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  • Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Social Ontology, Political Philosophy, Frankfurt School, Critical Social Theory, and 36 moreedit
  • I have studied Music Performance (Piano), Law, Political Theory and Philosophy in Athens, Düsseldorf, and Frankfurt/M... moreedit
Following Marx's dictum that man ‘in his individual existence is at the same time a social being’, this book explores the question of collective agency. My argument is that the subject is afforded the chance to engage in collective... more
Following Marx's dictum that man ‘in his individual existence is at the same time a social being’, this book explores the question of collective agency. My argument is that the subject is afforded the chance to engage in collective practices thanks to its social construction as a collective being. This socio-ontological justification of collective agency brings with it an anti-normative view of collective struggles that are no longer subject to the burden of moral regulations and identity policies.



Following Karl Marx‘ dictum that the human being is in its  “individual existence at the same time a social being”, the book explores the question of collective agency. With the help of authors ranging from Catherine Malabou and Judith Butler to Georg Lukács, Louis Althusser and Jean-Luc Nancy, the book explains how the subject originates not only processually, but mediated by the concrete social other at the intersection of different modes of production. Seen this way, the subject which is being structured as an originally collective can self-determine itself if it acts according to its structuration, i.e. if it acts collectively. This social-ontological foundation of collective agency brings with it an anti-normative view of collective struggles that are not bound to moral obligations or identity politics in order to be legitimized.

In a first step, I turn to Karl Marx’s concept of the subject as a social being and explicate it through the concept of communist subjectivity based on Jean-Luc Nancy. In a second step and by applying the theories of Georg Lukács, Louis Althusser and Judith Butler, I go on to demonstrate how the subject emerges at the intersection between labour, language and body practices. In a third step, I introduce the concept of the plastic body that I corroborate with the help of Catherine Malabou’s concept of plasticity. Mt aim thereby is to illustrate, first, how the different identities encounter each other in the subject’s body and, second, how these identities relate to one another. The decentered, socially constructed subject, which is originally structured as a collective event, can determine itself if it acts according to its structuration, i.e. if and onlt if it acts collectively.
In the age of high specialization the philosophers who can produce daunting and original academic work and at the same time serve as public intellectuasls have become scarce. Dieter Thomä is undoubtedly one of those few. Whether in... more
In the age of high specialization the philosophers who can produce  daunting and original academic work and at the same time serve as public intellectuasls have become scarce. Dieter Thomä is undoubtedly one of those few. Whether in light-footed columns or in in-depth studies of intellectual history - he is always interested in the trouble spots within the discipline(s). In addition, he has opened up new subjects for philosophy and enriched the public discourse with provocative diagnoses of the time. On the occasion of his 60th birthday, this volume documents Dieter Thomä's theoretical production with contributions from friends and colleagues including among others Jean Grondin, Lisa Herzog, Axel Honneth, Ulrike Landfester, Christoph Menke, Andrew Norris, Juliane Rebentisch, Gerhard Richter, Ulrich Schmid, Bernd Stiegler etc.
This volume aims to commemorate, criticize, scrutinize and assess the undoubted significance of the Russian Revolution both retrospectively and prospectively in three parts. Part I consists of a palimpsest of the different representations... more
This volume aims to commemorate, criticize, scrutinize and assess the undoubted significance of the Russian Revolution both retrospectively and prospectively in three parts. Part I consists of a palimpsest of the different representations that the Russian Revolution underwent through its turbulent history, going back to its actors, agents, theorists and propagandists to consider whether it is at all possible to revisit the Russian Revolution as an event. With this problematic as a backbone, the chapters of this section scrutinize the ambivalences of revolution in four distinctive phenomena (sexual morality, religion, law and forms of life) that pertain to the revolution’s historicity. Part II concentrates on how the revolution was retold in the aftermath of its accomplishment not only by its sympathizers but also its opponents. These chapters not only bring to light the ways in which the revolution triggered critical theorists to pave new paths of radical thinking that were conceived as methods to overcome the revolution’s failures and impasses, but also how the Revolution was subverted in order to inspire reactionary politics and legitimize conservative theoretical undertakings. Even commemorating the Russian Revolution, then, still poses a threat to every well-established political order. In Part III, this volume interprets how the Russian Revolution can spur a rethinking of the idea of revolution. Acknowledging the suffocating burden that the notion of revolution as such entails, the final chapters of this book ultimately address the content and form of future revolution(s). It is therein, in such critical political thought and such radical form of action, where the Russian Revolution’s legacy ought to be sought and can still be found.
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Die »Zeitschrift für Kultur- und Kollektivwissenschaft« ist ein Forum, das auf der Grundlage der Kulturwissenschaft eine Kollektivwissenschaft entwickeln möchte. Diese angestrebte neue Disziplin lenkt den Blick auf das Kollektiv als... more
Die »Zeitschrift für Kultur- und Kollektivwissenschaft« ist ein Forum, das auf der Grundlage der Kulturwissenschaft eine Kollektivwissenschaft entwickeln möchte. Diese angestrebte neue Disziplin lenkt den Blick auf das Kollektiv als Kulturträger und dient damit zum einen der praktischen Kulturforschung und gewährt zum anderen neuartige Einblicke in das Wesen des Sozialen. Der weit gefasste Begriff des Kollektivs tritt an die Stelle der traditionellen Gruppen- und Gesellschaftskonzepte und macht bisher verborgene Schichten menschlicher Gemeinschaftlichkeit zugänglich.

Die Zeitschrift erscheint zweimal jährlich, wobei sich Themen- und Tagungshefte abwechseln.

Heft 4/1 widmet sich den Verheißungen, Ambivalenzen und Fallstricken von Kollektivitäten. Die Beiträge schildern aus einer interdisziplinären Perspektive die politische Wirkmächtigkeit sowie die Konstitutionsbedingungen von Kollektivitäten. Zentraler Aspekt ist auch die grundlegende Ambivalenz von Kollektivierungsprozessen, die zwischen emanzipatorischem Versprechen und totalisierendem bzw. Differenzen nivellierendem Potenzial verortet sind.
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Welches gesellschaftskritische Potenzial hat die gegenwärtige Theoriedebatte um alte und neue Materialismen? Dieser Band ist der erste deutschsprachige Versuch, Antworten auf diese Frage zu finden. Die Frage nach einem neuen... more
Welches gesellschaftskritische Potenzial hat die gegenwärtige Theoriedebatte um alte und neue Materialismen? Dieser Band ist der erste deutschsprachige Versuch, Antworten auf diese Frage zu finden.

Die Frage nach einem neuen Materialismus hat gegenwärtig quer durch die Disziplinen Konjunktur.
Dabei wird Materie oder „Matter“ nicht länger als passiver Träger von Bedeutung, Diskursen oder menschlicher Manipulation verstanden, sondern die Eigensinnigkeit und Kontingenz der materiellen Welt betont. Dieser Band versammelt Beiträge, die die bislang maßgeblich im englischsprachigen Raum und auf theoretischer Ebene stattfindende Debatte aufgreift und sie mit Blick auf ihr gesellschaftskritisches Potenzial diskutiert. Bei aller Diversität der disziplinären und thematischen Zugänge hebt der Band eine grundlegende Tendenz hervor. Zum einen die Unzufriedenheit über die gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Zustände, zum anderen die Unfähigkeit gegenwärtiger Analysen, die aktuellen Bewegungen und Umbrüche in der Gesellschaft anschaulich zu machen. Die unterschiedlichen im Band vorgestellten Ansätze, Materie neu zu denken, nehmen diese Herausforderung an: Sie versuchen, soziale und politische Zusammenhänge in ihrer Komplexität zu erfassen ohne den kritischen Impetus des ‚alten’, marxistischen Materialismus aufzugeben. Dabei wird versucht, neomaterialistische Ansätze für unterschiedliche Bereiche der Gesellschaftskritik fruchtbar zu machen, darunter Ökonomiekritik, Biopolitik, Feminismus, Raumtheorie, Ästhetik, Technologie und kritische Theorie.

Mit Beiträgen von Nina Lykke, Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, Hanjo Berressem, Andreas Folkers und anderen.
Utopia, as a concept, was declared obsolete. Yet, the politics and social reality of Neo-Liberalism as well as the theoretical threads of Political Ecology and most importantly Intersectionality succeeded in helping utopias resurface... more
Utopia, as a concept, was declared obsolete. Yet, the politics and social reality of Neo-Liberalism as well as the theoretical threads of Political Ecology and most importantly Intersectionality succeeded in helping utopias resurface again. Yet, this came with the transformation of the concept of utopia from an exclusive, prescriptive narrative of what a better, future world should look like to a descriptive method and a normative benchmark. As a method, utopia describes what needs to be done in order for this better, future world to eventuate. As a normative benchmark, utopia provides us with the evaluative criteria to assess whether this better, future world has been achieved.

I call this new conceptualization of utopia a koinotopia. As I argue, its valence lies in incorporating the Other as the condition and vector of the subject’s production. In this social-ontological framework, utopia cannot but forfeit its monistic character and be reconstructed to a necessarily collective and inclusive endeavour. In order to demonstrate the latter, I start (under I) by sketching the challenges that Neoliberalism, Political Ecology, and Intersectionality pose to the utopianism. In a second step, I argue (under II) leaning on Ruth Levitas's canonical conceptualization of utopia as a method in favour of the advantages of such an reconceptualization of utopia. As I demonstrate, Levitas does not provide an account of the constitutive role of the Other throughout the subject’s production. Therefore, I trace (under III) the conceptualization of the Other in three theories of the Topical found in Roland Barthes’ concept of atopos, Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, and Ernst Bloch’s concept of ‘Not-Yet’. After demonstrating that it is Bloch’s consideration of the Other that seems to fulfil the demands raised by the koinotopian project, I conclude (under IV) by arguing that it is exactly this social-ontologically induced necessity to engage the Other that renders koinotopia to a necessarily collective, plural, and inclusive project.
In this book-chapter, I begin by tracing in what follows the current state of European affairs back to Jürgen Habermas’ notion of juridification (Verrechtlichung). After showing both the trajectories of the project and its delimitations,... more
In this book-chapter,  I begin by tracing in what follows the current state of European affairs back to Jürgen Habermas’ notion of juridification (Verrechtlichung). After showing both the trajectories of the project and its delimitations, I go on to discuss what Habermas considered as a viable alternative namely his concept of a “legally constituted civic solidarity” (Habermas, 2015: 37). As I argue though, Habermas' revisited concept of solidarity cannot serve as a bulwark against the awakening of European neo-nationalisms. The reason is to be found in what I call Habermas' “political solipsism” that goes back to Habermas’s linguistic Kantianism (cf. Habermas, 2003: 7) and – taking up an older idea of Joel Whitebook (1979) – could also be assigned to Habermas’ abandonment of Hegelian conflictuality in favour of Kantian monism. While – putting it in a nutshell – Habermas’ ethics is a pluralist one qua its discursivity, his epistemology remains a solipsistic one qua its universal-pragmatist epistemological assumptions. Seen this way, Habermas falls prey to what he himself describes as a performative contradiction since, although he acknowledges the collective foundations of the European Union, he does not extrapolate a collective epistemology or a collective understanding of the law but remains stuck within a (bourgeois) understanding of law that as he asserts cannot but be subjective and individualistic.
Seeking to support and not abort solidarity though, I go on to sketch an understanding of solidarity as freedom that I substantiate according to Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of freedom. Instead of being seen as opposed to one another, I argue that Habermas' and Nancy’s projects should be rather seen as complementing one another since they both take off from the acknowledgement that the European Union is structured as an originally and fundamentally collective project. As I argue, if we were to “retreat” (Lacoue-Labarthe/Nancy 1997) the European project, then what needs to be done is to draft a collective epistemology that obviates solipsism and is therefore able to circumvent power structures, the hegemony of the knowing One and last but not least the totalizations that unravel from such methodological individualisms.
Within the discourse on intersectionality, the status of the relation between partial identities that originate from different social structures/discourses is still fiercely debated. In this chapter, I argue in favor of mutual aid as a... more
Within the discourse on intersectionality, the status of the relation between partial identities that originate from different social structures/discourses is still fiercely debated. In this chapter, I argue in favor of mutual aid as a heuristic tool capable of providing an answer to this conundrum before going on to sketch the politics that derive from it. I contend that the articulation of and relationship between identities within the body of the subject are best explained by Kropotkin's model of mutual aid, as most recently reinterpreted by Catherine Malabou. As I argue, mutual aid is best understood as a socialontological constant and turn to to Malabou's recalibration of mutual aid as a social, moral, and dynamic concept. Applying these characteristics to illustrate how different identities are 'chained', as Malabou puts it, allows us to conceive of an overarching identity that is fluid and processual (social), consisting of equally participating identities (moral) that are in need of each other to be intelligible (dynamic). This mutual and interdependent interplay of identities leads to the subject's final appearance (événement) as a common/collective, oscillating between the identities it contains.

As for the politics that such a theorization of subjectivity gives way to, I suggest that the affinities between Spinoza, Kropotkin and Malabou shed light on this matter. Following Malabou, who echoes Kropotkin (and who in turn echoes Spinoza), the practices-and therefore also the politics-of the subject are naturalistic to such an extent that they demand that the subject informs its actions and transforms its life-sphere according to its own nature, i.e. according and corresponding to the history of its ways and modes of production. The latter is a point that is present throughout Kropotkin's Mutual Aid and which he attributes explicitly to Spinoza in his Ethics. It is equally brought up by Malabou, not only in her recent reading of Kropotkin but also in her earlier Ontology of the Accident. Within this framework, the subject's ability to engage in collective practices should be ascribed to its eventuation as a collective and an amalgam of different identities. From this perspective, collective agency and collective practices must be acknowledged as the subject's natural, and therefore necessary, forms of agency and practice.

Seen in this light, and against predominant understandings of solidarity as an ethical mode of comportment, the understanding of solidarity I propose here reveals the latter as a social-ontological vector of the subject's structuration and as the form of its political practices.
In this paper I start by arguing that "neoliberalism" is in fact a better word than "capitalism" because it designates not just economical but also social, political, and ideological complexes. I go on and sketch the main tenants of each... more
In this paper I start by arguing that "neoliberalism" is in fact a better word than "capitalism" because it designates not just economical but also social, political, and ideological complexes. I go on and sketch the main tenants of each of those four registers and finally provide a palette of concepts that could help as reclaim our forms of life (commons, UBI, repolitization of the EU, workers' self-organization). Acknowledging the conventionality of some of those measures, I experiment on Franco Berardi's idea of semio-inflation and point out how money could be descarcitized.
In this book-chapter I argue in favour of an immanent and anti-normative undestanding of collective agency. After acknowledging the legacy of both the French and the Russian Revolution in establishing collectivity as the core element of... more
In this book-chapter I argue in favour of an immanent and anti-normative undestanding of collective agency. After acknowledging the legacy of both the French and the Russian Revolution in establishing collectivity as the core element of revolutionary process par excellence, I go on to assume that both ‘the people’ and “the party” were paradigmatic collectivities brought forward by the French and the Russian Revolution yet failed to implement the totality of their goals. The reason for this was the fact that in the course of the revolutions they instantiated, those collectives were universalized, thereby forfeiting their collective and diverse character and, ultimately, falling back onto mere supra-individual entities. Though this can be easily attributed to adhering to a notion of subjectivity that bestows both the individual and the supra-individual subject with a metaphysically grounded revolutionary agency, the decentering of the subject that was pursued in the aftermath of May ’68 as a remedy to this problem is deemed as equally insufficient, since as soon as there is no subject, there is also no revolutionary subject and as soon as there is no revolutionary subject, there can be no revolution.

With this framework, the paper maintains that an alternative understanding of the subject as a socially constructed collective subjectivity can serve as an alternative to this conundrum; an understanding of subjectivity that can be traced back to Marx’s understanding of the subject in which one’s “individual existence […] is at the same time a social being.” By taking into account similar notions (such as the assemblic identity, the plural body, the being-in-common) that can be found in intersectionality studies, the work of Judith Butler and Jean-Luc Nancy, I argue for the need to rethink the subject as a socially produced collective entity. Henceforth, this "communist subjectivity" as I call this type of subjectivity is being rendered capable of engaging in collective practices due to its social-ontological production as a collective. In the last part of the article, practices are sketched that derive from such an understanding of subjectivity. The point is that revolutionary politics need not be normative, i.e. they do not need to share a same goal, pursue the same interests, or demand a common identity. In contrast to such a normative understanding of collective revolutionary practices, my argument is that revolutionary and collective action is immanent to every subject due to the process of its collective, social-ontological structuration.
After a cartography of the main interpretation threads of Georg Lukács' theory of reification (Postwar French Philosophy, Standpoint Theory Feminism and the Frankfurt School) I go on to discuss reification as a subjectivation process. In... more
After a cartography of the main interpretation threads of Georg Lukács' theory of reification (Postwar French Philosophy, Standpoint Theory Feminism and the Frankfurt School) I go on to discuss reification as a subjectivation process. In order to underpin the latter, I turn to Lukács' Ontology of the Social Being and especially to his understanding of labour as a social-ontological category as promoted by Lucien Goldmann and Nicolas Tertulian. The argument is that through labour processes the subject is being subjectivated not only through the production process and the subsequent alienation of the producer from the product, but also through the consumption of commodities since desires are herein being generated that subjectivate the subject towards their satisfaction. From this though, intersubjective bonds unravel between producers and consumers that designate dereification process as immanently collective process. In the last part, I discuss such collective dereification practices from the background of authors moving within the framework of New Materialisms. The argument is that the ongoing actuality of Lukács' notion of reification lays in founding agency as a necessarily collective form of practice.
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The recent phenomenon of taking “selfies” of oneself has been given two main interpretations, which are two versions of the transparency dream: the first is that of turning oneself inside out and being looked at (narcissism) or totally... more
The recent phenomenon of taking “selfies” of oneself has been given two main interpretations, which are two versions of the transparency dream: the first is that of turning oneself inside out and being looked at (narcissism) or totally grasping oneself through self-objectivization (quantified self). The chapter argues that neither version fully matches the “selfie” phenomenon. Instead, the “selfie” should be seen as an exemplary device for a subjectivation process which already thwarts the aim of full subjectification. The storage, serialization and dissemination of the “selfies” points to a “selfing” project that already takes place “out there,” under conditions of sociality and sharedness. In this respect, the “selfie” is neither a diminished version of the “I” nor an idealized type, neither merely self-referential nor merely self-quantificational, but a device of an ongoing “selfing” process, which opacifies a given identity all the while it pretends making it transparent.
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The paper lays down the fundaments for a socially constructed, social-ontological understanding of solidarity. In this framework, solidarity is neither an intentional collective activity aiming at overcoming significant adversities (cf.... more
The paper lays down the fundaments for a socially constructed, social-ontological understanding of solidarity. In this framework, solidarity is neither an intentional collective activity aiming at overcoming significant adversities (cf. Sangiovanni 2015) nor a moral goal (cf. Habermas 1990) or a certain means to avoiding social pathologies (cf. Neuhouser 2022). Rather, this type of solidarity is overdetermined because it comprises following three moments: first, the necessarily collective form of agency of a subject that is a collective entity since it embodies in itself all the different identities that have been inscribed in it through the various modes of subjectivity production; second, a set of collective practices that are contingent since they might not bar or prohibit individual actions but at the same time do not need to be legitimized when manifesting themselves in a collective manner because they correspond to the subject's collective agency; and third, a performative mode of normativity production through collective struggles, where inclusion functions as solidarity's ethical materialization. To explicate how the individual subject can be conceived as a socially structured, collective entity, I refer to Jean-Luc Nancy's conceptualization of freedom, to his concept of the body as an "instance par excellence of contradiction" that is "always in the plural", and ultimately to his theory of the irreducible but not incommensurable Other. Finally, I extrapolate the idea of solidarity as a necessary form of collective agency from Nancy's understanding of the commensurable Other; from his understanding of a body, and with the help of Oliver Marchart's concept of “necessary contingency” (cf. Marchart 2007), the idea of solidarity as a contingently necessary set of collective practices; and ultimately, from Nancy's understanding of freedom, the idea of solidarity as a performative normativity that guarantees the holistic and inclusive character of solidary actions.
In this article, I revisit Karl Marx's claim in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, that the subject in its "individual existence is at the same time a social being." I redefine what has been translated as "social being" as... more
In this article, I revisit Karl Marx's claim in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, that the subject in its "individual existence is at the same time a social being." I redefine what has been translated as "social being" as "common being" in order to extrapolate an understanding of subjectivity that is a socio-ontological and collectively structured collectivity. In doing so, I demonstrate (1) that this common being is a collection of different socioontological traits; (2) that in order for this common being to be approximated we must take into account all modes of subjectivity production that intersect in what will appear as the subject; and (3) that the Other is the constitutive parameter of the common being on which the subject depends. Finally, I revisit three exemplary modes of practice-namely critique, solidarity, and utopia-and show that conceiving of the subject as a common being renders critique constellational, solidarity overdetermined, and utopia a koinotopia.

Dans cet article, je reviens sur la déclaration de Karl Marx dans ses Manuscrits économicophilosophiques de 1844, selon laquelle, « dans son existence la plus individuelle, il [le sujet] est en même temps un être social. » Je redéfinis ce qui a été traduit par « être social » comme un « être commun » afin d'extrapoler une compréhension de la subjectivité qui est une collectivité socio-ontologique et collectivement structurée. Ce faisant, je démontre (1) que cet être commun est la collection de différents traits socio-ontologiques ; (2) que, pour que l'être commun soit abordé, nous devons prendre en compte tous les modes de production de subjectivité qui s'entrecroisent dans ce qui apparaîtra comme le sujet ; (3) que l'Autre est le paramètre constitutif de l'être commun dont dépend le sujet. Enfin, je revisite trois modes de pratique exemplaires, à savoir la critique, la solidarité et l'utopie, et je démontre comment le fait de partir du sujet en tant qu'être commun rend la critique « constellative », la solidarité « surdéterminée » et l'utopie une « koinotopie ».
In this paper, I start by pointing out that despite their differences, Slavoj Žižek and Karen Barad share an understanding of the notions of relationality, processuality, and immanence as central tenets of materialist philosophy. As I... more
In this paper, I start by pointing out that despite their differences, Slavoj Žižek and Karen Barad share an understanding of the notions of relationality, processuality, and immanence as central tenets of materialist philosophy. As I argue, however, it is collectivity that acts in both Žižek’s and Barad’s works as a safety valve that lends immanence, processuality, and relationality their materialist quality. To support this argument, I demonstrate that certain forms of collectivity underlie the passage from Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty to Niels Bohr’s indeterminacy in Barad’s interpretation of Bohr’s ‘philosophy-physics’. I call those forms of collectivity "collectivity as ontological necessity" and "collectivity as methodological necessity" respectively. However, I claim that there is a further form of collectivity, which I call ‘collectivity as inclusive and holistic overdetermination’, that Barad overlooks and that conditions the indeterminability of indeterminacy. As I argue, the latter also has implications for political agency. I conclude by briefly sketching out how these forms of collectivity can determine the production of subjectivity and, as a consequence, shape the subject’s collective action.
Jacques Derrida's lectures on Theory and Practice leave a lot to be desired from the perspective of historical materialism. Yet, one can nonetheless find in them the germ of a genuine understanding of materialism. More specifically,... more
Jacques Derrida's lectures on Theory and Practice leave a lot to be desired from the perspective of historical materialism. Yet, one can nonetheless find in them the germ of a genuine understanding of materialism. More specifically, following the systematic use of the word "enigma" in the text, I show that this term serves as the heuristic device for articulating an originally Derridean materialism, one which I name "enigmatic materialism," and which, I argue, is genuinely collective, insofar as it opposes any form of monism. Moreover, this materialism has profound repercussions for the concept of hope developed in these lectures. Hope, from the perspective of an "enigmatic materialist," becomes a collective endeavour that avoids the pitfalls of solipsistic individualism through the joint effort of the subject and its/the Other.

Les cours de Jacques Derrida sur Theórie et pratique laissent beaucoup à désirer du point de vue du matérialisme historique. Cependant, on peut y trouver les germes d'une véritable compréhension du matérialisme. Plus précisément, à la suite de l'utilisation systématique du mot « énigme » dans le texte, je montre que ce terme sert de dispositif heuristique pour articuler un matérialisme originellement derridien, que je nomme « matérialisme énigmatique », et qui, selon moi, est véritablement collectif dans la mesure où il s'oppose à toute forme de monisme. De plus, ce matérialisme a de profondes répercussions sur le concept d'espérance développé dans ces conférences. Dans cette perspective « matérialiste énigmatique », l'espoir devient une entreprise collective qui n'est pas la projection de l'individu solipsiste mais l'effort conjoint du sujet et de son/de l'Autre.
In my paper, I start by providing a brief taxonomy of three types of theories that conceptualize common sense. Thereby, I differentiate between positive, negativist, and dualistic/dialectical theories of common sense. By juxtaposing a... more
In my paper, I start by providing a brief taxonomy of three types of theories that conceptualize common sense. Thereby, I differentiate between positive, negativist, and dualistic/dialectical theories of common sense. By juxtaposing a "good" form of common sense that he calls buon senso and a "bad" form of common sense he calls senso comune Antonio Gramsci falls undoubtedly within the reach of the dualistic/dialectical theories of common sense. In order to scrutinize Gramsci's idiosyncratic conceptualization of common sense, I turn to Kate Crehan's interpretation of this concept and argue that Gramsci's understanding of common sense is better understood as a social-ontological category that is historical, inclusive, relational, and intersectional. In this framework, collectivity is disclosed as the primary mode both of existence and of practice. Ultimately, and in order to demonstrate the current political ramifications of Gramsci's understanding of common sense, I turn to his figure of the "modern prince." As I conclude, it is the "bad" form of common sense as senso comune that is most capable of addressing the current demands of an inclusive and radical democracy.
In my paper I start by providing a taxonomy of three types of theories that conceptualize common sense and differentiate between positive, negativist and dualistic/dialectical theories of common sense. By juxtaposing a "good" form of... more
In my paper I start by providing a taxonomy of three types of theories that conceptualize common sense and differentiate between positive, negativist and dualistic/dialectical theories of common sense. By juxtaposing a "good" form of common sense that he calls buon senso and a "bad" form of common sense he calls senso comune Antonio Gramsci falls undoubtedly within the reach of the dualistic theories of common sense. In order to scrutinize Gramsci's idiosyncratic conceptualization of common sense I turn to Kate Crehan's interpretation of this concept and argue that Gramsci's understanding of common sense is better understood as a social-ontological constant that is historical, inclusive, relational and intersectional. Yet, the practical-political implications of such an understanding of common sense remain hermetic, and in order to elucidate them I suggest to go back and analyze Giambattista Vico's understanding of common sense that had clearly influenced Gramsci's conceptualization of this notion. As I show, Vico's conceptualization of common sense reveals common sense as a mode of subjectivity production that at the same time engrafts in the subject the collective elements for its self-determination. It is this element that I find permeating Gramsci's understanding of common sense. Ultimately, I turn to his notion of the "modern prince" in order to ultimately carve out the elements that qualify such a social-ontological conceptualization of common sense as a mode of subjectivity production for radical democratic politics. As will be shown, the concept of pluriversality as explicated by Walter Mignolo will prove invaluable for this purpose.
In our paper we revisit the myth of Narcissus and Echo and argue for a relational becoming of subjectivity that is social-ontological, structural and processual. We invoke Narcissus and Echo as two equal, and paradigmatic symprotagonists... more
In our paper we revisit the myth of Narcissus and Echo and argue for a relational becoming of subjectivity that is social-ontological, structural and processual. We invoke Narcissus and Echo as two equal, and paradigmatic symprotagonists in order to exemplify the relational drama of human becoming. After laying down the fundaments of a relational psychanalytic reading of the myth, we turn to the original myth as laid down by Ovid and retellin four actshow the encounter between Narcissus and Echo played an essential role in their transformations. We demonstrate how coconstitutive both Echo and Narcissus are for the structuration of one another, provide an analysis of individual relational patterns of both individuals, and argue for the importance to observe this relationship from the viewpoint of a relational unconscious process. We go on to dissect this rapprochement by scrutinizing what we consider its two key elements: Firstly, we assert the irreducibility of the singular biography of each of our actors and how it functions as the inter-and intrapsychical vector towards the processualization of the subject's becoming. Secondly, we argue for the moment of the encounter as being a constitutive necessity of every relation. Thereby we observe a relational unconscious being at play which we approximate by means of a psychodynamic circular approach as outlined by the Operationalized Psychodynamic Diagnosis OPD-2. In doing so, we argue that the myth of Echo and Narcissus should be revisited in order to account henceforth for a subjectivity that is not primary composed of individual pathologies but originally social qua relational.
This article attempts to introduce and examine the valence of Catherine Malabou’s dialectical concept of plasticity for the theory of intersectionality. Of course, dialectics has been rehabilitated within the intersectional studies by... more
This article attempts to introduce and examine the valence of Catherine Malabou’s dialectical concept of plasticity for the theory of intersectionality. Of course, dialectics has been rehabilitated within the intersectional studies by Lena Gunnarsson in her groundbreaking “Why we keep separating the ‘inseparable’: Dialecticizing intersectionality” (2015). Instead of remaining within the critical dialectical realist philosophy that Gunnarsson operated with, I draw on Malabou’s Hegelian dialectics and start by sketching the general logic of plasticity. In a second step, I turn to Malabou’s concept of the subject as a collective event and argue that the subject of intersectionality that appears at the crossroads of more than one mode of subjectivity production can also be addressed through this concept. I conclude by visiting four topics, the relation between identity and discourse, the debate between heteronomous social construction and autonomous agency, the role of the concrete social other, and, last but not least, the conceptualization of the body as a plastic entity in order to sketch the concrete contributions that plasticity has to offer to the theory of intersectionality.
This article takes off from the assumption that the Hegelian system is not a totalizing endeavor but a collective undertaking. To substantiate the latter I turn to the Hegelian concept of the "Gestalt" as interpreted through variations of... more
This article takes off from the assumption that the Hegelian system is not a totalizing endeavor but a collective undertaking. To substantiate the latter I turn to the Hegelian concept of the "Gestalt" as interpreted through variations of the notion of the "structure". The argument is that by understanding the notions of "struktiv" (Georg Lukács), "structure" (Jean Hyppolite), "struction" (Jean-Luc Nancy) as models designating  collective subjectivity and corrsponding to the first half of Hegel's aphorism "I, that is We" we can obviate the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the second half of the aphorism “and We that is I”.
After its proliferation as a primarily psychological term in the literature of the late 1960s, creativity has since advanced to a core notion also for sociology. The first part of the paper tackles "the creativity narrative" according to... more
After its proliferation as a primarily psychological term in the literature of the late 1960s, creativity has since advanced to a core notion also for sociology. The first part of the paper tackles "the creativity narrative" according to three paradigmatic readings brought forward by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato, and most recently Andreas Reckwitz. Despite the insightful accounts that those readings provide concerning the entanglement of creativity to capitalist ways of production, the practical consequences they offer regarding how to contest this entanglement are debatable. Therefore, in the second part of the article a fourth understanding of creativity is invoked that was proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis. As argued, the radicality of this concept lies in defining creativity as a mode of production of the subject's psyche as a collective coexistence from which broader, necessarily collective practices can be derived.

Après sa prolifération en tant que notion psychologique dans la littérature des années 1960, la créativité est aussi devenue une notion fondamentale pour la sociologie. La première partie de l'article aborde le « récit de la créativité » à partir des trois lectures paradigmatiques proposées par Luc Boltanski et Ève Chiapello, Maurizio Lazzarato et, plus récemment, par Andreas Reckwitz. Malgré le fait qu'elles éclairent de manière significative l'enchevêtrement de la créativité aux modes capitalistes de production, les conséquences pratiques que ces lectures tirent sur les contestations possibles de cet enchevêtrement sont sujettes au débat. C'est pourquoi, dans la deuxième partie de ce texte, une quatrième compréhension de la créativité est proposée à partir de Cornelius Castoriadis. La radicalité de ce concept repose sur sa définition en tant que mode de production du psychisme du sujet compris en tant que coexistence collective, à partir de laquelle des pratiques plus larges et nécessairement collectives peuvent découler.
In my essay, I argue in favor of a social-ontological understanding of film as a genre of art. In order to corroborate my assumption I accroach Jacques Derrida’s film-philosophy to help me corroborate my assumption theoretically and turn... more
In my essay, I argue in favor of a social-ontological understanding of film as a genre of art. In order to corroborate my assumption I accroach Jacques Derrida’s film-philosophy to help me corroborate my assumption theoretically and turn to Ken McMullen's film "Ghost Dance" (Great Britain/Germany 1983) as the artistic and practical illiustration thereof.

My working hypothesis is that Ken McMullen’s Ghost Dance was an attempt to recast deconstruction in a film. By an indirect discussion with two other films dedicated to Derrida – Safaa Fathy’s autobiographical "Derrida’s Elsewhere" (France 1999) and Amy Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick’s documentary "Derrida" (USA 2002) – I turn to the figure of the ghost as the basic ontological vector of Derrida’s theorization of the film. By going through the different ghosts that haunt the film "Ghost Dance" I show how the Social appears as the ghost that interrupts the aesthetic procedure of the film and blurrs thereby the layers between social and cinematic reality. Seen this way, the Social becomes the determining, ghostly, factor of the film transforming thereby the latter to the social-ontological product of a certain historical reality. By letting the Social intervene in the film, McMullen lends a glimpse of the machinations of the Social that always-already - even if not uncredited - constitutes the filmic production.
Taking off from Adorno's emphatic estimation that we are in need of a new, "strictly Leninist Manifesto" the article argues that collectivity, as a theoretical notion and form of praxis alike, can very well qualify as a critical model... more
Taking off from Adorno's emphatic estimation that we are in need of a new, "strictly Leninist Manifesto" the article argues that collectivity, as a theoretical notion and form of praxis alike, can very well qualify as a critical model despite Adorno's well-founded objections. While Adorno seems at ease when arguing for the critical character of collectivity in his aesthetic writings, he is reluctant to admit to it when it comes to adressing collectivity on the epistemological level. The article argues that - pace Adorno - notions like "constellation", "remainder" or "riddle"  that Adorno introduced in order to rejuvenate philosophy and recast it as a critical theory, designate the very need to express underlying collectivities already at play. The fact that the sancrosanct individual is to be conceived of as "collective in its essence" is also indicative of the inevitability that even the individual has to be collectivized and that its praxis - should it wishes to become critical - can only be a collective one.
Which is the future of collectivities? How can we rethink the notion of collectivity per se? And what does it mean to do critical theory nowadays? This editorial, apart from introducing the articles of this special issue of the... more
Which is the future of collectivities? How can we rethink the notion of collectivity per se? And what does it mean to do critical theory nowadays? This editorial, apart from introducing the articles of this special issue of the Zeitschrift für Kultur- und Kollektivwissenschaft, argues that not only collectivities have to be collectivized in order to remain open and thus avoid unification under one dictate, but that also theory has to become collective if it wishes to remain a critical one.
"This editorial necessarily begins with a paradox—a paradox which stems from our own claim to question the present of deconstruction, at a conference that took place at the University of Frankfurt in March 2012. Whilst the question arose... more
"This editorial necessarily begins with a paradox—a paradox which stems from our own claim to question the present of deconstruction, at a conference that took place at the University of Frankfurt in March 2012. Whilst the question arose out of an awareness of a certain urgency to ‘actualise’ and ‘advance’ deconstruction with and against economic, institutional and academic interventions, at its centre this practice already bears an undeniable inconsistency in itself..."
(Nassima Sahraoui, Felix Trautmann, Thomas Telios)
Research Interests:
Amy Allen (2016). The End of Progress. Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.
Es gibt kaum einen anderen Begriff, der das westliche Denken so geprägt hat, wie der Begriff des Subjekts. Die abendländische Philosophie lässt sich ohne den Begriff des Subjekts nicht denken und das Denken selbst fällt ohne ein Subjekt... more
Es gibt kaum einen anderen Begriff, der das westliche Denken so geprägt hat, wie der Begriff des Subjekts. Die abendländische Philosophie lässt sich ohne den Begriff des Subjekts nicht denken und das Denken selbst fällt ohne ein Subjekt als Ort des Denkens schnell auseinander. Zugleich schien das Subjekt immer nur in Zusammenhang mit etwas Anderem - sei es die äußere Welt, eine andere Person,
eine Gruppe, ein Kollektiv oder gar die Gesellschaft - gedacht werden zu können. Von Aristoteles' Verständnis des Menschen als ein Lebewesen in einer politischen Gemeinschaft (ζῷον πολιτικόν) bis zum Menschenbild, welches den behavioral economics zugrunde liegt, kann sich das Individuum nur in Bezug auf eine Welt behaupten, die es umgibt.

Welche Formen nimmt dann dieser Bezug überhaupt an? Kann es mich in der Tat nur in Abgrenzung zu einer feindlichen Gesellschaft geben, oder - bedürftig, wie ich bin - sollte ich mich bedingungslos eben jener Gesellschaft fügen, die mir nunmehr als Sprungbrett zur Selbstentfaltung zur Verfügung steht? Gibt es einen Ausweg aus diesen Schlingen und kann es mich überhaupt geben oder bin ich ein Produkt, ein Platzhalter, ein Puppe in den Händen von gesellschaftlichen Strukturen, Machtmechanismen, ökonomischen Produktionsbedingungen, Familienstrukturen, Freundeskreisen, Liebhaber:innen etc.? Bin ich, der Mensch, nicht eher das einzige intelligente Wesen der Schöpfung, das Maß aller Dinge, unantastbar in meiner Würde, autonom in meinem Willen und autark in meiner
Gefühlswelt?

Das Seminar Ich ist ein Anderer. Moderne Subjektivität in Philosophie, Kunst und Pop-Kultur versucht die Verwobenheit des Subjekts mit seiner Welt zu erörtern, erläutern, auseinanderzuhalten, zu kritisieren, verbessern, zerreißen und zu vernarben. Dabei werden wir die wichtigsten philosophischen Ansätze der Moderne anschauen und anhand ästhetischer Mittel zu veranschaulichen versuchen. Dieser Aspekt ist für ein zwangsweise komplett auf ZOOM durchgeführtes
Seminar sehr wichtig: Der Wechsel der Medien und Genres - vom Film zum Theorietext zum Bild zum Pop-Song - kann in der lebendigen Diskussion zu einem bleibenden Lernerfolg beitragen (trotz der
Einschränkungen durch den Bildschirm-Diskurs).

Unsere heuristisch-didaktische Devise besteht darin, uns vor allem anhand von pop-kulturellen Beispielen, aber auch anhand von Beispielen aus allen Künsten den philosophischen Ansätzen der Subjektwerdung, die die Moderne geprägt haben, anzunähern. Von Kafka bis Camus, von Ludwig van Beethoven bis zu den Kardashians, von Georg Büchner bis zu Game of Thrones, von tourenden Pop-Icons bis fliehenden Migrant_innen werden wir uns im Seminar den Verstrickungen des Subjekts mit seiner Umwelt widmen, dabei die Formen der Übernahme der Welt seitens des Subjekts als Person, mit einem Geschlecht, als Arbeiter_in, Familienrolle, Gesellschaftsmitglied etc. unter die Lupe nehmen und Ansätze zu Befreiung und Selbstbestimmung herausarbeiten.
Research Interests:
The question of the moral value of the market arises with emphasis after the recent financial crises. The seminar explains what the essence of the market consists. After a brief introduction to the topic, the focus will be on relevant... more
The question of the moral value of the market arises with emphasis after the recent financial crises. The seminar explains what the essence of the market consists. After a brief introduction to the topic, the focus will be on relevant market conceptions from early modern to the present day.

Three thematic blocks are of particular interest:
(1) First of all, it is about the role of the market in organized societies: its expediency, the social role that is expected from the market, and the functionality of the market not only as a place of exchange of products, but also as a meeting place of people interacting with one another.

(2) The second block deals with texts that tackle the market from an ethical-moral perspective. Thanks to which specific qualities can the market regulate itself and according to which criteria should this be assessed? Which are the social conditions/factors/agents/institutions that while laying outside the market determine the social role of
the market? How does the market relate to political organizational forms such as democracy, political participation, and political self-determination?

(3) Last but not least, the seminar will deal with the social effects of the market mainly for the individual, but also for society. From where does the market draw its potential for free development and realization of individual freedom and how is this perceived by individuals? What dangers are hidden in the barter process and, if at all, how can they be overcome.

The aim of the seminar is to better understand the functionality, scope and normativity of the free market with the help of its most loyal advocates as well as its fiercest critics.
Research Interests:
Two people, two worldviews. On the one side stands Adam Smith, the first theorist of a type of economy which back then was still in its infancy and we nowadays call capitalism. For Smith, this type of economy is based on wealth, aimes at... more
Two people, two worldviews. On the one side stands Adam Smith, the first theorist of a type of economy which back then was still in its infancy and we nowadays call capitalism. For Smith, this type of economy is based on wealth, aimes at the wealth's expansion and privileges social structures that further the wealth's expansion. Every grievance of the system is acquitted-according to Smith's harsh critics-thanks to the self-regulatory power of the "invisible hand" and the supposed free will that Smith ascribes to the individual is nothing but the legitimization of the exploitation of the disadvantaged many by the privileged few. On the other hand stands Karl Marx who dedicated his life analyzing the same-in-between established-form of economic production. Capitalism was no more a neutral economic form that-as Smith envisaged it-was based on free will, autonomy and self-legislation in order to allow for the individual to express and develop itself. According to Marx' systemic close reading, capitalism was nothing but a default system based on an insurmountable contradiction: Capitalism is a self-destructive economic form which rests on alienation and exploitation and brings forward social structures that are geared towards increasing accumulation via the creation of national states who act as instruments in favour of the ones in possession of the means of production. Accurate as Marx might have been, he was not spared either. While Smith was accused of looking away as people tore each other apart in favor of expansion and wealth accumulation, Marx was accused of degrading people to a will-less cog of a blind, suffocating, and inhumane system.

Regardless of how formative and persistent these two images have been regarding our perception of Adam Smiths and Karl Marx's theories, there is more than just a yawning chasm between them. On the one hand, voices have been recently raised that draw our attention to the discrepancy between the earlier and the later Adam Smith. Adam Smith was not only the author of the celebrated The Wealth of Nations published in 1776, but also the author of the Theory of Moral Sentiments published in 1759. While the later work, i.e. the Wealth of Nations, could as a matter of fact corroborate te critique exerted against Smith, the earlier work, i.e. the Theory of Moral Sentiments, is a philosophical work that postulates ethical values such as solidarity and empathy in the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment. This debate re-launched and called the "Adam Smith problem", is being attempted to be resolved
by rereading and reinterpreting The Wealth of Nations from the background of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. On the other hand, there is something similar to observe with Karl Marx. Karl Marx is not only the author of the three-volume Capital, the first volume of which appeared in 1867. He is also the author of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts from 1844, which he wrote as a journalist in exile in Paris. While in the Capital Marx provides a structural and critical analysis of capitalist economic structures, the Manuscripts of the young Marx are
teeming with passages highlighting the uniqueness and singularity of the individual, its passions, and the individual's yearning for human coexistence. This "epistemological break", as it has been called, is being attempted - in a similar move to Adam Smith - to be solved by reading and understanding Capital in a henceforth socialontological and not merely structural way.

Following these considerations, the first two parts of the courses are dedicated in gettiing to kknow better the theories of Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Concerning Smith, we will begin by reading excerpts from his Theory of Moral Sentiments before we turn to his better known The Wealth of the Nations. Concerning Marx, we will find our away in his Capital after having read his earlier Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and we will continue by turning to some later texts of Marx with a clearer political character like the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte and the Critique of the Gotha Program. Following three axes will prove indispensable for our itinerary: (1) the structure and character of human nature, (2) social organizational structures, (3) interpersonal relationships. In the third and last part, we will try to understand the ethical content that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx tried to implant in the social fabric of economy by turning to the works of recent authors that attempted to bridge the supposedly yawning abyss between Smith and Marx. The works of John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter,
certain representatives of the Austrian (especially Friedrich August von Hayek) or the Chicago School (especially Milton Friedman, Murray Rothbard, and Garry Becker) will prove essential towards this objective. This last section will also help us scrutinize the differences between the prevailing neoliberalism and traditional liberalism as well as reflect upon current forms of capitalist ethics like "corporate social responsibility", "corporate governance" and "corporate citizenship".
Research Interests:
Social and political philosophy is this branch of philosophy that puts society, intersubjective relations and political institutions at the center of its inquiry. Questions concerning the role and structuration of societies, the rights... more
Social and political philosophy is this branch of philosophy that puts society, intersubjective relations and political institutions at the center of its inquiry. Questions concerning the role and structuration of societies, the rights and obligations of the individual, forms of living, the role and scope of political institutions, norms, values and ideals that dictate human conduct and behavior etc. are just a few of the most important concepts that belong to the canon of social and political philosophy.

In our Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy we will attempt to
address only some of those issues. Concretely, the seminar is entered around following three notions: society, subject, freedom/inequality. We will start by firstly asking ourselves what differentiates societies from communities, what holds societies together and under what kind of pathologies and grievances societies suffer. We will continue by scrutinizing the qualities and characteristics of the individual, the way it is being formed within certain cultural contexts and last but not least
finally what are the norms that influence its communication to his/her fellow individuals. Finally, we will investigate the different (negative and positive) forms of freedom, the meaning and value of democracy, the ideals of citizenship and the challenges of cultural diversity. Those topics will be addressed by going back to seminal texts that helped shape our understanding of the social and political world as we know it today. Nevertheless, during our weekly sessions we will constantly actualize, transfer and adapt the knowledge from those texts to current problems and phenomena like e.g. populism, social movements like #blacklivesmatter etc.
Research Interests:
There is hardly any domain of individual or social/political life that can be argued as being free of ethical considerations. From the way we behave to our peers, to the way we conduct business, treat our beloved ones, or regard the world... more
There is hardly any domain of individual or social/political life that can be argued as being free of ethical considerations. From the way we behave to our peers, to the way we conduct business, treat our beloved ones, or regard the world and all creations that inhabit, the demand for ethical behavior is omnipresent. But what exactly is ethics and what does ethical demeanor consist of? On the most rudimentary level, ethics answers to the ʺsimpleʺ question of what is to be valued as good or bad. And yet: Is ethics a set of practices or the assumption of a moral principle? Is every individual a partaker of a global/universal, moral/ethical spirit or are there as many ethical values as societies we inhabit? Are we allowed to be relative when acting ethically or do we ought to be absolute and unsparing?

Taking off from those very basic considerations, the course ʺWhat is Ethics?ʺ will tackle the most promising theories in all three fields of ethics. Firstly, we will turn to what is called metaethics, i.e. the query where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions? The existence of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves are just some of the issues we will occupy ourselves
with. Secondly, we will turn to what is called normative ethics, i.e. this branch of the philosophy of ethics that is concerned with more practical tasks. What are the moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct? What is the role of habits therein? Are there certain duties that we need to follow, or does ethical behavior depend solely on the consequences of our own behavior? Lastly, we will have the chance to examine and proof our ethical reasoning by considering according to the hitherto acquired knowledge specific controversial issues in this branch
of ethics called applied ethics. The latter includes such topics like abortion, suicide, animal rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, and/or nuclear war.
Research Interests:
Vom Griechischen φίλος und σοφία abgeleitet, bedeutet Philosophie vom Wort her die Liebe zur Weisheit. Doch in ihrem mehr als zweitausendjährigem Bestehen hat die Philosophie sowohl ihren wissenschaftlichen Gegenstand als auch ihre... more
Vom Griechischen φίλος und σοφία abgeleitet, bedeutet Philosophie vom Wort her die Liebe zur Weisheit. Doch in ihrem mehr als zweitausendjährigem Bestehen hat die Philosophie sowohl ihren wissenschaftlichen Gegenstand als auch ihre Methoden mehrmals bearbeiten, revidieren, umformulieren, neu denken und vom Beginn an ausrichten müssen. Im Einleitungskurs „Was ist Philosophie?“ werden wir vor allem Philosophiekonzepte in Betracht ziehen, die sich für die Moderne als prägend erwiesen haben. Paradigmatisch dafür hat Immanuel Kant in seiner bahnbrechenden Kritik der reinen Vernunft folgenden vier Fragen formuliert:

1) Was kann ich wissen?
2) Was soll ich tun?
3) Was darf ich hoffen?
4) Was ist der Mensch?

Von diesen Fragen ausgehend werden wir uns im Kurs nicht nur mit den Aufgaben oder Zielen auseinandersetzen, welche sich Philosoph_innen selbst aufsetzen oder von Philosophie-Liebhaber_innen erwartet werden. Wir werden uns des Weiteren einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Bereiche der Philosophie verschaffen. Nicht zuletzt werden wir uns konkrete Anwendungsfelder der Philosophie anschauen, um die Tragweite und Bandbreite des philosophischen Denkens besser kennen zu lernen.
Im Seminar sollen die Studierenden dafür sensibilisiert werden, wie sehr Urteile durch nicht hinterfragte Hintergrundannahmen mitunter gar verdichtet zu einem Weltbild ‑ vorgeprägt sein können und die Kompetenz erlangen, diese Hintergrundannahmen explizit zu machen. Die Studierenden sollen des Weiteren trainieren, gelernte Inhalte in anderen Kontexten zu übertragen, Stichwort: Transferwissen. Zudem sollen die Studierenden die Fähigkeiten ausbilden, konkurrierende Theorien zu einer bestimmten Fragestellung in Bezug auf Schwächen und Stärken gegeneinander abzuwägen und zu eigenen kritischen Urteilen zu kommen.
Research Interests:
Das positive, kodifizierte Recht und die Rechtstaatlichkeit gelten als große Errungenschaften des westlichen Denkens. Die Gründe sind eindeutig: Dem Recht wird die Aufgabe zugeschrieben, zuerst durch die Überwindung willkürlicher... more
Das positive, kodifizierte Recht und die Rechtstaatlichkeit gelten als große Errungenschaften des westlichen Denkens. Die Gründe sind eindeutig: Dem Recht wird die Aufgabe zugeschrieben, zuerst durch die Überwindung willkürlicher Herrschaft die Freiheit und Gleichheit der Rechtssubjekte sicherzustellen. Des Weiteren erhofft man vom Recht, den gesellschaftlichen Frieden zu bewahren und vormals gewaltsame Auseinandersetzungen in geregelte, gewaltfreie Verfahren der Konfliktbewältigung zu überführen. Nicht zuletzt soll das Recht allgemein verbindliche Normen bei gleichzeitigem Respekt vor partikularen Interessen durchsetzen können und somit als letzte überparteiische Instanz im gesellschaftlichen Leben wirken können. – Kritische Theorien des Rechts problematisieren diese legitimierende Selbsterzählung des Rechts, indem sie verschiedene ihrer Elemente hinterfragen: Reproduziert das Recht, indem es formale Freiheit und Gleichheit garantiert, untergründig materiale Ungleichheit? Ist die Willkür in der Rechtsanwendung wirklich verschwunden, oder nur durch Verfahren verdeckt? Überwindet das Recht – wie es seine Ursprungsgeschichten wollen – die Gewalt, oder kehrt die Gewalt nur in einer neuen Form zurück? Kann das Recht seine inneren Widersprüche immanent überwinden, oder bedarf es ausserrechtlicher Institutionen (Politik, Staat, Volk etc.), die die Rechtsanwendung regulieren? Wie verhält sich das Recht zu diesen ausserrechtlichen Bereichen? Könnte eine emanzipatorische Kraft des Rechts in seiner Tendenz liegen, sich auf immer weitere ausserrechtliche Bereiche auszudehnen, oder muss das Recht eher als ein Eindringling ins soziale und politische Leben verstanden werden? Nicht zuletzt: Wie verhält sich an Zeiten zunehmender Globalisierung und Intensivierung zwischenstaatlicher politischer und ökonomischer Interdependenzen das nationale Recht zu transnationalen Rechtsverträgen und ‑ordnungen? Kann eine der Perspektiven Vorrang beanspruchen? Kann das Recht als Mittel zur Neutralisierung eines solchen Abhängigkeitsverhältnissen dienen, oder fingiert es bloß Regulation, während es eigentlich einem Recht des Stärkeren Vorschub leistet?

Im Seminar werden diese Fragen anhand einschlägiger Beiträge aus der marxistischen Rechtstheorie, der Kritischen Theorie, der Critical Legal Studies, der Law and Literatur Studies und der Systemtheorie diskutiert. Im Mittelpunkt soll stehen, wie sich die Frage der Rechtsbegründung im Licht der modernen Form des Rechts als charakteristischer Organisationsform der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft stellt, und wie sie sich angemessen verstehen lässt. Wegen der starken inhaltlichen Ausrichtung ist das Seminar vorrangig für Jus-Studierende konzipiert, die bereits Einblicke in die Rechtspragmatik erworben haben. Das soll jedoch keinesfalls heißen, dass Studierende anderer Disziplinen ausgeschlossen sind. Das Seminar zielt im Gegenteil explizit auf den Austausch zwischen dem Recht und anderen disziplinären Denkweisen, Traditionen und Methoden. Angeleitet durch die zugrunde gelegte Textauswahl steht im Zentrum der Seminardiskussionen die Erörterung des Zusammenhangs und des Verhältnisses zwischen der Sphäre des Rechts und den Bereichen des Nicht‑ und des Außerrechtlichen. Dazu werden Studierende einerseits aus der Binnenperspektive der rechtstheoretischen Reflexion mit Ambivalenzen und Schwierigkeiten in der Geltungsbegründung des Rechts, in der Rechtsauslegung und in der Rechtsanwendung vertraut gemacht. Andererseits sollen mögliche Verstrickungen und Verquickungen des Rechts mit der Gesellschaft, der Politik, der Wirtschaft und der Bürokratie aus einer rechts‑externen Perspektive nachvollzogen werden. Studierende lernen so beide Perspektiven kritischer Nachfragen an das Recht exemplarisch kennen und üben, ihre Reichweite zu beurteilen und ihre Konsequenzen zu evaluieren.
Research Interests:
Es gibt keinen anderen Begriff, der das westliche Denken so geprägt hat, wie der Begriff des Individuums. Die abendländische Philosophie lässt sich ohne den Begriff des Individuums nicht denken und das Denken selbst fällt ohne das... more
Es gibt keinen anderen Begriff, der das westliche Denken so geprägt hat, wie der Begriff des Individuums. Die abendländische Philosophie lässt sich ohne den Begriff des Individuums nicht denken und das Denken selbst fällt ohne das Individuum als Ort des Denkens schnell auseinander. Zugleich erschien dennoch das Individuum immer nur in Zusammenhang mit etwas Anderem ‑ sei es die äußere Welt, eine andere Person, eine Gruppe, ein Kollektiv oder gar die Gesellschaft ‑ gedacht werden zu können. Vom Aristoteles´Verständnis des Menschen als ein Lebewesen in einer politischen Gemeinschaft (ζῷον πολιτικόν) zum Menschbild, welches der Verhaltensökonomie zugrunde liegt, kann sich das Individuum nur in Bezug auf eine Welt behaupten,die es umgibt.

Welche Formen nimmt dann dieser Bezug überhaupt an? Kann es mich wirklich in der Tat nur in Abgrenzung zu einer feindlichen Gesellschaft geben, oder ‑ bedürftig wie ich bin ‑ sollte ich mich bedingungslos eben jener Gesellschaft fügen, die mir nunmehr als Sprungbrett zur Selbstentfaltung zur Verfügung steht? Inwieweit lasse ich mich denn (fremd‑)bestimmen, wie stele ich diese Bestimmung fest und gibt es denn überhaupt einen Ausweg aus diesen Schlingen? Bin ich, der Mensch, nicht eher die einzige intelligente Schöpfung, das Maß aller Dinge, unantastbar in meiner Würde, autonom in meinem Willen und autark in meiner Gefühlswelt?

Diese Fragen suchen die gesamte Philosophiegeschichte heim und haben seit jeher das Verhältnis zu uns selbst und zu unserer Mitwelt bestimmt. Von den unzähligen Begriffen, die diesem Ringen entsprungen sind, wird im Seminar versucht, denen des Eigensinns und des Gemeinsinns nachzugehen. Dabei gliedert sich das Seminar in einen empirisch‑diagnostischen und einen theoretisch‑erklärenden Teil.
In einem ersten Schritt wird versucht, Bereiche des individuellen Lebens zu beobachten, an denen die Kluft zwischen dem Individuum und seiner sozialen Umwelt konkret und besser nachvollzogen werden kann: Treu dem Zeitgeist der 60er Jahre waren die Öko‑ oder die Studentenbewegungen an die Versöhnung des Individuums mit seiner Umwelt und an dem Umbau der Gesellschaft mit dem Individuum im Zentrum orientiert. ʺPhantasie an die Machtʺ war die Parole, die alle diese Bewegungen auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner brachte. Kommunikation, Vernetzung und Sozialisierung, Digitalisierung, Automation und das Ende der entfremdenden Arbeit sind die Verheißungen, denen seit den 90ern gefolgt wird. Kommunikativer Kapitalismus ist dafür das Schlagwort. Und gegen die Angriffe der globalisierten Welt ist in letzter Zeit ein Regress auf den Volksgeist festzustellen, der darauf abzielt, dem Individuum hinter den nationalstaatlichen Barrieren einen letzten Zufluchtsort anzubieten. Populismus ist das Wort, worunter alle diese Tendenzen von ihren Gegnern subsumiert werden. In einem zweiten Schritt wird versucht, anhand der eben genannten Begriffe des Eigensinns und des Gemeinsinns diese empirischen lebensweltlichen Beobachtungen theoretisch einzurahmen. Im Anschluss an bahnbrechende Texte der Weltliteratur und im Anschluss an die Modifikationen, denen der Begriff des Gemeinsinns mal alsκοινήαἴσθησις, mal als sensus communis, mal als common sense, mal als Gemeinsinn und nicht zuletzt als Dissens widerfahren ist, wird der Versuch unternommen, das Verhältnis des Individuums zu seiner Umwelt auszubuchstabieren. Dabei werden wiederum konkrete Lebensbereiche unter die Lupe genommen: Die Entstehung der sinnlichen und kognitiven Fähigkeiten des Individuums aus seiner Umwelt (Aristoteles); der Appel an den Gemeinsinn des Publikums bei der Ausübung der Politik (Cicero); die Entstehung sozialer Formen, wie Sympathie und Solidarität als Spiegelbild der menschlichen Psyche (Adam Smith); die Formierung des Geschmacks und der ästhetischen Urteilskraft des Individuums (Kant), nicht zuletzt der Riss, der die Gesellschaftsmitglieder voneinander trennt (Rancière, Deleuze, Lyotard).

Am Ende soll das Bild eines Individuums entstehen, welches seine Individualität beibehält, indem es sich mit seiner kollektiven Identität abfindet.
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Was ist Kritik und wie wird sie geübt? Wogegen richtet sie sich und nach welchen Kriterien wird sie implementiert? Geht dasjenige, welches kritisiert werden muss der Kritik voraus, oder produziert die Kritik selber die Objekte, die sie... more
Was ist Kritik und wie wird sie geübt? Wogegen richtet sie sich und nach welchen Kriterien wird sie implementiert? Geht dasjenige, welches kritisiert werden muss der Kritik voraus, oder produziert die Kritik selber die Objekte, die sie kritisiert? Welcher Mittel bedient sich die Kritik und welche Formen nimmt sie an? Ist Freundschaft eine Kritik an erstarrten Gesellschaftsbeziehungen und taugt die freie Liebe als Kritikform bürokratisierter Romantik? Ist die andere Wange hinzuhalten, eine Kritik gegen Gewaltausübung. oder ist eine Nelke in einem Maschinengewehr effektiver? Wie kann ich schlechte Entscheidungen am Arbeitsplatz kritisieren? Darf ich Lohnarbeiten überhaupt in Frage stellen und muss ich mir tatsächlich häusliche Gewalt, Sexismus, Rassismus, Homophobie etc. gefallen lassen? Was gehört kritisiert und wie übe ich meine Kritik aus? Darf das Dogma der Alternativlosigkeit kritisiert werden, oder soll es unhinterfragt angenommen werden? Wenn es doch Alternativen geben sollte, wie passe ich meine Kritik den äußeren und äußerst unterschiedlichenUmständen an? Gibt es allgemeine Maßstäbe der Kritik oder ist jede Kritik relativ und von der Person abhängig? Erschöpft sich Kritik darin, auf ein Problem aufmerksam zu machen, oder muss sie zugleich konstruktiv sein und Lösungen vorschlagen?

Diese sind nur manche der Fragen, mit denen wir uns im Seminar auseinandersetzen werden. Dabei geht es nicht nur darum, zu lernen, wie das kritische Denken funktioniert, sondern wie das Denken überhaupt zustande kommt und wie Denken und Kritik, zumindest in der Tradition der europäischen Aufklärung, seit jeher als deckungsgleich gegolten haben. Zusammenfassend lässt sich behaupten, dass die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff der Kritik keine bloß negative Tätigkeit darstellt, sondern zuerst eine diagnostische Tätigkeit der Analyse voraussetzt. Dies setzt Weiteres voraus, und zwar die Befreiung von Vorurteilen, Ideologien, Fehlinterpretationen etc. Dadurch gerät die Gesellschaft brisant ins Spiel, denn wo ließen sich sonst Hindernisse, die unser Beurteilungsvermögen verderben könnten, lokalisieren, wenn nicht in den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhängen, innerhalb derer wir sozialisiert wurden und welche unsere Denktätigkeit bestimmen? Zugleich ist aber das kritische Denken ein problemlösendes Denken und ‑ wie die Sprachwurzel des Wortes Kritik verrät ‑ ist das kritische Denken eine Denkform, die uns dabei hilft, Krisensituationen (z.B. in der Familie, in Freundschafts‑ oder Liebesverhältnissen, am Arbeitsplatz etc.) als krisenhafte zu erkennen und sie zu analysieren, um am Ende das Krisenhafte zu überwinden. Nicht zuletzt ist in dieser Hinsicht die Auseinandersetzung mit dem kritischen Denken eine kreative Tätigkeit, weil die Lösungen, die als adäquat vorgeschlagen werden, zuerst reflektiert werden müssen. So betrachtet, trägt schlussendlich Kritik zu Diversität und Multikulturalität bei, denn die Betrachtungsweisen, die herauspräpariert werden, um zur passendsten Lösung zu gelangen, müssen das Neue, das Andere, das Unterschiedliche mitberücksichtigen, ja, sogar erfinden.

Das Seminar gliedert sich in drei Teile: Im ersten, theoretischen Teil widmen wir uns dem Begriff der Kritik und wie er seinen umfassendsten Umfang im Denken der Kritischen Theorie der Frankfurter Schule erreicht hat. Kants kleiner Text «Was ist Aufklärung?», Michel Foucaults Replik auf diese Frage im Text «Was ist Kritik?» sowie das bahnbrechende Werk «Dialektik der Aufklärung» werden uns als Grundlagen dienen, uns mit dem Begriff der Kritik vertraut zu machen. Im zweiten und dritten Teil geht es darum, Kritikgegenstände und Formen der Kritik gemeinsam herauszuarbeiten. Als Kritikgegenstände werden wir (im zweiten Teil des Seminars) ökonomische Produktionsbedingungen, Genderrollen, supranationale geographische Deutungshoheiten, sowie das Recht heranziehen. Intersubjektive Beziehungen (z.B. Freundschaft oder Liebe), Kunstformen, religiöse Experimente, Technologie und Kommunikation, und nicht zuletzt soziale Bewegungen werden im dritten Teil des Seminars als paradigmatische Formen der Kritik untersucht werden und in ihrer Tragfähigkeit überprüft werden.
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The last presidential election in the United States of America as well as the rise of populist movements over the last couple of years across Western European countries brought forth in the most volatile way one fundamental question: What... more
The last presidential election in the United States of America as well as the rise of populist movements over the last couple of years across Western European countries brought forth in the most volatile way one fundamental question: What constitutes political life? It is this very question that the course seeks to address. Instead of lamenting over the loss, decline or drawback of politics as we supposedly knew them till now, the course strives – by scrutinizing the elements that constitute political life – to provide explanations for the increase and deployment of such phenomena and trace them back to their generative grounds in order to stipulate the necessary alternatives. The concept of the Political, drawn by primarily French post‑war philosophers, seems to be a highly effective medium for such a purpose. Unlike the political sciences or even the (normative) political theory that attempt to address these questions on a rather institutional level, the philosophical concept of the Political raises macroscopic questions concerning not only democratic political conduct or institutional legality, legitimization and/or correctness, but it takes up fundamental question in order to delineate the grounding notions that construct political life per se. Seen this way the course will address ground notions like those of politics as vocation (Max Weber), of politics as part of the public sphere (Jürgen Habermas) and of politics as an autonomous (autopoietic) societal subsystem
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Die Legende von der Büchse von Pandora sollte bekannt sein: Nachdem Pandora, die erste Frau, gegen Zeus' explizites Gebot die Büchse, die sie als Hochzeitsgeschenk bekommen hat, öffnete, sind aus ihr alle Laster und Untugenden entwichen,... more
Die Legende von der Büchse von Pandora sollte bekannt sein: Nachdem Pandora, die erste Frau, gegen Zeus' explizites Gebot die Büchse, die sie als Hochzeitsgeschenk bekommen hat, öffnete, sind aus ihr alle Laster und Untugenden entwichen, worauf hin das Schlechte die Welt eroberte. Bevor auch die Hoffnung entfliehen konnte, wurde die Büchse wieder geschlossen und die Hoffnung wurde in die Büchse weiter enthalten. Die Lektüren der Legende könnten gegen einander nicht diametraler konkurrieren: War es, die Hoffnung für den Menschen zugänglich zu machen oder vielmehr die Hoffnung vom Menschen zu halten? Ist die Hoffnung infolgedessen als gut zu betrachten, als Trost in Zeiten von Elend und als Reiz, um Tätigkeit zu erregen, oder als böse, d.h. als leere Hoffnung, in der es untätig geschwelgt wird? Sicherlich hat sich das Schlagwort " Hope " für Jeremy Corbyn bei der letzten Unterhauswahl im Vereinigten Königreich als immens hilfreich erwiesen, einen unvorstellbaren Wechsel in der britischen Politik zu erreichen. Zugleich ist Hoffnung dadurch als politisch-philosophischer Begriff wieder ins Leben gerufen worden. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit dem Begriff der Utopie. Vom Griechischen οὐ-τόπος abgeleitet und auf einen Ort hinweisend, den es (noch) nicht gibt, wird mit dem Begriff der Utopie, den 1516 der englische Staatsmann
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Das Seminar " Körper, Markt, Gesellschaft. Sozialtheoretische Modelle " beabsichtigt, den Student_innen einen Überblick über die wichtigsten philosophischen Körperauffassungen zu vermitteln. Das Ziel dabei ist nicht nur eine... more
Das Seminar " Körper, Markt, Gesellschaft. Sozialtheoretische Modelle " beabsichtigt, den Student_innen einen Überblick über die wichtigsten philosophischen Körperauffassungen zu vermitteln. Das Ziel dabei ist nicht nur eine Ideengeschichte von Körperbildern. Gefragt wird: Wie wird in heutigen Gesellschaften der Körper privat, professionell und öffentlich eingesetzt, benutzt, zur Schau gestellt, getestet, gepflegt, optimiert etc. Und: Wie können wir all diese Praktiken vor dem Hintergrund klassischer Körperbilder einordnen, aufeinander beziehen und bewerten? Unser Verhältnis zum Körper spielt auf ganz verschiedenen Ebenen des Lebens und Zusammenlebens eine Schlüsselrolle: bei der Arbeit, beim Sport, in zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen, bei sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen vom Schmerz bis zum Open-air-Konzert, beim Glück und bei der Trauer, bei Gewalt und Genuss, in Wissenschaft und Technik, in der Selbstpräsentation auf sozialen Netzwerken. Er ist überall im Spiel, und da er kein bloßes Werkzeug ist, muss man sich über seine Rolle und Funktion Gedanken machen. Selbst an Orten, an denen der Körper abwesend zu sein scheint, ist der Körper immer als Strukturmerkmal unserer Tätigkeiten, Praktiken und Handlungen vorhanden, der sich zugleich von diesen bestimmen, lenken und instituieren lässt. In der Geschichte der Philosophie, d.h. in der Geschichte unseres Denkens, wurde der Körper zugleich vernachlässigt, verdammt und gehuldigt. Dadurch hatte aber zugleich unser Denken immer geprägt.
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Die Frage nach dem moralischen Wert des Marktes stellt sich nach den Finanzkrisen der jüngsten Zeit mit besonderem Nachdruck. Im Seminar wird erläutert, worin das Wesen des Marktes besteht und wie das Bedürfnis nach einer Institution wie... more
Die Frage nach dem moralischen Wert des Marktes stellt sich nach den Finanzkrisen der jüngsten Zeit mit besonderem Nachdruck. Im Seminar wird erläutert, worin das Wesen des Marktes besteht und wie das Bedürfnis nach einer Institution wie dem Markt ideengeschichtlich entstanden ist. Nach einem kurzen Einstig in das Thema werden einschlägige Marktauffassungen von der Frühmoderne bis heute im Mittelpunkt stehen. Dabei sind drei Themenblöcke von besonderem Interesse: (1) Zuerst geht es um die Rolle des Marktes in organisierten Gesellschaften: seine Zweckmäßigkeit, die gesellschaftliche Rolle, die vom Markt erwartet wird, sowie die Funktionalität des Marktes nicht nur als Austauschort von Produkten, sondern auch als Treffpunkt von interagierenden Personen. (2) Der zweite Block beschäftigt sich mit Texten, die sich mit dem Markt aus einer ethisch‑ moralischen Perspektive beschäftigen. Dank welchen spezifischen Eigenschaften kann der Markt sich selbst regulieren, und nach welchen Kriterien ist dies zu beurteilen? Welche sind die marktexternen gesellschaftlichen Anforderungen, die die soziale Rolle des Marktes ausmachen und wie verhält sich der Markt zu politischen Organisationsformen wie z.B. Demokratie, Partizipation, Selbstbestimmung? (3) Nicht zuletzt wird sich das Seminar mit den sozialen Auswirkungen des Marktes hauptsächlich für das Individuum, aber auch für die Gesellschaft auseinandersetzen. Woher schöpft der Markt sein Potenzial zu freier Entfaltung und Verwirklichung individueller Freiheit und wie wird dies von den Individuen wahrgenommen? Welche Gefahren verbergen sich im Austauschprozess und falls überhaupt, wie sind sie zu überwinden?

Das Ziel des Seminars ist, den Markt mit Hilfe seiner Verfechter_innen wie auch seiner Kritiker_innen besser zu verstehen. Um dies zu erreichen, wird zuerst eine Analytik des Marktes angestrebt, in der wir uns bemühen werden, manche der ontologischen Elemente des Marktes zu eruieren. In einem zweiten Schritt werden wir versuchen, die Interaktionen zwischen diesen Elementen näher kennen zu lernen, bevor wir uns schlussendlich der Aufgabe widmen, Vor- und Nachteile daraus zu ziehen.
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Der Begriff der Solidarität erlebt gerade eine Hochkonjunktur. Ob wegen der Wirtschaftskrise, der Flüchtlingskrise, Naturkatastrophen oder als Reaktion auf die Wahl Donald J. Trumps zum 45. Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika... more
Der Begriff der Solidarität erlebt gerade eine Hochkonjunktur. Ob wegen der Wirtschaftskrise, der Flüchtlingskrise, Naturkatastrophen oder als Reaktion auf die Wahl Donald J. Trumps zum 45. Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ist Solidarität als Wert wie nie zuvor aktuell geworden. Im Anschluss an die Lektüre einschlägiger Texte soll es im Kurs darum gehen, nach Antworten für folgende Fragen zu suchen: Stellt Solidarität eine Grundlage dar, die unausweichlich für das gemeinsame Leben ist, oder soll sie als eine soziale Last wahrgenommen werden? Limitiert Solidarität die freie Entfaltung des Individuums, oder soll sie eher als Voraussetzung einer tatsächlichen Verwirklichung des Individuums betrachtet werden? Gibt es Kriterien, die der Gewährleistung von Solidarität obliegen und sie regeln, oder gehört Solidarität bedingungslose Gewährleistung zu? Ist es überhaupt möglich im Voraus zu wissen, was an Solidarität gewährleistet werden muss, d.h. was benötigt wird, oder ist Solidarität ein temporäres Mittel zur Beschwichtigung und Beruhigung von Schuldgefühlen und provisorischer Erledigung sozialer Diskrepanzen?

Im Seminar sollen die Studierenden dafür sensibilisiert werden, wie sehr Urteile durch nicht hinterfragte Hintergrundannahmen mitunter gar verdichtet zu einem Weltbild – vorgeprägt sein können und die Kompetenz erlangen, diese Hintergrundannahmen explizit zu machen. Die Studierenden sollen des Weiteren trainieren, gelernte Inhalte in andere Kontexten zu übertragen, Stichwort: Transferwissen. Zudem sollen die Studierenden die Fähigkeiten ausbilden, konkurrierende Theorien zu einer bestimmten Fragestellung in Bezug auf Schwächen und Stärken gegeneinander abzuwägen und zu eigenen kritischen Urteilen zu kommen.
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Centennials have always served as occasions for retrospection and reconsideration. They urge us to explain the making of an event; to revisit its impact; to gauge its legacy; to debate and/or question its continuing relevance; to imagine... more
Centennials have always served as occasions for retrospection and reconsideration. They urge us to explain the making of an event; to revisit its impact; to gauge its legacy; to debate and/or question its continuing relevance; to imagine the possibility of restaging or redeployment, etc.

The conference “ONE HUNDRED YEARS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD: FAILURES, LEGACIES, AND FUTURES OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION” aims to look back at the Russian Revolution, to turn to its siblings and stepchildren, and to discuss the idea of a “revolution” in general. Accordingly, the conference serves as a stage for three related discourses: (a) the Russian Revolution; (b) comparative perspectives; (c) conceptual challenges.

The following keynote speakers have confirmed their participation: Geoffroy de Lagasnerie (Paris), Christoph Menke (Frankfurt/Main) Jean-Luc Nancy (Strasbourg), Donatella Della Porta (Florence), Sylvia Sasse (Zurich) and Karl Schlögel (Berlin). Another 36 scholars from all levels and across disciplines (preferably philosophy, Slavic studies, political science, and history) will be selected based on their applications. Our aim is to consider in a collective attempt the significance of the Russian Revolution and to further our critical understanding of the concept and practice of revolution today.

For more details concerning the Call for Papers, the Keynote Speakers, the formalities of an abstract, as well as for a still preliminary version of the program, you can visit: www.unisg.ch/revolution2017

For any further question, do not hesitate to contact Thomas Telios under: revolution2017@unisg.ch
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After decades in oblivion, collectivities have started becoming to such an extent the focal point of reflexion, so that it wouldn't be farfetched to argue, that we are currently experiencing a collective turn in the field of social... more
After decades in oblivion, collectivities have started becoming to such an extent the focal point of reflexion, so that it wouldn't be farfetched to argue, that we are currently experiencing a collective turn in the field of social sciences. As constitutive factors of the everyday life, it is highly important to examine not only their theoretical status, but also their political (both emancipatory and authoritarian) dynamics and forms. Christian List's and Philip Pettit's book on Group Agency (2011) and the debate that followed, Judith Butler's recent work on a Performative Theory of the Assembly (2015) as well as Axel Honneth's last book on the Idea of Socialism (2015) are indicative of the diverse ways to approach – at least from a philosophical perspective – such notions as the collective, collective action or collective agency. Nevertheless all these various endeavors converge at one point: That of the essential necessity to rethink and readdress the questions of collectivity and detect not only their theoretical foundations, but analyze their political functionality. In the workshop we aim to let those different conceptualizations of the foundation of collectivities encounter one another. Not only do we explicitly want to address the question what makes joint action thinkable, eligible and legitimate; moreover, we want to scrutinize the possibility for collective action and collective agency beyond normative criteria of identity politics and moral/ethical regulative categories. Our scope is thus to discuss the different political, social and socio-cultural preconditions that constitute and condition the creation of collectivities and how they determine not only the form, but also the content of these (collective) struggles. The following guiding-lines are indicative of the conundrum that haunts every occupation with the collective. By highlighting the different vectors towards an analytics of the collective, we want to engage with the participants of the workshop in a discussion about their political impact.
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Commenting Theodor W. Adorno's doctrine of the 'predominance of the objective' and Wladimir I. Lenin's 'theory of reflection' Slavoj Žižek debunks in his Afterword. Lenin's Choice externality as regression to the " pseudo-problematic of... more
Commenting Theodor W. Adorno's doctrine of the 'predominance of the objective' and Wladimir I. Lenin's 'theory of reflection' Slavoj Žižek debunks in his Afterword. Lenin's Choice externality as regression to the " pseudo-problematic of the thought asymptotically approaching the ever-elusive 'objective reality', never able to grasp it in its infinite complexity. " (p. 179) Instead of " clinging to the minimum of objective reality outside the thought's subjective mediation " (ibid.) Žižek argues for an understanding of materialism that insists " on the absolute inherence of the external obstacle which prevents thought from attaining full identity with itself. " (ibid.) With this understanding of materialism as point of departure I go on to claim that collective agency per se can be understood only materialistically. The latter entails that the source of collective agency cannot be bestowed to a certain individual capacity, since this would coincide with a regression to individualist understanding of agency. At the same time though and according to the above mentioned definition, this external source – that for the same reasons cannot be an individual – has to become inherent to the subject in order to prevent it from unravelling its full identity. Seen this way, I claim, on a second step, that this parameter can be realized only through a theory that acknowledges the subject as a socially constituted entity. Through its creation this subject reproduces the practices that brought it forth and thus it internalizes them as a part of itself. On a first level the subject is being prevented – through its social constitution – to attain its full identity, because it is permanently irritated through the external norms that incessantly make it reconfigure itself. On a second level though the subject is being prevented from becoming an individual because of the clash of discourses, identities and ways of production that encounter each other as a subject through those various processes of subjectivation that culminate in the social construction of the subject. Out of the latter not just (individual) agency is being rendered inherent to the subject; a claim that Judith Butler has already convincingly underpinned in her Contingent Foundations when she asserted that " the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency " (p. 46). Moreover, collective agency seems also to emanate out of these subjectivation processes as an intrinsic agential mode of the subject, immanent to its own constitutional process. In this regard collective agency is materialistic in a threefold way: (a) because it does not require the legitimization of a subject in order to be conceived; (b) because it never allows the subject to consolidate itself; (c) because it is inherent to the subject qua its own process of constitution. The main political gain of this framework is that whereas collective action remains a matter of the Political concerning the domains it can/ought to be implemented, collective agency is to be located at the Social thus becoming an undisputed social-ontological condition of the subject in question.
Am 5. und 6. Juli wird Prof. Catherine Malabou, Kingston, für einen Vortrag in Frankfurt zu Gast sein und an einem Workshop teilnehmen, der sich – erstmalig in Deutschland – mit ihrem Werk befasst. Zu beiden Veranstaltungen möchten wir... more
Am 5. und 6. Juli wird Prof. Catherine Malabou, Kingston, für einen Vortrag in Frankfurt zu Gast sein und an einem Workshop teilnehmen, der sich – erstmalig in Deutschland – mit ihrem Werk befasst. Zu beiden Veranstaltungen möchten wir Sie herzlich einladen.

Catherine Malabous Philosophie zählt zu den wohl spannendsten Positionen der gegenwärtigen französischen Philosophie, deren Arbeiten über verschiedene Kontexte hinweg eine bedeutende Anregung und Herausforderung darstellen. Mit ihrem zentralen Konzept der ‚Plastizität’ hat sie nicht nur eine innovative Hegel-Deutung vorgelegt, die über den Bereich der Sozialphilosophie hinaus dessen Aktualität unter Beweis stellt;
ebenso hat sie mit Arbeiten zur Neurobiologie in die Diskussion um das Selbstverständnis der Lebenswissenschaften eingegriffen: Hier hat sie einer ideologischen Auffassung der Flexibilität des Gehirns den Hinweis auf die plastische Beschaffenheit des Zerebralen entgegengestellt. Obwohl Malabous Arbeiten, zu denen u.a. auch ein überraschendes Buch über Heidegger gehört, im französischen und englischen Sprachraum bereits breit diskutiert werden, ist diese überfällige Rezeption in Deutschland bisher ausgeblieben. Umso mehr freuen wir uns, dass neben Mitgliedern des Instituts für Philosophie der Goethe-Universität und
jüngeren Wissenschaftlern aus Frankfurt auch die besten Kenner von Malabous Werk in Deutschland für eine Teilnahme gewonnen werden konnten. Die Tatsache, dass Catherine Malabou den gesamten Workshop über anwesend sein wird, lässt auf eine intensive und fruchtbare Diskussion hoffen. Der Workshop findet in englischer Sprache statt.
In the wake of the thought of Jacques Derrida, the claim of philosophy can be understood as the opening of new paths, the disrupting of closures. But who makes deconstruction? Who makes it present? Can it be made present? How can... more
In the wake of the thought of Jacques Derrida, the claim of philosophy
can be understood as the opening of new paths, the disrupting of closures.

But who makes deconstruction? Who makes it present? Can it be made present? How can deconstruction continue? And in what does the movement of this thinking today consist?

From the beginning, the question of the presence of philosophy has been
a question of its progress. However, after Derrida, this question not only
presents itself once more, but also in a different way. With him, language,
conceptual thinking, as well as linguistic performance as questioning
self-reference, have been decidedly transformed. The approaches associated with the name Derrida move in a relation of tension to philosophy as a discipline, and evade that understanding of philosophy that grasps its time in concepts and its activity as conceptual work. In and through acts of deconstruction, this work opens up the concept, beginning from a variety of newly conceptualized turns and neologisms, which consist as much in turning away, turning against, turning astray, as well as turning to rigorous objections.

Meanwhile, deconstructive turns and practices themselves appear, and
come to take on, terminological and disciplinary forms. Today therefore,
the problem arises as to what extent acts of deconstruction, practices that
work with and against the concept, the very concept of the concept, as
well as the concept of philosophy and of other disciplines, can be thought. Do acts of deconstruction, which in part turn away from the concept or turn against it, still move in tension with the classical understanding of such conceptual work? Or has the deconstructive encounter with concepts ceased, transforming the nature of thinking itself? How can it still succeed in this thinking, which moves beyond concepts by means of concepts?
The aim of this conference is to provide a space to develop, problematize,
and discuss the formation of concepts after Derrida. The question of the
presence and future of deconstruction arises thereby as a double question:

It is not only a question of clarifying where the key problems of a deconstructive thinking could be situated, but also a question of what ways of describing such problems become possible.
Matter everywhere! We breathe, eat and die... Things surround and affect us until it becomes unclear who “we” are and what “we” can become. The question of materiality imposes itself. Accordingly materialities and materialisms gain... more
Matter everywhere! We breathe, eat and die... Things surround and affect us until it becomes unclear who “we” are and what “we” can become. The question of materiality imposes itself.

Accordingly materialities and materialisms gain popularity in social- and cultural studies. Recently, scholars of diverse disciplines have increasingly stressed the importance of posing questions concerning the social life of things; the materiality of affects, emotions and the psyche; the material preconditions of the production of knowledge, the independent existence of epistemic things; the materiality of signifiers, signs and media, communication and information; the performative production of materiality in the arts and in literature; vitality and materiality of life in the age of biotechnology; the potentiality of bodies beyond anthropocentrism; the materiality of space; new materialist ontology; lastly, Marx-based historical materialism and new materialist approaches to the economy testify their relevancy in times of never-ending crisis and social distortions. These approaches have one thing in common. They no longer refer to matter as a passive carrier of meaning or human manipulation. The world of the material is not considered as sphere of linear causality and determination; emphasis is rather put on the obstinacy and contingency of matter.

Interesting in these debates is not so much from what they either turn away (linguistic turn) or what they turn to (material turn), but rather the encounters enabled by them. “Matter” offers a flexible and pulsating point of reference for the concurrence of diverse materialisms, critical theories and radical politics. This encounter of critical materialistic approaches ranging from new to old, from feminist to postcolonial, from Marxist to post-structuralist, from the (social) sciences to the humanities raise questions such as: what forms of collective action emerge from assemblages of humans and non-humans? How considerable is the threat of exclusions, dependences and exploitations within these networks? Has a re-thinking of the classical concept of “reification” become necessary and how can the danger of essentialism be approached? What is critical in matter?
In their political force as well as in the conditions of their constitution, collectivities entail essential ambivalences: processes of collectivization often carry totalizing tendencies with them or planish differences. At the same time,... more
In their political force as well as in the conditions of their constitution, collectivities entail essential ambivalences: processes of collectivization often carry totalizing tendencies with them or planish differences. At the same time, however, they possess emancipatory promise and transformative potential. Precisely because of its ambivalence, the concept of collectivity requires constant actualization and critical reflection. The ubiquity of collective phenomena warrants questioning well-established presuppositions and theories. To which constellations do we refer when we speak about collectivities? What are the forms of collectivity surrounding us today? Might concepts of collectivity and collective action-oriented political practice harbor diagnostic and emancipatory potential? Or does collectivity perforce imply serious problems and dangers?

The conference “Challenging Collectivities” raises such questions from an interdisciplinary perspective. Focusing on the role of collectivities, we want to theoretically reflect and empirically consider a wide range of contemporary phenomena. We are interested in developments such as contemporary social and political movements, the debate surrounding the so-called digital revolution associated with new forms of networking, the newly arising debate on the concept of life forms and their political or critical potentials, the relevance of a collective unconscious for the analysis of contemporary events, and discussions of global phenomena which invite us to reconsider collective formations – especially in regard to the concept of (maybe even non-human) agency. Thus, the conference engages questions concerning the conditions and forms of collective action, the social transformation that occurs in social and political movements in continuation of and/or against established models, and the manifestations of violence that occur in processes of collectivization.
After decades in oblivion, collectivities have started becoming to such an extent the focal point of reflexion, so that it wouldn’t be farfetched to argue, that we are currently experiencing a collective turn in the field of social... more
After decades in oblivion, collectivities have started becoming to such an extent the focal point of reflexion, so that it wouldn’t be farfetched to argue, that we are currently experiencing a collective turn in the field of social sciences. As constitutive factors of the everyday life, it is highly important to examine not only their theoretical status, but also their political (both emancipatory and authoritarian) dynamics and forms. Christian List’s and Philip Pettit’s book on Group Agency (2011) and the debate that followed, Judith Butler’s recent work on a Performative Theory of the Assembly (2015) as well as Axel Honneth’s last book on the Idea of Socialism (2015) are indicative of the diverse ways to approach – at least from a philosophical perspective – such notions as the collective, collective action or collective agency. Nevertheless all these various endeavors converge at one point: That of the essential necessity to rethink and readdress the questions of collectivity and detect not only their theoretical foundations, but analyze their political functionality.

In the workshop we aim to let those different conceptualizations of the foundation of collectivities encounter one another. Not only do we explicitly want to address the question what makes joint action thinkable, eligible and legitimate; moreover, we want to scrutinize the possibility for collective action and collective agency beyond normative criteria of identity politics and moral/ethical regulative categories. Our scope is thus to discuss the different political, social and socio-cultural preconditions that constitute and condition the creation of collectivities and how they determine not only the form, but also the content of these (collective) struggles.
Centennials have always served as occasions for retrospection and reconsideration, especially if the events under consideration are generally seen as concluded. They urge us to explain the making of an event; to revisit its impact; to... more
Centennials have always served as occasions for retrospection and reconsideration, especially if the events under consideration are generally seen as concluded. They urge us to explain the making of an event; to revisit its impact; to gauge its legacy; to debate and/or question its continuing relevance; to imagine the possibility of restaging or redeployment, etc.

The revolutionary events that took place in Russia were declared accomplished after the mythologized storming of the Winter Palace at 2.10 a.m. on Thursday, 25th October 1917, as the mantle clock in the Hermitage’s "White Dining Room" indicates to this day. Due to the global changes these events set in motion, the Russian Revolution continues to loom large in intellectual debates one hundred years later.

The conference “One Hundred Years That Shook the World: Failures, Legacies, and Futures of the Russian Revolution” aims to look back at the Russian Revolution, to turn to its siblings and stepchildren, and to discuss the idea of a “revolution” in general. Accordingly, the conference serves as a stage for three related discourses: (a) the Russian Revolution; (b) comparative perspectives; (c) conceptual challenges.
As political instability moves throughout Europe, North and South America questions concerning the proper constitution of a (radical-)democratic society have arisen as urgent. These questions often take the form of how it is that we might... more
As political instability moves throughout Europe, North and South America questions concerning the proper constitution of a (radical-)democratic society have arisen as urgent. These questions often take the form of how it is that we might develop both an open and a unified society. Concomitant with this are the development of various movements for greater legal protection for members of traditionally dominated groups. Solidarity comes to take a formative role in individual agents’ political lives as organized protest, strikes, and other forms of strategic action are executed in response to democratic decay. Solidarity is thus posed with a double task: to further the democratic project via the development of strong social bonds and via strategic action designed to undermine unjust, illegitimate, or dominative features of contemporary social and political life. Fulfilling both demands at once seems impossible, given traditional liberal democratic political thought, which formally excludes strategic action from the procedure of legitimation. This is a primary difficulty of democracy today: we lack the normative and political resources to properly understand how people can maintain a democratic ethos when the formal institutions of democratic life are in disarray.
This workshop seeks to explore the difficulties of democracy in contemporary life through the lens of solidarity. Once, solidarity was considered to be a necessary feature of democratic life. Yet, contemporary democratic theory all but considers the necessary role this social value plays in the legitimation of law and the development of individual people as citizens or members of a political or social group.
The Conference addresses the different usages of the prefix "post-". While today’s political actors and intellectual observers are kept busy by ever new challenges and harrowing developments, grand theories are used to cover large... more
The Conference addresses the different usages of the prefix "post-". While today’s political actors and intellectual observers are kept busy by ever new challenges and harrowing developments, grand theories are used to cover large time-spans and long-term trajectories. The seemingly modest prefix “post-“ has played an instrumental role in a number of highly influential theoretical endeavors, among them the posthistorical age (“the end of history”-thesis), postmodernism, the postindustrial society, postheroic management and warfare, postmetaphysical thought, postcolonialism, posthumanism, postfeminism, post-Black, post-work, post-critique, and many others. The fact that this prefix has developed an appeal across several generations is to be regarded as a remarkable achievement.
Yet these “postisms” – as they have been called – are marked by a troubling ambivalence. While they promise to take a step forward, they cannot help but stick to what they leave behind. The new labels volunteer to depend on a given vocabulary. It seems that old concepts are disempowered when brought under the yoke of “post-“. Yet this procedure can also have the adverse effect of empowering the past. What if the prefix “post-“ had the effect of complementing the ghostly presence of the past by an equally ghostly pastness of the presence? As the prefix “post-“ initially indicates a purely temporal relation, there is considerable flexibility when it comes to defining and assessing the contrast or development indicated by “post”-compounds. In some cases the term amended by “post-“ is meant to be rebuffed, in others it is meant to be retained. Whether the “post”-world is regarded as agreeable or not is also open to debate.
The conference “What Comes After?” is meant to create a platform for reflecting on the prefix “post-“ and on “postisms.” It serves as an opportunity for taking stock of intellectual and political movements of considerable import and assess their achievements and shortcomings. Various “postisms” are to be scrutinized in detail. Yet the success story of the prefix “post-“ deserves an explanation that goes beyond case studies. It does not seem coincidental that the rise of this prefix takes place in a time known as the “post-war period.” It is anything but clear whether and how its rise is informed or framed by this historical background. The conference facilitates a self-reflection from the side of the humanities and social sciences invested in this paradigm. Moreover, it allows for considerations on the timeliness or temporality of theories, worldviews, and human self-understanding in general. By addressing the issue of temporal self-positioning, we want to tackle notions of historical continuity and discontinuity, retroactive and proactive horizons of agency and imagination, liberation and dependency. This includes the question of whether and how it is possible to draw a line, proclaim an ending, start something new.
Amidst the discussions on the rise of populist movements as a result of political disenchantment or the egotism that throughout the pandemic has become painfully noticeable, the notion of “common sense” has resurfaced as a crucial concept... more
Amidst the discussions on the rise of populist movements as a result of political disenchantment or the egotism that throughout the pandemic has become painfully noticeable, the notion of “common sense” has resurfaced as a crucial concept at the crossroads of debates in philosophy and social theory. Within those discourses “common sense” does not just designate sound practical judgments concerning everyday matters, or a basic ability to perceive, understand, and judge what is shared by or common to all people. Rather, the notion of “common sense” brings to the fore the following two intertwined aspirations: On the one hand it brings to the fore the longing to rearticulate shared convictions,
strengthen social bonds and revisit the plural and diverse foundations of communal life. On the other hand, it challenges idealist understandings of subjectivity that by claiming autonomy and insisting on selfreliance they thwart mutuality and reject social determination. Seen this way, the notion of “common sense” becomes a showcase for discussing the problem of what holds society together – a showcase, which has not been properly attended to in recent philosophical discourse. This workshop is meant to reevaluate the potential of this concept and explore its many theoretical layers.
The workshop starts from the observation that resentment and utopia are collectivisation tools of the present. While resentment creates a restorative emotional context through the re-activation of various “us vs them”, utopias imagine new... more
The workshop starts from the observation that resentment and utopia are collectivisation tools of the present. While resentment creates a restorative emotional context through the re-activation of various “us vs them”, utopias imagine new communities, multispecies societies, and just worlds, enhancing collective participation but also leading in some cases to the hierarchization of needs and identities.
The workshop explores the political dynamics triggered by resentment and utopia, and tackle the challenges that they pose to contemporary societies.