Z in these [conscious] cases, we are saying that at least some effort was made to get X (sweep hand, ...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Analysis
... Nor, in the end, is 'lurking around empty mouseholes' the kind of behaviour which leads to catching mice when they are there, since if there are mice in the hole kitty's 'behaviour' can no... more
... Nor, in the end, is 'lurking around empty mouseholes' the kind of behaviour which leads to catching mice when they are there, since if there are mice in the hole kitty's 'behaviour' can no longer be described as 'lurking around empty mouseholes'. ...
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Page 1. 1. Introduction 1.1. Biological compatibility Altruism and selfishness, like free will and determinism, seem to be polar opposites. Yet, as with free will and deter-minism (Dennett 1984), the apparent incompatibility may be... more
Page 1. 1. Introduction 1.1. Biological compatibility Altruism and selfishness, like free will and determinism, seem to be polar opposites. Yet, as with free will and deter-minism (Dennett 1984), the apparent incompatibility may be challenged by various forms of compatibility. ...
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The following offers a brief and suggestive comparison of two phenomena that appear in the literature of two very different disciplines: psi phenomena within parapsychology and the phenomenon of the Rosenthal effect within social... more
The following offers a brief and suggestive comparison of two phenomena that appear in the literature of two very different disciplines: psi phenomena within parapsychology and the phenomenon of the Rosenthal effect within social psychology. Parapsychology, of course, is a discipline held in grave suspicion if not outright contempt within the general scientific community. Social psychology, on the other hand, has a firm and established place among the social sciences. Despite that difference between disciplines, there are striking similarities between psi phenomena and the Rosenthal effect when they are compared in detail. There are two suggestions that can be made on the basis of that comparison. The first and less surprising observation is that these two very similar phenomena have been treated in radically different ways in two different disciplines, and have gained radically different reputations within the scientific community in general. Because the phenomena are so similar, any explanation for these differences in treatment, or any justification for such differences , must appeal to something other than the data itself. The second and more interesting suggestion, however, is that it is not clear that psi and the Rosenthal effect are two distinct phenomena, rather than a single phenomenon that appears under different names in two different disciplines. In other words, perhaps psi/s the Rosenthal effect, or the Rosen-thal effect ~ psi. If so, of course, one might conclude that the basic phenomenon of parapsychology amounts to no more thaw the Rosenthal effect. But one might alternatively conclude that psi, despite a long history of suspicion, appears not only within parapsychology but has been demonstrated with a standard rigor in social psychology as well. PSI There has been a wealth of experimental work done in parapsychology over the past half century or more, and the literature includes a wide variety of experimental techniques and designs as well as a wide range of results. The danger of oversimplification is clear. But if pressed we might nonetheless offer the following as a representative model of a typical or standard para-psychological experiment: We as the experimenters will be testing for clairvoyance or telepathy or precognition or psychokinesis. We would like to get a positive result; few investigators would continue working-in this field especially-if genuinely indifferent or antipathetic to positive results. 35
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How can three and a half pounds of gray matter in our skulls produce the world of subjective experience? Questions of bodies and minds have been topics of intense concentration through the history of philosophy. We can now approach... more
How can three and a half pounds of gray matter in our skulls produce the world of subjective experience? Questions of bodies and minds have been topics of intense concentration through the history of philosophy. We can now approach those questions with new techniques and new findings in the brain sciences.
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Thinking is one of the things we do best. Wouldn't it be great if we could do it even better? This series is designed with that goal in mind: including tools for conceptual visualization, critical analysis, creative thinking, logical... more
Thinking is one of the things we do best. Wouldn't it be great if we could do it even better? This series is designed with that goal in mind: including tools for conceptual visualization, critical analysis, creative thinking, logical inference, rational decision, real-world testing, effective reasoning, and rational argument.
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How does our brain give rise to the rich world of our conscious experience? Each lecture in this course approaches this fundamental philosophical question by focusing on a specific issue regarding thinking, minds, and brains. Topics... more
How does our brain give rise to the rich world of our conscious experience? Each lecture in this course approaches this fundamental philosophical question by focusing on a specific issue regarding thinking, minds, and brains. Topics include little-known facts about consciousness, what it is like to be a bat, the 'inner theater' view of consciousness, Charles Babbage's steam-driven computing engines, and how optical illusions work. Philosophical theories of mind are at the core of the course, from Plato and Aristotle through Descartes and Locke to contemporary work by Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and Paul and Patricia Smith Churchland. In addition, the course draws from psychology, neurophysiology, linguistics, and the amazing history of attempts at building thinking machines.
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The really fundamental questions of our lives are not questions of fact or finance but questions of value. What is it that gives something genuine value? What is worth striving for, and what makes life worth living? Are there values... more
The really fundamental questions of our lives are not questions of fact or finance but questions of value. What is it that gives something genuine value? What is worth striving for, and what makes life worth living? Are there values that transcend cultural differences? Is ethics possible without religion? If the universe is deterministic, can there be genuine choice? This course offers a philosophical examination of a wide range of questions in ethics and value theory, with an accent on individual choices.
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Research Interests: Economics and Reflexivity
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Barwise Jon and Etchemendy John. Language, proof and logic . In collaboration with Gerard Allwein, Dave Barker-Plummer, and Albert Liu. CSLI Publications, Stanford, and Seven Bridges Press, New York and London, 1999, xii + 587 pp.Allwein Gerard, Barker-Plummer Dave, Barwise Jon, Etchemendy John, ...more
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Research Interests: Physics and Epistemology
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He insists that the'because'of the formulation is used in'its ordinary, conversational, causal-explanatory sense'. He later notes that'When we say the function of X is Z in these [conscious]... more
He insists that the'because'of the formulation is used in'its ordinary, conversational, causal-explanatory sense'. He later notes that'When we say the function of X is Z in these [conscious] cases, we are saying that at least some effort was made to get X (sweep hand, ...
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A crucial question for artificial cognition systems is what meaning is and how it arises. In pursuit of that question, this paper extends earlier work in which we show the emergence of simple signaling in biologically inspired models... more
A crucial question for artificial cognition systems is what meaning is and how it arises. In pursuit of that question, this paper extends earlier work in which we show the emergence of simple signaling in biologically inspired models using arrays of locally interactive agents. Communities of “communicators” develop in an environment of wandering food sources and predators using any of a variety of mechanisms: imitation of successful neighbors, localized genetic algorithms and partial neural net training on successful neighbors. Here we focus on environmental variability, comparing results for environments with (a) constant resources, (b) random resources, and (c) cycles of “boom and bust.” In both simple and complex models across all three mechanisms of strategy change, the emergence of communication is strongly favored by cycles of “boom and bust.” These results are particularly intriguing given the importance of environmental variability in fields as diverse as psychology, ecology and cultural anthropology.
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PREFACE his book results from a collaboration inaugurated by Patrick in 2009. The project unfolded in ready dispatch and congenial harmony, though Nicholas insists on its being said that Patrick did the lion's share of the work.... more
PREFACE his book results from a collaboration inaugurated by Patrick in 2009. The project unfolded in ready dispatch and congenial harmony, though Nicholas insists on its being said that Patrick did the lion's share of the work. Patrick wants to make it clear that the project ...
Research Interests: Sociology, Logic, Semantics, Reflexivity, Consciousness, and 3 moreParadox, Indexicals, and relfexivity
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itself to be of value as a resource in informal logic and critical reasoning courses as well as a major text in courses on science and pseudoscience and a secondary source in traditional philosophy of science courses. The book has also... more
itself to be of value as a resource in informal logic and critical reasoning courses as well as a major text in courses on science and pseudoscience and a secondary source in traditional philosophy of science courses. The book has also been welcomed in its own right as a ...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Occult
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This latest volume of "The Philosopher's Annual" presents the ten best articles published in the field during 2001. No limitations are placed on the articles' sources, subject matter or mode of treatment, providing for a... more
This latest volume of "The Philosopher's Annual" presents the ten best articles published in the field during 2001. No limitations are placed on the articles' sources, subject matter or mode of treatment, providing for a diverse collection of engaging, high-caliber work that stands as a valuable sample of contemporary philosophy. This year's volume includes papers by Robert Bernasconi, Hans Halvorson, Christopher Hitchcock, Ignacio Jane, Brian Leiter, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, Joel Pust, Alison Simmons, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, and Crispin Wright.
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Research Interests: Reflexivity and Medicine
Research Interests: Sociology and Relativism
We build on a background of game-theoretic work regarding cooperation (Axelrod 1984, Nowak and Sigmund 1992), particularly the emergence of higher levels of cooperation in the Spatialized Prisoner’s Dilemma (Grim 1995, Grim 1996, Grim,... more
We build on a background of game-theoretic work regarding cooperation (Axelrod 1984, Nowak and Sigmund 1992), particularly the emergence of higher levels of cooperation in the Spatialized Prisoner’s Dilemma (Grim 1995, Grim 1996, Grim, Mar, & St. Denis 1998). Here we extend that work to the larger topic of communication, exploring spatialized models with large arrays of agents in an environment of wandering food sources and predators. Our individuals are simple neural nets; we use two species of neural nets in two series of runs. In each case we start with a spatialized cellular automata array of over 4,000 individuals with randomized weights and biases, and have them do a partial training on the behavior of more successful neighbors. In this environment each individual is capable of making arbitrary sounds and of responding to sounds from immediate neighbors by opening its mouth, hiding, or coasting in neutral. An individual whose mouth is open in the presence of a wandering food s...
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Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Diversity, Political Science, Governance, and 15 morePolitics, Group Dynamics, Democracy, Deliberation, Problem Solving, Politische Philosophie, Demokratie, Politikwissenschaft, Demokratietheorie, Problemlösen, Group Decision, Social Science, Model Construction, Gruppendynamik, and Diversität
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Beyond belief change and meme adoption, both genetics and infection have been spoken of in terms of information transfer. What we examine here, concentrating on the specific case of transfer between sub-networks, are the differences in... more
Beyond belief change and meme adoption, both genetics and infection have been spoken of in terms of information transfer. What we examine here, concentrating on the specific case of transfer between sub-networks, are the differences in network dynamics in these cases: the different network dynamics of germs, genes, and memes. Germs and memes, it turns out, exhibit a very different dynamics across networks. For infection, measured in terms of time to total infection, it is network type rather than degree of linkage between sub-networks that is of primary importance. For belief transfer, measured in terms of time to consensus, it is degree of linkage rather than network type that is crucial. Genes model each of these other dynamics in part, but match neither in full. For genetics, like belief transfer and unlike infection, network type makes little difference. Like infection and unlike belief, on the other hand, the dynamics of genetic information transfer within single and between linked networks are much the same. In ways both surprising and intriguing, transfer of genetic information seems to be robust across network differences crucial for the other two